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• Insurance Companies
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Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit (PDF file of SAS, plus additional information).
Fraud Resources
This folder contains a number of practical tools to assist with fraud-related issues in business—from planning 
an ethics training program, to implementing privacy policies and procedures using the AICPA/CICA Privacy 
Framework.
Ethics and Fraud in Business. This folder contains four expert commentaries to serve as 
guidance to other CPAs.
• Resource 1: Implementing An Ethics Strategy
• Resource 2: Designing An Ethics Training Program
• Resource 3: AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework (Including the AICPA/CICA Trust 
Services Privacy Principle and Criteria)
• Resource 4: Evaluating the Independent Auditor: Questions to Consider
Fraud in Business: Cases. This folder includes 16 cases depicting a range of fraudulent schemes 
and behaviors.
Internet Fraud Resources. This folder includes four files containing additional fraud resources, 
internet links and other valuable information.
• Resource 5: Management Override of Internal Controls: The Achilles’ Heel of Fraud 
Prevention—A report from the members of the AICPA’s Antifraud Programs and Controls 
Task Force.
• Resource 6: Audit Risk Alert Highlights (2005-2006).
• Resource 7: AICPA Antifraud & Corporate Responsibility Center—This resource 
center will give you the tools and information you need to combat fraud—whatever your 
role in the business community.
• Resource 8: AICPA’s Audit Committee Effectiveness Center—A key element in the 
corporate governance process of any organization is its audit committee. The AICPA’s 
Audit Committee Effectiveness Center provides additional guidance and tools to make audit 
committee best practices actionable.
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PREFACE
The CPA's Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime Prevention (the Fraud Handbook or Handbook) is 
the new model for every company. The Handbook provides CPAs with practical information, 
checklists, and examples to help identify and respond to fraud in the workplace. Although it is 
impossible to eliminate the risk of fraud completely, effective prevention policies and internal 
controls can reduce opportunities for fraud to occur. At the same time, the adoption of easy to 
implement detection methods can help uncover fraud in the early stages, minimize losses, and 
enable those affected by fraud, particularly CPAs or financial managers responsible for fraud 
prevention, to react to fraud in a way that could solve or mitigate the problem rather than 
contributing to it.
Fraud Handbook
The focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention and it is written by CPAs for CPAs. The authors, 
each having nearly 40 years of insight and practical experience developing and implementing fraud 
prevention and detection programs throughout the world, have combined their expertise in 
specialized areas to write what many consider to be the paradigm of fraud prevention guidance. 
Since prevention cannot be realized without understanding how fraud is perpetrated and 
concealed, the material in this Handbook has been written to explain to CPAs the nature and extent 
of fraud and to provide fraud prevention techniques. In addition to the core topics of fraud 
prevention and methods of combating specific kinds of fraud, two chapters are devoted to 
computer security and the unique kinds of crimes and criminals related to computer crimes.
This Handbook has been carefully designed to address not only the “whys” or reasons that fraud 
exists, but also the “hows” or the methods by which fraud takes place. The Fraud Handbook 
provides invaluable guidance and tools for preventing fraud from ever occurring in the first place. 
Highlights of the Handbook's coverage are outlined below.
Managing the Risk of Fraud (Chapter 1)
Chapter 1 describes fraud risk: understanding it and guarding against the threat posed by it. The 
specific factors that affect fraud risk are addressed, including the key internal controls—basic, 
supervisory and audit—that help prevent fraud. Since detecting and preventing fraud in books of 
account is key to any prevention strategy, there is a section devoted exclusively to this topic, with 
fraud and AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), covered in relation to 
fraud auditing.
A comprehensive and practical “Risk Management Checklist” is included at the end of the chapter 
with specific risk factors as they relate to internal control.
Promoting an Ethical Environment (Chapter 2)
Because an ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy, this chapter 
includes the steps that can be taken to promote an ethical environment within an organization, and 
thereby reduce the risk of fraud. A sample code of ethics and business conduct, which can be 
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reproduced and/or adapted for use in any organization, is included on the CD-ROM, along with 
an ethical environment checklist.
Insurance Against Fraud (formerly Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance)
(Chapter 3)
Risk management is a key component of fraud awareness and is essential for providing protection 
against potentially catastrophic risks, including fraud-related losses. Every organization must 
identify its risks and implement a strategy that balances the cost of potential losses with the cost of 
an acceptable level of risk management. Chapter 3 examines risk financing and reviews the kinds 
of insurance coverage generally available against employee fraud and dishonesty. It also highlights 
some of the issues found in insurance policies, common exemptions, and some of the important 
duties of the insured.
In addition, the chapter provides a step-by-step guide to making a claim after the discovery of the 
dishonest act. A “Fraud Insurance Checklist” is included as well.
Computer Security and System Recovery (Chapter 4)
Adequate computer security is an indispensable fraud prevention tool. Chapter 4 provides a 
comprehensive overview of computer security, including physical security, logical security, and 
system recovery. A checklist is also included with this chapter.
Internal Fraud (Chapter 5)
Chapter 5 addresses the various ways fraud is committed against an organization by a perpetrator 
from within that organization, meaning, by officers, managers, or employees—the most common 
form of fraud. Frauds are classified according to the various accounting cycles to which they relate: 
sales and collection, acquisition and payment, payroll and personnel, inventory and warehousing, 
and capital acquisition and repayment. Since cash is the focal point of most entities, a separate 
section is devoted to cash misappropriation.
External Fraud for Personal Gain (Chapter 6)
Fraud can also be committed against organizations by suppliers, professional con artists, and other 
outside perpetrators. Chapter 6 covers the various ways frauds are committed against small 
businesses and individuals, the government, and financial institutions, such as banks and insurance 
companies. Case studies are included to clarify the various kinds of fraud perpetrated by outsiders.
Commercial Crime (Chapter 7)
In addition to being victimized by fraud, organizations can also be the perpetrators of fraud. 
Chapter 7 provides the various forms of commercial crime and methods of preventing them. The 
crimes considered include false advertising, industrial espionage and trade secret theft, insider 
trading, securities fraud, organizational bribe giving. Interesting and informative case studies are 
included to exemplify the different kinds of commercial crime.
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Computer Crime and Computer Criminals (Chapter 8)
Although it has created very few genuinely “new” frauds, the computer has dramatically changed 
the environment in which fraud is committed. Chapter 8 describes the nature of computer crimes 
and computer criminals and details the controls that prevent and detect computer fraud. The 
chapter includes a comprehensive discussion of the role and responsibility of IT to ensure 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and how the COSO framework is integral to 
meeting SOX requirements. The section, “Fraud and the Internet” describes the characteristics of 
the Internet that make it an inadvertent facilitator of fraud as well as steps to take to avoid being 
victimized. The topic of computer forensics and making the best use of it in investigations is 
covered. A “Computer Crime Checklist” and a “Sarbanes-Oxley and Internal Control Over IT 
Checklist” appear at the end of the chapter.
Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud (Chapter 9)
Chapter 9 familiarizes CPAs with forensic accounting and the techniques of fraud investigation. 
Beginning with the fundamental concepts of forensic accounting, this chapter details a straight 
forward five-step investigative process and also provides interview techniques and guidance on how 
to conduct them—to help CPAs understand the role of forensic accountants and others involved in 
fraud investigations. A comprehensive checklist of steps to be followed in a fraud investigation is 
included at the end of the chapter.
Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud (Chapter 10)
The costs of financial statement fraud have been realized with the revelations in the marketplace 
and the media that once respected companies (and the darlings of Wall Street) were built on 
fraudulent manipulation of their financial statements. The resulting aftermath has included stock 
market upheaval, huge financial losses for investors and employees, and additional oversight 
demands and actions from regulatory agencies. The costs of financial statement fraud have never 
been more in focus than now.
In today’s business environment, it is more important than ever for financial professionals to 
understand financial statement fraud and how it might be used to deceive boards of directors and 
audit committee members, senior management, auditors, and investors.
Chapter 10 focuses on the pervasive nature and special areas of financial statement fraud, 
including, COSO’s Internal Control—Integrated Framework, preventive and detective controls 
under Sarbanes-Oxley, typical frauds related to misappropriation of assets, example audit 
procedures, the impact of SAS 99, and the new regulatory environment. A comprehensive 
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist and Sarbanes-Oxley Checklist are included at the end of the 
chapter.
Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis Management (Chapter 11)
Although most corporations have formal plans for fire and systems disasters, many would be forced 
to improvise if confronted by an emergency, whether man made or natural. Chapter 11 identifies 
the types of threats a business faces and addresses the primary issues involved in preventing or 
detecting such threats. Since there are certain threats that no plan can anticipate, this chapter also 
includes emergency, business resumption, and physical security planning. This comprehensive 
chapter concludes with a useful checklist.
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Bankruptcy Fraud (Chapter 12)
For CPAs to understand bankruptcy fraud, it is necessary to understand the bankruptcy process. 
Chapter 12 begins with a discussion of insolvency, the filing process and the bankruptcy petition, 
then identifies fraud in bankruptcy filings, provides thorough descriptions of the elements of 
bankruptcy fraud and details various kinds of bankruptcy fraud. In addition, this invaluable chapter 
discusses punishment provisions and the necessity of the mandatory referral report. The 
comprehensive checklist at the end of the chapter is organized according to elements and kinds of 
bankruptcy fraud. Selected bankruptcy forms are available on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD- 
ROM.
Detecting Procurement Fraud (Chapter 13)
Procurement fraud is one of the most difficult white-collar crimes to detect. All too many 
companies refuse to entertain the thought that their team of loyal employees could harbor 
fraudsters. When fraud strikes, the management team is taken by surprise. Regrettably, it is only 
after the insurance company has refused to pay the employee fidelity claim, that it decides to 
implement tighter controls and actively seek to deter fraud among its employees. Much of the 
damage caused by procurement fraud can be easily combated by separation of employee duties 
coupled with surprise audits and continuing management oversight.
Chapter 13 provides the specific tasks and controls needed to combat it: Procurement Fraud 
Detection and Investigation, Screening Procurement Contracts, In-depth Examination of Suspect 
Procurement Contracts, and Reporting Fraud in Procurement Contracts. The chapter includes red 
flags in various areas under scrutiny. The chapter concludes with a Procurement Fraud Checklist.
Identity Theft and Corporate Identity Fraud (Chapter 14)
Identify theft is touted as “.... A Critical National and Global Threat.” According to the FTC the 
most common cases of ID theft involved credit card fraud, followed by phone or utility fraud; bank 
fraud; employment-related fraud; government document or benefit fraud and loan fraud. It is a 
growing problem both for consumers and businesses. Chapter 14 is a practical guide to ID theft. 
The Appendix offers a useful checklist to detect personal and corporate identity theft and fraud.
Though fraud experts estimate that more than 75 percent of frauds are undetected, it’s difficult to 
reach a precise number because fraud not only evades detection by company management, but 
also goes unreported or underreported in many instances. Companies do not disclose their losses 
resulting from fraud for many reasons, including that they are embarrassed that they have been 
defrauded, or they want to keep the bad news from investors, clients, and customers.
It is with this in mind that the Fraud Handbook is written. Perhaps because fraud is so under 
reported, many companies think it will never happen to them. Unfortunately, an organization 
unwilling to consider that its personnel, agents, or vendors could act dishonestly is a fraudster’s 
dream. What better environment to exploit than one in which your guard is down?
The Fraud Handbook is an invaluable, practical guide to assist you in preventing fraud from ever 
occurring in the first place.
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Fraud Sector-By-Sector (See Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM)
This comprehensive section outlines a breakdown of fraud in the different sectors, complete with 
















• Brokers and Dealers
• Employee Benefit Plans
• Health Care Organizations
• Insurance Companies
• Investment Companies
Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in 
a Financial Statement Audit (See Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM)
The complete text version of the current SAS No. 99 is provided on the Fraud Prevention Checklists 
CD-ROM 2006-2007 included with the Handbook. SAS No. 99 is provided in portable document 
format (PDF) and is readable with Adobe Acrobat Reader. You can download the reader from 
http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.html if you do already have it installed on your 
computer.
Bibliography (Suggested References)
This alphabetical listing of the most current and relevant sources of information, including a 
separate section for Web sites and books, pertaining to fraud, commercial crime, and other closely 
related topics is included for further reading.
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Glossary
The comprehensive glossary is an effective quick-reference tool that provides an alphabetically 
arranged listing of definitions and explanations for all fraud-related terms and kinds of fraud.
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CHAPTER 1:
Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.1 The Nature and Extent of Fraud
1.1.1 Definitions
The key word used in most dictionaries to define fraud is deception. In the broadest sense of 
the word fraud, this definition may be sufficient. However, in the context of this Handbook, a 
slightly more restrictive definition is appropriate. Fraud is criminal deception intended to benefit 
the deceiver financially. Both of the qualifiers in this definition are necessary—that is, the 
deception must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
Criminal Deception
The qualifier criminal is necessary to exclude certain deceptions that may financially benefit 
the deceiver—for example, the mild overstatement of one’s skills on a job application; 
however, this kind of transgression will not be examined in this Handbook. Although such an 
overstatement could be labeled fraudulent in the broadest sense of the word, it can hardly be 
described as criminal.
Note that, for purposes of this definition, the word criminal is not used in a strict legal sense. 
Rather, it refers to a seriously “wrong” action taken with malicious intent. Thus, even if 
perpetrators of fraud are able to avoid successful criminal prosecution—for example, 
because a particular jurisdiction has lax laws or enforcement, or because of some legal 
technicality—their actions are still considered “criminal” for purposes of this Handbook.
Financial Benefit
The qualifier financial benefit is necessary to exclude certain types of criminal deception that 
we do not commonly think of as fraud and, therefore, they are not addressed in this 
Handbook—for example, a wealthy bigamist failing to disclose a previous marriage.
The financial benefit accruing to the fraudster from an action need not be direct for that 
action to be considered fraudulent. Indirect financial benefits are also possible, for example, 
environmental criminals (fraudsters) who dump toxic waste into rivers to avoid higher 
disposal costs and falsify records to conceal their actions.
1.1.2 Magnitude of the Threat
Because the essence of fraud is deception, determining its prevalence is problematic. Many 
frauds go undetected—probably more than 75 percent—and many frauds that are detected 
are not reported. It is virtually impossible to compile reliable statistics under these 
circumstances.
Fraud Supp. 6—2006 3
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
Simply based on the largest reported frauds—for example, the recent corporate scandals 
(Enron, Worldcom, et al), the U.S. savings and loan scandal, BCCI, Ivan Boesky, and 
Michael Milken—it is safe to say that fraud in the United States runs into the billions of 
dollars. In its 2006 Report to the Nation: Occupational Fraud and Abuse, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners estimates 5 percent of revenues (approximately $652 billion) 
will have been lost to fraud in the United States in 2006. In 2004, lost revenues were 
estimated at 6.1
Macro statistics are not particularly meaningful, however, even if you could obtain accurate 
statistics. The fact is that the threat of fraud depends largely on the circumstances, that is, 
the environment in which it takes place. Let’s begin with a view of personal integrity, as 
illustrated by Figure 1-1, “One View of Personal Integrity.”
Figure 1-1. One View of Personal Integrity
One View of Personal Integrity
Views of commitment to personal integrity vary, and the percentage figures shown are not 
definitive. Some views suggest a more even split between the three categories, while others 
state that the honest and dishonest categories may be as low as 10 percent each. However, 
all of these views point to one important conclusion: Exclusive reliance on the honesty of 
individuals is the surest way to be victimized. More than half the population—actually, 
probably more than two-thirds—is quite capable of committing dishonest acts in the right 
(or should we say wrong?) environment.
The importance of creating an environment that discourages fraud brings us back to the 
question, What is the magnitude of the threat? The answer is: the threat of fraud is as big as it 
is allowed to be. 1
1 2006 ACFE Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners, 2006.
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1.1.3 Sources of the Threat
The magnitude of the fraud threat is only one dimension contributing to the extent of the 
problem. The breadth of the fraud threat—that is, the various sources of fraud—must also 
be considered. A truly comprehensive prevention strategy must address the full spectrum of 
fraud sources.
You can classify the sources of the fraud threat as either internal or external These threats 
may or may not involve collusion, which can be defined as an agreement between two or 
more persons to defraud another or to obtain something forbidden by law. A brief 
description of the two sources of fraud threat follows.
Internal Sources
Internal opportunities to commit fraud differ from company to company. Some typical 
examples, which illustrate the broad nature of these internal opportunities, include the 
following:
• Officers of a company create false financial reports to improve their own performance 
measurement.
• Managers inflate their expense accounts or turn a blind eye to supplier fraud in 
exchange for kickbacks.
• Other employees commit fraud such as embezzlement, cash skimming, or accounts 
receivable lapping.
• Corporate directors defraud a company’s shareholders through fraudulent financial 
reporting, stock market manipulation, or insider trading.
• Employee theft/misappropriation of assets, which may involve collusion with outside 
vendors or suppliers.
External Sources
Typical examples of external opportunities to commit fraud include the following.
• Suppliers falsify or duplicate invoices.
• Competitors victimize a company through industrial espionage or price fixing.
• Con artists defraud a company with schemes involving products, services, or investment 
opportunities that never materialize.
• Customers commit fraud through false credits posted to their accounts or through rebate 
coupon frauds.
See Figure 1-2, “How a Company Can Be Victimized,” for a depiction of the various 
internal and external sources of fraud.
1.1.4 The Causes of White Collar Crime
The theory of differential association is undoubtedly the best known among all explanations 
offered to account for crime. Although it applies to all forms of crime—not just white collar 
crime—it is nevertheless useful for the purposes of this Handbook.
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This theory first appeared in 1939 in the third edition of Edwin H. Sutherland’s Principles of 
Criminology. Later, Sutherland would make his best-known contribution to criminology by 
coining the phrase white-collar crime and writing a monograph on the subject.
Based on nine concepts or points, the theory of differential association begins by asserting 
that criminal behavior is learned. Expanding on that assertion, Sutherland specifies as a 
second point that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other people in a process 
of communication. If individuals acquiring criminal habits or propensities were exposed to 
situations, circumstances, and interactions totally of a criminal nature, it would be relatively 
easy to comprehend how this process of communication operates. In view of the enormous 
variation in standards and personalities to which any individual in our society is exposed, it 
becomes exceedingly difficult to discern the elements that induce criminal behavior without 
some additional principles.
Sutherland’s third point is that criminal behavior is acquired through participation within 
intimate personal groups. This suggests that the roots of crime are in the socializing 
experiences of the individual. Unfortunately, the process of socialization is far from 
adequately understood. Sutherland’s fourth point indicates that the criminal learning
Figure 1-2. How a Company Can Be Victimized
How a Company Can Be Victimized
Supplier (false invoicing) Externally  
Competitors (profit fixing)
Con Men (false sale of ad products)
Customers (false credits)
Officers (false financial reporting) Internally
Managers (kickbacks, expense accounts)
Other Employees (cover up asset theft)
Directors (manipulate share prices) 
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process includes not only techniques of committing crime but also the shaping of motives, 
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes. Crime techniques often can involve a high degree of 
skill. For example, picking pockets (and not getting caught) demands considerable 
adroitness.
Fifth, Sutherland stipulates that legal codes define the specific direction of motives and 
drives as favorable or unfavorable.
Sixth, Sutherland establishes the principle of differential association. According to this 
postulate, a person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to 
violation of the law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. Sutherland states in 
his seventh point that differential association may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and 
intensity. But he does not suggest which of these elements is apt to be more important than 
the others.
Sutherland’s eighth point is that learning criminal and delinquent behavior involves all the 
mechanisms that are involved in any other learning. As his next to last proposition, 
Sutherland stresses that learning differs from pure imitation.
The last point is a worthwhile reminder that while criminal behavior is an expression of 
general needs and values, it is not explained by these general needs and values because 
noncriminal behavior is an expression of the same needs and values. This means that the 
generalizations sometimes employed to account for crime—that people steal because they 
crave “esteem” or are “greedy” or kill because they are “unhappy”—have little scientific 
merit.
In other words, much of the same needs and values motivate criminals and noncriminals 
alike. People become or do not become criminals on the basis of their unique responses to 
common drives for prestige, happiness, success, power, wealth, and other human 
aspirations. One person with a pressing need for money may take an extra weekend job 
pumping gas, or try to borrow from a friend. Another person, feeling the same need, may 
hold up a fast food outlet.
1.1.5 Understanding the Risk
Of the two available ways to combat fraud—prevention and detection—a prevention 
strategy is obviously the preferred approach. Such a strategy can be either general or 
specific in its objective. General prevention techniques for risk management involve two 
main elements:
1. Understanding the risk
2. Guarding against the threat
Fraud Versus Theft
Resolved: Fraud is not the same as theft.
In a debate, most people would choose to defend the above statement. They might win by 
arguing that:
• Theft is like robbing a bank; fraud is like cooking the books to create the impression of 
improvement in the financial results of the enterprise.
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• People committing theft do so at night, wearing masks; people committing fraud do so 
during the day, wearing suits.
• Theft is direct; fraud is indirect.
• Theft is what lower-class criminals commit; fraud is what upper-class criminals commit.
Few people, if any, however, will point out what is perhaps the most important difference 
between fraud and theft: The risk of fraud is much greater.
With an increasingly high media profile given to crime, particularly in large cities, most 
people are acutely aware of the need to protect themselves against crime’s overt forms. In a 
bad neighborhood, for example, you would not leave the keys in your car or the doors 
unlocked. In fact you probably would not want to be there at all. In this case the risk of 
theft, a more overt and direct form of criminal act than fraud, is easy to assess and deal 
with.
Now consider a different scenario. If you were to leave your wallet briefly on your desk at 
work, you would also be exposing yourself to a risk. However, assuming that access to your 
workplace is restricted to other employees, in all likelihood, you would consider this risk 
very small. Presumably, the people you work with are not criminals and would never pick 
up your wallet in a direct act of theft. The risk of being detected, as perceived by a 
perpetrator, would be relatively high. You would certainly know that your wallet had been 
stolen and a thorough investigation would ensue, possibly implicating a coworker.
Herein lies the first of two pillars on which the greater threat of fraud is built. One pillar is 
based on the premise that most people believe that those who are relatively close to them— 
their friends and coworkers—are basically honest. Potential victims may rationalize about 
those around them: “They would never steal. As long as we lock the doors at night to keep 
out the ‘real crooks,’ we’ll be safe.”
The other pillar is based on the perception that fraud is in some sense an indirect form of 
theft. Although a criminal act, people who perpetrate fraud will in many cases rationalize 
their behavior, believing that because it’s indirect, it’s victimless. Alternatively, the 
perpetrator may rationalize that the victim deserves it, or where the amount involved in the 
fraud is low in relation to the total assets available, that the victim can afford it and/or won’t 
even miss it. And so the second pillar is formed from the rationalizations of most 
fraudsters—the denial that the fraud is morally wrong: “No one will be hurt by this. The 
company won’t even miss it. Besides, they deserve it for the lousy way they treat me.” 
These two pillars—low perception of the threat of fraud by potential victims, and a high 
degree of rationalization by potential perpetrators—combine to make fraud a much more 
insidious threat than ordinary theft. A further illustration of this greater risk: according to a 
report in a 1999 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Bulletin, check fraud 
in 1994 was estimated to have an impact on financial institutions, private business, and the 
public that ranged from $815 million up to $10 billion. Further, according to bank 
executives, check fraud is the major crime problem facing the financial community. The 
enormity of the fraud problem is illustrated by another FBI report that indicated that about 
$60 billion in mortgage loans processed annually involved some degree of fraud, and that 
in 1996, 35 percent of the $3.3 billion of reported losses in the financial institution fraud 
criminal referrals the FBI received involved some type of loan fraud or false statement.
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Generic Versus Individual Risk Factors
A large number of factors can determine the risk of fraud. This Handbook contains an 
approach—a system of categorization that facilitates the understanding of fraud risk and the 
development of an appropriate strategy to manage it.
The literature is filled with many different systems of categorizing fraud risk. The system 
developed for this Handbook splits the risk factors into two groups:
1. Generic
2. Individual
Generic risk factors remain relatively constant in their impact on any subject individual or 
group of individuals. They are largely within the control of the organization or entity that is 
protecting itself, and largely outside the control of potential perpetrators. Because these risk 
factors apply in the same way to any employee, they can be set and manipulated by an 
organization without considering individual differences among employees. Employee 
turnover has virtually no effect on these risk factors. For example, if there is no dollar limit 
on checks that employees in the accounting department can issue, this risk would exist no 
matter who is employed in the accounting department.
Individual risk factors change from person to person and can even change for the same 
individual over time. They are only partially within the control of the organization or entity 
that is protecting itself, and this control is more difficult to exercise because it applies to 
each individual separately. Whenever turnover occurs, the individual risk factors change 
and must be managed. Even worse, whenever an individual’s personality, state of mind, 
  circumstance, or motivation changes—which, after all, is a constant process—the associated
risk factors may also change.
See Sections 1.2.1, “Generic Risk Factors,” and 1.2.2, “Individual Risk Factors,” for a more 
detailed discussion of generic and individual risk factors.
1.1.6 Guarding Against the Threat
On understanding the risk of fraud, you must develop an appropriate strategy and 
implement policies to guard against the threat. The main elements of this process are:
1. Choosing acceptable risk levels
2. Developing and implementing internal controls
3. Promoting an ethical environment
4. Arranging appropriate risk financing (insurance)
5. Ensuring adequate computer security
Choosing Acceptable Risk Levels
The risk of fraud can never be completely eliminated. Even if this were possible, it would 
probably not be desirable because of prohibitive costs and extremely tight controls that 
would stifle creativity and make employee morale suffer. The first step in a fraud­
prevention strategy is to determine the acceptable level of risk.
Choosing acceptable risk levels intertwines with assessing the various risk factors. For 
example, one of the generic risk factors is the opportunity risk available to potential 
perpetrators. Assessing this opportunity risk enables you to make other decisions, such as: 
“Do we need to lower this risk, and if so, by how much?”
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Developing and Implementing Internal Controls
Internal controls—consisting of basic controls, supervisory controls, and audit—represent 
the cornerstone of any fraud prevention strategy.
To ensure complete and accurate reporting, an internal control system must be designed 
and implemented regardless of the risk of fraud. However, a system should never disregard 
the risk of fraud; such disregard would amount to a virtual invitation to potential 
perpetrators.
See Section 1.3, Internal Controls and “Fraud-Proofing,” for a detailed discussion of 
internal controls.
Promoting an Ethical Environment
Promoting an ethical environment is another key element in a prevention strategy. In 
particular, implementing a formal code of ethics and business conduct helps set the tone for 
all employees within an organization. See Chapter 2, “Promoting an Ethical Environment,” 
for further discussion.
Arranging Appropriate Insurance
Recognizing that there will always be some risk of fraud, organizations must finance this 
risk either externally and explicitly (fidelity insurance) or internally and implicitly (self­
insurance). See Chapter 3, “Risk Financing and Fidelity Insurance,” for further discussion.
Ensuring Adequate Computer Security
Computers and information technology play an increasingly important role in business and 
society in general. The pervasive nature of these technologies demands that adequate 
computer security be an integral part of any prevention strategy. Although computer 
security may be considered a subset of internal control, it is still an important aspect. See 
Chapter 4, “Computer Security and System Recovery,” for details.
1.2 Fraud Risk Factors
Several factors contribute to the risk of fraud. Organizations use various systems for 
categorizing these factors; however, under most systems, the elements that combine to 
determine fraud risk are largely the same.
For example, one classification system is known as the GONE theory, an acronym for greed, 
opportunity, need, and exposure. Under this system, the greed and need factors relate largely to 
the individual (that is, the potential perpetrator), while the opportunity and exposure factors 
relate largely to the organization (that is, the potential victim). The four elements of the 
GONE theory interact to determine the level of fraud risk, and no one factor is universally 
more important than another. Each of the factors is unfavorable, to some extent, in virtually 
all situations. However, an organization that allows a sufficiently unfavorable or an out-of- 
balance combination of all four factors may face serious troubles. As one fraud investigator 
observed, “You can consider your money GONE.”
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), used a fraud “triangle” concept to categorize fraud. That 
document cited (1) incentives/pressures, (2) opportunities and (3) attitudes/rationalizations 
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as a framework for understanding fraud and its environment. Appendices to that auditing
standard provided examples of fraud risk factors under each of these headings and a useful
Exhibit directed to companies: “Management Antifraud Programs and Controls.”
In this Handbook we use a slightly different system that groups the risk factors into generic or 
individual, as previously defined. However, as described below, many of the same elements 
of the GONE theory or fraud triangle apply under this system as well.
1.2.1 Generic Risk Factors
Generic risk factors—those largely under the control of the organization or entity that is 
protecting itself—include:
• The opportunity given to potential perpetrators
• The likelihood of discovering a fraud that was committed
• The nature and extent of the punishment a perpetrator will receive once the fraud is 
uncovered and the perpetrator is caught
Note that the first factor corresponds to the O or opportunity in the GONE theory, while 
the second and third factors correspond to the E or exposure risk element. The exposure 
risk under the GONE theory is a product of two generic factors, which are the likelihood of 
getting caught and the subsequent consequences.
A brief description of each generic risk factor follows.
Opportunity to Commit Fraud
The opportunity to commit fraud refers primarily to allowing a potential perpetrator access 
to the assets of the organization, the accounting system or the object of the fraud. No 
organization can completely eliminate opportunity; experts consider such attempts 
uneconomical and counterproductive. As long as organizations have assets of value and 
these assets flow, are traded, or come under the control of others—such as employees, 
customers, and suppliers—the opportunity to commit fraud will always exist.
For organizations the challenge in fraud prevention is ensuring that the opportunity risk 
level is minimal under the circumstances, that is:
1. Assign, either explicitly or implicitly, to each employee an appropriate maximum 
opportunity level. For example, limit a junior clerk’s opportunity level to certain smaller 
fixed assets not bolted down in the office. Allow a more senior clerk’s maximum 
opportunity level to include an additional $500 petty cash fund, or the day’s cash 
receipts. Allow a senior executive an additional $5,000 check-signing limit. Consider 
similar limits regarding level of access to the accounting system.
2. Prohibit catastrophic opportunity levels. The definition of a catastrophic level depends 
on the circumstances—in particular, the size of the organization. For example, a small 
business with $50,000 in cash should probably not allow anyone but its owner(s) access 
to the full amount.
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Likelihood of Discovery
If an opportunity to commit fraud exists, making the chances of discovery high reduces the 
risk. In fact, even the perception that the chances of discovery are high can act as a deterrent. 
Of course, if a fraud does occur, discovery may result in recovery of some of the lost assets.
The likelihood of discovery stems primarily from the system of internal controls. Although 
these controls can never be so tight as to preclude any fraud from taking place, ideally they 
should be sufficient to prevent most material frauds from going undetected for any length of 
time.
Another factor that could increase the chance of discovery is encouraging employees to 
take an active role in reporting suspected fraud activities. Publicizing the negative impact of 
fraud on the stock price, employer profitability, and employee profit-sharing or retirement 
benefits has worked to stimulate employee efforts to curtail fraud.
See Section 1.3 for a closer look at internal controls.
Nature and Extent of Punishment
Discovery of a fraud is, in itself, insufficient to act as a deterrent against future fraud. 
Organizations must put in place some adverse consequences for potential perpetrators, 
who, most importantly, must understand these adverse consequences.
Although research has not provided proof, conventional wisdom holds that the nature and 
extent of punishment can be a deterrent.
Organizations or entities wishing to protect themselves from fraud should have clear 
policies regarding the nature and extent of the consequences of getting caught; for example:
• Anyone who commits a fraud will be dismissed.
• All frauds will be reported to the authorities, and charges will be laid.
1.2.2 Individual Risk Factors
Individual risk factors—those that vary from employee to employee largely outside the 
control of the organization or entity that is protecting itself—fall into two categories:
1. Moral character
2. Motivation
Moral character corresponds to the G or greed factor in the GONE theory, while 
motivation is equivalent to the N or need factor. Each of these categories is described 
below.
Moral Character (Greed Factor)
Greed represents broad concepts, such as ethics and moral character, or the lack thereof. 
Moreover greed and ethics essentially relate to the internal or personality attributes of an 
individual, as do character, integrity, honesty, and the like. You cannot know whether an 
individual possesses these attributes without the ability to read that individual’s mind. Even 
if this were possible, personal interpretation would still come into play.
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Social values also have an impact on moral character. Many sociologists lamented a trend 
in Western societies during the 1980s, namely the pursuit of wealth as an overriding 
objective. The Me Generation and the Decade of Greed were phrases coined in connection with 
this trend, which was perhaps best epitomized by the memorable speech made by Michael 
Douglas when he played the character of Gordon Gekko in the 1987 movie, Wall Street: 
“Greed is right. Greed is good. . . .”
In fact, Gordon Gekko’s philosophy may hold some element of truth. A certain amount of 
greed, tough-mindedness, and competitive instinct could greatly enhance the chances of 
success for an organization or an individual in a free enterprise society. Regardless of one’s 
own value judgment, there is no doubt that these attributes do exist in society. This poses a 
problem, however. Greed may not necessarily preclude the existence of ethics and good 
moral character, but, if left unchecked or promoted to a great extent, it can have an adverse 
impact vis-a-vis the risk of fraud. This leads to the essential question at issue here: What can 
or should an organization do to minimize the risk of fraud posed by greed and other 
negative attributes? Consider the following:
1. Corporate mission statement. Set the goals of an organization in a corporate mission 
statement and communicate it to all managers and other employees. The primary goal 
of most businesses is to maximize profits, presumably over the long term in order to 
survive. Other objectives might include maintaining either a high market share, 
leadership in an industry, or both. However, businesses must pursue these goals in a 
manner consistent with good corporate citizenship and standing in the community. This 
emphasis on corporate responsibility sets the tone for management and employees, and 
encourages personal responsibility. Conversely, business should discourage 
irresponsible actions—and by extension, fraud.
2. Written codes of business conduct. “Good moral character” means different things to 
different people. An organization must define this term and relate it to particular types of 
behavior. For example, does your organization consider it moral and ethical for its 
employees to accept gifts from customers and, if so, is there a specified value or limit? A 
written code of ethics and business conduct can help translate the relative concepts of 
greed, ethics, and morality into more specific behaviors that are either acceptable or 
unacceptable.
3. Management style and role models. Management must set the right example for employees 
by acting responsibly and living up to the spirit of the corporate mission statement and 
code of business conduct. Moreover, management must clearly and visibly appear to do 
so in its dealings and communications with employees. Policy statements mean nothing 
if they are undermined by management’s actions. In fact, such a situation may be worse 
than having no policy at all because management’s failure to adhere to its own 
guidelines would foster a kind of cynicism and “rules are made to be broken” 
philosophy that might potentially encourage fraud and commercial crime.
4. Hiring practices. Regardless of corporate mission statements, codes of business conduct, 
and good role models, moral character ultimately depends on the individual employee. 
To the extent possible, set hiring practices that weed out prospects with low moral 
character. See chapter 3 for further discussion.
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Motivation (Need Factor)
Why do people commit fraud? There is obviously no single, specific answer. People 
commit fraud for a variety of reasons.
Probably the most common group of fraud motivations relates to economic need. For 
example, the perpetrator may be experiencing an actual or perceived cash emergency; 
there is a mortgage to pay, drugs to purchase to satisfy an addiction, or gambling losses to 
win back. Alternatively, there may be no emergency but simply an unchecked desire for 
the good life, meaning the expenses of upscale restaurants, clothes, furs, jewelry, vacations, 
cars, homes, and summer cottages.
In addition, there are several motivations for managers to commit financial statement fraud. 
For instance, managers could have bonuses or incentives tied to revenue or earnings-per- 
share figures. Also, managers who own a large portion of company stock may be motivated 
to falsify financial statements to meet earnings-per-share projections and maintain or raise 
the company’s stock price.
Less frequently, there might be other reasons, such as disenchantment, revenge, or simply 
the perception that everyone else seems to do it. Even more rarely, the motives could be 
eccentric: a sense of challenge or thrill. Finally, the cause may be some form of 
psychological illness, such as compulsion, anxiety, paranoia, or outright psychosis.
What can be done about all of these complex motives, seemingly locked up in the 
Pandora’s box of an employee’s mind? Admittedly, the options are limited but they 
include:
1. A favorable environment. Creating the right environment can reduce the motivation among 
employees to commit fraud. In an unfavorable environment, morale suffers and feelings 
of disenchantment—even hate and the desire for revenge—may take hold. Try to 
promote the right environment by treating employees fairly, keeping communication 
lines open, and providing mechanisms for discussing and resolving grievances.
2. Performance appraisal and reward systems. Measure each employee’s work fairly by 
implementing a performance appraisal and reward system.
3. Employee assistance programs. Many enlightened employers provide free counseling and 
other assistance to employees facing personal problems, for example, alcohol and drug 
abuse. From the point of view of fraud prevention, this approach is preferable to keeping 
these problems “bottled up.” This approach helps prevent resentment that could 
ultimately lead to the commission of fraud.
4. Employee testing and screening. As part of their hiring practices and sometimes on a regular 
basis thereafter, some employers use testing and screening procedures to identify and 
weed out high-risk individuals, or form the basis for remedial action, or both. 
Procedures include psychological testing, drug testing, and even honesty testing in the 
form of lie detector tests where not prohibited by law. Highly controversial, these tests, 
in some instances, could cause more harm than good, for example, to employee morale, 
the organization’s reputation among prospective employees, and so on. Nevertheless, in 
especially sensitive occupations or circumstances, employers might find this testing 
appropriate and even necessary.
5. Common sense and a watchful eye. Although motives are not observable, the result of 
certain motives often is. An employee with a drug or gambling problem may not be able 
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to keep it a secret. And beware the $25,000-a-year bookkeeper who drives to work in a 
Mercedes or who, wary of getting caught, never takes a vacation.
Profiles of Fraud Perpetrators
Although external pressures do play a major role in whether or not an individual commits 
fraud, internal characteristics can affect a potential fraud perpetrator as well. Gwynn Nettler 
in his book, Lying, Cheating and Stealing, makes the following observations:
• People who have experienced failure are more likely to cheat.
• People who are disliked and who dislike themselves tend to be more deceitful.
• People who are impulsive, distractible, and unable to postpone gratification are more 
likely to engage in deceitful crimes.
• People who have a conscience (fear, apprehension, and punishment) are more resistant 
to the temptation to deceive.
• Intelligent people tend to be more honest than ignorant people.
• The easier it is to cheat and steal, the more people will do so.
• Individuals have different needs and therefore different levels at which they will be 
moved to lie, cheat, or steal.
• Lying, cheating, and stealing increase when people are under great pressure to achieve 
important objectives.
• The struggle to survive generates deceit.
The highly publicized cases in recent years of computer hackers committing high-tech 
crimes have resulted in a public perception that individuals who are highly knowledgeable 
about computers are more likely to commit fraud; however, there is no evidence to support 
this premise.
1.2.3 High Fraud-Low Fraud Environments
Employee fraud, theft, financial statement fraud, and embezzlement are more likely to 
occur in some organizations than others. The most vulnerable organizations are usually 
hampered by weak management and inadequate accounting and security controls.
Solutions often proposed include:
1. Tight accounting and audit controls
2. Thorough screening of applicants for employment
3. Close supervision and monitoring of employee performance and behavior
4. Explicit rules against theft, financial statement fraud, embezzlement, sabotage, and 
information piracy
Other considerations also affect the likelihood of employee crime. See Table 1.1, “A 
Comparison of the Environments and Cultures of Organizations With High and Low Fraud 
Potential,” for a comparison of the environment and culture of organizations with high 
fraud potential and organizations with low fraud potential.
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Table 1.1 A Comparison of the Environments and Cultures of Organizations 
With High and Low Fraud Potential
Variable High Fraud Potential Low Fraud Potential
Management style Autocratic Participative




Distribution of authority Centralized, reserved by top 
management






Performance Measured quantitatively and on a 
short-term basis
Measured both quantitatively and 
qualitatively and on a long­
term basis
Business focus Profit-focused Customer-focused
Management strategy Management by crisis Management by objectives
Reporting Reporting by routine Reporting by exception
Policies and rules Rigid and inflexible, strongly 
policed
Reasonable, fairly enforced












Interaction mode Issues and personal differences 
are skirted or repressed
Issues and personal differences 
are confronted and addressed 
openly
Payoffs for good behavior Mainly monetary Recognition, promotion, added 
responsibility, choice 
assignments, plus money
Business ethics Ambivalent, rides the tide Clearly defined and regularly 
followed
Internal relationships Highly competitive, hostile Friendly, competitive, supportive
Values and beliefs Economic, political, self-centered Social, spiritual, group-centered
Success formula Works harder Works smarter
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Not enough promotional 




Company loyalty Low High
Major financial concern Cash-flow shortage Opportunities for new investment
Growth pattern Sporadic Consistent
Relationship with competitors Hostile Professional
Innovativeness Copy cat, reactive Leader, proactive
CEO characteristics Braggart, self-interested, driver, 
insensitive to people, feared, 
insecure, gambler, impulsive, 
tight-fisted, numbers-oriented, 
materialistic, profit-seeker, 
vain, bombastic, highly 
emotional, partial
Professional; decisive; fast- 
paced; respected by peers; 
secure risk-taker; thoughtful; 
generous with personal time 
and money; people- products­
and market-oriented; builder­
helper; self-confident; 
composed; calm; deliberate; 
fair; and know who and what 
he or she is, and where he or 
she is going






Everything is documented, and 






Documentation is adequate but 
not burdensome, and some 
discretion is afforded.
Internal communication Formal, written, stiff, pompous, 
ambiguous
Informal, oral, clear, friendly, 
open, candid
Peer relationships Hostile, aggressive, rivalrous Cooperative, friendly, trusting
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1.3 Internal Controls and “Fraud-Proofing”
Developing an understanding of the various factors that contribute to the risk of fraud is 
only the first step in a fraud prevention strategy. Following this, it is necessary to implement 
policies that will help to reduce the threat.
Some of the measures that can guard against the threat of fraud were explained previously 
in this chapter. Consider what is perhaps the main, and certainly the most common, 
prevention tool, namely, a good system of internal controls.
1.3.1 Defining Internal Control Objectives
Fraud-proofing is a term that can be used to describe an effective system of internal controls. 
However, this term is somewhat misleading because no internal control system can 
completely eliminate the risk of fraud. What fraud-proofing should do, in theory, is reduce 
the risk of fraud to an acceptable level. If you have suffered from a fraud attack, consider 
interviewing the fraudster after the case is closed. Many fraudsters have a bit of braggadocio 
in them and, as a result, are only too willing to let you in on the very holes in your control 
system they exploited.
The risk of fraud is not the only factor in defining internal control objectives. For example, 
management information and reporting requirements are important considerations as well. 
However, the acceptable levels of risk and opportunity, as defined in Section 1.1.6, 
“Guarding Against the Threat,” should also be considered. This means effectively 
combining the three levels of internal control to limit the risk of fraud to acceptable levels. 
See the discussion that follows in Section 1.3.2, “Basic Controls,” Section 1.3.3, 
“Supervision,” and Section 1.3.4, “Audit.”
1.3.2 Basic Controls
A variety of basic controls exist in a typical system of internal controls. The most relevant 
basic controls are grouped into three categories:
1. Physical access
2. Job descriptions
3. Accounting reconciliations and analyses
Physical Access
Most people acknowledge the need to control physical access to valuable assets, including 
intangible assets such as information. Measures to control physical access include the 
obvious practice of locking doors, desks, and file cabinets so that unauthorized personnel, 
either within or outside the organization, cannot gain access. Other measures include 
employee IDs and passwords, computerized security systems (for example, access cards 
that record time of entry and exit), and electronic surveillance systems, which should 
include every new innovation, such as biometrics—including, for example, iris scans and 
voice recognition—that the business can afford.
As a general rule, organizations should restrict physical access to those who require it to 
perform their job function. Of course, controlling physical access in this way will not 
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completely reduce the risk of fraud. However, it will help to reduce the risk in the following 
ways:
1. Many frauds require that the perpetrator come into physical contact with either the asset 
being misappropriated, or the related asset records, in order to conceal the fraud. 
Reducing physical access reduces opportunity.
2. Physical access controls are often the most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong 
controls in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the 
system. Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
3. Access controls that do not prevent fraud often assist in the fraud investigation process 
(for example, determining what actually happened and narrowing down suspects).
Carefully screening who had access to cash receipts would have saved one U.S. County 
Clerk much grief. According to a newspaper report, a temporary employee was stationed at 
the front desk to handle passport applications, including collecting the necessary fees. The 
temp properly recorded and submitted for processing those applications paid for by check 
or money order. She pocketed any cash received and destroyed all evidence of the cash 
applications so that there was no record of the transaction. Not paying attention to 
controlling physical access led to several thousands of dollars in losses.
Job Descriptions
Formal, specific job descriptions are a very effective fraud prevention tool. These 
descriptions should spell out exactly what is expected of each employee. Generally, 
employees should not perform duties outside their job description. Those who do represent 
a significant red flag.
Create job descriptions that reflect the important principle of division of duties. For 
example, employees with physical control over an asset should not also keep the records 
relating to that asset (this will only make it easier for them to cover up the fraud). Segregate 
all other especially sensitive duties—for example, purchasing and check signing.
The need for job descriptions goes beyond the widely recognized concept of segregating 
duties, although it is certainly one of the important consequences of job descriptions. Some 
cases may result in an entirely appropriate duplication of duties, for example, double 
signing checks. Specify in the job description that all employees must take annual vacations 
(another well-known fraud prevention tool, because an employer is more likely to discover 
an ongoing fraud scheme when the perpetrators are removed from the scene).
Thus, it is apparent that employers must approach the process of formulating job 
descriptions for their employees in an integrated fashion. From an internal-control and 
fraud-prevention perspective, different tasks performed by different individuals may be 
interrelated; therefore, an appropriate job description for one employee will often depend 
on the job descriptions of others, and vice versa.
Employers often ignore or underestimate the need for formal job descriptions, writing them 
off as “more useless paper.” At other times, employers create job descriptions but then 
ignore them. This attitude invites trouble. As one leading fraud investigator put it, “When 
people begin to do things outside their job description, you have reason to be concerned. If 
it goes unrewarded, they begin to develop a justification to steal. It’s very important that job 
descriptions are clear, agreed upon, and adhered to.”
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Accounting Reconciliations and Analyses
After access controls and job descriptions, accounting reconciliations and analyses are the 
third most important group of basic controls. An essential ingredient of a successful fraud is 
successful concealment. Regular, appropriately performed accounting reconciliations and 
analyses often make such concealment difficult or impossible.
Perform accounting reconciliations regularly (for example, monthly basis) including:
• Bank reconciliations, for all accounts
• Accounts receivable reconciliations (both month to month and general ledger to 
subledger)
• Accounts payable reconciliations (again, both month to month and general ledger to 
subledger)
The exact nature of the accounting analyses performed depends on the nature of the 
organization’s operations. Analyses relevant for most organizations include:
• Variance analysis of general ledger accounts (budget to actual, current year versus prior 
year, and so on)
• Vertical analysis of profit and loss accounts (that is, the calculation of expenses as a 
percentage of sales, and comparison of these percentages with historical standards, or 
budgets, or both)
• Detailed sales and major expense analyses (for example, by product line or territory)
Of course, organizations often undertake accounting reconciliations and analyses with other 
purposes in mind—for example, to make management decisions or to ensure the accuracy 
of the accounting records, or both. Nevertheless, this process also can highlight 
discrepancies that point to fraud.
1.3.3 Supervision
Supervision represents the second level of internal control. From a fraud prevention 
perspective, strong supervision is vital—especially in small businesses that may have 
difficulty achieving segregation of duties.
Active supervision differs significantly from supervisory or management override, in which 
a manager or supervisor actually takes charge of or alters the work of a subordinate. In fact, 
override itself is a red flag—that is, it suggests that the manager or supervisor may be 
engaged in fraud or the concealment of one. Ideally, a supervisor or manager should allow 
basic controls to operate as they were intended, rather than to be circumvented by those at 
higher levels.
As a fraud prevention mechanism, good supervision consists of:
1. Fraud awareness
2. Approval, review, double-checking, and redoing
Fraud Awareness
Fraud prevention specialists constantly emphasize the need for “fraud awareness,” to the 
point that the term has almost become a cliche. However, such awareness is perhaps the 
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key prerequisite in building any effective fraud prevention strategy, and is especially 
important at the supervisory level.
Specifically, supervisors must be alert to the possibility of fraud whenever an unusual or 
exceptional situation occurs, such as complaints from suppliers or customers, discrepancies 
that don’t make sense, or accounting reconciliations that don’t balance. If a manager’s mind 
is closed to the possibility of fraud during an unusual or exceptional situation, the risk of the 
fraud continuing unabated greatly increases.
Several businesses have had positive results in raising employees’ awareness by publishing 
regular internal newsletters. In addition to reporting actual fraudulent activities, the 
newsletters relate the impact of the fraud on both the employees and the bottom line.
Approval, Review, Double-checking, and Redoing
In addition to awareness, fraud prevention demands that supervisors actually supervise. 
This means going beyond the typical approval function, such as initialing invoices or 
performing other duties of supervisors and managers. A more thorough review, double­
checking employees’ work, and redoing some tasks, may be necessary and should be 
approached diligently. For example, assign supervisors the responsibility of double­
checking important procedures such as the monthly bank reconciliation—that is, 
comparing the numbers on the bank reconciliations to those on the bank statements and in 
the general ledger, making certain those numbers total correctly, test-checking outstanding 
items at the very least, and so on. To simply initial bank reconciliations in a habitual or 
reflex-like manner without really reviewing and actually redoing them invites fraud.
For example, the owner of a busy downtown restaurant used the following system of 
internal control for sales. Employees entered all prenumbered customer bills into the cash 
register, and at least once each day the hostess/bookkeeper batched the customer bills, 
listed them on a deposit sheet, and made the related bank deposit. The owner then 
matched the totals on the deposit sheet with the amounts shown in the stamped deposit 
book, and believed this to be adequate supervision.
The owner’s supervision of the bookkeeper, however, was inadequate especially because 
she was responsible for handling the cash (the bank deposit) and related records (customer 
bills, cash register tapes, deposit sheets). In fact, over a three-month period, the bookkeeper 
skimmed a portion of each day’s cash receipts by omitting some of the cash sales bills and 
pocketing the corresponding amounts. The owner might have uncovered the fraud by using 
any one of the following methods:
1. Segregating duties. The owner rejected this method because he trusted the bookkeeper 
and did not want to incur the cost of an additional employee.
2. Accounting for all prenumbered bills. The owner opted not to use prenumbered bills 
because it was too time-consuming. The bookkeeper intentionally did not list the bills in 
numbered order on the deposit sheet and prenumbered books were issued out of 
sequence to waiters and waitresses.
3. Matching daily cash register tapes to the daily cash deposit. The owner rejected this simplest 
and most appropriate method, not wanting to check his employee’s work in this way 
because the tapes were a messy “dog’s breakfast” kept in a shoebox by the bookkeeper. 
The disorderly recordkeeping was entirely by design, of course, to cover up the fraud.
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The owner eventually uncovered the fraud when the bookkeeper became too greedy and 
withheld a bit too much from what the owner knew was an especially good cash sales day, 
which raised his suspicions and led to an investigation.
This example illustrates the necessity of supervision. Often, it is the primary defense against 
ongoing frauds such as financial statement fraud, the skimming of cash, or the lapping of 
accounts receivable. The maximum opportunity level for the bookkeeper in the previous 
example should have been the outright theft of the day’s cash receipts—typically less than 
half of a day’s total receipts of about $10,000. However, inadequate supervision allowed a 
smaller amount of cash—about $700 a day—to be stolen over a period of three months, 
which amounted to a total loss of over $60,000.
1.3.4 Audit
From a fraud-prevention perspective, audit represents the third level of an organization’s 
internal control system.
Internal Audit
Internal auditors work for the organization and perform the kinds of work defined by senior 
management. In this sense, internal auditors are an extension of senior management—they 
have the same concerns and deal with the same issues described throughout this chapter. 
Therefore, their work might include fraud detection, or developing fraud prevention 
mechanisms, or both.
The duties of internal auditors include the analysis of accounting policies and procedures 
for potential risk areas. The internal audit department submits recommendations to the 
controller to minimize the risk of financial statement fraud or the misappropriation of assets 
by accounting personnel. These recommendations might include increased segregation of 
duties, or modification of journal entry procedures.
The training programs and available literature for internal auditors—as provided by the 
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)—pay specific attention to the issue of fraud prevention 
and detection. Historically, the perspective of internal auditors differs from that of the 
external auditors, which is described below.
External Audit
External auditors are independent of the organization. They report on financial statements 
and perform other independent reviews. The restricted role of the external auditor has 
evolved over time. During the late 1800s and into the early 1900s, auditors actively looked 
for fraud—to be a kind of “bloodhound.” Court rulings gradually redefined their role to 
that of a “watchdog.”
This watchdog metaphor has persisted throughout most of the twentieth century. In 
particular, the concept of materiality has played an important part in the accounting 
profession’s view of fraud, which is, specifically, that an auditor’s procedures cannot be 
expected to detect immaterial frauds. No audit can be expected to give absolute assurances 
in this area, since Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit (AlCPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), requires that 
an auditor obtain reasonable assurance that there is no material misstatement as a result of 
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fraud.2 If a fraud is material enough to affect the financial statements of an organization— 
and an auditor’s opinion on those financial statements—then the auditor’s procedures 
should be reasonably designed to uncover it. However, there is certainly no guarantee of 
detection. For example, even when the auditor’s procedures are sound, the perpetrator(s) 
may go to great lengths to deceive the auditor and hide the accounting fraud.
2 In the language of auditing standards, “reasonable” is intended to mean a high but not absolute level of 
assurance. This was clarified by SAS No. 104, “Amendment to Statement of Auditing Standards No. 1, 
Codification of Auditing Standards and Procedures.”
In recent years, the public’s expectations have reopened to some extent the bloodhound­
watchdog debate primarily because of the perception that auditors should bear 
responsibility for detecting significant frauds even when immaterial to the total worth of an 
organization. In a 1998 speech by then Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Chairman Arthur Levitt, the issue of immateriality in contemporary financial statements 
was broached: “Some companies misuse the concept of materiality. They intentionally 
record errors within a defined percentage ceiling.... When either management or the 
outside auditors are questioned about these clear violations of GAAP [generally accepted 
accounting principles], they answer sheepishly, ‘It doesn’t matter. It’s immaterial.’ ” This is 
an example of the attempts to increase the responsibility of both management and external 
auditors in the detection of fraud.
1.4 Detecting and Preventing Fraud in Books of Account
1.4.1 The Auditor’s Duty to Detect Fraud
Accountants and auditors have had to contend with dishonest practices in accounting 
records since commercial activities were first recorded using the double-entry system. Since 
that time, there has developed a division of responsibility between accountants and 
auditors. In general, the accountants are responsible for the preparation of the financial 
statements under the double-entry system. The auditor has a duty to report whether the 
results of operations and balance sheets reflected in those financial statements have been 
prepared in accordance with GAAP.
In addition to the auditor’s duty to determine whether the financial statements have been 
prepared in accordance with GAAP, historically auditors have had a corollary 
responsibility to determine whether any material entries were false (that is, fraudulent). But 
there has been much debate about whether the latter was the peculiar province of the 
auditor or of management. In general, management is primarily responsible for detecting 
fraud in the accounting records.
According to SAS No. 99, the auditor is responsible for obtaining reasonable assurance that 
there is no material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud. Federal courts 
seem to hold auditors to a higher duty of professional care than do state courts. But even 
state courts tend to impose a duty to detect fraud under some circumstances. In fact, a large 
number of professional malpractice suits brought against outside auditors in state courts 
involve allegations of undetected embezzlement or failure to detect materially fraudulent 
financial reporting.
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Recent events regarding very large public companies in the United States and elsewhere 
have heightened the sensitivity of the investing public to fraudulent financial reporting. It is 
safe to assume that the public has an expectation that auditors should consider the detection 
of material financial reporting fraud as an important part of their overall responsibility.
1.4.2 Fraud and Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99
SAS No. 99 carries the same title as its predecessor SAS No. 82 (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 110, 230, 312, and 316), but is clearly more far-reaching and 
more performance directing. The new provisions in SAS No. 99 include sections dealing 
with: brainstorming the risks of fraud while exercising increased professional skepticism; 
discussions with management and others as to whether they are aware of fraud; the use of 
unpredictable audit tests; and responding to management override of controls by requiring 
on every audit certain procedures responsive to detecting management override. The 
standard also used the term “should” often throughout the SAS, making clear that many of 
the recommended procedures were not just for consideration. The SAS also directed 
auditor attention to revenue recognition, a constant source of reported frauds and 
misstatements, noting that improper revenue recognition should ordinarily be “presumed” 
to be a fraud risk. The new auditing standard was effective for audits of financial statements 
for periods beginning on or after December 15, 2002.
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit
Fraud detection is not the primary objective of a financial statement audit. Yet the auditors’ 
responsibility for detecting fraud is increasingly controversial. Earlier standards and 
writings addressing fraud tried unsuccessfully to imply that collusive fraud was somehow 
not within the scope of an audit, as it is difficult to detect. This line of reasoning withered 
away under public pressure and litigation until today, the auditor seeks to perform an audit 
with a low risk of the financial statement containing material misstatement, whether due to 
fraud or misstatement. With the release of SAS No. 99 in October 2002, the auditor now 
has more in-depth guidance to assist him and more is expected of the auditor in his role of 
detecting financial statement fraud. However, as a result of the expectation gap, the 
controversy still exists.
The expectation gap is the difference between what the public expects auditors to do and 
what auditors in fact, do. In other words, the public remains ignorant of the extent of the 
auditors’ responsibilities. This is contrasted with the limitations of what auditors can 
reasonably expect to achieve. The general public and certain media, regardless of the 
efforts by the AICPA and other professional groups, still lack a true understanding of the 
role of the auditor.
Auditors should be fully aware of their responsibilities under the AICPA’s SAS No. 99.
As stated in SAS No. 99, the auditor should consider the risk that the financial statements 
are materially misstated due either to unintentional error or fraud. Accordingly, the auditor 
must specifically consider factors that bear on the likelihood of fraud. The level of risk 
assessed may affect engagement staffing, extent of supervision, overall strategy, and the 
degree of professional skepticism applied. In addition, as stated above, SAS No. 99 includes 
additional procedures to be performed by the auditor in their role of detecting financial 
statement fraud.
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Auditors' Responsibility
SAS No. 99 states, in part, “If the auditor believes that misstatements are or may be the 
result of fraud, but the effect of the misstatements is not material to the financial statements, 
the auditor nevertheless should evaluate the implications, especially those dealing with the 
organizational position of the person(s) involved.” With this in mind, the crux of the 
auditor’s responsibility in conducting a financial statement audit, as it relates to fraud, is to 
determine whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement. To achieve 
this, the following steps should be followed (bearing in mind the items noted above):
1. Assess the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud and 
consider that assessment in designing audit procedures.
2. Inquire of management about its understanding of the risk of fraud and its knowledge of 
frauds perpetrated on or within the organization.
3. Plan and perform the audit to achieve reasonable assurance of detecting material 
misstatement of the financial statements due to fraud.
4. Consider whether misstatements detected during the audit are the result of fraud and, if 
so, evaluate the implications and communicate the matter to appropriate client 
personnel.
5. Document the facts that evidence the auditor’s assessment of the risk of fraud and the 
auditor’s response to the risks identified.
For a more detailed discussion of these steps, see SAS No. 99 attached on the Fraud 
Prevention Checklists CD-ROM accompanying this volume.
Types of Fraud
The misstatements most relevant to an audit of financial statements originate from two 
types of fraud:
1. Fraudulent financial reporting. The client intentionally misstates the financial statements 
through phony accounting records or documents, the misrepresentation or omission of 
significant information, or the misapplication of accounting principles. Fraudulent 
management usually directs or performs these activities. In most cases, there will be 
collusion between members of management and possibly third parties.
2. Misappropriation of assets. Client personnel steal entity assets and conceal the theft 
through misstatement of financial records. Fraudulent employees usually perform these 
activities.
The auditor has no responsibility for detection of misstatements, whether caused by error or 
fraud, that are not material to the financial statements. For example, the misappropriation 
of assets often is not material to the financial statements. However, the client might 
incorrectly expect that the auditor should detect all cases of fraud, whether or not the 
financial statements are materially misstated.
1.4.3 Fraud Auditing Versus Financial Statement Auditing
Financial statement audits are usually conducted in the context of an annual recurring 
function (a process which, to a certain extent, assumes a level of stability in the enterprise 
being audited). On the other hand, fraud audits are usually only commenced when there is 
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a concern that something very unusual has occurred. For example, allegations of fraud have 
been made, a whistleblower has come forward, accounting entries appear to be 
unsupported, or revenue recognition appears to have been accelerated.
Financial statement auditing is a methodology for evaluating the level of accuracy, 
timeliness and completeness of the recordings of business transactions. However, auditors 
do not review all transactions. Auditors use sampling and confirmation techniques to test 
accuracy, timeliness, and completeness. The purpose of testing is to determine whether 
transaction data are free of material error and to confirm that financial statements 
accordingly are free of material misstatement.
In 2007, new auditing standards will require auditors of private companies to consider 
internal controls more closely than past practice. While testing of controls is only required 
when the auditor’s strategy is to rely on controls, SAS No. 109, “Understanding the Entity 
and Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement,” and No. 110, 
“Performing Audit Procedures in Response to Assessed Risks and Evaluating the Audit 
Evidence Obtained,” clarify that understanding controls should consist of evaluating the 
design of the control procedures (including all five components of the COSO framework 
and IT controls) and examining evidence of their implementation (i.e., the control has been 
placed in operation). Auditors will not be able to “default” to high control risk and simply 
perform substantive tests. The COSO framework is considered an appropriate template for 
assessing the effectiveness of controls. These more specific requirements regarding controls 
may indeed provide more information for auditors on fraud risks and control deficiencies to 
enable more detections of fraud and misstatement.
Fraud auditing, while borrowing many techniques from financial statement auditing, is 
more a mind-set than a methodology. It relies on creativity (right-brain thinking) as much as 
it does on reasoning (left-brain thinking). It requires that the fraud auditor think, but not act, 
like a fraudster by considering the following:
• Where are the weakest links in the internal controls?
• How can the controls be circumvented and what financial statement elements are most 
at risk?
• How would a fraudster create support for false entries?
• What would be a motivator for management to commit fraud?
• How would management rationalize the fraud?
The more fraud auditors can learn to think like fraudsters, the more effective their efforts 
will be in detecting fraud.
Financial statement and fraud auditing also differ in the degree of concern for evidence of 
material error or misstatement. Although the materiality rule in financial statement auditing 
has its place partially in a cost-benefit context, materiality is not a guiding principle in fraud 
auditing. The amount of a visible fraud may be small, but frauds in books of account can be 
like icebergs—the biggest part is below the surface. Discovering even small discrepancies 
can reveal large issues. Are all frauds in the accounting records discovered on the basis of 
undetected discrepancies? No. Many frauds surface on the basis of allegations or complaints 
by coworkers, coconspirators, customers, competitors, suppliers, or prospective suppliers.
26 Fraud Supp. 6—2006
Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud
Fraud auditors often have a considerable advantage over financial statement auditors in 
digging out the root nature and amounts of fraud—fraud auditors almost always are 
working in environments where it is known that fraud exists. Discovery of a fraud in a 
financial statement audit is a relatively rare event, despite the impressions one might get 
from reading the newspapers. It is not uncommon for general auditors to examine the 
statements of dozens of clients over decades, and still not see or discover a fraud. The role 
of the fraud auditor is sometimes likened to that of a pathologist, where the end result is 
known, and the task is seeking the reason and source. The role of the financial statement 
auditor is similarly likened to that of a general practitioner of preventive medicine, where 
sometimes the signals about the patient’s health are just not observable.
1.4.4 Fraud Auditors Versus Financial Statement Auditors
Skills of fraud auditors include:
• Reconstructing financial transactions through third-party sources
• Gathering and preserving accounting evidence for trial
• Testifying as expert witnesses
• Calculating net worth and living expenses
• Inspecting documents for authenticity, alteration, forgery, and counterfeiting
• Documenting a fraud case for criminal, civil, and insurance claim purposes
• Designing fraud scenarios, that is, imagining what a fraudster might think and do in 
situations in which internal controls are loose or not enforced and the fraudster has 
certain powers and authority over assets and accounting records
What distinguishes fraud auditors from financial statement auditors? In most respects, they 
are the same. Fraud auditors must make order out of what looks like chaos in books and 
records. Many of the supporting documents the fraud auditor must access for confirmation 
lie in the hands of third parties who might be reluctant to assist in the audit effort. Fraud 
auditors are usually retained after an alleged fraud is discovered or allegations have been 
made and are given the tasks of finding any additional fraud and validating or refuting the 
allegations of fraud.
1.4.5 The Risk of Fraud
Some organizations suffer more fraud than others. What increases the risk or exposure to 
loss from fraud in any organization? The answer depends on a number of factors. The 
incidence of fraud in the accounting records is distributed unevenly. Some industries, some 
companies, some occupations, and some individuals are higher risks than others.
High-risk industries are noted for intense rivalry, low profits, and unethical business practices. 
Some members of these industries are controlled by underworld figures and may enjoy 
sweetheart arrangements with corrupt labor unions. Disputes are often settled by bribes, or, 
when necessary, by force.
High-risk companies are noted for poor management, loose controls, loose cash, and loose 
business morality.
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High-risk occupations provide easy access to cash and accounting records, and are often 
characterized by low pay, long hours, and job-related stress.
High-risk individuals are financially overburdened people with low self-esteem, addictive 
personalities (prone to gambling, substance abuse, and high living); are poor managers of 
their financial resources; have worked their way into positions of trust; and rationalize their 
thefts as “borrowing” or getting even for imagined exploitation. Such people often work 
long hours at their own discretion, and take no vacations for fear their defalcations might be 
discovered while they are away. A growing number of these thieves also keep elaborate 
records of their thefts. The records usually contain dates, amounts, and details of the 
conditions in their lives at the time the cash or property was taken. It is believed that such 
scrupulous bookkeeping is a defensive ploy. If they get caught, they think they can make a 
credible defense of their intention to return the money or property. This defense may cast 
doubt on one element of proof needed to convict, that is, the intent to permanently deprive 
the owners of their property. The same characteristics that make highly motivated 
entrepreneurs successful can also fuel greed and misdeeds and blur the line between the 
business and the entrepreneur, such that intervention in the financial reporting aspects of 
the business does not seem inappropriate. Smaller businesses with active management 
oversight face both a potential blessing: better monitoring; and a potential curse: 
management override of controls.
People commit crimes for a number of reasons. The main motives are economic, 
egocentric, ideological, and psychotic. The economic motive (need or greed) is the most 
common one found for the crimes of fraud, theft, and embezzlement.
In large corporations, with promotional policies and compensation plans geared to short­
term bottom-line results and little else, a form of competitive greed can set in at the profit­
center management level. Even well-managed companies have become victims of their own 
compensation designs. Therefore, falsifications of unit profits, revenues, and expenses have 
become a greater problem in the U.S. corporate landscape.
1.5 A New Environment for Fraud Risk Detection and
Enforcement
The issue of fraud in financial reporting has been on the radar screen for a significant 
period of time. Throughout the go-go stock market period of the 1990’s, sporadic reports of 
fraudulent financial reporting and the enrichment of executives continued to emerge. 
Standards setters in the U.S. and Internationally were well aware of this dangerous issue, 
and with the urging and support of the research and conclusions of Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness of the Public Oversight Board, in conjunction with the International auditing 
standards group under IFAC, undertook projects to strengthen the auditing standards to 
address this threat to security markets and preserve the credibility of the profession. The 
Public Oversight Board was part of a self-regulatory structure of the profession to provide 
oversight to the peer review process and provide timely and relevant guidance to the 
auditing profession. It was dissolved in 2002 as the concept of what became the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was being formed.
Those efforts, which ultimately led to Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99, 
“Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement,” resulted in more focused guidance than 
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in any previous standard on the issue, and often used the word “should,” implying that 
suggested procedures were more than just considerations, but were generally required.
1.5.1 The Winds of Change
In the timeframe in which SAS No. 99 was being deliberated, huge public company fraud 
scandals were being played out in the news media on a daily basis. Corporate names such 
as Enron, Worldcom, and others, will forever signal a period when the fundamental 
structure on which our economic system is based was seen to be threatened. Such was the 
threat that Congress passed a law, The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30, 2002, 107 P.L. 
204, §1, 116 Stat. 745), to restore confidence in the securities markets and strengthen the 
financial statement reporting process.
1.5.2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes Oxley Act had a number of sections that had a profound effect on the 
business environment from its enactment. Some of those most directly relevant to fraud and 
financial reporting are:
• Title 1 established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board as an independent 
overseer/standard setter for accounting and auditing for “issuers” (public companies). 
The SEC would oversee and approve the rules promulgated by the PCAOB. The 
PCAOB adopted the AICPA auditing standards (through SAS 101) as of April 2003, and 
began to modify that literature with Standards issued by the PCAOB.
• Title 2 established new auditor independence requirements, including the prohibition of 
certain services, the requirement that management boards pre-approve certain non-audit 
services, and established guidelines for periodic auditor rotation.
• Title 3 outlined corporate responsibilities including Section 303 which requires quarterly 
certifications regarding controls from responsible officials.
• Title 4 outlined enhanced financial disclosures to be made, including the requirement 
for companies and their auditors to assess and report on the effectiveness of internal 
controls (Section 404).
• Title 7 addressed corporate and criminal fraud accountability with specific penalties for 
fraudulent acts.
• Title 8 addressed white-collar crime penalty enhancements.
• Title 11 was directed at Corporate Fraud and Accountability.
The net sum was a sweeping law attempting to detect fraud and dissuade individuals and 
organizations from participating in or permitting frauds that could threaten the viability of 
business reporting and capital financing.
Other countries (e.g., Canada, UK, Japan) have moved to study and adopt some or all of 
the provisions of SOX, adapted to their country’s laws and business practices. Thus, anti­
fraud sentiment today is clearly not limited to the U.S.
1.5.3 PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 and the COSO Framework
In 2004, the SEC approved the implementation of Auditing Standard No. 2, “An Audit of 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of
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Financial Statements” (AS 2) in response to the requirements in section 404 of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act (SOX). That standard established auditor requirements for conducting such an 
audit and significantly increased required procedures and the extent of auditor’s work over 
the requirements in the AICPA’s Attestation report on internal controls (AT 501).
Both SOX and AS 2 led to the defacto establishment of an existing control framework as 
“the standard” for companies and auditors. In 1992 the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) issued a multi-volume guide entitled “Internal Control—Integrated 
Framework.” This document grew out of the work of the National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission), a group formed to consider 
corrupt foreign practices and improper political campaign practices. Following 
recommendations from a 1987 report, the COSO was formed to create such a controls 
framework. The COSO Framework is discussed more fully in Chapter 10.
When the COSO Framework document was initially released, some companies voluntarily 
undertook assessments of their controls, and new attestation standards were developed to 
guide auditors in reporting to the public on internal controls. Interest then waned in 
undertaking this voluntary task, as companies concluded that the annual cost of such 
reporting was not providing a measurable benefit to the organization.
The COSO Framework was readily available when Congress was seeking guidance on the 
approach companies should take to strengthen and report on internal controls. While other 
comprehensive frameworks exist (COCO in Canada, Turnbull in the UK), the COSO 
Framework is today’s virtual standard for internal controls.
The COSO Framework had sat virtually untouched since its release in 1992. Guidance in 
the original document was less extensive on fraud than what had emerged in the literature 
and auditing standards since that time. Notable in the 1992 work is that there is little 
mention of the role of systems and IT in conjunction with controls and fraud. Additionally, 
there was no guidance specifically directed to smaller companies—not necessarily a focus of 
the original report, but certainly a concern if SOX was to apply to all public companies.
The first two years of reporting on Internal Controls under Section 404 occurred under this 
framework. Only “accelerated filers” (the largest companies) were required to report on 
internal controls in 2004 and 2005. Data from Audit Analytics used for an academic 
research study indicate that of 2,641 2004 opinions on internal control, 386 (14.6%) 
received adverse opinions because of material weakness, and preliminary data for 2005 
indicates about half that rate of adverse opinion in the next period for the group of second- 
year filers. While that rate may seem low and encouraging, it does not reflect the massive 
amount of remediation undertaken during the period of examination to be able to reach the 
“effective controls” conclusion “as of” the ending balance sheet date reflected in the report. 
“Large, well controlled” entities received quite an overhaul along the road to a clean audit 
opinion on controls. An E&Y survey published in 2005 indicated that 25% of the largest 
companies remediated over 500 controls in their first year of implementation. These issues 
are important, as deficiencies and weaknesses in controls provide “opportunity” for fraud, 
one of the three essential elements identified in SAS No. 99 in the “fraud triangle.”
30 Fraud Supp. 6—2006
Chapter One: Managing the Risk of Fraud
1.5.4 Issues for Smaller Entities and Private Companies
In July 2006, the COSO released a report entitled “Internal Control over Financial 
Reporting—Guidance for Smaller Public Companies” with welcome enhancements to the 
original guidance. While re-affirming that the basic principles of control are the same for 
smaller and larger entities, this document provides some simpler tools for analysis and 
some additional guidance on integrating fraud, systems, and IT considerations into the 
assessment of controls. This is in anticipation of the initially deferred smaller firms and 
Foreign Issuers (over 10,000 of them) having to report on internal controls beginning in 
2007.
In 2007, a suite of new auditing standards (SAS No. 104 through SAS No. 111) will become 
effective for private companies. The significance of this event is that the new standards 
require the auditor to assess the design of internal controls and see that the controls have 
been implemented (but do not require the testing of controls unless that is part of the audit 
strategy). These standards, as has been true since SAS No. 55 and reflected in Codification 
section AU 319 are based on the COSO Framework. Under existing practice many auditors 
defaulted to “high” control risk, and performed a minimal assessment of controls for many 
entities, going on to rely mostly on substantive audit procedures as a basis for the opinion 
on the financial statements. This will no longer be permitted under the new standards. 
Auditors will assess the controls design and implementation and under SAS No. 112 
(Communicating Internal Control Matters Identified in an Audit), effective in 2006, report 
identified material weaknesses and significant deficiencies to “those charged with 
governance.” It is anticipated that the additional focus on controls on all audits will reveal 
and report to management in a formal way more deficiencies than ever before. This 
standard will be effective for all audits conducted under AICPA standards, estimated to be 
more than 350,000 audits of private, non profit, and government entities.
Smaller businesses are not immune to fraud loss. The 2006 ACFE “Report to the Nation” 
indicates that the median fraud loss was $190,000 to organizations with fewer than 100 
employees.
Nonprofit entities and governments have also taken an active interest in the issue of 
reporting on internal controls and are providing input to the Auditing Standards Board on 
its revision of its Internal Control Reporting attestation standard (AT Section 501). An 
exposure draft of this revised standard was posted for comment, and is expected to be 
finalized in 2006. The devastating impact of alleged improprieties at the American Red 
Cross demonstrate how fraud or allegations of fraud can harm the mission or de­
commission a nonprofit organization—even the largest ones.
Even among the “accelerated filer” group, smaller entities seemed to have a higher 
incidence of adverse reports. Most are expecting that the next tier of public companies 
trying to report on internal controls will have a more difficult time than the larger 
companies did due to:
• The lack of formality in the existing controls
• Less documentation of internal controls
• The lack of extensive internal audit resources
• The continuing lack of urgency in preparing for this reporting requirement
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• The lack of financial resources to perform the assessment, hire expert assistance and pay 
additional professional fees for various legal and auditing services
While the close involvement of management with the business is sometimes cited as an 
asset in preventing misstatements and fraud, it can be a liability when management 
override is a risk.
What is clear is that we are at a crossroads in terms of the old and new order and the “war 
on error” (due to poor controls and fraud).
1.5.5 Post Sarbanes Implementation Effectiveness
It may indeed be too soon to evaluate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and 
other forces set in motion by that. Frauds continue to be found such as a fraud at Refco, 
recently discovered by the auditors Grant Thornton LLP. Enforcement actions and 
prosecutions of executives have had mixed success to date, but are prominent in the 
business news. As of September 2006, nearly 100 firms are embroiled in SEC and internal 
investigations and restatements due to backdating or spring-loading the dates of stock 
option awards. Now that stock options can result in compensation expense and are not just 
a disclosure item, seemingly broad and longstanding inappropriate corporate policies and 
practices are coming to light. Auditors are now expanding their procedures to cover such 
possible schemes in other businesses.
The bottom line may be that the forces at work today will result in the earlier detection of 
frauds as a result of auditing procedures, and serve as a deterrent to those tempted to 
massage the numbers or gain unfair advantage.
1.6 Risk Management Checklist
Table 1.2, “Risk Management Checklist,” is designed to assist CPAs in assessing and 
managing the risk of fraud in their organizations and in those of their clients. Generally, all 
no answers require investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. 
The final section entitled “Specific Risk Factors” generally requires investigation and follow­
up for all yes answers. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference any additional 
documentation to the appropriate working papers.
Companies also can use this checklist to self-assess their fraud awareness and fraud 
readiness. The Exhibit to SAS No 99 also provides a discussion of anti-fraud programs and 
controls from the company perspective.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute 
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who 
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
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Table 1.2 Risk Management Checklist
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Does the organization have an adequate level of fraud 
awareness, and are appropriate policies in place to minimize 
fraud risk, specifically:
a. Generic risk factors
• Has the organization assigned each employee a maximum 
“opportunity level” to commit fraud, that is, has 
management asked itself the question, “What is the 
maximum amount this employee could defraud the 
organization, and does this represent an acceptable risk?”
• Has the organization set a catastrophic opportunity level; 
that is, has management asked itself the question, “Have 
we ensured that no single employee—or group of 
employees in collusion—can commit a fraud that would 
place the organization in imminent risk of survival?”
• Does the organization have a policy of immediately 
dismissing any employee who has committed fraud?
• Does the organization have a policy of reporting all frauds 
to the authorities and pressing charges?
• For all frauds experienced by the organization in the past, 
has management evaluated the reasons that led to the 
fraud and taken corrective action?
b. Individual risk factors
• Does the organization have a corporate mission statement, 
which includes an objective of good citizenship or the 
maintenance of good standing in the community?
• Does the organization have a written code of ethics and 
business conduct (see the checklist in Chapter 2 for 
details)?
• Does the organization conduct ethical and security 
training for new employees and periodic updates for 
existing employees?
• Does management set the right example; that is, does it 
follow the organization’s mission statement, code of ethics 
and business conduct, and other policies of the 
organization; and is it clearly seen to be doing so by 
employees?
• Does the organization’s culture avoid characteristics that 
promote unethical behavior, for example, high or even 
hostile competitiveness within the organization that might 
push employees to the point of burnout; pointless rigid or 
petty policies, or both; overcentralization of authority?
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Does the organization have a fraud hotline or other 
communication vehicle for reporting issues? Is the hotline 
number communicated or easily accessible to employees?
• Has the organization communicated the Whistleblower 
Protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or any other 
applicable government regulations to employees?
• Do the organization’s hiring policies, to the extent 
possible, seek out individuals of high moral character and 
weed out those of low moral character (see the checklist in 
Chapter 3)?
• Does the organization use screening and/or testing 
procedures for especially sensitive positions; for example, 
psychological tests, drug tests, or lie detector tests, or a 
combination of all three, where permitted by law?
• Does the organization provide or encourage counseling, 
or both, for employees with personal problems, for 
example, alcohol and drug abuse?
• Does the organization have fair policies in the area of 
employee relations and compensation, for example, 
salaries, fringe benefits, performance appraisal, 
promotions, severance pay; and do these policies compare 
favorably with those of competitors and promote an 
environment that minimizes disenchantment and other 
similar motives to commit fraud?
• Does the organization have fair mechanisms in place for 
dealing with employee grievances?
• Does the organization, as a feedback mechanism 
concerning employee relations’ policies, conduct exit 
interviews with departing employees?
c. Overall risk factors
• Does the organization exhibit an awareness of fraud and 
its possible manifestations, for example, signs of employee 
problems such as drug addiction, employees who are 
living beyond their means, etc.?
2. Does the organization have an adequate system of internal 
controls, specifically:
a. Internal control
• Has the organization explicitly considered the need for 
fraud prevention in the design and maintenance of the 
system of internal controls?
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Control over physical and logical access
• Does the organization have a policy of locking doors, 
desks, and cabinets after hours and when unattended, 
especially in areas with valuable assets including files and 
records, for example, personnel and payroll, customer and 
vendor lists, corporate strategies, marketing plans, 
research?
• Does the organization use IDs and passwords, for 
example, for computer files? Are these passwords changed 
periodically and de-activated on a timely basis when 
employees leave or are terminated?
• Does the organization state and enforce a policy that 
restricts access to those requiring it for job performance, 
including a strict policy against employees allowing access 
to unauthorized personnel, for example, by loaning keys 
or sharing passwords?
• Has the organization installed, for especially sensitive 
areas, the computerized security or electronic surveillance 
systems, or both?
• Does the workplace appear to an impartial observer to 
have adequate access controls?
c. Job descriptions
• Does the organization have written, specific job 
descriptions?
• Are job descriptions adhered to?
• Does the organization have an organization chart that 
reflects and is consistent with the job descriptions of its 
employees?
• Are incompatible duties segregated, for example, the 
handling of valuable assets—especially cash—and related 
records?
• Does the organization properly segregate the purchasing 
functions, that is, ensuring that one individual cannot 
requisition goods or services, approve and make the 
related payment, and access accounts payable records?
• Are especially sensitive duties duplicated, for example, the 
double-signing of checks over a specified amount?
• Do job descriptions specify that employees must take 
annual vacations?
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Is the overall process of formulating job descriptions
integrated with adequate consideration to the importance
of fraud prevention?
d. Regular accounting reconciliations and analyses
• Are all bank accounts reconciled?
• Are all accounts receivable reconciled, for example,
month to month, general ledger to subledger?
• Are all accounts payable reconciled, for example, month
to month, general ledger to subledger?
• Has the organization performed a variance analysis of
general ledger accounts, for example, budget to actual,
current year versus prior year?
• Has the organization performed a vertical analysis of
profit and loss accounts, that is, as a percentage of sales
against historical or budget standards, or both?
• Has the organization performed an analysis of detailed
sales and major expenses, for example, by product line or
geographic territory?
e. Supervision
• Do supervisors and managers have adequate fraud
awareness, that is, are they alert to the possibility of fraud
whenever an unusual or exceptional situation occurs, such
as supplier or customer complaints about their accounts?
• Do supervisors and managers diligently review their
subordinates’ work, for example, accounting
reconciliations, and redo the work when appropriate?
• Does close supervision adequately compensate against the
increased risk of fraud in smaller businesses or where an
inability to divide duties exists.
• Is supervisory or management override prohibited and
are others within the firm alert to the fraud risks associated
with management override?
f. Audit
• Is there an internal audit function?
• Does the internal audit function perform regular checks to
ensure that fraud prevention mechanisms are in place and
operating as intended?
• Are external audits performed on a regular basis, for
example, quarterly for larger businesses and public
companies?
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Are the timing demands of management on external 
auditors reasonable?
• Do external auditors receive full cooperation from 
management with respect to their work in general and 
fraud matters in particular, for example, through the audit 
committee?







1. Is the organization’s financial stability or profitability 
threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating 
conditions?
2. Is there excessive pressure on management or management 
incentives related to reaching earnings expectations or certain 
revenue benchmarks?
3. Are there significant balances in the financial statements 
which are based on subjective management estimates?
4. Are there significant cash balances or significant transaction 
activity in overseas banks in tax havens such as the Cayman 
Islands or the Channel Islands?
5. Does the entity have an overly complex organizational 
structure or a large number of complex subsidiaries?
6. Does management consistently use materiality as a basis for 
justifying marginal or inappropriate accounting methods?
Misappropriation of Assets
1. Are there planned layoffs which have become known by 
employees throughout the company?
2. Are the company’s assets easily convertible and are they 
physically available to employees?
3. Is there insufficient segregation of duties related to check 
writing, wiring of funds, or cash?
4. Are the controls over the accounting system or automated 
records inadequate?
(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Risk Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
5. Are audits of cash, inventories and other saleable or useable 
goods under employee oversight conducted periodically and 
unpredictably?
6. Do certain employees exhibit a change in behavior to a 
disagreeable or discontent state?
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CHAPTER 2:
Promoting an Ethical Environment
2.1 Ethics: A Framework
An ethical environment is a key element in any effective prevention strategy. This chapter 
will acquaint you with the field of applied ethics, provide essential tools for promoting an 
ethical environment within an organization, and conclude with a diagnostic tool that you 
can use when evaluating an organization’s current ethical status.
2.1.1 Overview
Ethics—derived from the Greek ethos, meaning character or custom—is a very broad term 
referring to principles or standards of human conduct. Ethics has been, and continues to 
be, one of the key concerns of all religions, schools of philosophy, sciences, liberal arts, 
professions, and political movements. Moses, Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Kanto, and many 
others devoted a great deal of their recorded teachings to the subject of ethics. It is 
impossible to engage in any human endeavor, including business, without entering the field 
of ethics.
Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the science devoted to the study of the “walk,” rather than the talk, of 
ethics. According to Lisa H. Newton, in her text Doing Good and Avoiding Evil: Principles and 
Reasoning of Applied Ethics, “Applied ethics, then, is the field that holds ethical theory 
accountable to practice and professional and business practice accountable to theory.” It’s 
where the rubber meets the road.
Personal Versus Organizational Ethics
Whose principles and standards should we adopt? There remains much confusion about 
this fundamental question. Some believe that ethics are a matter of personal choice. 
Therefore, any attempt to establish a code of ethics, or conduct, would result in a narrow 
flight of parochial fancy that would be so patently offensive to so many, it would render 
itself immediately irrelevant. Others believe that a kind of universal genetic code of ethics 
or conduct exists. This theory suggests that we are all born with an inherent sense of right 
and wrong. So, any artificial code of ethics is unnecessary and would be flawed in any way 
in which it conflicted with the natural code. Both groups believe it would be wrong for any 
organization to impose ethical standards on its members, employees, or other stakeholders. 
Nothing could be further from the truth.
It is an organization’s right and duty to clearly communicate its values and expectations 
regarding the conduct of its affairs to all its stakeholders. Employees or members may 
freely choose to join, or not to join, any given organization. But, once individuals choose to 
join an organization, they assume a duty to respect the organization’s values and abide by 
its code of conduct.
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Ethics and the Law
When confronted about unethical behavior, many people will point out that their actions 
were not illegal. This would be roughly analogous to saying that because a person follows 
the rules of law, he or she would be an excellent judge. According to the Professional Ethics 
for Certified Public Accountants (a publication of the California Certified Public Accountants 
Foundation for Education and Research) “Laws and rules establish minimum standards of 
consensus impropriety; they do not define the criteria of ethical behavior.”
2.1.2 Ethics at Work
In the Professions
Most, if not all, recognized professions have developed written codes of ethics, professional 
conduct, or both. They also have implemented means to assure that members of the 
profession abide by these codes. Violators are usually disciplined or expelled, sometimes in 
public proceedings, to demonstrate the profession’s commitment to its code and willingness 
to effectively police itself.
Some would argue that the professions became interested in ethics for entirely selfish 
reasons. They see the rise of successful plaintiffs’ litigation in the 1970s as a key motivator 
in the promulgation of professional codes of ethics and conduct. They also point out that, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government demonstrated an interest in playing an 
increased role, including the actual promulgation of codes of conduct, in the regulation of 
professions. The AICPA has written and rewritten its code of professional conduct many 
times during the past 100 years or so. In fact, according to Professional Ethics for Certified 
Public Accountants, a complete restatement of the code was made in 1973.
Whatever the motivation, professional codes of conduct have been effective. The reason is 
simple: if you do not abide by the ethics code of your profession (medical, legal, etc.) you 
may risk being expelled from your professional organization, thus losing the right to 
practice and earn a living. Coupling this reason with the profession’s corporate interest in 
maintaining its standing and authority, and minimizing its own exposure to litigation and 
intrusion by regulatory agencies or others, demonstrates the steps taken by many 
professional organizations toward promoting an ethical environment.
But, how do we apply this model to businesses, including professional firms?
Business Ethics
Should business be concerned with ethics? The answer was not always a unanimous yes. 
Who hasn’t heard the appropriated maxim: All is fair in love and business. You may recall 
Shakespeare’s merchant and Dickens’ Fagan as examples of at least the perception of 
business motives in western society. In this country, tales of the robber barons of the 
nineteenth century suggest that business ethics were not at the top of the enterprise success­
factor list. That was then, but what about now? As recently as the 1970s, mainstream
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economist Milton Friedman said that the only obligation of a business is to make a profit. 
This became dogma in American business schools in the 1970s and 1980s.
So, why should business be concerned with ethics today? One could argue that after 
November 1991—the effective date of the federal sentencing guidelines for organizations— 
business became concerned with ethics in order to guard against huge fines and penalties. 
But there are other, pragmatic reasons for business to be concerned with ethics:
Enlightened self-interest. According to the Professional Ethics for Certified Public Accountants, a 
business needs to avoid scandals, keep government off its back, protect itself from internal 
corruption, avoid fines and penalties, and keep its executives out of jail. Also, there is the 
value of a good corporate image, the internal cost of investigations and legal fees, the value 
of good employee morale, and the impact of wrongdoing on the share value of public 
companies to consider. In fact, ethics may have a great deal more to do with making a 
profit than Mr. Friedman imagined.
2.1.3 Promoting an Ethical Environment
The Tone at the Top
You’ve heard it before and it must be said again. The tone of upper management is most 
important in the field of ethics. Ethics will not suffer senior management’s clever 
rationalization or thinly veiled hypocrisy. Fortunately, or unfortunately, ethics always 
comes down to a simple choice of right over wrong. Even the most learned defense of 
improper conduct in the executive suite would fail the ethics test. If the bosses aren’t ready 
to walk the talk, the process simply will not work.
Senior management must be made aware of this essential element. Some will raise 
objections about the cost of an ethics program or its potential negative impact on revenue. 
Even today, the best way to communicate the value of an effective ethics program is to 
quantify the cost of not having an ethics program. Statistics and examples abound. 
According to an Association of Certified Fraud Examiners report, it was estimated that in 
1996 U.S. organizations lost over $400 billion to occupational fraud and abuse. But, to 
bring the point home, you need look no further than your favorite daily business journal. 
Virtually every issue contains stories of businesses and other organizations that have been 
victimized through fraud and paid dearly for it. Those businesses that allegedly “benefited” 
from the fraud end up losing the most.
The Current Situation
All ethics, like all politics, are local. Resist the temptation to run out and “buy” someone 
else’s ethics program for your organization. An ethical environment flows from an ethics 
program that is tailored to the organization. If you try to develop a rule in advance for 
every situation, you will fail. If you try to fix things that are not broken, you will fail. 
Finally, if in the process of installing your new, super-deluxe, off-the-shelf ethics program, 
you communicate your distrust of employees and other stakeholders to them, they, in turn, 
will justify that distrust.
For all of these reasons, begin by analyzing your individual organization. Involve everyone 
in the process. Get their input. Develop a brief statement (mission statement) of the 
organization’s core values and mission.
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Perform a diagnostic to identify weak and strong areas of ethical conduct within the 
organization. You should consider using the Ethical Environmental Checklist at the end of 
this chapter, or you could use this checklist as a template to develop a diagnostic tool of 
your own. Once you compile the results of your diagnostic exercise, analyze the results, 
make any necessary decisions, and begin designing the program.
Designing the Ethics Program
The most important requirement when promoting an ethical environment is having a 
written code of ethics and business conduct. A written code helps to set the right ethical 
tone within an organization. Figure 2-1 is an example of a written mission statement.
Figure 2-1. A Written Mission Statement
Mission Statement
The Organization’s mission is to provide the highest quality goods and services to its 
customers; to strive at all times for market leadership and in so doing, to benefit the 
Organization’s shareholders and its employees.
The Organization is committed to a policy of fair dealing and integrity in the conduct of all 
aspects of its business. This commitment is based on a fundamental belief in law, honesty 
and fairness. The Organization expects its employees to share its commitment to high legal, 
ethical and moral standards.
This Code of Business Conduct is mandatory, and the Organization expects full 
compliance by all of its employees and by its subsidiaries under all circumstances. The 
Organization will monitor compliance, and any violation of the Code may result in 
disciplinary action that could include termination of employment.
Employees uncertain about the application of the Code should consult with their superior. 
Similarly any employee who becomes aware of, or suspects, a contravention of the Code, 
must promptly advise his or her superior, or report the matter directly to Human 
Resources, Internal Audit or the Law Department.
Figure 2-2 is an example of an organizational code of conduct, which includes definitions 
of what is considered unacceptable, and the consequences of any breaches thereof. Note 
that figure 2-2 is only an example. The specific content and areas addressed in your 
mission statement and code should flow from your own analysis of your organization.
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Figure 2-2. An Organizational Code of Conduct
Organizational Code of Conduct
The Organization and its employees must, at all times, comply with all applicable laws and 
regulations. The Organization will not condone the activities of employees who achieve 
results through violation of the law or unethical business dealings. This includes any 
payments for illegal acts, indirect contributions, rebates and bribery. The Organization does 
not permit any activity that fails to stand the closest possible public scrutiny.
All business conduct should be well above the minimum standards required by law. 
Accordingly, employees must ensure that their actions cannot be interpreted as being, in 
any way, in contravention of the laws and regulations governing the Organization’s 
worldwide operations.
Employees uncertain about the application or interpretation of any legal requirements 
should refer the matter to their superior, who, if necessary, should seek the advice of the 
Law Department.
General Employee Conduct
The Organization expects its employees to conduct themselves in a businesslike manner. 
Drinking, gambling, fighting, swearing and similar unprofessional activities are strictly 
prohibited while on the job.
Employees must not engage in sexual harassment, or conduct themselves in a way that 
could be construed as such, for example, by using inappropriate language, keeping or 
posting inappropriate materials in their work area, or accessing inappropriate materials on 
their computer.
Conflicts of Interest
The Organization expects that employees will perform their duties conscientiously, 
honestly and in accordance with the best interests of the Organization. Employees must not 
use their position or the knowledge gained as a result of their position for private or 
personal advantage. Regardless of the circumstances, if employees sense that a course of 
action they have pursued, are presently pursuing or are contemplating pursuing may 
involve them in a conflict of interest with their employer, they should immediately 
communicate all the facts to their superior.
Outside Activities, Employment and Directorships
All employees share a serious responsibility for an Organization’s good public relations, 
especially at the community level. Their readiness to help with religious, charitable, 
educational and civic activities brings credit to the Organization and is encouraged. 
Employees must, however, avoid acquiring any business interest or participating in any 
other activity outside the Organization that would, or would appear to—
(continued)
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Figure 2-2. (continued)
• Create an excessive demand upon their time and attention, thus depriving the 
Organization of their best efforts on the job.
• Create a conflict of interest—an obligation, interest or distraction—that may interfere 
with the independent exercise of judgment in the Organization’s best interest.
Relationships with Clients and Suppliers
Employees should avoid investing in or acquiring a financial interest for their own accounts 
in any business organization that has a contractual relationship with the Organization, or 
that provides goods or services, or both to the Organization, if such investment or interest 
could influence or create the impression of influencing their decisions in the performance 
of their duties on behalf of the Organization.
Gifts, Entertainment and Favors
Employees must not accept entertainment, gifts, or personal favors that could, in any way, 
influence, or appear to influence, business decisions in favor of any person or organization 
with whom or with which the Organization has, or is likely to have, business dealings.
Similarly, employees must not accept any other preferential treatment under these 
circumstances because their position with the Organization might be inclined to, or be 
perceived to, place them under obligation.
Kickbacks and Secret Commissions
Regarding the Organization’s business activities, employees may not receive payment or 
compensation of any kind, except as authorized under the Organization’s remuneration 
policies. In particular, the Organization strictly prohibits the acceptance of kickbacks and 
secret commissions from suppliers or others. Any breach of this rule will result in 
immediate termination and prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.
Organization Funds and Other Assets
Employees who have access to Organization funds in any form must follow the prescribed 
procedures for recording, handling and protecting money as detailed in the Organization’s 
instructional manuals or other explanatory materials, or both. The Organization imposes 
strict standards to prevent fraud and dishonesty. If employees become aware of any 
evidence of fraud and dishonesty, they should immediately advise their superior or the Law 
Department so that the Organization can promptly investigate further.
When an employee’s position requires spending Organization funds or incurring any 
reimbursable personal expenses, that individual must use good judgment on the 
Organization’s behalf to ensure that good value is received for every expenditure.
Organization funds and all other assets of the Organization are for Organization purposes 
only and not for personal benefit. This includes the personal use of organizational assets 
such as computers.
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Organization Records and Communications
Accurate and reliable records of many kinds are necessary to meet the Organization’s legal 
and financial obligations and to manage the affairs of the Organization. The Organization’s 
books and records must reflect in an accurate and timely manner all business transactions. 
The employees responsible for accounting and record-keeping must fully disclose and 
record all assets, liabilities, or both, and must exercise diligence in enforcing these 
requirements.
Employees must not make or engage in any false record or communication of any kind, 
whether internal or external, including but not limited to—
• False expense, attendance, production, financial or similar reports and statements
• False advertising, deceptive marketing practices, or other misleading representations
Dealing With Outside People and Organizations
Employees must take care to separate their personal roles from their Organization positions 
when communicating on matters not involving Organization business. Employees must not 
use organization identification, stationery, supplies and equipment for personal or political 
matters.
When communicating publicly on matters that involve Organization business, employees 
must not presume to speak for the Organization on any topic, unless they are certain that 
the views they express are those of the Organization, and it is the Organization’s desire that 
such views be publicly disseminated.
When dealing with anyone outside the Organization, including public officials, employees 
must take care not to compromise the integrity or damage the reputation of either the 
Organization, or any outside individual, business, or government body.
Prompt Communications
In all matters relevant to customers, suppliers, government authorities, the public and 
others in the Organization, all employees must make every effort to achieve complete, 
accurate and timely communications—responding promptly and courteously to all proper 
requests for information and to all complaints.
Privacy and Confidentiality
When handling financial and personal information about customers or others with whom 
the Organization has dealings, observe the following principles:
1. Collect, use, and retain only the personal information necessary for the Organization’s 
business. Whenever possible, obtain any relevant information directly from the person 
concerned. Use only reputable and reliable sources to supplement this information.
(continued)
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2. Retain information only for as long as necessary or as required by law. Protect the 
physical security of this information.
3. Limit internal access to personal information to those with a legitimate business reason 
for seeking that information. Only use personal information for the purposes for which it 
was originally obtained. Obtain the consent of the person concerned before externally 
disclosing any personal information, unless legal process or contractual obligation 
provides otherwise.
When designing your program, implementation strategy and training, remember the 
following bit of wisdom:
Give a person a fish and he or she will be able to eat today. Teach a person to fish and he 
or she will be able to eat for a lifetime.
If you try to create a rule for every ethical dilemma, your people will focus on how to fit 
their decisions to the rules. On this premise, if there is no rule, there is no problem. If you 
train your people to make ethical decisions for themselves, however, they will focus on 
doing just that.
Training and Communication
After writing your organization’s code of ethics and business conduct, ask everyone to read 
it and have them confirm in writing that they have done so and understood the content. 
Keep a record of this acknowledgment.
You should consider seminar training for all employees and agents. The training doesn’t 
have to be long and complicated. Use the KISS (Keep It Simple Stupid) method to develop 
your ethics curriculum. Instead of giving them rules, give them tools. These tools can be as 
simple as a list of broad principles to follow and questions to ask when making decisions.
In Policies and Persons: A Case Book in Business Ethics, John B. Mathews and coauthors suggest 
the following tools.
1. Avoid harming others.
2. Prevent harm to others.
3. Respect the rights of others.
4. Do not lie or cheat.
5. Keep promises and contracts.
6. Obey the law.
7. Help those in need.
8. Be fair.
So, when a considered action may raise serious ethical questions, try applying the 
generalized criteria. For example, you can use the guidelines above and ask yourself the 
following specific questions.
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2. Is the action fair, just, and equitable to all parties?
3. Does the action serve the common good and the public’s interest?
4. Does it provide the greatest good for the greatest number?
5. Does it do the least harm to the greatest number?
6. Does it cost more than its social benefits?
7. Would you like it if it were done to you (known as “The Golden Rule”)?
8. Would an ethical role model (for example, your parent, priest, or minister) approve of 
this act?
Enforcement
As discussed in chapter 1, an effective prevention strategy demands there be some adverse 
consequences when an employee is caught committing fraud (for example, dismissal of the 
employee and the pressing of charges). Similarly, there also must be some adverse 
consequences—commensurate with the severity of the breach—when an employee 
contravenes an organization’s stated policies, and in particular its code of ethics and 
business conduct For severe breaches, or for repeat offenders, dismissal may be an 
appropriate consequence and the organization’s policies should so state.
To ensure that all employees are aware of their responsibilities, organizations should 
require that the staff sign an annual declaration stating they are aware of the company’s 
code of ethics and business conduct policies, and confirming they have complied in the past 
and will continue to do so.
Employee Hiring and Employee Relations
Ultimately, the employees, not the organization’s policies, create a good ethical climate. 
Employee hiring practices and employee relations are therefore important fraud prevention 
variables. The Ethical Environment Checklist (at the end of this chapter) provides a fairly 
comprehensive list of the factors to consider.
Generally, organizations face a balancing act. On the one hand, they must minimize the 
risk of fraud and be cost-effective in employee remuneration. On the other hand, they must 
promote an open environment in which employee morale and creativity flourish, while 
employees feel rewarded for their efforts. Tipping the scale too far to one side or the other 
can lead to problems, or reduce the competitiveness of an organization, or both.
Organizations can achieve success at a point somewhere in between and only through the 
good judgment of management.
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2.1.4 Ethics and Information Technology
The ever-accelerating information revolution—particularly during the latter half of the 
twentieth century—has raised special ethical issues. In particular, makers, distributors, 
owners, managers, and users of information resources have ethical responsibilities for the 
products and services that they create, own, sell, manage, and use. The ethical issues raised 
by information technology include the following:
• Privacy
• Piracy








A myriad of both private-and public-sector organizations collect data for a wide variety of 
purposes. The U.S. government alone has gathered and stored four billion records on 
individuals. The development of database management software for personal computers 
has extended these capabilities to anyone with a few hundred dollars. Although databases 
have grown explosively, controls over access and disclosure of confidential data have not 
kept pace. Unauthorized access to databases and disclosure of confidential information 
contained therein are commonplace.
There are legal constraints on the improper collection and dissemination of personal data in 
the United States and Canada, embodied in their respective Constitutions, Supreme Court 
decisions, tort law, and in federal and state privacy and consumer rights enactment.
However, these laws and rulings are not sufficiently clear to reach consensus. For example, 
on the question of access to personal history databases versus an individual’s right of 
privacy, an ethicist might ask the following.
● Who is collecting the data?
● For what use are the data being collected?
● How, to whom, and for what purpose will the data be disseminated?
 ●How well protected is that data against unauthorized access and disclosure?
● How accurate, complete, and timely are the data?
● What degrees of confidentiality should be accorded to such disparate data as medical, 
psychiatric, credit, employment, school and criminal records?
If medical records were considered the most confidential of the lot, the ethical standard for 
the care accorded such data would be higher; that is, medical records should be gathered, 
stored, and disseminated with great care and caution.
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Piracy
Software piracy signifies that the creative work of another has been used or duplicated 
without permission or payment of royalty, or both. The definition assumes that the 
software’s creator has complied adequately with the legal requirements of the federal 
copyright law. Therefore, the software pirate commits an act of infringement and may be 
civilly sued for damages, criminally prosecuted, or both.
Software piracy is probably the most common breach of ethics in the field of information 
technology. For each software program sold, developers claim that another two to five 
copies are bootlegged. The lost royalties of developers are staggering. Some thieves 
rationalize that software prices are too high and that the developers are large and will not 
miss the lost royalties. In reality, the software industry has become increasingly competitive 
and losses to piracy can have a serious impact on a company’s viability. Moreover, even the 
largest and most profitable developers have a right to seek a fair price and return for their 
development efforts, the costs incurred and the risks taken.
Safety and Health
The widespread use of computers in today’s information-driven economy has contributed 
to and in some instances created, unique safety issues that can be divided into the following 
two distinct categories:
1. Accidents resulting from the use of computer-controlled systems
2. Occupational health and safety problems for users caused by long-term or improper use 
of computers, or both
Computer-controlled systems safety issues—The accelerated pace of technological change in this 
century has resulted in an exponential increase in new industries with many innovative 
products and processes. Dangerous substances and sensitive information are being handled 
on an unparalleled scale. New systems are being built—using computers to control them— 
that have the capacity to cause extensive destruction of life and the environment. A single 
accident could be catastrophic. Computers now control most safety-critical devices and they 
often replace traditional hardware safety interlocks and protection systems. Even when 
hardware protection devices are retained, software is often used to control them. Because of 
the explosive increase in the use of, and reliance on computers, methods to ensure the 
safety of computer-controlled systems have not always kept pace with the development of 
these very systems. Ethicists recognize there is a serious danger of overreliance on the 
accuracy of computer outputs and databases. The nonoccurrence of particular types of 
accidents in the past is no guarantee that they will not take place in the future. Software and 
hardware developers and information technology professionals alike must recognize their 
moral and ethical responsibilities. We can’t wait to learn from experience, but must attempt 
to anticipate and prevent accidents before they occur.
Computer-related safety and health issues—Today’s computer operators, particularly heavy 
users, may develop problems caused by the repetitive motions used daily in operating their 
machines. The most common problem is repetitive stress injury (RSI), in which workers 
experience moderate to severe pain in the muscles and joints of the hands, wrists, arms, 
shoulders, neck and back. RSI can be caused by carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS), irritation of 
the nerves leading to the fingers due to the prolonged use of a keyboard while the body is 
in an unnatural or strained position. RSI can be completely incapacitating, sometimes
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requiring surgery if not treated early. According to Patrick G. McKeown in his text, Living 
With Computers, these injuries are epidemic in computer-related jobs; RSI constitutes more 
than 60 percent of work injuries and costs employers $20 billion annually. Other health- 
related problems involve radiation emissions from the monitor and eyestrain from watching 
the screen for long periods of time without proper lighting or screen glare protection, as 
well as noise-induced problems caused by the pervasive low-level noise in today’s computer 
environment.
Because of the enormous costs resulting from worker’s health and safety issues, many 
organizations are opting for ergonomically designed work environments. Ergonomics, or 
human factor engineering, is the science of designing equipment for the workplace to keep 
employees safe and healthy while they work, which usually results in fewer physical 
complaints, higher employee morale and increased productivity. An ergonomically 
designed work area considers the following factors:
• The height and position of the monitor
• The height and angle of the keyboard
• A fully adjustable chair that provides lower back and adjustable arm support and height 
adjustment capabilities
• A keyboard that allows users to work with their hands in a natural position
• A mouse designed for either a left- or right-handed user with wrist support
• An anti-glare monitor screen
• Noise reduction measures
• Proper indirect and task lighting
• Adequate ventilation
In addition, employers should emphasize the proper use of equipment, encourage regular 
breaks, and provide stress reduction training for employees to further minimize the risk 
factors related to RSI and related injuries. In an ethical environment management is 
sensitive to the well-being of regular employees and applies the same principles to part-time 
workers and support staff.
Data Security
The protection of personal information from unauthorized access, disclosure, and 
duplication obligates a database owner to—
• Formulate and enforce standards for the proper use of the data.
• Communicate to, educate, and train users about their responsibility for protecting such 
information.
• Plan for likely contingencies.
• Establish adequate security controls.
• Monitor control exceptions.
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Data Integrity
An incorrectly entered arrest report, credit report, insurance rejection, debt default, or lab 
test can cause great emotional and financial damage. Yet the error rates of databases with 
such sensitive information are often higher than the standards of quality set by the original 
designers of these systems. Accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and relevance are what give 
information its value. In particular, creators of personal history databases have a special 
obligation to compile and process such data accurately and to protect it from the prying 
eyes of snoops, browsers, and hackers.
Today people can collect, process and disseminate information at a high speed. If 
information is irrelevant to the needs of users or is flawed in logic, assumptions or 
conclusions, relying on such specious data can cause catastrophic damage. Therefore, 
quality begins with clear objectives, exacting designs, flawless development and proper 
training of users. People and organizations involved in software development and database 
design are obliged to make products that are fit for their intended uses and have no 
fundamental defects.
Competence
The field of information technology is notable for its fast growth and complexity, and the 
sweeping social, economic, and political changes it has wrought. At times, change seems 
overwhelming. Skills and products become obsolete overnight. Companies must invest 
large sums of money in research and product development.
In the race to get new products out of the labs and into the market, people often 
compromise quality, safety and security. New products might contain design flaws, software 
errors, bugs and glitches, and other impediments to proper functioning. These impediments 
can be costly to uninformed and unsophisticated users. Makers and providers of 
information technology products—both hardware and software—must take great care and 
caution in their work to avoid damage or interruption of service to their users. Providers of 
information technology should seek the most competent people available for sensitive 
design and product development projects. They should also create an ethical climate in 
their firms and foster responsible behavior among all employees.
Honesty
Makers, sellers, dealers, distributors, and installers of information technology products— 
like all other business people—must be honest in their dealings with one another. All 
parties should use truthful representations, nondeceptive advertising, and accurate labeling, 
as well as fulfill contract requirements.
Loyalty
The information technology industry is large, complex, fast changing, and highly 
competitive. Some information products—such as chips and PCs—have become 
commodities. The relationship between buyers and sellers is changing from one in which 
mutual trust, confidence, and faith give way to arms-length transactions. Sellers attract 
buyers on the basis of price alone. The service-after-sale element is forgotten.
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These same industry dynamics have also changed the relationship between employers and 
employees. Loyalty is supposed to be a two-way street. In today’s competitive environment, 
some high-tech, high-talent employees are loyal only to their paychecks thereby blurring 
obligations between employers and employees, sellers and buyers, and manufacturers and 
suppliers.
Fairness
Normally people conduct business on the basis of mutual faith and trust. You cannot, 
however, provide for all contingencies in a formal contract. The writing and execution of a 
detailed contract would take too long, thus frustrating the objectives of both parties.
Assuming business ethics are a matter of mutual rights and obligations of the transacting 
parties implies that fairness is the rule by which we measure whether a transaction is right 
or wrong. In theory, both parties have equal bargaining power in a commercial transaction. 
Therefore, ethics should leave the parties to their own negotiations. Often in the 
information industry, both parties are not of equal size, competence, skill, knowledge or 
experience. In these circumstances, fairness may mean that the more powerful of the two 
has an added measure of obligation. The English common law treated buyers and sellers as 
equally competent to transact business. Yet in the modern era the notion of caveat emptor (let 
the buyer beware) has been diluted. Sellers with superior knowledge, skills, and resources 
must be most forthcoming. Fairness may no longer be a 50-50 proposition. Fairness 
depends on the relationship between the parties, their relative power positions, and the 
context of the business transaction.
2.2 Ethical Environment Checklist
CPAs can use table 2.1, Ethical Environment Checklist to help promote an ethical 
environment in their organizations and in those of their clients. No answers may require 
investigation and follow-up, the results of which should be documented. Use the Ref column 
to cross-reference the checklist to appropriate work papers.
Some sections in this comprehensive checklist may not be applicable or appropriate in 
certain instances. For example, most organizations will not conduct the entire employee 
screening procedures described in section 4 of the checklist. This checklist is intended for 
general guidance and information only. Use of this checklist does not guarantee the 
prevention of fraud. If fraud prevention is an especially vital concern or if fraud is suspected, 
consider seeking the advice of a knowledgeable fraud practitioner.
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Table 2.1 Ethical Environment Checklist
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Organizational Approach to Ethics
a. Does the organization have a Mission Statement that 
emphasizes respect for the law, ethics, and ethical conduct?
b. Does the organization have a written and enforced Code of 
Ethics?
c. If the organization or its employees are subject to outside 
ethical standards and rules (e.g., industry or professional), 
does the organization’s code refer to and emphasize their 
importance?
d. Does the organization have—
• Internal auditors?
• Electronic data processing (EDP) auditors?
• At least one Data-Security Officer or Administrator?
• A Corporate-Security or Loss-Prevention Unit?
• An investigative staff?
e. Does the organization, as a matter of written policy, refer 
incidents of employee crimes on the job to police or 
prosecutorial authorities?
f. If the organization has experienced fraud in the past five 
years, has management established the causes and taken 
remedial action for any of the following:
• A substantial inventory shortage corporate-wide
• A substantial inventory shortage in a major operating 
division
• A major embezzlement involving a loss of more than 
$10,000
• A successful penetration of the main office computers by 
outsiders
• An accounts payable, accounts receivable, payroll, or 
benefit claim fraud of any amount
• A commercial bribery of purchasing or other personnel
2. Situational Approach to Ethics
a. Are ethical considerations a critical element in corporate 
policies, tactics, and decision-making?
b. Is there a specific framework—especially for important and 
difficult corporate decisions or actions—for addressing the 
ethical element, such as a series of questions like those set out 
in item 2c (below)?
(continued)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
c. Does the organization, when contemplating actions or 
decisions that may raise ethical concerns, consider the 
following:
• Does the action violate any law or code to which the 
organization is subject?
• Is the action fair, just and equitable to all the parties 
involved?
• Does the action serve the common good and the public’s 
interest (for example, does it: (i) provide the greatest good 
for the greatest number, (ii) do the least harm to the 
greatest number, and (iii) yield social benefits that exceed 
the cost)?
• Would an ethical purist or role model (for example, the 
stereotypical good parent, priest or minister) approve of 
the act?
3. Policy Approach to Ethics
a. Does management set the right tone for employees and 
demonstrate the organization’s commitment to ethical 
conduct (for example, by regularly referring to the 
organization’s code of ethics in policy meetings and 
communications) ?
b. Do the organization’s policies in all activities, 
communications, and transactions reflect a commitment to 
the following:
• Honesty and integrity
• Competence and due care
• Commitment to excellence
• Fair and prompt dealings
• Respect for privacy and confidentiality
c. Does the organization have written policies that restrict or 
prohibit the following:
• Engaging in outside employment (moonlighting)
• Engaging in conflicts of interest
• Accepting gratuities, expensive gifts or lavish 
entertainments from vendors, contractors and suppliers
• Compromising or bribing customers
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Engaging in false advertising and deceptive marketing 
practices
• Disclosing company trade secrets to unauthorized persons
• Fixing prices with competitors
• Gambling on the job
• Abusing drugs or alcohol, or both
• Fighting on the job
• Stealing company property, including personal use of 
company property (for example, computer time)
• Destroying company property
• Falsifying time or attendance reports
• Falsifying production reports
• Falsifying personal data on a job application
• Falsifying or forging accounting records
• Destroying accounting records
• Falsifying expense accounts
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to confidential 
records (for example, payroll and personnel records, 
customer and vendor lists, research results, product and 
marketing plans)
• Allowing unauthorized persons access to company 
buildings or critical work areas
• Loaning company building access identification cards, 
badges or door keys to unauthorized persons
• Disclosing computer log-on codes or passwords to 
unauthorized persons
• Allowing unauthorized persons use of computer terminals
4. Ethics and Human Resources
a. To the extent necessary, when considering an applicant and 
depending on the importance and sensitivity of the position, 
does the organization perform reference checks, background 
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Credit standing
• Satisfactory past employment history
• Absence of criminal convictions (including name or 
fingerprint checks, or both)
• Reputation
• Character
b. Especially for very sensitive positions (for example, those 
affecting public safety, the custodianship of large amounts of 
cash or securities, the secrecy of important information), and 
to the extent allowed by law, does the organization 
administer any of the following to employees and 
prospective employees:
• Polygraphs
• Paper and pencil honesty tests
• Voice stress analyses
• Handwriting analyses
• Intelligence tests
• Psychological diagnostic tests
• Drug tests
c. Does the organization conduct or provide (or both) any of 
the following:
• Security orientation training for new hires
• Ongoing security awareness training programs for all 
employees
• Written rules of employee conduct to all employees
• Annual, signed employee declarations acknowledging 
awareness of the company’s code of conduct, and past and 
future adherence to it
• Hearings for employees charged with punishable offenses
• Employee representation at such hearings




• Performance appraisals ______
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(continued)
Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Coaching and counseling of employees whose work is 
unsatisfactory
• Counseling of employees with drug abuse problems
• Technical training programs
• Human resource development programs
• Tuition reimbursement
• Time off for study
• Time off for family emergencies
• Employee involvement programs
• Job enlargement, enrichment or rotation programs
• Exit interviews for departing employees
e. Does the organization compare favorably or at least equally 
with other firms in its industry, or areas of operations, or 







• Promotions from within the company
• Ability to recruit new employees
• Skills of its employees
• Educational level of employees
• Employee attitudes toward their work
• Employee loyalty
5. Ethics and Information Technology
a. Does the organization’s code of conduct specifically address 
the importance of using information technology (especially 
computers) in an ethical manner?
b. Are the following specific ethical concerns relating to 
information technology adequately addressed in the 
organization’s code of conduct and in its policies:
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Ethical Environment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Privacy of information (for example, information related 
to employees, customers or clients)
• Prohibition of software piracy
• Safety and health (for example, ergonomically sound 
computer workstations)
• Quality standards for information technologies and the 
information they process (for example, accuracy, integrity, 
security)
© Relationship of technology and human resources (for 
example, communication with employees concerning 
technological change, adequate training)
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3.1 Financing the Risk of Fraud
Every organization must identify its risks and implement a strategy that balances the cost of 
potential losses with the cost of an acceptable level of risk management. Although the risk 
of loss from fraud and other forms of dishonesty can be reduced, no amount of spending 
on prevention can eliminate it completely.
As with any area of risk, an organization can select an acceptable level of potential loss and 
finance it from its own resources by, in effect, self-insuring or through the purchase of 
appropriate insurance coverage. It would be imprudent not to consider purchasing 
insurance from a reputable insurance company, particularly in situations in which there is a 
significant risk of potential and possibly catastrophic loss. In reality, however, some 
organizations do not even consider, let alone acquire, the appropriate insurance because 
they do not know how to assess the risk and its financial impact correctly or they are 
simply unfamiliar with the nature of available insurance coverage.
Most individuals and businesses should never consider self-insurance, that is, waiting until a 
loss occurs and then absorbing the costs out of their own resources. This is particularly true 
where there is a risk of a catastrophic loss that may threaten the very survival of a business. 
In other areas of risk, it would be unthinkable to not obtain insurance against potential 
catastrophes such as life and disability insurance for breadwinners supporting families, fire 
insurance for homeowners, and liability insurance for professionals and automobile 
owners.
This chapter reviews the kinds of insurance coverage generally available against employee 
fraud and dishonesty. It also reviews some of the issues found in insurance policies, 
common exemptions, and some of the important duties of the insured. In addition, the 
chapter will provide a step-by-step guide to making a claim after the discovery of the 
dishonest act.
It must be stressed that an insurance policy is a contract. Insurance and legal advisers 
should be consulted to consider whether insurance is appropriate, the nature and extent of 
coverage required, and how any losses sustained should be handled.
3.2 Fraud Insurance
Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” of this Handbook provides a definition of fraud as 
criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. In that same chapter is a 
description of how a company may be victimized from outside by customers, suppliers, 
competitors or “con men,” and from inside by directors, officers, and employees (see 
Figure 1-2, How a Company Can be Victimized).
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Basic coverage insures a business against losses suffered directly as a result of fraud or 
dishonesty committed by employees of the insured (as defined in the policy). It typically 
forms part of a crime or dishonesty policy that also covers losses due to theft, 
disappearance, or destruction of the insured’s property.
Such coverage does not, however, protect against losses suffered as a result of the 
fraudulent and dishonest conduct by outside (nonemployed) directors or external parties 
when not in collusion with employees. Dishonest acts by outside directors may be covered 
under a separate director and officer policy although fraud against the insured or against a 
third party is not generally covered.
3.2.1 Overview
Insurance policies providing coverage against losses from employee fraud and dishonesty 
have many names including commercial crime, blanket bonds, and 3D policies 
(dishonesty, destruction, and disappearance). The desired coverage may be reflected in 
standard bond or policy language, as an extension of coverage or rider to existing 
insurance policies or in a manuscript format, that is, written for a specific company or set of 
circumstances.
Coverage and wordings may be specific to certain industries. For example, there are 
specific forms for financial institutions such as banks, brokerage houses, and insurance 
companies. For other industries, including manufacturing, health care, retailing, 
transportation, or service providers, dishonesty coverage is more generic. Regardless of the 
name used by a particular insurer, policies generally follow a similar format. This Handbook 
uses the term commercial crime policy when referring to coverage for employee fraud and 
dishonesty, unless otherwise noted.
When a company applies for a policy, the insurer will ask for information to be used in 
evaluating the risk and determining the premium. Although the type of details requested 
may vary from insurer to insurer, the information will always show how the applicant 
operates its business and the controls and procedures in place to prevent loss. If this 
information is false or erroneous or the insurer is not advised of changes such as 
discontinued or weakened controls, the ability to make a successful claim may be 
jeopardized. Therefore, the insurer must be informed of any changes that may affect 
assessment of the risk to be covered.
3.3 Important Provisions in Commercial Crime Policies
The principal components of a commercial crime policy are the Insuring Agreements. 
Their purpose is to describe and define the kinds of losses covered under the policy and 
make clear what needs to be demonstrated as proof of a valid claim, in addition to listing 
the various conditions and limitations. The first Insuring Agreement is typically for 
Employee Dishonesty or Employee Theft. The following types of losses, which do not reflect 
losses identifiable with or attributable to the conduct of employees of the insured, are also 
covered by Insuring Agreements:
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1. Loss inside the premises
2. Loss outside the premises
3. Depositor forgery
4. Money order fraud and counterfeit paper
The conditions and limitations further defining the coverage include the following:
• Definitions
• Exclusions
• Duties of the insured
3.3.1 Insuring Agreements
Employee Dishonesty or Employee Theft
Although the wording of this agreement may vary among insurers, there are certain 
important common elements that should be noted:
• The indemnity is for loss of money, securities, and other property
• The loss must result directly from one or more acts of an employee of the insured
• The employee can be acting alone or in collusion
• Coverage continues even when individual employees cannot be identified.
The meaning of various terms used, such as property or employee, may be given specificity in 
the “Definitions” section of the policy. It is essential, therefore, to refer to and understand 
the definitions outlined in the terms of coverage to ensure that the policy meets the 
particular needs of the organization. Some of the more significant terms, as they are 
typically defined in a policy, are discussed later in this chapter.
Where the Insuring Agreement is for Employee Dishonesty (sometimes described as Employee 
Fidelity), coverage for loss resulting directly from employee fraud or dishonesty is further 
qualified by wording that refines the scope of possible losses covered. Some typical 
wording is shown in Figure 3-1, Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts.
Note the reference to the manifest intent to cause the loss and obtain a financial benefit. 
Unfortunately, the courts have shown no consensus in the interpretation of manifest intent. 
Some have found this term applicable only where the employee intends to gain a benefit at 
the expense of the insured; others have found a broader meaning and afford coverage if the 
employee acted with such disregard for the insured that the loss was a virtual certainty. In 
one case, a court ruled: “Such a person is deemed to intend the natural and probable 
consequences of his acts.”
It is important to note, in the wording of Figure 3-1, the restriction on the type of financial 
benefit that disallows claims in situations in which the employee receives the benefit 
because of his or her position in the company. Therefore, in a situation in which the benefit 
intended and obtained by the dishonest employee is, for example, a bonus, there would be 
no grounds for a claim under the policy.
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Figure 3-1. Dishonest or Fraudulent Acts
DISHONEST OR FRAUDULENT ACTS
Dishonest or fraudulent acts are committed by an employee with the 
manifest intent to:
(1) Cause the loss
(2) Obtain financial benefit for the employee or any other person or 
organization intended by the employee (other than salaries, 
commissions, fees bonuses, promotions, awards, profit sharing, 
pensions or other employee benefits earned in the normal course of 
employment).
In a commercial crime policy in which the insuring agreement is for Employee Thefts 
coverage is for loss resulting directly from theft. The term theft may be defined as, for 
example, the unlawful taking of money, securities, or other property to the deprivation of 
the insured. There is no reference either to the intent of the person committing the theft or 
to their financial benefit. Although the word fraud is not used, the circumstances and 
resulting loss would be tantamount to fraud as defined in the policy.
Other Insuring Agreements
A typical commercial crime policy includes an insuring agreement against loss of money 
and securities by the theft, disappearance, or destruction within the insured’s premises or 
any banking premises (usually referred to as Loss Inside the Premises} or outside the insured’s 
premises while being conveyed by messenger or armored car company (usually referred to 
as Loss Outside the Premises).
A policy may also contain insuring agreements providing coverage against:
• Money Order and Counterfeit Paper Currency. Money order fraud and counterfeit paper are 
typically defined as loss due to the acceptance, in the normal course of business, of 
counterfeit currency, money orders, and so on.
• Depositor Forgery. Losses as a result of the insured having someone process forged checks, 
money orders, and so on, through its bank account.
A rider can provide additional coverage for risks not covered by a standard policy. Riders 
may provide coverage for losses from unauthorized electronic transfers, pension plan 
frauds, credit card forgeries, computer fraud, and the unauthorized use of telephone 
services. An insurance professional can ensure the rider provides the required 
supplementary protection.
3.3.2 Policy Definitions
Definition of words and descriptions adds specificity. In some policies, however, what is 
included by definition may be excluded in the “Exclusions” section. Therefore, 
“Definitions” should be read carefully and in conjunction with the “Exclusions” section.
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Employee
One of the most important definitions is that of employee. The definition of employee limits 
the coverage. Make sure the definition gives the kind of coverage required in the case of 
loss.
In a typical policy, an employee is defined as any person who, while in the regular service 
of the insured and in the ordinary course of business, is compensated by way of salary, 
wages, or commission. A policy may also be written to include temporary staff under the 
definition of employee.
Some persons defined as employees may be excluded from coverage. For example, a paid 
outside director of the insured not retained in any other capacity may be expressly 
excluded from the definition under the policy. Further, the definition may also exclude 
such third parties as agents, brokers, consignees, or independent contractors.
3.3.3 Policy Exclusions
An insurer will write policies with its own list of exclusions. Commonly found exclusions 
are losses from:
• Acts committed by the insured (the owner) or a partner
• War and insurrection
Read carefully and understand the terms before purchasing the coverage and obtain 
competent advice when preparing a proof of loss. The following sections describe other 
examples of commonly found exclusions.
Indirect Losses
Commercial crime policies specifically exclude indirect and consequential losses such as 
lost income, lost business opportunities, or lost interest on stolen funds. Although the 
insurer’s intent is to limit its obligations to direct losses only, court rulings have not 
consistently recognized this position. Discuss the relevant case law with legal counsel for 
any jurisdiction in question.
An indirect loss would also include investigative costs incurred in establishing the existence 
and amount of a direct loss. Separate coverage may be available from an insurance carrier 
to cover these costs; some write policies covering all or part of the costs of investigation, 
while others cover costs shared between the insurer and the insured. You should weigh the 
cost of this coverage in light of the potential cost of any investigation. A typical wording of 
an indirect loss exclusion is excerpted in Figure 3-2, Indirect Loss Policy Provision.
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Figure 3-2. Indirect Loss Policy Provision
INDIRECT LOSS EXCLUSION
Indirect Loss: Loss that is an indirect result of any act or “occurrence” 
covered by this insurance including but not limited to, loss resulting 
from:
(1) Your inability to realize income that you would have realized had 
there been no loss of, or loss from damage to, Covered Property
(2) Payment of costs, fees or other expenses you incur in establishing 
either the existence or the amount of loss under this insurance.
Atlas Construction Case Study
Atlas Construction, Inc. had a long history in construction and commercial 
development and was widely regarded as one of the most reputable companies in 
the region because it completed all projects on time and within budget Much of 
this reputation was attributable to the hands-on management style of project 
managers and the sophisticated accounting and management reporting system that 
could provide up-to-the-minute actual costs with a comparison to budget.
As part of risk-management, the operation was assessed annually for vulnerability 
to fraud and the effect of potential losses. In consultation with its insurance advisers, 
a standard commercial crime policy was in place, which provided annual coverage 
of $500,000 with a $5,000 deductible. There had been no claims made against the 
policy since its inception.
One day, an anonymous letter was received alleging that one of the project 
managers was colluding with a supplier to inflate invoices in order to receive 
kickbacks. A discrete investigation was undertaken to get to the heart of the 
problem without alerting or confronting the project manager.
Internal auditors together with external investigators and forensic accountants 
conducted a thorough review of bids for the supply of goods and services and the 
payment of supplier invoices. It soon became apparent that not only were certain 
suppliers’ invoices, which were consistently 7 percent higher than agreed, approved 
for payment by the project manager, but also numerous suppliers were found to be 
connected to the project manager and his close family members. Strong evidence 
showed that some “suppliers” were merely shell companies supplying no goods or 
services; their only purpose was to receive the payments from Atlas. The project 
manager was confronted with the evidence and confessed to the scheme although 
he claimed to have spent all the proceeds of the fraud.
Atlas determined it had lost almost $350,000 to the fraudulent suppliers. The police 
were notified and civil proceedings were initiated to recover. A claim against the 
insurance policy was made for $422,000 representing the loss from fraudulent 
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suppliers plus $72,000 in investigation costs (internal audit and external 
professionals) and legal costs. Atlas considered the $72,000 to be directly 
attributable to the fraudulent and dishonest acts of its employee and would not 
have been incurred but for his conduct. This part of the claim was denied on the 
basis of the policy’s explicit exclusion of such costs as indirect.
In ven tory Losses
One of the most common types of business loss is inventory loss. A company comes to the 
end of a reporting cycle and compares the value of inventory reflected in the perpetual 
inventory records to the value of the physical inventory on hand, and notes a significant 
discrepancy for several product groups. The value of physical inventory on hand is far less 
than the accounting records indicate. Is the discrepancy the result of recording errors in the 
perpetual system, a flawed physical count, errors in the values applied to the physical 
inventory or, possibly, theft?
A claim citing the discrepancy as proof of employee theft and the loss suffered would be 
denied under a commercial crime policy. The coverage would be denied on the basis of 
the policy’s “inventory loss exclusion” clause stating that an inventory loss, the existence of 
which is based solely on an inventory or profit-and-loss calculation, is excluded from 
coverage.
The inventory loss exclusion disallows claims for losses resulting from errors in the 
accounting records or improper physical inventory counts and pricing. A claim can only be 
successful if the evidence demonstrates there is no error or inaccuracy in the records and, 
in the absence of overt evidence of theft by employees or others, there is no plausible 
explanation for the discrepancy other than theft. It also excludes claims made where the 
discrepancy reflects inventory shrinkage occurring in the ordinary course of business. Such 
shrinkage may be the result of physical decline or reduction caused by evaporation, the 
disposal of damaged goods, promotional giveaways, and the distribution of samples to 
prospective customers.
There may indeed be suggestive evidence of inventory theft by employees. For example, 
employees may have been seen loading inventory into their cars after work on a Friday. 
The perpetual records may even show the items to be in stock despite the fact they cannot 
be physically located. The volume and frequency of the thefts must now be investigated. 
One Friday-night theft does not create a significant discrepancy.
The first step to determining whether an actual inventory loss has occurred is to understand 
the company’s accounting system as well as the internal control processes of the inventory 
cycle, the perpetual accounting system, and the physical inventory system.
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The inventory cycle includes:
• Manufacturing or purchasing process
• Warehouse receiving process
• Sales order process
• Warehouse shipping process
• Perpetual inventory accounting system:
• Purchase journal
• Sales journal
• Reconciliation process with physical count
• Physical inventory system
• Count process
• Pricing process
• Adjustments (obsolescence, shrinkage, and sales cutoff)
Understanding the control processes permits investigation of their operation during the 
period of the alleged theft. This knowledge should identify exploitable weaknesses and 
help focus the detailed investigation. It may also identify changes introduced by a 
particular employee or group.
If the accounting records are to provide the proof needed to substantiate a theft claim, the 
investigation should start with the most recent accounting period in which the perpetual 
system and the physical count were in agreement. Care must be taken, however, to identify 
and explain any accounting adjustments or unusual entries made to reconcile the perpetual 
system to the physical count. A comparison of the inventory accounting activity between 
the base period and the period of the alleged theft should identify some red flags. Pay 
particular attention to any large or unusual adjustments to the inventory records. 
Investigate and understand these adjustments because fraudsters often hide their thefts 
temporarily with accounting adjustments.
Another step is to interview the personnel working at the different stages of the inventory 
cycle including those involved in accounting for purchases and sales, receipts and 
deliveries, and those physically handling the inventory in the warehouse or transport and 
delivery. A productive interview requires a thorough understanding of what should have 
occurred. The interviews may identify control overrides and/or control weaknesses 
exploited by the fraudster. Also inquire about new employees or employees who have 
recently left the company and interview them, if necessary. The discrepancy could be 
revealed by a new employee’s activities or by a departed employee no longer able to 
conceal the theft.
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If an employee theft is uncovered, the insured will be required to file a Proof of Loss that
identifies:
• The thief (if known)
• The circumstances of the theft
• Period in which the theft took place
• The amount of stolen inventory
• The value of stolen inventory
As always, get advice from attorneys and insurance advisors when acquiring coverage or 
making a claim.
Inventory Loss Case Study
Jetro, Inc. has been a wholesaler of men’s clothing in Pennsylvania for the last ten 
years. The company maintains an integrated perpetual inventory system tied to 
purchasing and deliveries and sales. Historically, Jetro has taken annual physical 
inventory counts on December 31, the last day of the fiscal year. In 2002, however, 
Jetro’s internal accounting group requested a surprise count to be scheduled for 
March 31 and employees were notified just two days in advance.
The physical inventory count showed only $6.4 million, while the perpetual 
inventory system identified $6.5 million. After the internal auditors had 
doublechecked the numbers, they conducted an investigation to find the missing 
$100,000.
Using their knowledge of the entire inventory cycle, the internal auditors reviewed 
the activity recorded in the December 31, 2001, perpetual-to-physical inventory 
working papers. They also interviewed various warehouse and accounting 
personnel as to possible reasons for the shortage.
Their investigation uncovered the following red flags:
• Three purchase orders for $45,782, $48,925, and $49,818 were identified in 
December 2001 to three different companies that had not done business with 
Jetro for about two years. Internal audit found these amounts interesting since 
they were all just under the $50,000 limit requiring management approval. 
Further review of the invoices showed all three companies had processed billing 
address changes to P.O. boxes in South Carolina.
• As of March 31, 2002, all three companies still had the over-90-day receivable 
balance outstanding.
• During an interview, a part-time weekend warehouse employee said that, on 
Saturdays, he always noticed about 15-to-20 garment boxes stacked in pick-up 
bay 1. He found this strange since only bays 4 through 8 were used for Saturday 
shipments. When he questioned his supervisor, he was told not to concern 
himself with that order. He continued to notice this pattern on subsequent 
Saturdays but never inquired about it again. When questioned further by 
internal audit, the employee recalled this had been going on since about 
October or November 2001.
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• Upon further review of the March 31, 2002, physical count sheets, internal audit 
noted several handwritten adjustments to the count sheets. These adjustments 
increased the quantities on several brands of men’s suits.
Internal control became increasingly suspicious of Walter Wilson, the Saturday 
warehouse supervisor, because of what they knew from the interview with the 
warehouse clerk and from the fact that it was Mr. Wilson who had adjusted the 
count sheets. Internal audit decided to do some background checking before they 
confronted Mr. Wilson.
An outside investigation agency uncovered the following:
• The owner of the P.O. boxes in South Carolina belonged to Jennifer Hickey. 
Ms. Hickey was also identified as Jennifer Wilson Hickey, Walter Wilson’s 
married sister.
• It was discovered that Walter Wilson was the coowner of a small discount retail­
clothing outlet in New Jersey.
• Upon inspection of the New Jersey clothing store, the investigative agency 
identified numerous matches of suits sold by Jetro.
Based on the results of the investigation, Jetro confronted Mr. Wilson. After his 
initial denial, Jetro began to unveil the evidence. In the end, Mr. Wilson admitted 
to stealing an unknown quantity of men’s suits for sale in his store. He admitted to 
starting the theft in November 2001. He covered his 2001 theft with the three 
fictitious purchase orders and shipments. He estimated he stole another $250,000 of 
men’s suits in 2002. He was planning to leave Jetro before collection efforts 
commenced on the three fictitious December 2001 sales. In the meantime, the 
surprise inventory required him to adjust the March 31, 2002, physical counts to 
buy more time (and apparently steal more suits).
Now that  Jetro had Mr. Wilson’s confession, they needed to quantify the amount of 
loss for their insurance claim. A $489,525 “Proof of Loss” was eventually filed. The 
breakdown and support follow:
• $144,525 in 2001 representing the three fictitious invoices. Mr. Wilson utilized 
three former Jetro customer names because these customers were already 
approved to do business with Jetro. The billing address was changed to his 
sister’s P.O. boxes to assure that the three companies would not receive the 
billings. With the fictitious shipments to the three customers, no significant 
discrepancies would be noted in the December 31, 2001, perpetual-to-physical 
reconciliation.
• $345,000 in 2002 represents the theft in the first quarter. After reversing the 
March 31, 2002, handwritten count-sheet adjustments made by Mr. Wilson, the 
physical inventory totaled approximately $6.1 million, not $6.4 million. This 
now resulted in a $400,000 discrepancy. Based on a reconciliation of purchase 
and sale information in 2002, the investigation identified a purchase value of 
$345,000 in suits with no matching sales and no physical inventory of the suits. 
The reconciliation involved taking the perpetual inventory from December 31, 
2001, adding in all purchases of a particular brand of men’s suits (the 
merchandise Mr. Wilson was stealing) and subtracting all sales of the suits. This 
amount was then reconciled to the March 31, 2002, physical count to quantify 
the amount stolen.
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The remaining $55,000 ($400,000 less $345,000) does not relate to suit theft and thus was
not included in the claim. Internal control has attributed the $55,000 to shrinkage for the
first quarter of 2002.
In conclusion, a surprise physical inventory count, an observant part-time warehouse clerk 
and some diligent investigation on behalf of internal audit resulted in Jetro stopping a 
potentially larger theft and a being able to present a well-supported “Proof of Loss.”
Is this documentation enough to assure a full recovery? No claim payment can be 
guaranteed; however, every link between the employee and the claimed loss strengthens 
the insured’s claim.
Figure 3-3. Standard Inventory Loss Exclusion
STANDARD INVENTORY LOSS EXCLUSION
Loss, or that part of any loss, the proof of which as to its existence or 
amount is dependent upon:
(1) an inventory computation; or
(2) a profit or loss computation.
Source: Employee Dishonesty Coverage Form (CR 00 01)
Loan Loss
Among the various commercial crime policies available from insurers, financial institution 
bonds are specifically for financial institutions such as commercial banks, savings 
associations, savings banks, credit unions, insurance companies, and securities brokers.
Lending institutions suffer losses if the borrower fails to repay the loan and the market 
value of the collateral is too impaired to permit full recovery of the amount owed. Upon 
investigation, the borrower is sometimes discovered to have falsified the loan application 
by submitting false financial statements or appraisals. If a bank victimized by such a 
borrower were to file a claim under a financial institution bond, the claim would be denied 
under the “loan loss exclusion” clause that states that loans obtained through “trick, artifice, 
[or] fraud” on the part of the borrower are excluded. The loan loss exclusion specifically 
disallows claims for losses as a result of dealings with a deceitful borrower if no bank 
employee is involved in collusion with the borrower or other third-party beneficiary.
If the credit officer had an undeclared interest in the borrower and accepted a loan 
application he knew to be fraudulent, the financial institution bond might provide coverage 
for a loss. The loss must be shown to have been a direct result of his dishonesty and his 
manifest intent both to cause a loss to the financial institution and to obtain a financial 
benefit for himself or a third party. (See Section 3.3.1, Insuring Agreements, and Figure 3- 
1.)
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As with commercial crime policies, legal counsel should always guide a forensic accounting 
assignment involving a financial institution bond. This is true not only for the purpose of 
maintaining privilege but because certain provisions of the bonds are subject to varying 
and often conflicting interpretations in different jurisdictions. Moreover, certain elements of 
the coverage itself are controversial due to these same conflicting court interpretations or 
the lack of applicable court rulings.
Guidance and advice should be sought from legal and insurance advisors when acquiring 
coverage under a financial institution bond and making a claim.
The Kindly Old Loan Officer Case Study
A large multibank holding company acquired a small bank. Approximately one 
year after the acquisition, the bank experienced significant losses from a portfolio of 
small business installment loans that were all collateralized by 18-wheeler tractor­
trailers.
Initially, the bank did not have any proof of employee dishonesty but the size of the 
loss encouraged a closer look. Since loans can be manipulated in two ways, that is, 
to make dishonest loans or disguise the loan’s performance by making a delinquent 
loan look current, the bank decided to look first at those individuals who made 
decisions affecting the loan portfolio. A review showed the portfolio had been 
created and administered by one particular loan officer in the bank, who 
immediately became suspect. The bank’s investigation revealed that the loan officer 
had manipulated the monthly reports to show delinquent loans as current. The 
bank filed a claim with the insurance company alleging employee dishonesty.
The forensic investigation that followed included a review of bank documents as 
well as the personal financial records of the bank loan officer. Each loan was 
reviewed to determine whether it had complied with the bank’s loan policy and 
had been approved by the loan committee. Loan department reports were also 
reviewed for proper disclosure and loan histories examined for any payments 
made.
The documents reviewed included the loan applications, internal analysis and 
approval memos and documents, financial information provided by the borrowers, 
collateral information, and verifications. The loan closing documents, specifically 
the settlement or disbursement sheets, were also reviewed to discover whether the 
loan proceeds might have been used to pay kickbacks. Loan histories and loan 
delinquency reports were analyzed in detail. The delinquency and cash payment 
reports were compared to determine whether the loan payment status had been 
manipulated to show the loans as current when, in fact, they were past due.
This comparison showed the loan officer had intentionally falsified loan 
delinquency reports to make the loans look current. When confronted with the 
evidence, he admitted he had falsified the loan records to show payments when 
none had been made. He said he felt sorry for the borrowers who were suffering 
from the economic difficulties of the area and wanted to give them every chance to 
repay the loans. If the loans had been reported as delinquent, the bank would most 
likely have repossessed the vehicles. The loan officer either had a heart of gold or, 
as the bank suspected, was receiving kickbacks from the borrowers.
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The loan officer’s personal bank accounts were examined for evidence of financial
benefit. The bank interviewed some of the borrowers and, in some instances,
obtained updated financial information. The forensic investigation showed the loan
officer did not obtain any financial benefit from making the loans and the
borrowers obtained only the obvious benefit of the use of the loan proceeds.
A detailed review of the loan origination documents showed the loan officer 
initiated the loans, which were approved with no evidence that false information 
had been submitted to the loan approval committee. Moreover, the loan proceeds 
were indeed used to purchase the 18-wheelers. It was also noted that in most cases, 
the borrowers made consistent monthly payments for at least a year and all 
acknowledged their debt and made efforts to repay past due amounts.
The bank filed a claim under its financial institution bond with the insurer for 
reimbursement of the unpaid interest costs. The insurer denied the claim, and the 
bank turned to the courts for recovery. The court ruled in favor of the insurer on 
the grounds that the bank had failed to prove manifest intent to defraud on the part 
of the loan officer.
The Bank President Makes His Move Case Study
A bank made a large loan to a condominium developer for a new project that was 
bigger than anything the developer had built before. After a few months, the 
developer was unable to make interest payments and the loan appeared on the 
bank’s delinquency list. A preliminary review of the borrower’s history showed he 
had had financial troubles with other banks and should never have been granted 
the loan. A subsequent forensic investigation focused on the bank president who 
was also the senior loan officer. Deeper probing showed the bank president/loan 
officer had received a financial benefit in the form of ownership of a condominium 
unit in the project. The bank president held title through a shell company set up as 
a limited partnership whose general partner was a corporation he also owned. The 
manifest intent of the president was determined by the way the project financing 
was structured on false and/or incomplete information that was presented to the 
bank’s loan committee, which ultimately approved the loan.
The documents examined to discover the fraud included:
1. The loan request/application
2. The financial information provided by the borrower
3. The bank’s analysis of the financial information, including:
• Project budget and costs
• Projected sales proceeds
• Use of proceeds and loan repayment
4. The bank’s internal approval documentation, including:
• Loan officer’s recommendation
• Loan committee minutes
• Board of directors’ approval minutes
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03 15
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
5. Loan closing documents including disbursements
6. Settlement sheets and closing information for the sales of the condominium 
units.
A background investigation of the project developer/borrower showed that he had 
been a small player on other projects and lacked the resources to finance the kind 
of project presently in question. A review of the documents prepared and presented 
to the loan committee by the president raised serious questions about the 
borrower’s cash-flow projections and his capacity to service the loan. A search of 
the public records to discover the owners of units whose sale had already closed 
showed a company owned by the bank president holding title to a luxury unit 
whose price was far beyond anything he could have afforded on his known 
financial resources.
The bank filed a claim under its financial institutions bond and was ultimately 
reimbursed by the insurer.
3.4 Insured’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Loss
3.4.1 Duties of the Insured
Issuers of dishonesty policies typically impose several duties on the insured to protect their 
ability to recover. The insured must take action to prevent further loss, mitigate the 
damage, and recover from any loss sustained. These duties include:
1. Timely notice of potential loss
2. Filing of a “Proof-of-Loss” form
3. Cooperation with any insurance investigation
See Figure 3-4, Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss, for an example of the 
specific language spelling out the insured’s duties in a commercial crime policy.
Most dishonesty policies typically contain two additional obligations for the insured: 
agreeing not to prejudice the rights of the insurance carrier and accepting the procedures 
for filing a lawsuit in the event of a claim denial. See the following section for more 
information on these duties.
3.4.2 Handling the Discovery of Employee Dishonesty
Dealing with an allegation of wrongdoing against an employee provokes feelings of shock 
and betrayal within the firm and often causes a decline in internal morale and external 
goodwill. A large loss may also hurt the bottom line if it is not covered by fidelity 
insurance.
Dishonest acts must be addressed immediately whether by the police or pursued within the 
organization. In either case, your actions will influence whether or not you can recover 
under your fidelity insurance. Therefore, it is important to know how to respond when 
allegations of wrongdoing arise. Most victims (and even most claims adjusters), however, 
rarely deal with these types of situations and, as a result, they are often an education for all 
concerned.
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Figure 3-4. Insured’s Duties to Insurer in the Event of Loss
INSURED’S DUTIES TO INSURER IN THE EVENT OF LOSS
After you discover a loss or a situation that may result in a loss of, or 
loss from damage to, covered property you must:
(1) Notify us as soon as possible.
(2) Submit to examination under oath at our request and give us a 
signed statement of your answers.
(3) Give us a detailed, sworn proof of loss within 120 days.
(4) Cooperate with us in the investigation and settlement of any claim.
Source: Crime General Provisions (CR 10 00)
Victims of dishonesty should never forget that it is their property that has been lost. No one 
can relax when this kind of incident occurs. You must conduct yourself as if there were no 
insurance policy, make every effort to minimize or prevent additional loss and initiate 
proceedings for maximum recovery.
It is important to note the right of first recovery provisions in fidelity coverage. Typically, if a 
loss does not exceed the policy limit and recoveries are made, the right of first recovery is 
to the underwriter and then to the insured to satisfy any policy deductible. If, however, the 
loss exceeds the policy coverage amount, the right of first recovery is to the insured for the 
amount of the loss in excess of the bond coverage only and the aforementioned rule 
applies.
3.4.3 A Course of Action
The first decision to make on the discovery of any form of dishonesty is whether or not to 
conduct an investigation. Some victims choose not to proceed even when they have fidelity 
coverage. They consider the potential cost of an investigation, including time lost, external 
investigators’ expenses, legal fees, and the possibility of unknown additional costs, to be 
prohibitive.
There are, however, many reasons to proceed with an investigation. The loss may be 
covered under the fidelity insurance policy and therefore would be recoverable. In 
addition, there may be more to the dishonest scheme than was initially realized. Failing to 
investigate and take appropriate action when the crime is first discovered may prejudice 
the insured’s rights and result in coverage denial when the true extent of the loss surfaces. 
The involvement of more people than originally believed could make any initial corrective 
actions ineffective.
A victim who fails to report a loss or reports it late risks the possibility of coverage denial. 
The typical policy includes the standard requirement that a loss be reported as soon as 
possible (see Section 3.4.4, “Notice of Loss”). In addition, the insurer also immediately 
cancels coverage for any employee discovered to have committed any dishonest act. 
Therefore, it is extremely risky to continue the employment of an individual who has 
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defrauded or stolen from the company. If management determines that the best course is to
continue the employment of the dishonest employee, they should consult with the insurer
and request a waiver of the provision canceling coverage for that employee.
Assuming the organization decides to proceed with an investigation, management should 
assign a representative of the firm the responsibility of coordinating efforts to investigate, 
document, and prepare a proof of loss. In view of the timing obligations under the policy, 
this individual should be available immediately to prepare the claim. This claim coordinator 
should have a financial background and the authority to cross departmental boundaries if 
necessary. The claim coordinator must also understand all the policy details before 
beginning an in-depth investigation. This individual, together with legal counsel, should 
bear responsibility for all communications with the dishonest employee, the insurer, and its 
representatives including the agent.
3.4.4 Notice of Loss
Immediate action after discovery is critical because discovery triggers the policy’s notice 
and proof-of-loss timing requirements. The insured should notify the insurer by telephone 
and a follow-up letter. Although the coverage states “as soon as possible,” sooner is always 
better than later, as the date of notification is determined by the circumstances of the case 
and can become a question for a jury. One jury found seventeen days to be an 
unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer but for another a fifteen-month delay was not 
deemed too long.
Some victims opt to allow the dishonest individual to continue his or her wrongdoing in an 
attempt to gather evidence. This is not advisable because, as previously discussed, an 
insurer will cancel coverage for any dishonest employee immediately upon discovery, and, 
therefore, the policy will not cover subsequent losses.
When providing notice, it is not necessary to have developed all the facts or even the 
extent of the loss. After a more comprehensive investigation, the insured can then provide 
the details of the claim in the form of a written and sworn proof of loss. The typical policy 
requires the insured file the proof of loss within 120 days from the discovery of the 
dishonest act—not from the time the insured gave notice. If it seems impossible to meet this 
deadline, ask for an extension-in advance—from the insurer and request a response in 
writing. Most insurers will accommodate this request, thereby providing an extension 
under a reservation of rights.
3.4.5 Supporting Documents
Although insurers value statements made by the dishonest employee, they also require 
documentation supporting the claim of dishonesty and the resulting loss amount. Make it a 
priority to obtain and secure the relevant documents. Verify what may seem obvious or 
conclusive in appearance using the most complete documentation possible. Use discussions 
with other employees to determine the existence and importance of the documentation. 
Since dishonest employees often purposely understate or overstate the extent of their 
transgressions, the gathering of supporting documents is critical to correctly quantifying the 
loss.
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Early in the investigation, identify those employees or outside parties who may be able to
assist in the loss analysis. Although there are myriad factors that affect the timing and
appropriateness of interviewing these employees, remember that over time memories not
only fade but also become selective. Conduct these interviews individually and take
detailed notes. If possible, the claim coordinator should attend all interviews.
An Academic Love Story Case Study
The president of a small liberal arts college became concerned about possible 
wrongdoing as rumors reached him that a certain professor Smith was having 
extramarital affairs with some of his young students. The college had been founded 
by a Protestant denomination in the nineteenth century, and was known for its 
competitive admissions. In the president’s view, such conduct by a faculty member 
put the college’s very reputation at stake.
The president, a wise old bird, knowledgeable in the ways of the world, knew 
professor Smith’s salary and general financial circumstances were such that he 
could not finance his amours out of his tight family budget without alerting his wife. 
If the rumors were true, professor Smith would have to find the money elsewhere. 
He also knew that as a department head, professor Smith had a great deal of 
discretion in approving departmental expenditures, including those he made for 
himself.
The president began his investigation by assigning the college’s internal audit 
department (IAD) to look at professor Smith’s departmental purchases and travel 
expenses for the previous three years. Supporting documentation for all 
departmental purchases was analyzed, including purchase orders, invoices, shipping 
documents, and printouts of the relevant general ledger accounts. A “routine” 
inventory count of departmental equipment was also performed. The IAD noted 
that the transfer of equipment was properly documented on a few occasions. 
Nevertheless, of the 59 items purchased within the past three years, 33 could not be 
located in the departmental offices or elsewhere at the college.
A special review was made of all departmental travel and entertainment expenses, 
including individual time and expense reports (TERs) and original restaurant, hotel, 
airline, and taxi receipts. Usually, professor Smith maintained detailed, descriptive 
records when he traveled or entertained on college business. He wrote the names of 
his dinner companions on the actual restaurant receipts and included these names 
plus additional details such as titles, companies, and events on the TERs. The 
information could always be corroborated by other documents such as promotional 
material for an out-of-town conference or the visit of a distinguished scholar who 
had been entertained by professor Smith during his or her stay.
A review and analysis of recent TERs, however, revealed certain departures from 
these practices. Beginning in November 2000, professor Smith began using 
descriptions such as titles, organizations, etc., for his eating companions on the 
TERs but not the actual names. Of the approximate 67 dining companions on the 
TERs from November 2000 through June 2002, a total of 32 were not specifically 
named. Conversely, of the approximate 69 dining companions from January 1999 
through October 2000, all 69 were named.
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Examples of descriptions used on the TERs during the period from November
2000 through June 2002 included the following:
1. Dinner at the ABC Restaurant with three representatives from the DEF Medical 
School
2. Dinner with Dean of Undergraduate Studies and Associate Dean [at GHI 
University]
3. Dinner and beverages at M&S Chicago [with] Sr. Program officer-JKL 
Foundation
4. Lunch with MNO faculty and staff-PQR Restaurant.
In addition, professor Smith no longer wrote names or descriptions of dining 
companions on restaurant receipts for six of the TERs that were submitted for 
February through June 2002, as had been his normal practice prior to that time.
Without original supporting documentation, patterns (or deviations from patterns) 
such as these may not have been noted. Departures from previously used 
procedures can be an indicator of potentially fraudulent activities. The choice of 
periods for selecting the documents to be reviewed must also include a “clean 
period,” that is, a period before the dishonest individual was employed or before 
the fraudulent acts began. In this matter, it was suspected that the fraud began 
sometime in 2001. If the period selected for review had been limited to just 2001 
and 2002, the deviations from the “normal” patterns or procedures evident in 1999 
and 2000 might not have been discovered.
As the fraudulent activity escalates, patterns can also often be found in either the 
increasing frequency of the occurrences or the increase in dollar amounts. This 
often occurs as a result of the dishonest individual becoming bolder as more and 
more of the dishonest acts go undetected.
Since professor Smith could not name legitimate dining companions to include on 
his submitted receipts as he had done during the “clean period,” he used instead 
vague or general descriptions that made it appear that his travel expenses were for 
legitimate college business. This deviation was noted both on the original receipts 
and on the TERs. The analysis provided other deviations from the “clean period” 
including more out-of-town stays that extended into the weekends and later meal 
times.
Based upon these findings, a number of individuals from organizations outside the 
college were contacted in order to corroborate the information recorded on the 
TERs as part of a “routine” IAD examination. A total of 26 documented dining 
companions were contacted in an attempt to verify the information recorded on the 
submitted TERs. Fifteen of the 26 interviewees stated that they did not dine with 
professor Smith on the date or at the location noted on the TERs.
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Conclusion and Analysis
Professor Smith was confronted with this information and confessed to bringing “a 
friend” and submitting false expenses on a number of his purported business trips. 
Professor Smith also admitted to submitting false and fraudulent TERs to the 
college including false statements of business meetings and fictitious dining 
companions as methods for justifying meal, travel, and hotel costs as reimbursable 
expenses incurred in connection with college business. He also admitted to giving 
equipment that had been purchased for his department to these same “friends” as 
gifts. So much detailed information and supporting documentation was gathered for 
each missing piece of equipment and questionable “business” trip that professor 
Smith was compelled to admit the full extent of his wrongdoing.
This detailed information gathering also simplified the quantification of the loss to 
the college. After all of the original receipts and invoices had already been 
collected, it became a simple matter to add up the fraudulent expenses and costs of 
the stolen items. Finally, the corroborative evidence also facilitated the insurer’s 
claim verification process.
After the full story had been pieced together, it turned out that professor Smith was 
indeed wayward and had been supporting one-half of his double life on the 
departmental budget. As the college president had suspected, professor Smith could 
not afford these activities on his academic income alone and did not want to reveal 
his philandering to his wife. He had his cake and ate it too by developing this crude 
scheme to finance his amours and escape the oversight of both his wife and the 
college auditors. He was reprimanded but not dismissed and the college was 
successful in its claim against the insurance company. His wife was never any the 
wiser.
3.5 The Insurer
3.5.1 The Insurer’s Investigation
After receiving the proof of loss, the insurer may send an independent investigator to 
analyze the claim. Start preparing for this investigation by designating one contact 
person—usually the claim coordinator—to act as liaison for all requests from and 
discussions with the insurer’s representative. Provide a secure working area close to the 
contact person and segregated from the general business operations so that the insurer’s 
investigators can review documents but are in no danger of having unauthorized 
communication with the insured’s staff.
Control the flow of documents. All documents to support the claimed loss should be 
segregated and examined by the claim coordinator before the insurer’s examiner arrives. 
They should be well organized and, if possible, indexed. The investigators should address 
any requests for additional documents in writing to the designated contact person. No 
documents should be given to the insurer’s investigators without having been first reviewed 
by the claim coordinator.
Fraud Supp. 3—3/03 21
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
The independent investigators will probably want to interview the dishonest employee’s 
superiors and coworkers and talk to the person who “discovered” the loss. The insured’s 
representatives have the right to attend these interviews and should do so. The investigators 
may request the interviews be taped but either the insured or the interviewees may refuse 
this request. If the interview is recorded, ask for a transcript; if not, take comprehensive 
notes.
Do not give independent investigators access to a photocopier. Instead, designate someone 
from the insured organization to copy all documents. Two copies of each document should 
then be made or the copied documents should be flagged in some other manner.
3.5.2 Subrogation Rights and Duties
If the insurer pays any portion of the claim, the insurer is subrogated to the insured’s 
recovery rights. This is covered under Section B 17 of the crime general conditions policy 
form.
Although subrogation is thought of as arising in the context of a resolved claim, it also 
imposes a further duty on the insured long before resolution. The insured must in no way 
jeopardize the subrogation rights of the insurer.
However, if the insured has the opportunity to maximize its recovery as a result of 
accepting a setdement offer from the dishonest employee or the employee’s attorney, the 
insured could appear to be acting contrary to the language of the subrogation provision. In 
this case, the insured should bring the settlement offer to the attention of the insurer and 
demonstrate its benefits. Generally speaking, insurers will agree to reasonable settlement 
offers. As always, get all such “side agreements” with the insurer in writing.
3.5.3 Response to a Claim Denial
Denial of a claim is not necessarily the end of the matter. Request a detailed, written 
explanation for the denial. Ask independent advisers to review the claim and the reasons 
for its rejection to determine carefully whether the denial is warranted. If you can make a 
good argument for coverage and it becomes necessary to file a lawsuit against the insurer to 
invoke coverage, the provision form stipulates certain procedures for the insured to follow 
(see Figure 3-5, Legal Action Against Insurer Provision).
As stated in the clause in Figure 3-5, the insured must give the insurer at least 90 days from 
the date the proof of loss was filed to investigate and make a decision about the claim. Only 
after this period has expired, may the insured file a lawsuit against the insurer. The insured, 
however, is permitted two years following discovery of the crime to bring such an action.
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Figure 3-5. Legal Action Against Insurer Provision
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST INSURER PROVISION
You may not bring any legal action against us involving loss:
(1) Unless you have complied with all of the terms of this insurance;
(2) Until 90 days after you have filed proof of loss with us; and
(3) Unless brought within 2 years from the date you discover the loss.
3.5.4 Summary
Fortunately, most organizations experience few employee dishonesty losses of any 
consequence. The strict policy requirements and sensitive nature of the investigation 
required to document claims and the entire process of asserting a fidelity coverage claim 
can be quite intimidating. If addressed in a well-thought-out and logical manner, however, 
you can effectively handle employee dishonesty claims. The process reviewed in this 
Handbook should give risk and insurance professionals some guidance for planning a 
response.
3.6 Fraud Insurance Checklist
Table 3.1, “Fraud Insurance Checklist,” is designed to assist CPAs in addressing risk 
financing and insurance for fraud and dishonesty in their organizations and in those of their 
clients. If necessary, investigate and follow up “No” answers, and then document the 
results. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference the checklist to any additional 
documentation.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If risk financing is a 
concern, seek the advice of a risk management specialist.
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TABLE 3.1 FRAUD INSURANCE CHECKLIST
Fraud Insurance Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Purchase of Insurance Coverage Against Fraud
a. Has management reviewed operations to determine the nature 
and extent of potential losses from fraud and commercial 
crime?
b. Has management considered the extent to which the 
organization can self-finance this risk (that is, could it survive a 
major or catastrophic loss without insurance)?
c. Has management taken all reasonable steps to remedy any 
previously identified vulnerable areas of the business or any 
weaknesses in internal controls?
d. Has management established contact with a reputable 
insurance broker capable of placing the required fraud and 
theft coverage?
e. Has management assigned an appropriate person the task of 
liaising with the broker to determine alternative kinds, levels, 
and costs of coverage, and to report back to management on 
these alternatives with appropriate recommendations?
f. Are procedures in place to provide for the timely and 
appropriate response to circumstances where dishonesty is 
identified, suspected or alleged?
g. Prior to finalizing the recommended coverage, has 
management and, if necessary, legal counsel, carefully 
reviewed the wording of the policy to ensure the following:
• Definitions, exclusions, and other clauses are acceptable 
and consistent with the nature of the business.
• When possible, duplication with other insurance (for 
example, fire policies) has been avoided. —
• All statements and information provided on the application 
for insurance are complete and accurate (for example, 
where an internal control is indicated, does it exist and is it 
operating effectively).
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Table 3.1 (continued)
(continued)
Fraud Insurance Checklist Yes No NA Ref
i. Prior to signing, has management reviewed the wording of the 
policy to determine what changes, if any, are required and 
which of these changes should be made in the conduct of the 
business, including the following:
• Hiring and screening of new employees
• Use of contract employees, who may not be covered
• Bookkeeping and reporting practices
• Internal controls
2. Maintenance of Insurance Coverage
a. Is a mechanism in place to ensure that the organization meets 
the important terms in the policy in order to keep the policy in 
good standing, including the following:
• Paying premiums when due
• Reporting any loss incidents to the underwriter, even those 
below the deductible when no loss claim is filed
• Maintaining adequate internal controls and good security 
practices (for example, locking safes)
• Reporting to the underwriter any changes in the accounting 
system
• Reporting to the underwriter any changes in the nature and 
scope of operations from that may affect risk
b. Does the organization review its coverage on at least an annual 
basis to ensure that the coverage remains adequate and 
continues to meet acceptable cost-benefit criteria?
c. Does the organization assess its risk and its financing through 
insurance on at least an annual basis?
3. Discovery of Dishonesty and Theft Insurance Claims
a. Immediately upon suspicion or discovery of a loss incident, has 
the organization implemented the following steps:
• Protection of assets from further loss
• Preservation of relevant documentation and other evidence
• Notification of the underwriter by hand delivery or 
registered (certified) mail (“return receipt requested”)
• Involvement of legal counsel and a claim coordinator
Never ignore this issue; you must act as if there is no 
insurance
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Fraud Insurance Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Internally, or in cooperation with the underwriter (or both), are 
adequate resources in place to undertake a thorough and 
timely investigation?
c. After establishing reasonable suspicion of a criminal act, has 
management called in the police?
d. Has management ensured that no actions are taken to 
prejudice the insurance claim, or the underwriter’s ability to 
make recoveries, or both (for example, obtain underwriter’s 
permission before reaching settlement with third parties or 
suspected perpetrators) ?
e. Has management considered initiating legal proceedings to 
ensure maximum recovery?
f. Are adequate personnel and procedures in place to perform 
the following:
• Document the insurance claim (that is, the “Proof of Loss”)
• Follow up with the underwriter as required until the claim 
is settled
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CHAPTER 4:
Computer Security and System Recovery
4.1 The Role of Computers in Modern Corporations
It is fair to say that modem multinational corporations could not exist without the 
computer. The size of today’s enterprises, the globalization of trade, the velocity of business 
and the sensitivity of financial marketplaces to news are all driven by the ability to move, 
store, analyze, and present huge volumes of information quickly, cost-effectively, and 
accurately. Computers track every type of asset, manage accounting, handle word 
processing, operate phone and voicemail systems and control communications. Computers 
have evolved from large mainframes to networks of PCs—each of which has capabilities 
greater than most of the mainframes from the sixties and seventies—to provide a wide 
range of services to the modern corporation. Even in those systems whose development 
was the prime mover of computers from government laboratories to corporate use such as 
airline reservation systems and banking, we are witnessing a rapid development away from 
the legacy mainframe to networks of file servers. COBOL, FORTRAN and the other 
programming and machine languages that facilitated the computer revolution have become 
largely anachronistic and will inevitably become the digital equivalent of ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphs.
This trend toward digitization is not hidden within corporations and government agencies. 
More and more, it intrudes into everyone’s life. Going to the bank used to mean dealing 
with a teller. Now we interact with an ATM or perform many of our transactions through 
an internet connection with our bank. Our phone systems have digital backbones where 
our words axe translated into binary impulses speeding through optical fibers or shooting 
into space on their way to or from satellites. The same phone system can simultaneously 
carry our voice conversations and provide us with high-speed always-on internet 
connections.
If those computers on which we depend both as corporations and as individuals fail or are 
compromised, whether by accident or by deliberate action, we are in trouble. Preventing 
an incident is infinitely preferable to dealing with one after the fact. If an incident occurs, 
however, the corporation must have a way of recovering operations quickly and efficiently 
and of understanding how and why the incident happened. Therefore, the establishment of 
appropriate policies, procedures, and tools to provide computer security and to facilitate 
system recovery has become a vital function of any organization.
Make no mistake: computer and information security are complex subjects that grow and 
become even more complex every day. Surveys indicate that the security of information 
stored in and processed by computers has become a major issue at the most senior levels of 
management. Businesses spend many billions of dollars each year on hardware and 
software to control access to computers, secure the data they contain, and detect intrusions.
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They invest hundreds of millions more in systems that permit efficient recovery should a 
problem occur. The federal government has recognized the importance of computer 
security in the post 9/11 world and has not only established requirements for security 
within federal systems, but has established an office to coordinate computer security as part 
of the larger Homeland Security infrastructure. There are firms, some with thousands of 
employees, specializing in computer security. Clearly, this is a highly specialized field. One 
chapter in this Handbook cannot make you an expert in computer security and it is not 
intended to do so.
This chapter orients you to the field of computer security so that you, as a CA or CPA, can 
be certain not only to handle computer security and systems recovery appropriately but 
also to consider the major risk factors.
4.2 Management’s Security Issues
In the modem, global business environment, the computer has evolved from being a 
number cruncher used by the accounting department and tended by a priesthood of 
mathematical geniuses in a glass-fronted, fire-protected, climate-controlled computer room, 
to infiltrate virtually every facet of the corporation. The computer has replaced typewriters 
with word processors, adding machines with spreadsheets, and voluminous physical files 
with database programs. Time clocks have morphed into automated timekeeping systems 
or become integrated into access control systems. The eyes of inventory control specialists 
have become bar code scanners. In many companies, all significant information 
concerning assets, transactions, and operations are held on one or more computers. The 
twenty-first century organization likely makes use of hundreds or even thousands of 
computers connected in various local area networks (LANs) and wide area networks 
(WANs) connected through switches, bridges, routers, firewalls, Virtual Private Networks, 
frame relay connections, and the global Internet. An organization may have dozens of 
these networks each using servers ranging in power from PCs to mainframes.
4.2.1 Components of Security
Data Communications
Businesses do not exist in a vacuum. Increasingly, companies are dedicating more 
resources to data communications. Many companies—perhaps most, by now—have 
moved onto the Internet both as a way of distributing information and transmitting 
information between people or units. Usually, this refers to the World Wide Web, but often 
includes the use of what are called Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). VPNs are secure 
channels for communicating between a central site and distributed users. Through the use 
of encryption technology, a VPN provides the means for sending secure traffic over 
insecure networks like the Internet. The Internet also includes the technology that 
facilitates electronic mail (email) which has become ubiquitous, instant messaging, which 
has moved from being a favorite communication tool of teenagers to an increasingly 
important tool in business, and the use of various techniques (or protocols) to move files 
across the Internet. Some of these provide a good level of security. Others do not. The 
space on business cards that in former years held a Telex address now is far more likely to 
display an email address and a Web site identifier.
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Many companies are developing and fielding what are sometimes called extranets that link 
their suppliers and distributors through Internet technology. Other businesses seeking more 
security than is provided on the global public Internet have turned to private network 
providers who operate worldwide data communications networks. These providers use the 
same tools and protocols as the Internet but limit their availability to subscribers and 
employ various encryption tools to safeguard the information from eavesdroppers.
The latest communication tools have eliminated the use of wires or fibers. Businesses are 
rapidly installing wireless communication systems either entirely in-house, for example, a 
wireless LAN, or globally, through tools such as Internet-enabled cell phones. 
Unfortunately, the security of proprietary information broadcast through the air is not 
automatically assured. We have entered the age of the “drive-by hack”. Intruders can now 
sometimes enter our networks by simply driving near our buildings with a wireless-enabled 
laptop computer to intercept or send messages over insufficiently secured wireless network 
connections.
Security and System Structure
Before computers, businesses achieved information security by installing locks on file 
cabinets and file-room doors and by restricting access to various rooms, files and 
documents. “Intelligent” security systems generally involved underpaid security guards 
who might (or might not) provide an increased level of protection. During the initial period 
of computerization, systems were characterized by extreme centralization. Organizations 
used mainframe computers with attached terminals; if effective access control existed on 
the central system, since the hardware outside of the computer room generally consisted of 
“dumb” terminals and local printers, the security situation seemed manageable. Today, the 
situation is different. How is it possible to secure computer networks and data 
communications structures that are not only complex but also may exist on a global scale? 
How do we secure systems that may have hundreds of servers in dozens of locations and 
communications networks that use private circuits, the Internet, and wireless channels to tie 
the pieces together?
As businesses increasingly rely on computers and networks, they have a greater need to 
secure their information-processing infrastructure against accidental or deliberate damage 
and to provide an efficient, effective, and secure system for backup of data and programs 
on a regular basis. Organizations need security systems that will facilitate restoring 
information following an incident or outage. Systems are virtually impossible to manage 
and keep secure if they are not properly organized, structured and documented. As a key 
aspect of security and recovery and as a measure of preventive maintenance, businesses 
should implement a structure for organizing and storing information, for example, data 
files, spreadsheets, word processing documents, and so on. In developing an effective 
information storage structure, you should consider issues such as file nomenclature and file 
access privileges.
There is a lesson that too many organizations have learned the hard way: the worst possible 
time to discover that your data recovery and business continuity plans are not good enough 
is just after an incident has occurred and your management and your users are screaming 
for the system to be restarted.
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External Versus Internal Security
As people recognize that information has enormous value—sometimes, in fact, an even 
greater value than anything else in the organization—their need to safeguard this 
information increases. The risks inherent in the processing, storage, and transmission of 
that data have also increased, however, particularly as the Internet has flourished. There 
have been many documented cases of industrial and economic espionage designed by 
organizations attempting to jump-start their business activities by stealing proprietary 
information. In a number of countries, governments also recognize the value to their 
economies of conducting active intelligence programs that can include what is sometimes 
called “Industrial Espionage”. When you are being targeted by a hostile or supposedly 
friendly foreign government, you have to understand that it is only your data security that 
protects you.
Companies have also been victimized because management believed the major risk they 
faced was from outside the organization. They spent substantial resources on firewalls and 
anti-virus protection and very little on other forms of security. Unfortunately, study after 
study indicates that 80 percent or more of crime against business is perpetrated from within 
the company, that is, from inside the firewall. This is not meant to suggest that the external 
threat can be ignored. That threat is growing, as we can see from the highly publicized 
incidents of viruses, worms, and “denial of service” attacks. But many of these could be 
prevented by using a combination of straightforward technological safeguards and 
common sense.
As systems grow more complex with the increase in bandwidth connecting to the Internet, 
it is important when assessing security that you consider a wide range of threats and a wide 
range of ways in which to thwart those threats. Although an outsider can hack into your 
network to gain access to a specific file, an insider might be able to pick up a carelessly 
stored backup tape and walk out with a copy of every file in your system recorded on a 
tape small enough to fit into a shirt pocket.
Because of a corporation’s vulnerability, no one should question the need for computer 
security and the ability to recover from problems both natural and human. It is useful, 
therefore, to focus on some of management’s key concerns.
4.2.2 Management’s Key Concerns
Managers in business and government have recognized the growing importance of 
computer processing to their organizations. Over the last few years, they have expressed 
their concerns in a wide variety of surveys and publications. These concerns generally fall 
into one of the following three functional categories:
1. Theft of confidential information
2. Information integrity
3. System availability
Each of these concerns is addressed in the sections that follow.
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Theft of Confidential Information
Because companies increasingly store more information in computer systems, corporate 
governance theorists and practitioners must recognize that in the current environment 
internal controls have to provide reasonable assurance that this information is well 
protected both in use and through backup and that only properly authorized employees 
have access.
For example, theft of proposed pay scales or negotiating positions dining labor negotiations 
would be detrimental to the spirit of the collective bargaining process not to mention a 
violation of a number of criminal statutes. Theft of marketing or pricing plans would result 
in a loss of competitive advantage. Similarly, theft of personal or financial customer 
information could result not only in embarrassment but also in a direct loss of business and 
possible litigation. Even where information is given out voluntarily, it can cause substantial 
damage. In 2003, JetBlue Airlines voluntarily provided data on more than a million 
customers to a U.S. Defense Department contractor engaged in research to identify 
characteristics of potential terrorists. This was done in violation of the airline’s published 
privacy policy. Aside from very negative publicity, several investigations have been 
opened, and a number of passengers have filed lawsuits and are attempting to gain class 
action status.
The threat to the national economy of the loss of valuable intellectual property has become 
so great that the government has enacted the Electronic Espionage Act, which makes the 
theft of intellectual property a federal crime punishable by up to ten years in prison. 
Increasingly, the Digital Millenium Copyright Act is also being used as a basis for 
safeguarding confidential information and for prosecuting those who seek to distribute 
protected proprietary data.
Information Integrity
Because of the large volume of information processed by computers, it is not always 
feasible to confirm the validity or accuracy of processing results. To a large extent, users of 
a system make the assumption that the information presented to them by various 
applications is correct. Therefore, management seeks assurance that computer-generated 
information is reasonably protected against unauthorized tampering by employees, 
computer viruses, hackers or other forms of sabotage or accident.
For example, tampering that results in inaccurate reporting of sales figures could, in turn, 
cause inappropriate production, excessive (or inadequate) inventory levels, and lost 
product sales. Inaccurate unit production costs could result in disastrous pricing decisions. 
Unauthorized altering of the accounts-payable records could result in incorrect check 
routing and amounts, and thus create direct financial loss.
System Availability
While recognizing their organization’s dependence on the data processing service, 
management needs to be reassured not only that everything has been done to reduce the 
likelihood of disruption but also that there are plans in place for resuming data processing 
in the unlikely event of a major catastrophe. The total or partial loss of data processing 
services would make it difficult, if not impossible, for most organizations to perform routine 
business operations. This must also be understood in light of so-called “denial of service” 
attacks in which hackers do not attempt to break into a system but just to flood it with data 
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and thus render it inaccessible to authorized users. An information systems disaster
recovery plan is not necessarily enough, however. A document with broader coverage,
usually called a Business Continuity Plan must take into account the issues of personnel
availability, customer demand levels, availability of alternate office locations, changes to
business process that will be necessary during the critical period, etc.
4.2.3 Effective Computer Security Systems
An effective computer security program can help to manage and, to a certain extent, 
alleviate the above concerns. The design of an effective computer security program must 
take into account the nature of the risk as well as the nature and cost of the controls 
required to reduce exposure. Note that there is no such thing as 100 percent protection. 
The growth of networking and particularly of the Internet has materially increased the risk 
of computer crimes and incidents. The following areas are among those that management 
must address.
Accidental Versus Deliberate Events
The events that result in breaches in confidentiality, integrity or availability may be 
accidental or deliberate in nature and may be the result of actions either internal or 
external to an organization.
On a day-to-day basis, statistics indicate that management should be able to trace most 
incidents to internal accidents such as an employee entering incorrect data or inadvertently 
deleting an essential file. Accidents also include failures arising out of undiscovered 
program errors or bugs.
Virtually every system in use today is built on a software platform that exists as one or 
more software packages procured from manufacturers. A few may be custom written but 
even these almost universally operate on a standard, purchased operating system such as 
Windows® or Linux. In any case, the systems that support an organization, whether 
procured or written in-house, may consist of tens or even hundreds of thousands of lines of 
code. It is virtually impossible to test every possible condition that might occur in these 
immensely complex systems. Indeed, most companies will never actually see the computer 
code that makes up the programs they use every day, because software companies consider 
that to be their exclusive property. Program bugs exist in every major system. With the 
marketplace demanding speedier program development cycles, manufacturers have 
converted at least a part of their traditional testing procedures into beta testing in which the 
manufacturers release an advance version of the software to customers who test its 
capabilities on their systems.
It is important to understand the difference between beta testing and the more traditional 
system testing. In system testing, the software is stressed with deliberate input errors, 
processing problems and anything else the testing team can do to cause the software to fail. 
In beta testing, however, the users are not deliberately stressing the system in an attempt to 
make it break down. Nonetheless, commercial-software beta testing is valuable, and results 
in reports to the manufacturer of hundreds or even thousands of potential program bugs. 
Regardless of how thoroughly a program is tested, it can still fail and fail disastrously as the 
result of an accidental bug. Indeed, there has been a continuing problem with newly 
identified security issues in widely used packages, which has forced vendors to issue a series 
of software “patches” designed to close specific security holes. Any organization that is not 
8 Fraud Supp. 4—3/04
Chapter Four: Computer Security and System Recovery
closely monitoring the manufacturers of every piece of installed software for newly 
identified problems and that does not have a procedure in place to rapidly install new 
patches across all relevant systems is likely to be running with security “holes” that may 
place the integrity of proprietary information at extreme risk!
Prevention, Detection and Recovery Controls
Prevention is the best and most effective way to minimize the impact of an unwanted event 
that could affect information confidentiality, integrity or availability. In the case of 
deliberate acts, preventive controls will reduce opportunity and thereby remove 
temptation. Another important factor in preventive control is the notion of deterrence 
because it creates a belief in the mind of would-be perpetrators that they are likely to be 
caught and punished if they attempt a computer-related crime.
Preventive controls, however, cannot and do not provide a 100-percent guarantee that a 
problem will not occur. As a result, organizations typically use complementary detective 
controls to highlight any actual or attempted security violation. For example, existing 
software features may successfully prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to data. 
In these situations, the software is programmed to produce reports that document all 
attempts by unauthorized users to access restricted data—a feature known as detective 
control.
In addition to preventive and detective controls, organizations must prepare in advance for 
recovery from unexpected events. For example, a plan to use backup copies of files to 
retrieve an accidentally deleted data file constitutes a recovery control as would having 
software available to repair simple problems that can make files on a disk unreadable.




The mix of controls used depends on the nature of the information stored on the computer 
taken together with the degree of reliance that can be placed on the computer plus 
management’s willingness to accept the associated risks. In the rapidly changing global 
environment in which we work, where Internet connectivity grows at an unprecedented 
rate and new equipment and software may become obsolete in months, it is no simple 
matter to keep security features ahead of or at least in line with potential threats.
4.3 Physical Security
Physical security is the generic term used to describe the protection of the computing facility. 
The controls exercised under the heading physical security are typically preventive and 
detective in nature.
Many may think that physical security has become unimportant in the age of the personal 
computer when virtually every employee has a powerfill workstation with a fast processor 
and access to company networks that are often equipped with huge local storage disk 
drives. But the reality is that mid- to large-size organizations still use midrange computers 
(such as the IBM AS400, Digital Vax and Alpha systems, HP 9000s, and similar systems 
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from other manufacturers), mainframes (such as the IBM System 390) and large scale DEC, 
SUN, HP, Dell and Unisys servers. Even managers at companies that base their computing 
on a LAN often realize that smaller file servers are best protected by placing them in a 
dedicated and protected operating facility. In some cases, the servers are placed in the 
former mainframe room, where they take much less space, and where there is certainly 
plenty of power, cooling and fire extinguishing capabilities.
Physical security primarily addresses the accessibility concern—the ability to physically 
access a machine—and attempts to minimize the potential for system loss as a result of 
equipment theft or damage. To achieve physical security, consider each of the following 
areas:
1. Computer or Server Room Construction
2. Fire Detection and Suppression
3. Water Protection
4. Electrical Power Reliability
5. Environmental Control
6. Physical Access and Surveillance Controls
7. Physical Security for PCs
8. Physical Security for Portable Computing Devices
Details on each of the components of physical security are presented in the sections that 
follow.
4. 3.1 Computer Room Construction
The National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) standards provide the most concise 
specifications for recommended mainframe, midrange, and server computer room 
construction. In summary, to provide an appropriate level of protection, computer room 
perimeter walls should be constructed to a minimum of a one-hour fire-resistance rating. 
These walls should extend from concrete ceiling to concrete floor (slab to slab). Obviously, 
slab-to-slab walls also protect the facility against unauthorized entry from a false ceding or a 
raised floor.
This construction minimizes the possibility of fires originating in general office areas 
migrating to the computer room before they can be extinguished. The use of standard-glass 
partitions to segregate the computer room from the general office environment usually 
does not provide sufficient protection against a migrating fire.
Computer rooms have come full circle. During the sixties and seventies, the only 
computers in most organizations were large mainframes kept in presumably secure 
computer rooms. As companies changed from central computers to client-server 
environments, file servers, which had become the departmental version of a mainframe, 
did not need special environments. They were placed anywhere—on the floor, under a 
table, or sometimes in a closet. This led to a lot of problems. Often, they were accidentally 
turned off or damaged. They did not always have power protection and, on more than one 
occasion, companies suffered when someone accidentally pulled the server’s plug from the 
wall. With servers in a closet or under someone’s desk, backup was sometimes forgotten,
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and even when carried out, the backup tapes were often stored adjacent to the server. The 
trend now is to collect servers and large-scale storage devices into dedicated rooms that can 
provide proper protection.
4.3 .2 Fire Detection and Suppression
Fire detection and suppression systems are essential in the computer room to protect the 
investment in computer equipment and the information stored thereon. These systems are 
designed to detect and suppress fire before it advances to a serious state. Security experts 
recommend automated detection and suppression systems because these systems reduce 
the dependence on manual fire-fighting techniques that may prove unsatisfactory or arrive 
too late.
The most common fire-suppression systems are water sprinklers and various fire­
suppressing gases. A gas, Halon 1301, formerly the most popular fire suppression gas, is no 
longer manufactured because it turned out to be a significant environmental hazard. There 
are a number of fully acceptable replacement fire-suppression gases that do not have 
Halon’s environmental issues. These can be engineered to fit any size computer facility 
and, although they can be expensive, they provide a very high level of protection. It is 
particularly important to recognize that these gases do not damage computer equipment.
Water-based systems may serve as the primary fire-suppression system or as a backup to a 
fire-suppressive gas system. Some building codes may require that sprinklers be installed. 
Water sprinkler systems may be “wet” or “dry”. Wet systems contain water in the pipes at 
all times. Dry pipe systems, also called pre-action systems, do not contain water until an 
alarm is activated that usually involves a products-of-combustion detection unit. At this 
point, a valve automatically opens to charge the system. A high-temperature event must 
also occur to open a sprinkler head.
Fire detection systems can also provide a direct linkage to other significant support 
functions such as opening fire exits, shutting off equipment and fans and providing 
immediate notification to an alarm company or the fire department via a communications 
link.
In thinking about the use of sprinkler systems, remember that water is not a good mix with 
computers or any other electrical equipment. Severe damage can be done to system 
components. A sprinkler system should be considered a backup to alternative systems.
It is also important to have handheld extinguishers around. A handheld unit can put out 
many fires and prevent the room-wide system from being used. If you have them, please 
take the time to have your staff trained in their use. Fire departments will usually be glad to 
help provide this kind of training if you contact your local department’s fire prevention 
unit.
Finally, remember that a large percentage of computer-room fires result from having too 
much combustible material lying around. A computer room is not a good place to store 
paper, checks, or anything else that can bum. For a computer-room wastebasket, consider a 
“self-extinguishing”waste container. These containers have domed tops, which are designed 
to snuff out a fire by blocking the supply of air.
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4.3 .3 Water Protection
Water and electrical systems do not mix but both are generally found in computer rooms 
protected by sprinkler systems. Water can also enter computer rooms through leaks that 
may originate on another floor of the building. Therefore, it is vitally important to ensure 
that precautions are taken to detect and remove water leakage before it contacts the 
electrical supply. Water protection usually involves the provision of the following:
• Underfloor water detectors normally located in the vicinity of air-conditioning units. 
Water detection systems are usually monitored in the same manner as fire alarms.
• Floor drains remove any water buildup. Unless specified during construction, floor 
drains typically are not provided in modem office towers.
• Waterproof equipment covers should be on hand where sprinkler systems or other 
above-floor water sources are present. If they are available, equipment covers or rolls of 
plastic can be pulled over the equipment in the event of a problem. A simple and 
inexpensive solution might be to have some roles of plastic table-covering material 
(available from party-supply stores). These can be quickly unrolled and cut to size when 
emergency water protection is needed.
4.3.4 Electrical Power Reliability
Unless suitable precautions are taken, a disruption of the electrical power supply will result 
in the loss of computer service. The provision of backup-power sources can be expensive 
and may not be cost justified if the computer center is located in an area where the electric­
power supply is reliable. If the electric-power supply is unreliable or the nature of 
processing critical, consider using uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and backup 
generators.
Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)
UPS provides battery backup in the event of power failures or brownouts. The regular 
power supply is monitored at all times and battery power automatically provided when 
required. These systems have become increasingly affordable. Systems sized for PCs can be 
purchased at discount stores and warehouse clubs. However, it is important to remember 
that these systems generally have a very limited operational time. Some may only give a 
few minutes of power if an outage occurs. If power fails when no one is present, the UPS 
can run until its battery power is expended. You will then find that you have both a dead 
system and a dead UPS. If reliable operations are critical, you need to add a backup 
generator to your UPS. Some UPS systems can also tell the server it is running on backup 
power and that any pre-programmed notification or safe-shutdown routines can be run. 
UPS systems, even with very limited capacity, can be of great value in helping to step over 
brief outages ranging from a fraction of a second to a few seconds that would otherwise 
cause systems to fail.
Backup Generators
Backup generators are recommended because UPS can only provide battery-backup power 
for a limited time. In computer centers that provide critical processing services or in areas 
where electric power is unreliable, diesel or turbine generators that can produce electric 
power for as long as the fuel lasts, often support UPS systems. For PC-based servers, 
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smaller gasoline powered generators are often readily available through home supply stores 
and can provide enough power to keep key servers running without the necessity of 
investing in a large fixed UPS installation.
Power Conditioners and Surge Suppressors
Finally, regardless of the local power supply outage record, it is likely that power 
conditioners will be used in larger computer installations and surge suppressors provided 
for desktop PCs. Power conditioners and surge protectors monitor the electric power 
supply and remove voltage sags and surges that can severely damage computer equipment.
4.3.5 Environmental Control
Environmental control is an issue that primarily has been a concern for larger mainframe 
computer environments. Even the users of the smaller machines which their manufacturers 






Computers cannot operate in extreme temperatures. It is true that the range of operating 
temperatures has increased over the years. However, even when the specifications indicate 
that the machine will operate in a wide temperature range, for example, 59 to 90 degrees 
Fahrenheit or 15 to 32 degrees Celsius, it is not advisable to operate these machines near 
either limit. Air conditioning is usually installed to reduce the likelihood of system outage 
or damage as a result of overheating. Where it is necessary to install an unusual amount of 
heat-generating equipment in a PC case, for example, if a number of hard drives are added, 
consideration should be given not only to operating the machine in a climate-controlled 
location but also to installing an extra fan in the case to dissipate the heat. There are fan 
units available through a number of vendors that can be placed into a standard drive bay 
or standard circuit card position.
Humidity Control
The computer manufacturers normally indicate a range of humidity acceptable for their 
machines, for example, a 20-to-80 percent humidity tolerance. Normally, the air 
conditioning unit provides humidity control.
Environmental Contamination
Dust can cause major problems in a computer environment. If dust gets into a removable 
storage unit, it may cause a head crash and make information on that disk inaccessible. In 
addition, accumulations of paper dust from printers are a potential fire hazard. To 
minimize the potential for dust contamination, you should regularly vacuum the areas 
where dust normally accumulates.
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The importance of physical access controls over all assets and related records is obvious.
Such controls help to reduce the risk of fraud and commercial crime for the following
reasons:
4.3.6 Physical Access Controls
• Physical access controls are often most visible to potential perpetrators. Strong controls 
in this area send a powerful deterrent message vis-a-vis the other controls in the system. 
Conversely, loose physical controls invite challenge.
• Perpetrators of many frauds must come into physical contact with either the asset being 
misappropriated or the related-asset records in order to cover up the fraud. Reducing 
physical access reduces opportunity.
• Access controls that fail to prevent fraud and commercial crime still often assist in the 
investigation process, for example, the determination of what actually happened and the 
narrowing of the list of possible suspects.
The physical security of computer installations and equipment is particularly important. 
Sometimes white-collar criminals and irate employees resort to blue-collar crimes, such as 
arson and the willful destruction of property. When this happens, these blue-collar crimes 
may be classified as being commercial or economic in nature. There are also new 
categories of computer crimes defined by most states and the federal government. To 
combat these new crimes, new laws have been passed specifically directed at protecting 
computers. The destruction of a computer may involve a number of chargeable offenses, 
some of which are general in nature, for example, malicious mischief. Others are more 
specific, such as economic espionage or computer tampering.
The only employees who should require physical access to computer equipment are those 
responsible for its operation. Any third-party engineers performing maintenance should be 
accompanied by operations staff or otherwise monitored at all times. Providing more access 
increases the potential for vandalism, mischief, and human error; any of these threats could 
result in processing disruptions.
Limiting access to the computer/server room involves securing the doors and keeping them 
closed at all times. There are a variety of devices available for achieving this. The most 
common include the following:
• Key locks. These are the cheapest to install but are usually the least secure because 
duplicate keys can be made and distributed without control. At the very least, all 
authorized keys should be marked by the locksmith with the words DO NOT 
DUPLICATE. Reputable locksmiths will not duplicate a key with such a marking. This 
does not prevent extra keys from being made, but it sharply reduces the number of 
sources for such duplication.
• Cipher locks. These are push-button combination devices and are generally more secure 
than key locks provided the combination is changed on a regular basis. The downside 
of these locks is that the combination can be easily shared with unauthorized persons. 
Whereas a physical key is needed for a standard lock, only knowledge of the 
combination is required to operate a cipher lock.
• Card-access devices. These are among the most secure mechanisms because cards cannot 
be readily duplicated and card distribution can be controlled. There are also card-access 
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devices that require the user to enter a pass code along with the card key. These are 
more secure than standard card-access devices since the user must have both a physical 
device (the card) and knowledge of a secret piece of information (the pass code).
• Biometric locks. These provide access based on physical characteristics. Perhaps the most 
commonly used involve hand geometry, but devices based on fingerprints, iris 
recognition, and facial recognition are also becoming commercially viable.
4.3.7 Physical Security for PCs
Much of the preceding discussion relates to computer systems of any size. The following is 
important information for the physical security of PCs:
• Restrict physical access. Lock doors during off-hours or whenever an office is vacant, or 
both.
• Use the security features provided on many PCs, such as passwords, that prevent access 
by unauthorized individuals.
• Ensure that all employees watch for unauthorized personnel in areas where personal 
computers or servers are located.
• Consider using any of the various devices that can prevent the removal of PCs for those 
that have high-value data stored in them. These devices include pads that are screwed 
or pasted down or cables that can lock a PC to a desk.
4.3.8 Physical Security for Portable Computers
Portable computers such as laptops, notebooks, sub notebooks, and personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) also present security issues. Their large storage capacities can hold huge 
volumes of confidential information. Experience indicates that these are attractive targets to 
both thieves and those who would commit industrial espionage. Some security tips follow:
• When taking a computer through an airport security checkpoint, do not put the 
computer into the X ray machine until the metal detector is clear for your use. There 
have been a large number of incidents in which one member of a criminal gang delays 
you after you have put your computer case onto the x-ray belt by finding more and 
more metal objects on his or her person. By the time you can go through the metal 
detector, a confederate of the “blocker” has already taken your PC case off of the belt 
and departed. Since in the U.S. you are required to put your PC through the X ray 
machine separately, and since most portable PCs look alike, make sure to prominently 
mark your machine on the top and bottom. A label with your name, or even a large 
sticker is good. The objective is to make it easy for you to recognize your machine, and 
others to recognize that the machine is not theirs.
• Do not leave your PC unattended in your hotel room. Where possible, put it in the safe 
in your room (if one is provided) or in the hotel safe-deposit box. Another option is to 
keep all of your confidential data on a removable device or to remove the hard drive 
from the laptop and take the data with you. If the machine gets stolen while you are out, 
you still have the data. It is now very cost-effective to use flash memory devices. A flash 
memory device that plugs into either the PC card slot or the USB port can store up to 4 
gigabytes of data.
Fraud Supp. 4—3/04 15
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
• Consider installing software that can detect whether the computer has been stolen. This
software attempts to contact a data center through an Internet connection to report its
location. Such software is available from several vendors.
• Use encryption software which is often included with new PCs. You can set your 
machine to encrypt the hard drive’s contents which only become usable when the 
correct password is entered.
4.4 Logical Security
Logical security is the term used to describe the overall method for the protection of 
information stored on a computer system. The controls involved are usually a blend of 
preventive and detective controls. Organizations use logical security to address 
confidentiality and integrity concerns and to reduce the potential for inappropriate 
information disclosure, modification, destruction, or deletion.
Achieving an appropriate level of logical security involves giving careful thought to how 
the user gains access to information. In addition to the security controls for the data itself, 
you should consider the controls over the software that provides access to the data and to 




• Computer operations security
• Logical security for personal computers
A description of each follows.
4 .4.1 Communications Security
Communications security focuses on controlling the various methods of access to the 
computer system. Of course, communications security serves primarily to ensure that valid 
transmissions between computer systems are complete and accurate. As an added benefit, 
communications security also presents an obstacle to criminal activity.
Passwords and Administration
A valid user identification and password is the first fine of access control on most computer 
systems. The validation of the ID and password by a computer program represents the 
preventive part of the control while the rejection and recording of an invalid ID or 
password represents the detection control. To be effective, the detective aspect of password 
control requires an investigation of all reported access failures.
For effective password controls, procedures should be installed to ensure the following:
1. Users choose passwords that are not simplistic in nature. Because simplistic passwords 
can be readily guessed and the system compromised, never use initials, a spouse’s name, 
or other similar personal passwords. For example, you could implement a policy that 
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requires passwords to have a defined minimum length and require them to contain at 
least one letter, one number, and one special character. A password like interaction 
would be more secured if it was replaced by \nterAct10n.
2. Management distributes new user IDs and passwords to users in a controlled manner. 
The initial password should be required to be used within a limited period and users 
required to change the initial password to a new one on their initial login.
3. Users change passwords regularly, approximately every thirty to ninety days, depending 
on the nature of the information accessed. The system should keep track of a number of 
prior passwords to prevent their reuse.
4. Management revokes IDs and passwords of users who have left the organization. 
Similarly, when users move from job to job within an organization, management 
modifies their access rights so they can only access the data required for their current 
job.
Network Security Features
The programmed network security features that are available vary from system to system. 
Some of the common features include:
• A maximum number of log-on attempts. If the user has not successfully logged on in the 
specified number of attempts, the session is terminated and the incident is recorded on a 
log for investigation. To prohibit additional attempts to compromise the account, some 
systems lock the user’s account either for a limited time (5 to 30 minutes) or until reset 
by the information security unit.
• Automatic log-off of inactive terminals. If an employee leaves a terminal logged-on, anyone 
who gains access to that terminal has the access rights of the previous user thereby 
breaching password security. Therefore, many systems automatically log off users when 
the terminal has been inactive for a defined period of time. Alternatively, some systems 
invoke a screen-saver that prevents using the system until the password is re-entered.
• Restriction of users to specific terminals. Users must be restricted not only to specific 
terminals, but also to specific times of the day, or both.
• Echo checking. The protection of transmitted information by echo checking ensures the 
information is complete and accurate. This is achieved by a retransmission of the 
message to the source terminal for validation.
• Firewalls. Provide the security necessary to control unauthorized access to the system 
from the Internet with firewalls. Ranging from relatively simple hardware or software to 
complex and hard-to-maintain packages, firewalls have become a requirement for 
systems attached to the Internet. Careful planning is essential to prevent making 
unintended access points available to an invader by putting the firewalls in the wrong 
place in the network. In complex networks, multiple firewalls may be required. 
Firewalls must also be carefully configured with the proper instructions entered into the 
firewall. Errors can leave security “holes” that may be exploited by intruders.
• Intrusion Detection Systems. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) consist of hardware and 
software that monitor activities within a system to determine whether those activities 
represent a potential problem. For example, a user who suddenly begins to download 
large amounts of proprietary information might be reported for investigation or, 
alternatively, have their access privileges suspended pending a review. These systems, 
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which are now evolving, may be either network-based, that is, they review traffic on a
given communication channel, or host-based, whereby they monitor the work of a given
server.
Remote-Access Security
Hackers have received considerable publicity in recent years after successfully gaining 
unauthorized access to numerous computer systems. In response to the problems created 
by hackers, several companies have developed and marketed security devices to limit 
remote access to authorized employees.
One common device available to help control dial-up computer access is the callback 
device. When an employee dials in, the callback device intercepts the call, the employee 
enters a special code, and the device then calls back the phone number associated with the 
code entered. The communications link is then established and the user ID and password 
are entered in the normal way. This, of course, is based on dial-up access. As more and 
more corporate communication goes over the Internet, this security tool is becoming less 
important.
For both dial-up access and Internet access, there are a number of devices that provide 
security by effectively providing authorized users with a new password for every log-on. 
Some systems accomplish this by providing the user with a small keychain-sized device 
called a token, which has a window that displays a new code every minute. The user must 
enter this code along with a memorized password to gain access.
Another version looks much Eke a calculator. When a user requests access, the system 
provides a random number (the challenge) that the user then enters into the special 
calculator along with a password. The calculator then displays another number (the 
response), which is entered into the system to gain access.
Another class of access control based on biometrics involves the measurement of a physical 
characteristic. Currently, manufacturers offer devices that can check identity based on 
fingerprints, hand or facial geometry, and iris or retinal patterns. Systems based on 
voiceprint or signature dynamics are also under development. These systems are becoming 
increasingly cost effective. For example, a number of fingerprint-reading devices can be 
had for less than one hundred dollars.
4.4.2 Data Security
Unauthorized access to information can result in its disclosure, modification, or deletion. 
To achieve efficient data security, you should implement a system capable of evaluating the 
sensitivity of the data to provide a level of protection commensurate with the nature and 
perceived value of the information. Data security addresses the issue of protecting 
information stored on computer files, magnetic media, and hard copy reports.
On-line Data Files
On-fine data files are those files stored on a computer system that users can access directly. 
The following two effective techniques are available to secure on-line data files:
1. Software restrictions. A program or series of programs that reference established security 
tables to determine whether the user is allowed the requested access, for example, to 
read or write, to the requested data file. If the request is valid, the user will be permitted 
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access; if not, access is denied and the access violation is reported on a log file for 
subsequent investigation. The security software process is illustrated by Figure 4-1, “The 
Security Software Process.”
On some computer systems, the software restriction facility is an integral part of the 
operating system, while on others a separate security software product that interfaces with 
the operating system is used.
2. Data encryption. This technique scrambles information using a predefined algorithm or 
key so that the information is not meaningful to anyone who merely gains access to the 
disk file. There are a number of mathematical systems (algorithms) in use as the basis of 
encryption systems. These systems use keys of various lengths and complexity. Longer 
keys usually provide more security than shorter ones. On the Internet, all browsers 
provide some level of security through encryption. Some have short-key capabilities 
generally employing 40-bit keys that provide a basic level of security while other 
versions are often export-restricted and use much stronger 128-bit keys. Some data- 
encryption packages, for example PGP, can provide for even longer keys often 1,024 
bits in length, which provide incredibly robust security against unauthorized 
interception. Companies using the Internet to transmit confidential data should 
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seriously consider using encryption to protect that information from unauthorized
interception. Encryption should also be considered for email as well because standard
email is not secure.
Offline Data Files
Offline data files are information stored in libraries on magnetic tape, removable disks, and 
diskettes. Information stored on these media is as readily susceptible to inappropriate 
disclosure, amendment, and deletion as online data files unless it is properly controlled. 
The preventive controls usually applied include the following:
• Keep the media library in a physically secure room where the door is locked unless an 
authorized staff member is present.
• Adhere to media library procedures requiring that files be issued from the library only 
for approved purposes, for example, production use and transport to off-site storage.
• Assure that the media, when no longer needed for storage of confidential data, are 
erased or destroyed. As long as they contain data, they should be protected.
Detective controls normally include an investigation of all materials borrowed but not 
returned in a reasonable time as well as the performance of periodic inventory checks. 
However, many smaller organizations consider the use of comprehensive library 
procedures impractical because of limited staff availability. In these situations and in 
personal computer environments, you should regularly back up computer information on 
hard disks and diskettes and store the backups in a secure location away from the 
computers.
Reports and Documents
It is easy to become preoccupied with protecting information on computer systems while 
neglecting the information printed on input forms and computer reports. Generally, people 
rely on internal controls exercised by user departments to ensure that data approved for 
input is not modified before it is entered into the computer. Frequently, however, people 
pay less attention to securing input documents before and after input. Yet these input 
documents contain all of the confidential information ultimately stored on disk.
You should also pay attention to printed output, including the following:
• Printing control. Completely destroy any partially printed reports that result from printer 
problems.
• Distribution control. Ensure that the appropriate staff distributes computer-printed reports, 
particularly reports containing sensitive or confidential information, only to authorized 
recipients.
• Storage security. Staff should secure computer reports in the user department for 
protection after office hours.
• Destruction control. Staff should completely destroy all reports when no longer required. 
This practice applies to all offices, not just computer areas. Even when information is 
outdated, improper disclosure may still prove embarrassing.
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4.4.3 Software Integrity
Software integrity refers to the protection of all system software stored on magnetic media 
and the migration of programs to production. The integrity of information depends not 
only on the accuracy of the input data, but also on the integrity of the programs that 
produce and use that information. Integrity of information also depends on the integrity of 
the communications software, transaction processors, file access software, security software 
and operating system—known collectively as the system software—that control the 
operation of and possible use by application programs.
Online Software Libraries
Computer programs are stored on disk files in libraries or software directories. The most 
effective means of restricting user access to these libraries is through security software 
restrictions as described earlier in the section entitled “Online Data Files”, although library 
control software may also assist in restricting user access.
The programming staff requires access to copies of the programs to perform their jobs. 
They do not, however, require access to the production versions. Providing programmers 
with direct access to production versions compromises software control and increases the 
possibility that unauthorized changes may be made. In general, only qualified production 
librarians should require access to the production programs and those individuals should 
copy only new versions of programs into production as required.
Offline Software
Offline software refers to the backup copies of program libraries or directories stored on 
magnetic tape, exchangeable disks and diskettes. The controls required to secure these 
versions of the software are identical to those described earlier in this chapter in the section, 
“Offline Data Files.”
Migration of Programs to Production
If a programmer can gain access to a program and make changes between the program 
tests being performed by the user and the program being put into production, the version 
used in production may not be the same version that was originally tested and approved. 
Changes may be introduced that could affect information integrity and expose the 
organization to financial loss. Organizations can address this problem in a variety of ways 
including the following:
• Restricting access to the test version of the program to the users who are running the test 
and the individual(s) who are performing the librarian function responsible for the 
transfer to production.
• Record and monitor the time when the last change was made provided the system or 
library control software retains that information. The date of the last change should not 
be later than the date the tests were run and the software approved for use.
• Assure that all updates provided by software manufacturers are applied promptly. These 
should always be tested before being put into production to assure that the updates have 
not had an unintended result.
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4.4.4 Computer Operations Security
Improper operator intervention also can affect the proper operation of computer programs 
and, therefore, the integrity of information. In particular, computer operators can create 
problems by performing the following:
• Run the incorrect version of a program against the correct data files. This may introduce 
errors through the use of untested program code or the possibility of fraud through the 
use of unauthorized code.
• Run the correct version of the program against incorrect versions of data files. 
Obviously, the results produced by this action would be incorrect and could have 
serious implications.
To control operator activity effectively, you should consider taking certain measures 
including the following:
• Restrict an operator’s ability to change the Job Control Language. Job Control 
Language directs the processing of a program and identifies the program to be run and 
the data files to be used.
• Use internal tape, disk-label checking, or both, to ensure use of the correct file.
• Provide detailed operating instructions to reduce accidental error.
• Monitor operator intervention by reviewing the computer activity-console logs and 
investigating unusual activity.
• Reconcile data file totals from run to run to ensure use of the correct version of the file.
4.4.5 Logical Security for Personal Computers
The important points to note with respect to logical security for PCs include the following:
• Be wary of leaving sensitive information on hard disks unless the files are encrypted. 
Consider using removable disk-cartridge devices or removable hard drives. Data may 
also be stored on flash memory cards.
• Use cryptic passwords. Do not leave passwords on or near computer workstations.
• Back up hard disks regularly to CDs, network drives, or tape.
• Remember when erasing a hard disk that the normal erase procedures of some 
operating systems leave the file on the disk, that is, it may only remove the file name 
from the directory. Even reformatting a PC hard drive does not make the data 
unrecoverable. To prevent any possible recovery of sensitive files, use the disk-wiping 
functions provided by commercial hard-drive utilities programs. These programs 
overwrite the space used by the file—often several times—to make the information 
completely unrecoverable.
4.5 System Recovery
If properly applied, the preventive and detective controls provided by physical and logical 
security will minimize the possibility of problems occurring. However, problems do 
occur—either accidentally or deliberately. System recovery procedures are intended to 
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assist in implementing an orderly and controlled return to normal operations in the event 
of a problem.
You should consider using recovery controls to address any computer-related availability 
concerns. These controls are necessary to address short-term problems as well as more 
catastrophic long-term events.
4.5.1 Recovery From Operational Failures
Operational failures are those problems that occur during the performance of day-to-day 
processing. Examples include the following:
• Incorrect file usage
• Disk files deletion
• Disk files destruction
• Job processing failure
• Computer equipment or media failure. For example, most people have seen cassette 
tapes that have been “eaten” by players. Drives fail. Tapes can break.
Overcoming problems of this nature requires an appropriate combination of back-up and 
written recovery procedures.
Data File and Software Backup
To protect against accidental or deliberate destruction by hackers, for example, it is 
essential that you and your staff regularly make copies of all data files and software library 
directories. How often is “regularly?” This will vary from installation to installation. To 
determine an appropriate backup cycle, you should consider the following factors:
• The frequency at which file managers update the file, library, or directory. This will help 
managers determine when to make backup files. For example, for system-software 
libraries that are rarely changed it may be more effective to make backup copies only 
after making changes.
• The number of transactions processed each time the file is updated. This total helps 
managers determine the amount of effort required to reprocess all transactions entered 
since the last available backup was taken.
• The amount of processing time available for backup.
In the past, a backup cycle was often determined on an application-by-application basis. 
Today organizations typically take a weekly copy of all files and libraries and supplement 
this with daily incremental backups. Incremental backups take copies of only those files and 
libraries that have been updated during the day.
In many firms, employees frequently work off-line from their server either away from their 
office or saving files directly to their local drives. To ensure that all necessary data is 
properly backed-up at appropriate times, you should establish guidelines that stress the 
importance of the employees moving their work to the server as soon and as often as 
possible. This not only provides back-up protection in the event of a personal computer 
failure but also maintains a complete data record on the server for back-up purposes.
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To assist in recovery from day-to-day operational failures, keep a backup copy of the data
files and software on site. In addition, send a copy off site for use in the event of more
catastrophic problems such as when all on-site material is either unavailable or destroyed.
(See section 4.5.2, “Disaster Recovery Plans”).
With the growing availability of high-speed data fines, other new forms of backup are 
evolving. Remote vaulting and remote backup involves transmission of backup files to 
another location so that the backup is actually created offsite. It is also possible to maintain 
disk storage at a remote location and to keep it updated on an essentially real-time basis. 
The tremendous increase in storage efficiency has made hard drives of as much as 160- 
gigabyte capacity available for as little as $100. The use of RAID (Redundant Array of 
Inexpensive Drives) arrays can provide for storage units that not only have high capacity, 
but can also write multiple copies of each record to different disks, so that a failure of any 
one disk drive will not result in loss of data.
Recovery Procedures
In addition to providing backup copies of the files and libraries, give sufficiently detailed 
written instructions to the operators so they can efficiently and effectively recover any 
necessary files. These procedures are described in most computer-operational manuals and 
should address issues such as:
• Application failure recovery measures. These measures are normally documented for each 
application and for each job step within the application. These measures describe how 
operators can restore processing at an earlier point, and reprocess transactions. In some 
cases when restoring and reprocessing is not possible, the manual should provide 
direction for obtaining programming or technical support to resolve the problem.
• Use of utilities to recover from backup copies. The involvement of operators in recovery 
varies from organization to organization. In some installations, the operators copy the 
files and libraries to a predefined recovery area on disk and it is the responsibility of a 
user or support group to copy them from the recovery area to the production area. 
Other organizations will recover directly to the production areas.
• Vendor support for equipment failures or head crashes. Users should document all equipment 
failures including details of the request for vendor assistance and the vendor’s response.
4.5.2 Disaster Recovery Plans
Disaster recovery plans are intended to assist with recovery from a catastrophic event. They 
are not intended to deal with day-to-day operational failures. The term disaster is used in 
the broadest sense; it need not be an act of God. It could be anything from a drunken 
driver knocking down a power pole to terrorism. As previously noted, white-collar 
criminals can also arrange disasters to cover up their crimes.
Definition
A disaster recovery plan is a documented description of the course of action to take, 
resources to be used, and the procedures to be followed before, during and after a 
disruption of data processing capability.
Given the business community’s current reliance on computers, many executives would 
probably find the loss of the computer center for a lengthy period of time inconceivable.
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However, the same executives’ organization has probably taken little or no action to 
develop or maintain a contingency plan. A survey completed several years ago suggested 
that less than 50 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies had disaster recovery plans and, for 
the companies that did, only half the plans were feasible.
Elements of Effective Disaster Recovery Plans
Before disaster occurs, you should take action to ensure that off-site backup is capable of 
supporting recovery operations. Keep off-site backup copies of data files and software some 
distance from the principal site so that these vital records will be accessible in the event of a 
disaster affecting the local geographic area. Where appropriate, companies should contract 
for services with disaster recovery centers that maintain hardware for use when needed.
Consider what happened when a train derailed in Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto, 
Canada, a few years ago. In this case, the authorities closed access to a sizable area of the 
city for five days because of a dangerous chemical spill. Any organization housing both its 
data center and off-site storage in that geographical area would have had difficulty 
implementing its disaster-recovery plan.
In addition to keeping off-site backup copies of data files and software, consider keeping 
off-site supplies of other materials required for processing. Examples include: check stock 
files, special invoice forms and forms for laser printers, operations documentation, and a 
copy of the recovery plan.
Documenting detailed recovery procedures and implementing regular tests of the recovery 
plan are the most important actions to be taken before the advent of a disaster. Disaster­
recovery operations require the channeling of information to management to assist in 
decision making during the chaos of a disaster. Without clearly identifying reporting 
channels and decision points in advance, employees may later take inappropriate action.
Prepare detailed procedures for system recovery because operations staff may not perform 
standard procedures as expected when affected by the stress of a disaster. Remember that 
in a disaster, personnel who might be expected to participate in the recovery—either on 
the operations team or the management team—may themselves be victims of the disaster. 
The plan must anticipate this possibility by designating one or more alternates for each 
recovery position. Regular testing ensures that the plan is workable and helps to keep the 
plan current.
During the disaster, the staff with recovery responsibilities should follow documented 
procedures to:
1. Notify all necessary parties that a problem has occurred.
2. Assess the extent of the damage and the expected period of system outage for 
communications to the recovery team.
3. Report to a predetermined emergency control center.
After invoking the disaster recovery plan, the recovery staff should follow the documented 
procedures for:
1. Recovering the critical systems at the identified alternative-processing location.
2. Operating at the alternative site.
3. Refurbishing or replacing the damaged site.
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4. Returning to normal operations once the damaged site has been refurbished.
Most organizations plan to recover only the critical systems at the alternative-processing 
site. These are the application systems needed to ensure continued business operations. If 
sufficient resources exist at the alternative site to run other systems, do not recover them 
until the critical systems are running.
See figure 4-2 for a schematic of an approach to developing a disaster-recovery plan.




For most businesses that rely heavily on computer processing, an effective disaster­
recovery plan is likely the only effective means of ensuring continued business survival 
following a major computer-system disruption. However, it is possible to mitigate some of 
the financial loss through insurance coverage. Some examples of the kinds of insurance 
coverage available include:
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• Data processing equipment coverage. These policies assist in defraying the cost of 
replacement-computer hardware and air-conditioning equipment. Some policies also 
cover the cost of removing the debris from covered equipment.
• Data, computer programs, and media coverage. These policies cover only data and programs 
in computer format, not hard copy. Organizations can take out insurance to cover the 
estimated potential loss if data and programs are destroyed.
• Extra expense coverage. These policies cover the extra expenses involved in continuing 
data processing operations if the equipment, air conditioning, or building housing the 
equipment is damaged.
• Business interruption. These policies cover the business losses incurred following a 
disaster in the computer department but are subject to limits on the amount to be paid 
per day and a total amount payable.
• Fidelity coverage. These policies may cover costs associated with the unlawful acts of a 
dishonest employee. There are various new forms of crime coverage that may extend to 
certain acts by outsiders as well.
4.5.4 System Recovery for Personal Computers and Servers
Equipment failure for PCs generally is not a major concern for organizations, particularly 
compared with similar situations associated with larger computer systems. It should be 
given more attention, however, considering the dependence of many businesses on PCs 
and local area networks. If a PC fails, normally another machine is available or can be 
obtained with relative ease. LAN file servers and the communications gear associated with 
connecting LANs to private and public networks, including the Internet, may be highly 
specialized and take one or more days to replace and reconfigure. The biggest concerns are 
the potential damage to communications facilities that would cause a loss of electronic mail 
functions and the loss of data stored on hard disk or diskettes. If the failed system was 
running the firewall, loss of a PC server could seriously compromise the security of the 
organization’s information.
Good PC and LAN security should be a priority to avoid situations requiring recovery. 
However, as noted earlier, disasters do occur. Therefore, a regular policy of backing up 
hard disks is advisable. Consider using one of the specialized backup-software packages 
that will help you manage the process. Also be aware that computer data recovery 
specialists can, under some circumstances, help you recover information that has been 
accidentally or deliberately lost. You should consider establishing a relationship with a data 
recovery company before you have need for their services. Selecting a vendor during a 
crisis is not a recommended procedure.
4.6 Management’s Responsibilities in a Security Program
Management is responsible for protecting the organization’s assets against both dishonest 
employees and outside criminal acts. The information asset, administered in most 
organizations by the information systems or computer department, is as vital and 
vulnerable as any other asset. Although many organizations have invested heavily in the 
development of computerized systems to support their business operations, they have not 
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necessarily invested sufficient effort to establish a security program that would adequately
protect that investment Computer security is often neglected because of pressures to deal
with day-to-day operating needs first, yet security can be fundamental to business survival.
You can implement effective security by identifying the following:
• The information in your organization that requires protection
• The level of protection currently provided for that information
• The risks and exposures that currently make that information vulnerable
• The right combination of information security tools and techniques based on your needs 
analysis
Using this approach you can achieve a level of security that is appropriate to the 
requirements of your organization. The objective is to provide sufficient security without 
going overboard and making security more complex than necessary. After taking the steps 
outlined in this chapter, your organization can implement a security program to address the 
exposures. This program should incorporate the development of policies, standards, 
guidelines and procedures, the assignment of security responsibilities and the monitoring of 
progress.
4.6.1 Policy, Standards, Guidelines and Procedures
It is generally unwise to assume that employees will act in a security-conscious manner 
particularly if the organization’s expectations in this regard have never been 
communicated. Companies can communicate policies through the development and 
implementation of policy statements on computer security and should emphasize security 
and fraud awareness.
Effective policies must be succinct. If policies are too detailed and lengthy, they probably 
will not have the desired effect, especially with junior-level employees. For brevity, simply 
cross-reference the more detailed standards rather than attempting to include this material 
in the policy statement itself. The policy, standards, guidelines and procedures provide a 
framework for effective security in any organization.
Many organizations in consultation with legal counsel have determined that it is important 
to have employees sign security and confidentiality agreements that define the person’s 
responsibility for safeguarding information in all forms. Indeed, many organizations have 
also developed agreements to be completed by contractors, vendors and temporary 
workers who require access to confidential and proprietary information. You should give 
careful consideration to implementing a policy calling for employees and others, such as 
temporary workers, who have access to your systems to sign these security and 
confidentiality agreements on an annual basis, perhaps in conjunction with an annual 
review program.
There is an international standard for information security called ISO/IEC 17799, 
consisting of a policy guide (ISO/IEC 17799-1) and implementation guide (BS 7799-2) 
which many organizations are using as the basis for their information security programs. 
The standard gives a way of measuring your program against an accepted set of policies as 
a step to a comprehensive solution.
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4.6.2 The Security Function
Having recognized the importance of computer and information security to the 
organization, management must assign responsibility for carrying out the duties associated 
with this function. The person identified to take on the security function will usually be 
responsible for:
• Assisting in the development of policies, standards, and guidelines and procedures.
• Developing a formal security program to improve the level of security in accordance 
with management’s expectations.
• Raising security and fraud awareness.
• Reporting on progress to senior management.
• Remaining in close contact with specialists such as police, forensic accountants, 
computer forensics experts, and specialists in computer viruses who can assist in 
implementing the program or help in the event of a crisis.
This may be either a full- or part-time responsibility according to the size of the 
organization. Initially, setting up the program probably will require a full-time position and 
can be aided by outside, experienced assistance. One important function of the person or 
team charged with the computer-security function is to check the Internet regularly for new 
information about the latest trends in fraud prevention and fraud techniques. Another 
specific responsibility is to maintain liaison with the manufacturers of the hardware and 
software that is in use within the company to get the latest security “patches” as they are 
issued. There are also a number of organizations that one can join that can provide useful 
information and ideas for the security professional. These range from large national 
organization like the American Society for Industrial Security to government sponsored 
groups like Infogard.
4.6.3 Policing
Once the security program is underway and the policy, standards, and guidelines and 
procedures are in place, an organization must ensure compliance with expectations on an 
ongoing basis. This is a policing function.
Most organizations have an internal audit department that performs the policing function 
for controls that operate in other areas of the business. As such, internal audit may be an 
ideal candidate to become involved in testing compliance with corporate security 
expectations. Alternatively, external auditors or consultants can fill this role. In addition, it 
should be remembered that many software packages generate both activity and security 
logs. Reviewing the security logs is an important aspect of the policing function.
4.6.4 Evidence Recovery
If a security incident occurs, computer and security personnel may find themselves 
pursuing different objectives. In an actual case in which a company’s email servers 
suddenly reformatted their hard disk drives, the computer operations department saw as its 
objective repairing the damage and restoring email services within the company as quickly 
as possible. In contrast, the security people regarded the data center as a crime scene and 
wanted to collect evidence to determine whether the incident had been a technical accident 
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or the deliberate act of a perpetrator. The two groups had to work together to ensure that
the technical personnel assigned the task of restoring service and the hastily summoned
outside consultants would understand the importance of identifying any evidence of
wrongdoing and call in the security people to gather and secure the evidence so that it
would be admissible in court.
In cases in which the crime scene is, in fact, the surface of a hard drive, the collection of 
evidence becomes critical. As with any other evidence, it is necessary to ensure that the 
process of collecting and safeguarding the evidence also preserves that evidence from any 
changes. Courts will not turn a blind eye when recovery technicians have made changes 
and later claim that the hard drive bears evidence of a crime. Under these circumstances, 
how would it be possible to prove that the purported evidence of a crime was not planted 
to incriminate an innocent person? In complex or important cases, this task is often 
assigned to experts in the field of computer evidence recovery—a discipline known as 
computer forensics. Computer forensics is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.
4.7 Computer Security Checklist
Table 4.1, “Computer Security Checkfist,” is designed to assist CPAs in dealing with 
computer security in their organizations and those of their clients. Generally, all No answers 
require investigation and follow-up. The results should be documented. Use the “Ref” 
column to cross-reference the checklist to any additional working papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the adequacy of computer security, and it is not intended as a substitute 
for audits or similar procedures. If computer security is an especially vital concern or if 
computer fraud is suspected, seek the advice of a knowledgeable computer professional.
Table 4.1 Computer Security Checklist
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Physical Security 
a. Computer Room
• Does the room have minimum one-hour fire-resistance 
rating plus smoke detectors, fire alarms, extinguishers, and 
sprinklers?
• Is the room protected with a remotely monitored alarm 
system?
• Are there underfloor water detectors, floor drains and 
waterproof equipment covers to protect against water 
damage from sprinkler systems?
• Are there battery-equipped Uninterruptible Power Supplies 
(UPS) or backup generators and surge protectors for PCs?
• Are temperature, humidity and dust particles in the air in the 
computer room monitored?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
(continued)
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Are computer centers operating without personnel present, 
for example, late at night or weekends, equipped with 
sensors to monitor and report temperature, humidity, 
flooding, or fire to a control center or responsible official?
• Is access to sensitive computer installations restricted by key 
locks, combination or cipher locks or card-access systems 
together with access-control policies and procedures?
b. PCs and Workstations
• Are PCs and workstations in areas where theft is a threat 
secured by cables, locks, or other antitheft devices?
• Are PCs and workstations secured by cables, locks, or other 
antitheft devices?
• Are PCs and workstations secured with screen-saver 
programs requiring passwoods to unlock?
• Are computer users prohibited by written policy from 
installing unauthorized software including encryption 
software on company PCs and notebook computers?
• Is there a procedure for regularly examining company- 
provided PCs for unauthorized software?
2. Communications Security
a. Is a user ID and password or stronger system with one-time 
passwords or biometric security in place?
b. Are the distribution of new IDs regulated and those of 
terminated users promptly deleted?
c. Do controls prohibit multiple persons from sharing a single 
account or log-in code?
d. Are passwords secured by requirements for adequate length 
and use of numeric and special characters?
e. Are there written policies requiring employees to sign 
computer-use and confidentiality agreements, to maintain 
password secrecy and forbidding the use of simplistic or easily 
guessed passwords?
f. Are passwords changed regularly at intervals no greater than 90 
days?
g. Does the system monitor and control use by restricting users to 
specific terminals or times, automatically logging out inactive 
users, limiting the number of log-on attempts, and recording all 
use for later follow-up and investigation if required?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
h. Is remote access controlled by callback, biometric, or one-time 
password devices?
i. Is anyone responsible for security and required to check 
Internet sources and vendors for information on fraud 
prevention?
3. Data Security
a. Is access to on-line data limited to authorized individuals 
through built-in software restrictions or screening?
b. Has encryption been considered for the transmission of 
sensitive data?
c. Are backup files stored on magnetic or optical media and kept 
in a physically secure place away from the computers and 
accessible only by authorized persons?
d. Are backup files stored in a fire-rated safe?
e. Are printed records retained on- and offsite and destroyed 
according to statutory requirements and recognized records 
management schedules?
4. Software Integrity
a. Is access to production versions of all software tightly controlled 
by a production librarian or similar authorized person?
b. Does the alteration of tested and approved software 
programming code require documented authorization?
c. Is the installation of any anti-virus software authorized and 
screened?
d. Is anti-virus software installed on every computer and updated 
continuously through a contract with the software provider?
e. Are there adequate controls to prevent the installation of 
pirated software?
5. Operations Security
a. Are detailed operating manuals available?
b. Is computer activity logged and any unusual use investigated?
c. Are computer-operations personnel prohibited from altering 
program code and Job Control Language that match the 
program and data files?
d. Are all software and data storage media clearly and correctly 
labeled and dated?
e. Are data files reconciled from run to run?
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Table 4.1 (continued)
Computer Security Checklist Yes No NA Ref
f. Are all data storage media electronically wiped clean by a 
suitably designed wiping program before disposal?
6. System Recovery
a. Are backup copies of all transactions files made daily, and data 
files and software made at least weekly?
b. Do guidelines ensure all employee work is saved to the network 
server?
c. Is at least one backup copy of all data files and software stored 
off site?
d. Have employees been provided with written instructions and 
training in disaster recovery procedures?
e. In the case of catastrophic failure, do alternative processing 
arrangements exist?
f. Have the backup plans been tested in a realistic simulation?
g. Is there adequate insurance to cover computer equipment, 
software, recovery expenses, and business interruption?
h. Is there a written agreement in place to provide recovery 
services?
i. Are all PC hard drives backed up on a regular basis?
j. Does the company have a written arrangement with a data 
recovery vendor to retrieve data from a hard drive, tape or 
other storage device, which has become unreadable, and for 
which no backup exists?
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CHAPTER 5:
Internal Fraud
5.1 Asset Misappropriation from Within
As difficult as it is to believe, many experts are convinced that the worst threat to business 
is from the people who work there. Fraud committed against an organization by a 
perpetrator from within that organization is probably the most common form of fraud. 
Certainly it is the most widely recognized.
It is estimated that at least one-third of all employees steal to some degree. In retail 
organizations, shoplifters are responsible for only thirty percent of retail losses; employees 
steal the remainder. Probably the worst case of insider misappropriation is the infamous 
U.S. Savings and Loan scandal; the billions of dollars stolen by trusted insiders has no equal 
in history.
5.1.1 Classification of Fraud
Regardless of the industry, you can classify internal fraud in several different ways. One 
way is by the method of concealment, including on-book and off-book frauds.
On-Book Fraud
On-book fraud principally occurs within a business when an employee creates an audit trail 
(which is sometimes obscure) that inadvertently aids the employer in detection. Examples 
include phony vendors and ghost employees. On-book fraud is normally detected at the 
point of payment.
Off-Book Fraud
Off-book fraud occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit trail is likely to 
exist. Examples include bribery and kickbacks. If an employee receives a bribe for 
selecting a certain vendor, that payment would be made by the vendor and, therefore, 
would not be reflected on the books of the affected company. These frauds are detected in 
an indirect manner (that is, responding to other vendor complaints, investigating the life­
style of the person receiving the bribes, and so on). If you suspect that an employee is 
receiving illicit payments, examining the employee’s personal finances should prove this.
5.1.2 Cycles
You can classify fraud occurring within the business environment by one of the five cycles 
in the accounting system. These cycles are:
1. Sales and collection
2. Acquisition and payment
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3. Payroll and personnel
4. Inventory and warehousing
5. Capital acquisition and repayment
All of these cycles flow through the cash account. Accordingly, cash misappropriation is 
discussed separately in this chapter. The following sections discuss the more common 
frauds occurring within each cycle.
5.2 Sales and Collection Cycle
The sales and collection cycle deals with the billing of goods or services to customers’ 
accounts receivable and the collection of funds relating to those receivables.
5.2.1 Functions
The functions of the sales and collection cycle include:
• Receiving orders from customers
• Administering credit approvals
• Invoicing customers
• Collecting receivables
• Adjusting sales and receivables for allowances, returns and write-offs
5.2.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Sales revenue on the income statement and accounts receivable and cash on the balance 
sheet are affected by the sales and collection cycle. See Chapter 10 for further information 
on reducing the risk of financial statement fraud.
5.2.3 Perpetration
Frauds in the sales and collection cycle most commonly involve the theft of cash, the theft 
of other assets, and kickbacks to customers. It can also involve off-book fraud in a situation 
described as front-end fraud, that is, when an employee diverts company revenue before 
entering it on the books.
Theft of Cash
By far, the most common sales-cycle fraud is the theft of cash. The main schemes include: 
not recording sales, under-ringing sales, lapping, theft of funds from voids and returns, 
overbilling and keeping the difference, simple theft of cash, writing off receivables as 
uncollectible, and issuing bogus credit memoranda.
For example, in one lapping fraud, a cashier was able to misappropriate cash receipts 
totaling over $35,000 and cover the shortage by subsequent receipts. The prelisted receipts 
were not compared to the deposits by an independent person, allowing the fraud to go 
undetected over time. This scheme was eventually discovered as a result of a CPA 
following up on the clearing of deposits in transit listed on the year-end bank 
reconciliation.
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Theft of Other Assets
These schemes include ordering and shipping company goods to the residence of the 
employee, and ordering goods for personal use.
Kickbacks to Customers
The most common schemes for kickbacks to customers include underbilling for 
merchandise and splitting the difference, and writing off receivables owed to the company 
for a fee.
Front-End Fraud
A front-end fraud occurs when a company’s customers are improperly directed to take their 
business elsewhere, thereby depriving the company of profits it could otherwise have made. 
Another example is the receipt of a purchase rebate that is misappropriated and not 
deposited to the company’s bank account.
5.2.4 Detection
Generally, CPAs can best detect frauds in the sales and collection cycle by analyzing cash 
or inventory, or both.
Theft of Cash and Front-End Fraud
Following are some methods for detecting the theft of cash and front-end fraud:
• Investigate customer complaints.
• Insist that customers examine receipts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices.
• Compare receipts with deposits.
• Follow up on deposits in transit at the end of each period.
• Account for consecutive sales orders and cash register transactions.
• Compare volume of credit memos by period.
• Verify independently customers who don’t pay.
• Examine gross margin by product.
• Use a computer to—
— Identify missing invoices by number.
— Match shipping documents, sales invoices and customer orders.
— Verify numerical sequence of documents.
— Analyze sales volume by employee.
— Match daily deposits with customer credits.
For example, in one fraud case, a CPA for a retail client noted a skip in the perpetual 
transaction count for one of the cash registers. During a one-year period an employee had 
destroyed sections of cash register tapes totaling $17,000. The irregularity was directly 
related to the company’s failure to institute and maintain adequate internal controls and 
procedures over cash register tapes.
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Theft of Other Assets
You can detect theft of other assets by using the following methods:
• Resolve customer disputes.
• Conduct periodic surprise inventory counts.
• Use statistical sampling of sales invoices, including examining the shipping address.
• Use a computer to—
— Match sales invoices with customer orders.
— Compare customer names and addresses with employee names and addresses.
— Verify delivery addresses against addresses of customers.
Kickbacks to Customers
You can use one or a combination of the following to detect the common schemes in 
kickbacks to customers:
• Follow up on customer disputes.
• Conduct statistical sampling of sales invoices by contacting customers regarding prices 
and terms.
• Conduct computer analysis of—
— Prices charged by product to customer.
— Credit granting approval versus actual sales to customers.
— Customer balances versus sales.
— Customer balances versus length of time doing business with the customer.
— Receivable write-offs.
— Credit memos to customers.
— Time between order and delivery.
— Discounts to customers in descending volume of purchase.
5.2.5 Prevention
Employers can generally prevent sales and collection frauds by using adequate internal 
controls. More specifically, the following methods typically form part of an overall 
prevention strategy:
• Honesty testing
• Separation of duties
• Physical safeguards over assets
• Proper documentation
• Proper approvals
• Independent checks on performance
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The legality of using certain kinds of honesty testing as part of the hiring process varies 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, since the advent of the U.S. Polygraph 
Protection Act of 1988, generally it has been unlawful to require preemployment 
polygraphs of prospective employees. A number of companies have turned to pencil and 
paper honesty tests, which their designers tout as accurate.
Separation of Duties
Employers can prevent most frauds by properly segregating the custody, authorization, and 
record-keeping functions. In the case of sales and collections, it is important to separate the 
functions of credit granting and sales. In addition, the functions of sales, record keeping, 
and cash handling should also be separate.
Physical Safeguards over Assets
If assets and records have physical safeguards, misappropriation is much more difficult. In 
the area of computers, physical safeguards such as restricted access, locks, and similar 
controls are especially important.
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation requires adequate records, including prenumbered checks and 
invoices, to make fictitious entries more difficult. Documentation in sales and collections 











Independent Checks on Performance
In addition to a necessary independent review of employee adherence to internal controls, 
you should make the potential perpetrators aware that their performance is being 
monitored. Independent verification steps include reconciling bank accounts, audits and 
supervision.
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5.2.6 Sales, Receivables and Receipts System
The sales, receivables and receipts system is the part of the accounting system that records a 
company’s sales and revenue collections. Individuals can use false books and supporting 
documentation for sales, receivables and receipts to perpetrate a fraud on a company. This 
section covers three such methods:
1. Front-end fraud
2. False sales invoices
3. Lapping
Front-End Fraud
As discussed in section 5.2.3, employees may divert company revenues before that money 
ever reaches the sales, receivables and receipts system, thus circumventing the accounting 
system entirely. This is commonly called front-end fraud.
A front-end fraud occurs when company products are sold for cash, the sale and the receipt 
of the cash are not recorded, and the cash is diverted—usually, directly into the pocket of 
the perpetrator. A front-end fraud also occurs when a company’s customers are improperly 
directed to take their business elsewhere, thus depriving the company of profits. Finally, a 
front-end fraud occurs when an employee receives and misappropriates special or unusual 
revenues and cost reductions, such as a purchase rebate.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are:
1. Do recorded sales represent all company sales? Where no sale has been recorded, there 
is nothing in the sales accounting system to red-flag an unpaid or overdue account. As a 
result, unrecorded sales are difficult to detect; however, actual inventory on hand has 
been depleted. Therefore, if the company has a good inventory accounting system, 
unrecorded sales may be detected.
2. Has the company unexpectedly lost some of its oldest and best customers?
3. Are all revenues recorded? Service businesses, such as parking lots, theatres and movie 
houses operate primarily with cash sales and have no inventory systems. Front-end 
frauds in these kinds of businesses, therefore, are extremely difficult to detect.
When allowed under local law, a review of a suspected perpetrator’s personal bank 
accounts may reveal unexplained cash deposits, which could be important in establishing 
circumstantial evidence of front-end cash skimming. Otherwise use of the net worth 
approach may be necessary to establish that the suspected perpetrator has benefited.
Investigators should analyze the sales records and other supporting documents of the victim 
company for the period both before and after the assumed occurrence date of a front-end 
fraud. When possible, the investigators should interview customers as well.
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“Taxes ‘R Us” Case Study
Jane Brown and Jack Smith were cashiers who worked at a county tax office. 
Investigation revealed that, over a two-month period in 1997, thirteen individuals 
apparently paid tax for vehicle tags and did not receive an official receipt.
On a review of all the official receipts issued during this period of time it was found 
that:
1. The numerical continuity of the prenumbered receipts was complete; that is, all 
of the issued receipts were accounted for in the bureau’s records.
2. There were no receipts to support the thirteen payments made by those 
individuals identified as exceptions.
The county tax office’s banking records were then reviewed for the days on which 
people reportedly paid for their tags but did not receive a receipt. The review 
disclosed that the amount of cash and checks relating to the tax deposited to the 
county bank account totaled only the amount of receipts issued for that date.
Five of the individuals who reportedly paid for their tags, but were not issued an 
official receipt, paid by check. In the case of each of these five individuals, the 
checks were deposited to the county bank account, but the checks, upon deposit, 
were applied to cover actual receipts issued. With respect to those individuals who 
were known to have paid for their tags by check, but who did not receive an official 
receipt, it was noted that a like amount was included on the county tax office 
deposit slip.
During the same period, cash totaling $4,600 was deposited to the known bank 
accounts of Jane Brown. The source of that deposited cash was not identified.
Front-end fraud of this type is very difficult to detect. Larger frauds may be uncovered if the 
perpetrators become too greedy because the resulting unusually low daily deposits may 
highlight the problem. In fact, skimming of small amounts may be detected only through 
customer complaints: as in the case study, by the lack of an official receipt. This illustrates 
the need to thoroughly investigate similar complaints and any other irregularities.
False Sales Invoices
Employees can alter a company sales invoice to show a lower sale amount than what was 
actually received. They can misappropriate the difference between the real sale amount and 
the adjusted lower amount without the accounting system showing a red flag.
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud include:
1. Are recorded sales amounts the actual sales amounts?
2. Can customers confirm the sales?
3. Are sale amounts reasonable in the circumstances?
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Investigators should obtain and examine all original copies of invoices and all the related 
books of original entry. Again, the investigator must become familiar with the accounting 
system in effect and understand the accused’s position within that system. Did the accused 
have the necessary authority to perpetrate this crime? Did the accused have the 
opportunity?
“Ms. Wanda Cash” Case Study
Wanda Cash was the bookkeeper for Anytown Animal Center. She looked after all 
customer records including preparing bills and collecting payments. The owners of 
the business became suspicious when daily bank deposits were not as high as 
expected considering the level of business. Upon investigation by the owners, the 
police and forensic accountants, it was discovered that Wanda Cash, through 
altering sales invoices, had misappropriated approximately $11,700.
The investigation revealed that:
1. The 183 customer copies of sales invoices showed a total-charge amount higher 
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash receipts journal. The customer 
copy of sales invoices indicated total charges to be higher by $2,579 than the 
amount recorded in the cash receipts journal.
2. The 549 office copies of the sales invoices indicated a total-charge amount higher 
than the total-charge amount recorded in the cash-receipts journal. The office 
copy total-charge amount was higher by $8,941 than the amount recorded in the 
cash-receipts journal.
3. Approximately 68 office-copy invoices were apparently altered so that the total 
charge after alteration balanced with the total charge recorded in the cash­
receipts journal.
To uncover this fraud and measure its magnitude, investigators compared the 
following:
• Customer copies of invoices obtained by the investigating officer
• Office or accounting copies of the company’s sales invoices
• Entries in the customer ledger cards and the cash-receipts journal
The result was that the amount of the total charge on the customer copies of sales 
invoices exceeded the amount of the total charge recorded in the cash-receipts 
journal by an aggregate amount of $2,579. An examination of these documents 
disclosed that in 54 separate cases the corresponding office copy of the invoice was 
altered so that the altered amount agreed to the total-charge amount recorded in the 
cash-receipts journal.
Investigators compared the office copies of the sales invoices with the total charge 
recorded for those invoices in the cash-receipts journal and found that the total 
charge amount on the office copy exceeded the total charge amount recorded in the 
cash receipts journal. In aggregate, the excess was $8,941.
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This case illustrates the need for close supervision in small businesses, in which adequate 
division of duties is difficult to achieve.
Lapping
Lapping occurs when cash receipts from Customer A are misappropriated and the 
misappropriation is subsequently concealed by recording the receipt of monies from 
Customer B to the credit of Customer A (to the extent of the earlier misappropriation).
The questions to address when investigating this kind of fraud are as follows:
1. Are the amounts recorded as owing to the company actually still owing to the company?
2. Are deposits from Peter being used to cover Paul’s debts?
To handle these questions, the investigator should understand the organization’s system for 
receiving customer payments, making bank deposits, and preparing entries to customer 
accounts. The following is a guide to understanding an organization’s account management.
1. Who first received the payments?
2. Who prepared the company bank deposit?
3. Who updated the customer accounts?
4. Has an individual written off any accounts?
5. Who approved the write-offs? (It is also often necessary to contact customers and obtain 
their records of payments, including paid checks and remittance advices.)
6. Do the customer’s records show payment of specific invoices that are shown as unpaid 
in the victim company’s records?
“Ms. B. A. Lapper” Case Study
Jones Transport Company operated a trucking terminal in Norcross, GA. Their 
accounts receivable clerk, Ms. B.A. Lapper, had been a loyal employee for over 
eight years. The terminal manager often complimented her for the extra effort she 
put into the business, evidenced by the amount of work she frequently took home. 
This employee was so loyal that her only time off was attributable to sickness.
Ms. Lapper was responsible for preparing the day’s deposit to the bank and for 
preparing input to the computer systems for updating payments on accounts 
receivable. (The processing of the sales invoice as an account receivable was outside 
her control.) Every month the head office in Atlanta forwarded aged listings of 
accounts receivable to the manager’s attention at the terminal. He gave the analysis 
to the accounts receivable clerk—Ms. Lapper—satisfied that the aged analysis was 
relatively current.
Investigators determined that Ms. Lapper had conducted a lapping scheme over a 
period of six years. The lap grew so large during this period that she had to take the 
aged receivable analysis home in the evenings, along with the paid and unpaid sales 
invoices. There, she would set aside invoices for payment during the next day to 
ensure a favorable aged receivable analysis in the following month. As the lap grew,
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the new cash receipts were no longer sufficient to cover the previously 
misappropriated funds. Accordingly, Ms. Lapper began to apply checks received 
from the larger customers of the company to cover up the already-paid sales 
invoices.
Investigators examined the known personal bank accounts of the accused and her 
husband. An amount of $35,000 was found deposited to these bank accounts over 
and above personal income during the relevant period.
Accounts Receivable Routines: Ms. Lapper’s main function each day was to 
balance the cash with the pro-bills (sales invoices) and prepare a cash deposit for the 
bank in Norcross and a cash report for processing by the head-office computer. She 
would process all incoming checks from charge account customers by matching 
checks to the applicable pro-bill control copies and preparing a deposit for the bank 
in Norcross and a receivable report for the head office. She would present the 
deposit slips and receivable reports to the manager for his signature, along with the 
customer’s checks and cash in an envelope.
The supporting documents were always in sealed and stapled envelopes for each 
report. The envelopes were not opened and verified by the manager. If the total of 
the bank deposit agreed with the total of the receivable report, he would sign the 
report. One copy of the report, the bank deposit slip, and pro-bills were then 
forwarded to the Atlanta head office, while a second copy of the report and the 
remittance copies of pro-bills were retained on file at the Norcross terminal.
Ms. Lapper would work on the company’s Accounts Receivable Aged Analysis, a listing 
of all outstanding pro-bills prepared at the Atlanta head office, and would appear to 
question certain delinquent accounts for payment. She would often take the analysis 
home because she said she was too busy during the day to perform this function.
The Atlanta terminal manager would look at the receivable analysis printout and 
tell Ms. Lapper to question certain delinquent customer accounts, which she 
appeared to do. She would inform the manager of checks arriving after her contacts 
with the customer. For instance, in regard to the Best Quality Cheese account, she 
informed the manager that Best Quality was having serious problems converting to 
a computer accounting system and as a result had requested that Jones Transport be 
patient with the amount of old outstanding receivables.
Jones Transport hired a new person to replace Ms. Lapper when she became 
seriously ill. Her replacement began the collection work on the two largest charge­
account customers, Best Quality Cheese and Anyco Inc. Successful collection of 
these accounts would immediately reduce the analysis’ sixty- and ninety-day totals, 
which had become very high.
Customer Best Quality: Best Quality was advised that their pro-bills dated July 
and August were still outstanding on the receivable analysis. Ms. Brown asked Best 
Quality if they were having computer problems and the response was negative. 
Subsequently Best Quality informed Jones Transport that the pro-bills mentioned as 
outstanding were all paid by checks issued in July and August.
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Jones Transport then examined copies of the reports around the dates of the Best 
Quality checks, together with check stubs and supporting pro-bills. Although the 
pro-bills that were paid with the Best Quality checks were all Best Quality, all were 
dated April and May. Jones Transport wondered if Best Quality had made an error, 
because their August check, which was paying July and August pro-bills, did not 
appear to apply to the pro-bills in the deposit that were all dated May and June. 
Best Quality responded that there was no error on their part, and they could not 
understand how there could be a mistake because they had attached all the 
applicable pro-bills with their remittances.
Customer Anyco: Jones Transport then called Anyco Inc. and asked when they 
would be paying certain outstanding pro-bills. Anyco indicated that these bills had 
been paid by checks that had been issued and received as paid. When Jones 
Transport checked their copies of the reports, they found that Anyco checks were 
deposited, but that the checks were applied to older Anyco pro-bills and other 
customer pro-bills and not to the pro-bills submitted by Anyco with its checks.
The outstanding pro-bills totaled about $47,000 at Best Quality and about $12,000 
at Anyco. At this point Jones Transport recognized that the customer checks were 
not applied to the pro-bills as intended by the customer. Instead the checks were 
applied either to the customer’s older pro-bills or to other customers’ pro-bills. 
Further investigation revealed that these other customers were normally cash­
paying customers.
Examination of the Amount of Money Due Jones Transport: To determine the 
correct amount of money owing to them by all their customers, Jones Transport 
communicated directly with each customer, based on their accounts receivable 
analysis. For each customer, Jones Transport prepared from their analysis a list of 
pro-bills by number, date, and amount that the customers had not paid and 
requested verification that the information concerning the outstanding pro-bills was 
accurate.
A reply made by all customers indicated that several pro-bills shown in the analysis 
of Jones Transport were, in fact, paid and were, therefore, not outstanding. This 
finding confirmed the evidence of the samples and the discussion by Jones 
Transport with both Best Quality and Anyco, that a customer’s check was applied 
not to his current pro-bills as intended by the customer, but rather to a combination 
of the customer’s older pro-bills and other customer’s pro-bills that had been paid in 
cash.
From the information provided by the customers, the investigators determined that 
the dollar value of the pro-bills, which had been paid by these customers, was 
$115,132.
Jones Transport fell victim to a fraudulent scheme commonly called lapping. Cash 
and checks were received at the Hamilton terminal of Jones Transport and 
controlled by Ms. Lapper. The cash was removed from Jones Transport while the 
checks were applied to the pro-bills that were to have been paid by the cash. 
Consequently, the pro-bills remitted with the checks remained outstanding on the 
accounts-receivable analysis published at the end of each month.
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As a result, the amount of the outstanding pro-bills, which Jones Transport found 
through direct communication with their customers to have been paid, represented 
that amount of the cash that had been misappropriated over the time period under 
investigation, that is, $115,132.
Victims most often detect lapping frauds through accounts-receivable reconciliations or 
confirmations, or both. Supervision is also important. Organizations can prevent lapping by 
appropriately dividing duties (for example, assigning someone other than the accounts 
receivable clerk the duty of handling cash receipts). You should also consider establishing a 
policy of mandatory vacations, which could be helpful.
5.3 Acquisition and Payment Cycle
The acquisition and payment cycle includes the procurement and payment of all goods and 
services except for payroll and capital acquisitions. This cycle is especially vulnerable to 
fraudulent transactions because this is the point where funds flow out of an entity.
5.3.1 Functions
The functions of the acquisition and payment cycle include:
• Processing purchase orders and dealing with vendors.
• Receiving and recording goods and services.
• Accounting for the liability of items or services purchased.
• Processing and recording cash disbursements.
5.3.2 Financial Statements Accounts
Balance Sheet
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Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the acquisition and payment 
cycle:
• Cost of goods sold
• Advertising expenses
• Travel and entertainment expenses
• Miscellaneous expenses
• Income tax expenses
• Professional fees
• All expense accounts
• Gains and losses on sales of assets
5.3.3 Perpetration
By far the most common fraud in the acquisition and payment cycle involves the 
purchasing agent (buyer), who is especially vulnerable to the temptation of accepting 
kickbacks and gifts from outside vendors.
One study revealed that companies who caught employees accepting small gifts were 
hesitant to discharge their employees. Two percent suspended the employees, while only 
12 percent fired them. Sixty-six percent reprimanded the employees and made them return 
the gifts.
There are three general kinds of acquisition and payment-cycle frauds:
1. The buyer-employee acts alone, and without outside assistance.
2. The vendor acts alone.
3. The buyer acts in collusion with the vendor. As is the case with other methods of 
prevention and detection, the collusion between both parties is the most difficult to 
prevent and detect.
Buyer Acting Alone
Noncollusive purchasing frauds usually involve the use of a nominee entity, commonly 
called a shell company, that is, an apparent third party owned by the buyer. Examples 
include the use of a nominee entity to submit fictitious invoices (the most common fraud), 
or to order goods for personal use.
Shell company schemes can be quite sophisticated using bank accounts, corporate filings, 
and mail drops to assist in the fraud. One common shell company failing is using a post 
office box rather than a street address. The post office box address has come to be 
recognized as a red flag.
In one case, a 61-year-old employee of a major department store was indicted for allegedly 
stealing $2 million from the company. His responsibilities included leasing buildings to 
house the retailer’s stores. On twenty-two leases over a two-year period, through a nominee 
company, he altered leases to receive overpayments, and forged invoices billing the 
company for fictitious legal and building services.
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In another example, an executive was indicted for defrauding a large cosmetics company 
of $1.1 million over four years. During this period, he allegedly approved more than 150 
vendor invoices for services that were never rendered in connection with a newsletter the 
company was going to publish. The executive (whose salary was $124,000 per year) helped 
set up two nominee printing companies, which bilked his employer with the fraudulent 
invoices.
Finally, a director of customer-service technology was able to defraud his employer of over 
$2 million in one year by taking advantage of defects in internal control. The fraudster set 
up a legitimate agreement with a legitimate vendor to provide certain equipment. Then he 
set up a fake distributorship and told the vendor the company would purchase only from 
this one distributor. The vendor was content to have the business and proceeded to invoice 
the distributor. The fraudster, through his nominee distributorship, then inflated the 
invoices and billed them to his employer. The fraud was possible because the employee 
had the authority to set up the agreement, and to approve invoices for payment. The fraud 
was discovered by a manager who thought it was strange that the employee was delivering 
the invoices to accounts payable by hand.
Buyer and Vendor in Collusion
Nearly all collusion between buyer and vendor involves some form of secret commission 
or kickback from the vendor to the buyer. In these cases, secret benefits are given by a 
vendor in order to buy business, or are requested by the buyer for direct financial benefit. 
Collusion fraud often involves more than one kind of scheme perpetrated over time. Of 
course, there is always the question of who took the initiative, that is, the buyer or the 
vendor.
For example, one case started out involving inferior goods and later graduated to inflated 
invoices. A county purchasing agent was responsible for acquiring a long list of janitorial 
supplies, including mops, pails, soap, plywood, rakes, and paper goods. Area paper 
jobbers—experienced connivers—approached the purchasing agent with a deal. “Without 
changing our invoice price,” they told him, “if you agree, we can deliver a cheaper brand 
of paper towels. Half the extra is for us; the other half is for you.” Once the purchasing 
agent accepted a lesser brand, the vendor began squeezing for more by raising the price on 
the invoice and billing for five times the amount of merchandise actually shipped.
Monetary payments are not the only benefit that can be offered. Other common ways of 
corrupting a buyer include products or services; gifts, trips, or sex; promises of subsequent 
employment; reduced prices for personal items; and employment of friends or relatives.
Vendor Acting Alone
Common schemes used by vendors include product substitutions, billing for work not 
performed or services not provided, undershipping, padding overhead charges, and 
courtesy billings.
5.3.4 Detection
Because of the difficulty of detection, fraud awareness and prevention is the best policy, 
that is, know your vendors, and have an effective tendering process for all contracts. Fraud 
in procurement contracts always poses special problems, and detection is difficult. 
Common red flags include sole source contracts, unhappy purchasing agents, significant 
price changes or changed orders (especially after a contract is awarded), and vendor 
complaints.
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In one case detected through vendor complaints, a buyer with six years’ seniority obtained 
purchase requisitions from various departments at his plant. He then created a nominee 
company and placed orders with this firm. The nominee company would place real orders 
with a legitimate vendor and have them ship the merchandise to his employer. The 
merchandise would be billed through the buyer’s company at 150 percent of the real 
amount. The scheme was unraveled when the buyer failed to pay one of the vendors, who 
then complained to the buyer’s employer.
Sometimes you can also detect schemes through a computer analysis of the following:
• Timing of bids
• Patterns of bids
• Amount of work performed by vendors
• Patterns of hiring new vendors
• Vendors with post-office-box addresses
In an example involving post-office-box addresses, a junior buyer, who had been with his 
company for two years, created five nominee companies that he then placed on an 
approved vendor list. Thereafter, he did business with these phony companies, placing 
various orders with them. The scheme was unraveled when the auditors noticed that these 
particular vendors all had post-office boxes for addresses and were not listed in the 
telephone book. The amount of money lost was in excess of $250,000 over a period of 
more than a year.
If you suspect that a buyer and vendor are in collusion, consider the following items:
• Assessment of the tender process, if any
• Patterns of business and bids
• Noncompetitive pricing
• Products of inferior quality
• Buying unnecessary goods or services
• Lack of competitive bidding
5.3.5 Prevention—Key Controls
As previously noted, prevention of procurement fraud can be achieved best through fraud 
awareness, effective tendering and budgeting, and knowledge of your vendors. Other 
prevention controls include proper documentation, approvals, and segregation of duties.
Proper documentation includes prenumbered purchase requisitions, purchase orders, 
receiving reports, and checks. Proper approvals should include detailed background 
information on the vendor; ideally, purchase contracts should include a right-of-audit- 
access clause to the vendor’s books. In addition, conduct both irregularly scheduled audits 
of the purchasing function as well as assessments of the performance and happiness of the 
purchasing agent.
5.3.6 Prevention—Policies
Organizations should have established prevention and detection policies. The following are 
some policies to consider implementing.
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Accepting Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the acceptance of gifts and gratuities:
“Employees, and members of their immediate families, should not accept gifts, 
favors or entertainment that might create or appear to create a favored position 
for someone doing business with the company. Advertising novelties or trinkets 
are not considered as gifts and are excluded from these restrictions.
Gifts that are received by an employee should be returned to the donor and may 
be accompanied with a copy of this policy. Perishable gifts should be donated to 
a charitable organization and the donor notified of the action taken.
It is not the intent of this policy to preclude the acceptance by the company’s 
employees of occasional meals or refreshments that are provided in the normal 
course of business-work relationships, with other individuals. Discretion must be 
used, however, in the limited acceptance of meals, refreshments or incidental 
hospitality to avoid situations that could create a conflict of interest or appear to 
do so.”
Providing Gifts
The following is a sample policy statement covering the giving of gifts:
“Occasionally, it may be appropriate for employees, acting for the company, to 
provide people outside the company with promotional items, meals, refreshments, 
transportation, lodgings or incidental hospitality. Expenditures for such purposes 
should be moderate and should be done only within the framework of good taste. All 
expenditures are subject to the overall company policy that an employee shall avoid 
constituting improper influence over others.”
Use of Hotlines
You should study the feasibility of installing hotlines to monitor complaints by employees 
and other vendors. Make sure the hotline staff is not associated with either the purchasing 
or payment functions. Failure to take this precaution could result in the fraudster receiving 
the whistle blower’s call.
Disposition of Materials
The purchasing department normally should not be in charge of disposing of obsolete 
inventory, scrap, or fixed assets.
Rotation of Jobs
Rotate buyers frequently within a department to keep them from getting too close to 
vendors. In addition, enforce a mandatory vacation policy.
Competition in Bidding
Ensure that bidding policies and procedures are thoroughly reviewed. Whenever possible, 
enforce competitive bidding.
Compensation of Buyers
Buyers should be well paid to reduce the motives and rationalizations for fraud.
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5.3.7 Purchasing, Payables and Collection Systems
The purchasing, payables, and collection systems are part of the accounting systems that 
record a company’s purchases and expense payments. Employees can falsify books and 
supporting documentation for purchases, payables and collections to perpetrate a fraud on 
their employing company. This section covers three categories of perpetrating fraud:
1. False expense reports
2. False supplier invoices
3. Other false information
False Expense Reports
Expense reports prepared and submitted to the company for payment are false if they 




An employee could use a company credit card for personal items. If the company pays the 
entire amount of an employee’s account, that employee may be committing a fraud. 
Ultimately, the answer depends on the first accountability for the disbursements.
Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the expense item an allowable business-related expense? It is necessary to determine 
the company’s policy regarding allowable business expenses.
2. Is the expense amount the actual amount incurred? It is necessary to obtain the 
suppliers’ copies of the original expense vouchers and compare them with those 
submitted in support of the expense report.
3. Is the expense ultimately charged directly to the business? If yes, is there evidence of 
any reimbursement?
It is also necessary to understand the approval and payment system in effect. Who 
approved the expense reports? How were the expense reports categorized in the accounting 
records? Were the expense reports adjusted at a later date to reflect those items of a 
personal nature? Was there any pattern in the submission, approval or recording (or any 
combination thereof) of the fraudulent expense reports?
“Manny Miles” Case Study
Manny Miles had been the Business Administrator and Secretary-Treasurer for The 
County Hospital since shortly after it was formed in 1983. In addition to overseeing 
the administration of the hospital and its 145 employees, Miles’ duties included 
preparing budgets. He had check-signing authority and payment approval for the 
hospital’s annual budget of about $5 million.
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The governing body of the hospital consisted of a board comprised of twelve 
members; eight were elected and four were appointed as representatives of the 
county. In 1993, the board members hired Dr. Jane Wilson as Medical Officer. 
Almost immediately Miles and Wilson developed a severe personality conflict; 
accusations and negative feedback caused a division between the personnel of the 
hospital and members of the board. Attempts to terminate Dr. Wilson’s services 
failed due to the intervention of the hospital board members on her behalf. The 
hospital conducted studies to improve conditions but never implemented any 
recommendations.
In mid-1996, during its audit, the auditors found irregularities in travel claims 
submitted by Manny Miles, and the hospital referred the matter to the police for 
investigation. In December 1996, and January 1997, the police executed search 
warrants not only on the hospital but also on the residence of Manny Miles. They 
seized the hospital’s financial records along with Miles’ personal banking records.
Examination of the records revealed that from 1993 to 1996, Miles had continually 
made claims for travel expenses while using a hospital car. Additionally, he claimed 
mileage from both the hospital and the county for the same trips. Furthermore 
Miles had used his hospital credit card to repair his own vehicle and purchase 
numerous personal items, including restaurant meals on weekends, when he was 
not working. The card was in Miles’ name but the hospital paid the bills.
As business administrator, Miles could approve his own expenditures and authorize 
the checks. To conceal his spending, Miles had authorized the listing of these 
expenditures in the hospital’s financial records under other categories. Invoices 
were missing for some checks issued and for credit-card expenditures. The financial 
records of the hospital did not show any reimbursement by Miles to cover the vast 
majority of his personal purchases, although on several occasions he had made 
restitution for small purchases on the hospital card.
The Manny Miles case shows that independent approval and division of duties is essential 
in the payment of all travel claims and other expenses. Employees should not be able to 
approve their own expense reports. In addition, check signers should not be the same 
people approving expense reports.
False Supplier Invoices
Suppliers’ invoices prepared and submitted for payment to the company are false if either:
1. No goods have been delivered or services rendered
2. The quantity or value (or both) of the goods are inflated
The delivery of goods or services to a location other than a business location (for the use 
and benefit of the perpetrator) is a common technique, as is the payment to a friendly 
supplier when no goods or services were actually provided. Payments of inflated amounts 
to suppliers often reflect the existence of secret commissions.
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Were goods and services actually provided? Find out, first, whether the supplier 
company actually exists and next, whether any goods or services were in fact provided. 
If they were provided, determine to whom.
2. Did the company receive the benefit? It is often necessary to obtain the bills of lading, 
that is, the freight companies’ proof-of-delivery slip, to confirm where the goods and 
services were delivered.
3. What was the approval and payment system? As with false expense reports, you should 
understand the approval and payment system.
“Credit To You Inc.” Case Study
In January 1993, Jones and Smith signed an agreement to start Smith Construction, 
a business that primarily consisted of erecting service stations. It was agreed that 
Smith would provide the financing while, for a salary of $600 per week plus 
expenses, Jones would manage and operate the business. Smith and Jones were to 
share equally any profits from the business. The business progressed well and 
showed a profit for the first three years.
Smith did not take an active part in the construction business, as he continued to 
operate his own plastering company. Smith Construction operated as a division of 
Smith Plastering Corp. Smith initially invested $42,000 as capital to start the 
construction business, and as sole signing officer, would attend the Smith 
Construction office regularly to sign checks, some of which were blank when 
signed.
Jones tendered and obtained contracts, hired subcontractors, hired and fired 
employees and purchased the goods necessary to operate the business, without 
interference from Smith. Jones could also purchase material he required for himself 
through the construction business and charge these amounts to himself on the 
business books as a form of salary.
Smith was aware that over the years Jones had erected a bam on his farm, 
renovated other buildings including his residence, and continued to operate the 
farm. Jones informed Smith that he had obtained a grant from the government of 
$300,000 to finance these endeavors.
In 1998, Smith Construction had difficulty paying its suppliers (creditors) and was 
eventually forced into bankruptcy by creditors in June 1998. The company’s debts 
exceeded $300,000. Jones gave no explanation for the shortage of funds except to 
say that he had miscalculated the actual cost of various construction jobs. An 
examination of Smith Construction’s books, canceled checks and available 
supporting documentation revealed that Jones had defrauded Smith Construction 
of $861,000 by various means.
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As general manager, Jones was responsible for the day-to-day operations and in this 
capacity, he was afforded a degree of trust. At the same time, Smith, the absentee 
owner, retained signing authority over all checks and, thus, thought he had control 
over all policy decisions.
In his private life as a farmer, Jones incurred debts with suppliers who also dealt 
with him as general manager of Smith Construction. Jones personally owed one of 
these suppliers, Credit To You Inc., more than $25,000. In June 1997, Jones 
purchased a $12.30 item, documented by the supplier invoice made out in pencil. 
Later, the penciled information on this invoice was erased. Information was typed 
onto the invoice, indicating instead that the company, Smith Construction, had 
purchased $9,500 worth of material for a job then in progress. On the strength of 
this typed document, Smith signed a check for $9,500 to the supplier, believing, of 
course, that the disbursement was for the benefit of Smith Construction. When the 
supplier received the check, on Jones’ instructions, he credited Jones’ personal 
account, reducing the debt to $15,500. This altered document was the prelude to a 
fraud of more than $861,000.
The alteration of documents (erasures, stricken information, or both) is at times the 
only indication of a fraud as it can disclose a change of mind (intent) by the person 
making the entry. Such alterations frequently occur in the earlier stages of a fraud as 
the perpetrator has yet to perfect the scheme.
Acme Products Inc. invoiced Smith Construction for the sale of roof trusses, with 
delivery scheduled for a gas station being built by Smith Construction. However, a 
description of the route to Jones’ farm appeared on the back of the invoice. The 
building of Jones’ barn required roof trusses. A review of the bill of lading 
confirmed the redirection.
Investigators can also review delivery instructions as another technique for identifying 
fraudulent transactions.
Other False Information
A business receives vast amounts of information, and subject to the existing systems of 
internal control, relies on it in making decisions, initiating, executing and recording 
transactions. If this information is false, a business can be deceived, resulting in deprivation 
of some sort and hence the company is put at economic risk.
Examples of false information that businesses may rely on include:
• False financial statements (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement 
fraud.)
• Overstated accounts receivable listings
• Overstated statements of income and net worth
• False general journal entries
• Altered internal company records
• Fictitious customer credit information
• False asset valuations
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Address the following questions when investigating this kind of fraud:
1. Is the summary information presented (accounts receivable listings, financial statements) 
consistent with the underlying books and records, and are the real assets on hand? It is 
necessary to determine the representation made by the person or entity under 
investigation and the understanding reached between that person or entity and the 
victim. Once accomplished, you can examine the books and records supporting the 
summary financial information in question from the appropriate perspective.
2. Have the correct authorities properly approved entries in the general ledger? Are the 
entries appropriate and consistent with the facts?
3. Can customers confirm transactions?
To address the second and third questions above, you should understand the accounting 
systems in effect. Also, you should contact third parties to review and discuss with them 
their books and records, and then compare that information to the victim’s information.
“Ms. I. O. Much” Case Study
Ms. I.O. Much was the office manager of Anyco Inc. from May 1995 to May 1998. 
As office manager, Ms. Much, together with the general manager and president of 
the company, had check-signing authority for the company payroll account.
While Ms. Much was office manager, the company’s auditors frequently had 
difficulty completing their audit work primarily because of the poorly maintained 
books and records. Finally, Ms. Much was replaced with a new office manager, who 
found irregularities in the company’s bank reconciliations. After the company, 
police, and forensic accountants completed an investigation, they determined that 
I.O. Much received unauthorized payments from the company totaling at least 
$11,195. These payments were covered up in a variety of ways.
After examining banking records for the payroll account of Anyco Inc., 
investigators noted all checks payable to the order of I.O. Much. They found that 
eight checks totaling $9,126 were paid to I.O. Much but were not recorded in the 
payroll journal.
June 15, 1997: A check dated June 15, 1997, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to 
I.O. Much but not recorded. Attached to the December bank statement was a note 
dated June 15, 1997, which stated, “This is to certify that I.O. Much received a loan 
of $2,500 from Anyco Limited to be repaid before the end of the year.” The bottom 
of the note had a legend stating “paid Dec. 28/97.” It appeared that no record had 
been made of this apparent loan transaction until December 1997.
A review of relevant accounting records disclosed that on December 28, 1997, a 
deposit of $2,500 was made to the Anyco general bank account. The deposit slip for 
this $2,500 showed that the deposit consisted of three checks, as follows: $350, 
$178, and $1,971. The sources of the three checks noted on the deposit slip 
appeared to be as follows:
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1. William Smith—$350: A check was issued to Anyco on the account of William Smith, 
dated September 8, 1997. The current office manager at Anyco stated that this check 
was a repayment to Anyco as a result of an over-advance of funds to Smith, an Anyco 
employee.
2. Anybank—$178: A check was issued from Anybank to Anyco Limited.
3. Bank draft—$1,971: The check was a bank draft purchased from Otherbank. When this 
deposit was recorded in Anyco’s records, someone apparently recorded it as a reduction 
of the company loan to I.O. Much. This loan was reflected in the books as having been 
advanced and repaid in the same month, that is, December 1997.
March 1, 1998: A check dated March 1, 1998, in the amount of $2,500 was paid to 
I.O. Much but not recorded in the payroll journal. It appeared that a journal entry 
was prepared to record this check. This journal entry suggested that the $2,500 was 
paid with respect to five different accounts as follows:
1. Account #99-6, salespeople’s salaries, Boston
2. Account #99-2, salespeople’s salaries, Dallas
3. Account #99-7, salespeople’s salaries, Washington, D.C.
4. Account #199-12, delivery salaries, New York
5. Account #99-8, salespeople’s salaries, Seattle
The journal indicated that this entry was “to record checks cashed but not recorded 
or deposited.” The only check apparently not recorded in March 1997 was check 
#2000 for $2,500 payable to I.O. Much.
It is significant that the checks paid to I.O. Much in 1997 and 1998, which were not 
noted in the payroll journal, were not available in the corporate records. 
Investigators obtained copies of these checks from the microfilm files at Anybank.
A review of the payroll records indicated two apparent discrepancies related to I.O. 
Much. The April 7, 1997, payroll records indicated “income tax withheld” of $200 
more than apparently had been withheld from I.O. Much’s pay. Similarly on 
August 11, 1997, payroll records indicated $1,000 more income tax withheld than 
apparently had been withheld to date. In that time period an offsetting adjustment 
was made to the net pay figure, thereby indicating that the net amount of money 
paid to I.O. Much was $1,000 less than apparently had been paid to her at that 
time.
The effect of these adjustments was an apparent benefit to I.O. Much of $1,200. Her 
W2 for the year ended December 31, 1997, indicated that she paid $1,200 more 
income tax than she had actually paid. The Anyco Limited employee deduction 
account was not reconciled at the time of the investigation, and thus it was not 
readily apparent how the $1,200 tax benefit was accounted for in the company’s 
books.
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While the amounts involved were not terribly large, this case points out a number of internal 
control weaknesses that can result in fraud, including lack of supervision, inadequate division 
of duties, and failure to perform appropriate accounting reconciliations.
5.4 Payroll and Personnel Cycle
The payroll and personnel cycle handles the hiring, firing, and payment of employees, 
along with timekeeping, expense-account and travel reimbursements, and insurance 
matters.
The hiring function can play an important role in reducing the risk of potential fraud 
through the careful vetting of employment applications. Adding an employee whose 
resume is not truthful is opening the business’s door to a potential fraudster.
5.4.1 Functions
The functions of the payroll and personnel cycle are as follows:
1. Personnel and employment
2. Preparation of timekeeping and payroll
3. Payment of payroll
4. Payment of payroll taxes and other withholdings
5. Reimbursements of expense accounts and travel expenses
6. Processing and payment of employee insurance, pension withholdings, and other 
employee benefits
5.4.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Balance Sheet
The following balance sheet accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle (see 
Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement fraud):
1. Cash
2. Salaries payable
3. Payroll taxes payable
4. Other withholdings payable
Income Statement
The following income statement accounts are affected by the payroll and personnel cycle:
1. Travel and entertainment expenses
2. Salary and commissions expenses
3. Payroll tax expenses
4. Medical and insurance expenses
5. 4.3 Perpetration
Payroll is particularly ripe for internal fraud. Common schemes include nonexistent or 
ghost employees, fictitious hours and overtime abuses, overstating expense accounts, and 
fictitious or overstated medical claims.
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In one case, approximately one month after the payroll check date, Mr. Smith attempted to 
pick up his check from Ms. Doe, who was responsible for all departmental check 
distributions. Ms. Doe stated that the check was lost and that she would process the paper 
work necessary to obtain a new check. She then entered false payroll data in order to 
generate the check. Within a few weeks, Mr. Smith received a new check. However, upon 
reviewing his year-to-date earnings, he discovered that the lost check amount was included 
in his earned income. When confronted with the situation, Ms. Doe admitted to her 
supervisor that she had forged Mr. Smith’s name and cashed the check for personal 
reasons. Ms. Doe, who had been with the company for seven years, had her employment 
terminated.
Expense accounts are easily and frequently abused. For example, the president of a 
subsidiary submitted requests for business travel and entertainment advances with the 
parent company. The chief accountant issued the checks for the requested advances. After 
one-and-a-half years, the president had not repaid the advances. When pressed, he could 
not support the advances with proper business receipts. He confessed that he had none. 
The president who had ten years of service, had his employment terminated. The amount 
involved was $120,000.
5. 4.4 Detection
Organizations typically discover ghost employees when payroll checks are hand-delivered, 
and extra checks are left. For businesses employing vigorous payroll fraud detection 
procedures, investigators can perform significant computer and statistical analysis. For 
example, time card approvals, which are the same as signatures and endorsements on 
checks, can provide items for further investigation. Computer-generated detection methods 
could indicate:
• Payments to employees not on the master lists
• Payments to employees versus those not authorized for payment
• Write-offs of employee accounts
• Duplicate payments to employees
• Overtime by employee
• Password use during vacation
• Social security numbers listed in descending or ascending order
• Employees with no withholding
• Each kind of withholding in descending order
• Salary expenses in descending order
• Hours worked in descending order
• Time-card hours versus authorized job orders
• Hours worked by employee by pay period
• Pay rates in descending order
• Dates of employment versus authorized dates of payment
• Travel reimbursement by employee overtime
• Travel reimbursement compared to other employees
26 Fraud Supp. 1—3/01
Chapter Five: Internal Fraud
• Travel reimbursement for specific function by employee
• Travel reimbursements by kind of expense, that is, rental car, hotel, airfare, and so on
• Date of travel reimbursements compared to dates employee worked
• Numerical sequence of employee travel reimbursements
5.4.5 Prevention
Proper Documentation
Proper documentation for payroll purposes includes time cards for appropriate employees, 
prenumbered travel reimbursement forms and payroll checks, and verification of medical 
services.
Proper Approval
Proper approval includes hours worked and wage rates, hiring and terminations, overtime, 
medical benefits, and travel allowances.
Separation of Duties
At a minimum, you should consider separating the following duties to reduce the 
possibility of one employee acting alone.
• Accounting for hours worked and processing checks
• Processing and distributing paychecks
• Hiring and firing from timekeeping
• Claims processing, approval, and payment
• Travel expense approval and payment
Independent Verification
Independent verification is especially important for preventing payroll and personnel 
fraud, and includes the following:
• Using time clocks wherever possible, and verifying the hours worked against the clock
• Ensuring hours worked are approved by someone other than the employee
• Conducting surprise audits of the personnel and payment cycle
5.5 Inventory and Warehousing Cycle
The inventory and warehousing cycle includes functions relating to the purchase and 
warehousing of merchandise for manufacture and resale. Because of the volume of activity 
and funds involved, fraud represents a significant risk.
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5.5.1 Functions
The functions of the inventory and warehousing cycle include:
• Processing purchase requisitions.
• Receiving raw materials and finished goods.
• Storing raw materials and finished goods.
• Cost accounting.
• Processing goods for shipment.
• Shipping finished goods.
5.5.2 Financial Statement Accounts
Inventories on the balance sheet and cost of goods sold on the income statement are 
affected by the inventory and warehousing cycle. (See Chapter 10 for further information 
on financial statement fraud.)
5.5.3 Perpetration
The more common frauds in the inventory and warehousing cycle include: ordering 
unneeded inventory, appropriating inventory for personal use, theft of inventory and scrap 
proceeds, and charging embezzlements to inventory.
For example, a loading-dock employee and delivery-route driver were able to steal 
$300,000 of inventory through collusion over a six-month period. The load sheets at the 
dock were either not filled out or inaccurately completed by both employees (control 
procedures required the dock employee and route driver to verify the quantities loaded 
and sign a load sheet). The products were transported to an independent distributor and 
subsequently sold. The defalcation surfaced when outside sources informed the company 
that certain products were being stolen as the result of collusion between particular 
employees and an independent distributor.
In a case involving a theft of inventory, an inventory records supervisor and a security 
guard colluded to steal $400,000 from a jewelry warehouse over a two-year period. The 
security guard stole the merchandise, and the supervisor concealed the theft by 
manipulating inventory records. An undercover investigator, who was hired because of a 
significant increase in year-end inventory shortages, eventually discovered the theft. After 
this experience, and following a consultant’s recommendation, the company started to 
perform surprise physical inventories at varied times during the year.
5.5.4 Detection
The three primary ways for detecting inventory and warehousing frauds are: statistical 
sampling of documents, computer analysis, and physical counts.
Statistical sampling includes looking for inconsistencies and discrepancies in purchase 
requisitions, as well as receiving reports, perpetual inventory records, raw material 
requisitions, shipping documents, job-cost sheets and similar documents.
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Computer analysis includes identifying the following items:
• Purchases by item
• Purchases by vendor
• Inventory levels by specific kinds
• Inventory shipped by address
• Costs per item over time
• Direct labor per inventory item
• Direct materials per inventory item
• Overhead per inventory item
• Disposals followed by reorders
• Shortages by inventory item
• Shipments by address
5.5.5 Prevention
Prevention is critically important in the case of inventory and warehousing fraud because 
of the amounts of money involved and the relative ease with which this kind of fraud can 
be concealed. Prevention includes: receiving reports, keeping perpetual records, using 
prenumbered and controlled requisitions, raw material requisitions, shipping documents, 
and keeping job-cost sheets.
Someone independent of the purchase or warehousing function should handle approvals of 
purchasing and disbursement of inventory.
Separation of duties becomes critical in preventing this kind of fraud. Authorization to 
purchase should be handled by someone not performing the warehousing function. 
Someone other than the individual responsible for inventory should handle the receipt of 
inventory.
Independent checks on performance are also important prevention measures. Someone 
independent of the purchasing or warehousing functions should conduct the physical 
observation of inventory.
Physical safeguards include ensuring that merchandise is physically locked and guarded, 
and that entry is limited to authorized personnel.
5.6 Capital Acquisition and Repayment Cycle
The capital acquisition and repayment cycle, sometimes referred to as the financing cycle, 
includes borrowing money and accounting for the debt of an entity.
5.6.1 Functions
The functions of the capital acquisition and repayment cycle include: borrowing funds and 
accounting for debt, accounting for and paying interest, accounting for and paying 
dividends, accounting for stock transactions, and equity financing.
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5.6.2 Financial Statement Accounts
The following balance sheet and income statements are most often associated with the 













The common schemes in this cycle include borrowing for personal use, misapplication of 
interest income, and theft of loan and stock proceeds.
In one case, a factoring company obtained a credit facility from a regional bank to fund the 
purchase of qualified assets, primarily accounts receivable. The vice president of the 
company, in collusion with a customer, purchased fictitious accounts receivables with the 
proceeds of the credit facility. Part of the purchase proceeds was wired to offshore bank 
accounts beneficially owned by the vice president. The activity was discovered when the 
bank manager reviewed the bank account of the factoring company and saw wire transfers 
made to Caribbean tax havens. He hired forensic accountants who discovered the bank 
had been defrauded of $9.5 million over a two-year period.
5.6.4 Detection
Most frauds in the capital acquisition and repayment cycle involve tracing the proceeds of 
loans to ensure that all of the proceeds go to the benefit of the company. This can be 
accomplished by tracing loan proceeds to the bank deposits, and tracing authorization for 
borrowing from the minutes of the board to the loan ledgers. In addition, a computer 
analysis can do the following:
1. Compare addresses of interest payees.
2. Match borrowings with repayments.
3. Check the schedule of late repayments.
4. Check the schedule of authorization of loan proceeds.
5. Check the list of loan recipients.
6. Check the list of addresses where loan proceeds were delivered.
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5.6.5 Prevention
Proper documentation of loan documents, journal entries, interest coupons and stock 
certificates can aid in prevention of capital acquisition and repayment frauds.
Proper approvals include receiving approval of the board of directors for: borrowing, 
paying dividends and refinancing debt. Physical safeguards include keeping stock 
certificates and loan documents under lock and key. Also, conduct independent checks on 
the transfer agent and registrar.
Segregation of duties is also important in prevention. The authorization to borrow should 
be separate from handling cash and accounting. Authorizations to issue stock should be 
separated from the handling of cash; and accounting should be separated from handling 
cash, and dividends and interest.
5.7 Cash Misappropriation
Although not a cycle, cash is the focal point of most entities. All other cycles flow through 
the cash account. Because there are so many different ways to misappropriate cash, this 
section covers cash exclusively.
Most organizations can divide their cash into two major categories: petty cash and demand 
deposits. Petty cash consists of cash on hand that is accounted for separately. It is 
reimbursed periodically, and the expenditures are then booked to the various accounts. 
Demand deposits consist of checking accounts maintained by the entity; savings or interest 
bearing accounts; and certificates of deposit and all other liquid investments that can be 
easily converted to cash.
5.7.1 Perpetration
Frauds perpetrated on the cash accounts are normally committed in conjunction with other 
cycles. The most common are the theft of petty cash and the theft of bank deposits.
Theft of Petty Cash
Petty cash thieves usually forge or prepare fictitious vouchers for reimbursement from petty 
cash. As an alternative, perpetrators frequently borrow from the petty cash account and 
fraudulently represent that the petty cash account is intact.
For example, the head security officer had custody of petty cash. He had altered legitimate 
receipts—primarily for postage—to reflect higher amounts. Postage is an overhead item 
that was loosely monitored. At a surprise count of the fund, only about $700 in currency 
and receipts were on hand of the $4,000 fund. Polygraph examinations were given to all 
security officers, but the head officer resigned before his test. A promissory note for the 
approximately $3,300 shortfall was executed by the former head officer. He had been with 
the company for seven years. The company estimated the loss at $12,000 but was unable to 
prove that this amount had been stolen.
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Theft of Bank Deposits
Many times employees steal cash receipts prepared for deposit. In some instances, they 
change the amount reflected on the deposit. In other cases, they make no attempt to 
conceal the theft.
In one case, an employee of a food services business received daily receipts from sales 
along with the cash register tapes from two or three cashiers. The employee mutilated the 
tapes so they could not be read, then prepared the transmittal of funds for the comptroller, 
but kept the difference between the amount transmitted and the amount submitted to her 
by the cashiers. She sent the mutilated tapes to the comptroller with the deposit. The 
comptroller’s office did not compare the deposit with the cash register tapes. The fraud was 
detected when one of the cashiers noted that the transmittal to the comptroller was small 
for a comparatively busy day. When questioned about tracing the transmittal amount to the 
cash register tapes, the perpetrator was unable to show completed tapes. The employee, 
who had been with the company two-and-a-half years, was fired but not prosecuted.
Employees, officers, and even outsiders can steal checks, both blank and signed. One case 
involved an employee—a grandmother—who was the sole bookkeeper for an electrical 
supply company in Omaha, Nebraska. She wrote the company’s checks and reconciled the 
bank account. Over a period of five years she stole checks totaling $416,000, which she 
spent on herself and her family. In the cash receipts journal, she coded the checks as 
inventory; in fact, however, she wrote the checks to herself using her own name. When the 
checks were returned with the bank statements, she would simply destroy them. She 
confessed after she had a nervous breakdown, caused by continuous guilt from stealing, 
which she knew was wrong.
5.7.2 Detection and Prevention
Because cash can be counted exactly, most detection methods involving cash relate to its 
timely counting. The proof of cash is a standard audit technique that compares cash in the 
bank to reported cash on hand. Properly done, the proof of cash can not only account for 
theft, but also show overstatements or understatements by expense classification.
Timely and regular bank reconciliations by a person not responsible for handling cash will 
frequently reveal discrepancies. Good reconciliation methods include examining 
endorsements and dates, and if staff and time permit, referencing the checks to invoices, 
orders, and other relevant documentation.
For example, a misappropriation of funds was detected through a reconciliation of bank 
deposits with a collection log, which was normally kept by the accounting clerk, who at the 
time of the reconciliation was absent on sick leave. Because the accounting clerk prepared 
the collection log, the daily cash report, and the bank deposits, she was able to alter 
individual accounts receivable records and misappropriate almost $24,000. She 
accomplished this by preparing daily cash reports that reflected fewer cash receipts 
collected than were actually received, and depositing the lesser amount in the company’s 
bank account. The accounting clerk processed virtually the entire accounting transaction. 
After the discovery of missing funds, she was fired, prosecuted, pleaded guilty, and was 
sentenced to ten years’ probation. She had been with the company three-and-a-half years.
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Auditors frequently use cutoff bank statements to ensure that expenses and income are 
reported in the proper period. Surprise cash counts sometime turn up situations of 
employees borrowing or floating small loans. It is critical that these counts be done on an 
irregular basis.
Cash thefts are sometimes reported by customers who have either paid money on an 
account and have not received credit, or in some instances when they notice they have not 
been given a receipt for a purchase.
As an example, a client of a branch of a large bank complained that there had been a 
$9,900 forged savings withdrawal from her account. The client indicated that she had 
recently made a $9,900 deposit at the branch and suspected that the teller who accepted the 
deposit may have been involved. The employee was interviewed and admitted to forging 
and negotiating the savings withdrawal. The teller had obtained the client’s mother’s 
maiden name and birthplace, fabricated a duplicate savings receipt book, and on an 
unscheduled work day went to the domiciling branch and posed as the client. The 
employee did not have any identification, yet was persistent enough to obtain an approval 
on the savings withdrawal.
Computer analysis of the following categories can sometimes turn up fraud in a cash 
account: checks that are missing, checks payable to employees, checks that are void, 
comparisons of deposit dates to receivables, and listings of cash advances.
It is absolutely imperative to implement tight control of cash and to maintain the duties of 
accounting, authorization, and custody.
In one case a fraud occurred at one of several campus cashier’s offices maintained by a 
university for collecting and processing student tuition bills and other related charges. The 
perpetrator was employed as a teller for approximately five years before being promoted to 
head cashier. This position required reconciling daily cash register receipts to the cash 
transmittal and bank deposits, as well as preparing deposits for funds received from outside 
departments, such as the bookstore or dining service operations. These deposits involved 
substantial amounts of cash. As head cashier, the employee also prepared the initial 
accounting documents that served as the input to the various general ledger accounts, 
including accounts receivable.
The perpetrator’s extensive knowledge and experience, coupled with the employer’s trust, 
resulted in diminishing supervision, particularly of the cash register reconciliations. As a 
result, the perpetrator was able to manipulate the documentation and the control 
procedures necessary to conceal the continued embezzlement of funds. The employee, who 
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External Fraud for Personal Gain
6.1 Fraud Perpetrated by Outsiders
Fraud is not merely the product of internal thieves acting against their employers. Fraud in 
the accounting records may originate with outside suppliers and service providers as well.
It is not possible to determine the number of persons and bogus business operators 
engaged in crimes of this nature. Suffice it to say that the problem is extensive. By some 
estimates, nearly everyone at one time or another has been either a direct victim of such a 
crime, or an indirect victim through higher fees or income taxes.
6.1.1 Classification of Internal and External Fraud
As introduced in chapter 1, for the purposes of this Handbook, commercial fraud can 
generally be classified into two categories:
1. Internal fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by its employees, 
officers, or directors
2. External fraud—that is, fraud committed against an organization by arms-length parties 
(either individuals or corporations) who are outside the organization
Noncommercial fraud and other forms of white-collar crime also exist in which the 
fraudster is unrelated or external to the victim (an individual).
The Impact of Collusion
Some forms of external fraud can also be committed with the help of an internal 
fraudster—someone internal to the organization who is willing to assist the external 
fraudster commit his or her crime. Generally, internal personnel would need some form of 
an incentive—often in the form of a secret commission, kickback, or bribe—in order to be 
induced to assist in this manner.
Fraud involving parties both internal and external to an organization are sometimes 
referred to as collusive frauds. Another form of collusive fraud involves fraud committed by 
a group of people within an organization. Both kinds of collusive frauds exist because most 
internal controls are based on the principle of segregation of duties—this is circumvented 
by collusion.
Another form of collusive fraud, committed totally externally, is price fixing. When 
competitors agree to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their products or 
services are sold, it is price fixing. The victimized customer of the colluders usually is not 
aware of the price fixing unless there is a whistle blower. And, as markets are served by 
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fewer and fewer entities resulting from mergers, price fixing will probably become a bigger 
problem.
6.1.2 Reasons for Classification
Without some form of classification, the numerous kinds of fraud would overwhelm and 
confuse the student of this topic. Learning is enhanced when long lists are grouped and 
classified—for instance, students of a foreign language don’t start at a in the English 
translation dictionary. Instead they start by studying the common elements of verb 
conjugation, pronouns, nouns and adjectives so that they can grasp a wider cross section of 
the language, and then put it all together when they begin to speak it. Of course, languages 
have many exceptions to the rules. Similarly, most foreign-language pocket guides present 
phrases by topic. For instance, phrases relating to money are separate from phrases relating 
to restaurants, travel, shopping and health; however, certain phrases could be applicable to 
more than one situation.
Much the same way, this Handbook’s approach to grouping and classifying fraud enhances 
the CPA’s ability to learn about the numerous kinds of fraud. As a result, you should have 
a greater appreciation for the wide variety of fraud that can occur, and should be better 
equipped to recognize the signs of fraud at first sight. However, some frauds are difficult to 
classify, fall into more than one category, or don’t exactly fit into any of the established 
categories. These instances are mentioned as appropriate within the body of this 
Handbook.
6.1.3 Classification of Fraud in this Handbook
In chapter 5, we discussed a restricted group of frauds—those committed against an 
organization by its employees, officers or directors—otherwise known as internal fraud.
External frauds cover all remaining forms of fraud and represent a wide variety of frauds. 
This chapter covers those external frauds that can be classified by perpetrator. These frauds 
include:
1. Fraud committed primarily by individuals against a company, government, or other 
individuals; this is referred to as external fraud for personal gain.
2. Fraud committed primarily by a company against another company, government, or 
individuals; this is referred to as commercial crime.
Note that individuals using a corporate veil could also conduct certain of the frauds 
presented in this chapter. Similarly, chapter 7, which primarily covers fraud by 
corporations, includes fraud that could be conducted by individuals directly.
6.2 Individuals versus Individuals and Corporations
Individuals can commit many kinds of fraud against other individuals and corporations. Most 
of the victims of the crimes described in this section are generally manufacturers, retailers, 
wholesalers, service companies or other individuals; however, in some instances, victims 
can also include governments, financial institutions, and insurance companies.
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6.2.1 Lawyers’ Schemes
Overbilling for Time
Lawyers can easily commit fraud, largely because of the nebulous nature of the services 
provided. As one commentator indicated: the law lends itself to confidence scams.
Contrasted to a plumber, for example, whose failure to make the contracted repair is 
quickly noticed, a lawyer’s performance of an agreed to service is not always discernable. It
(Text continued on page 5)
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could be merely some advice, a brief phone call or any number of innocuous, 
commonplace actions.
The victims of overbilling can include the lawyer’s clients who are unable to assess whether 
the time billed by the lawyer is reasonable, and can also include government funded legal 
aid programs whose organizers are unable to assess whether the services billed were 
actually performed. When in doubt, a lawyer’s invoices can be vetted; that is, they can be 
assessed by another lawyer for reasonableness regarding whether the services billed needed 
to be performed, and whether the time taken to perform the services was excessive or not.
Misappropriation of Trust Funds
Lawyers have access to funds provided to them by clients in trust to complete transactions. 
There are many cases of lawyers borrowing client funds because they are in personal 
financial difficulty. The most common crime associated with lawyers’ trust funds is the 
misappropriation of client funds held in trust and the use of the money for the lawyer’s 
personal purposes (for example, to subsidize a business, pay gambling debts, or support a 
life-style).
There are three kinds of misappropriation:
1. Single transaction: Client funds can be traced to an unauthorized disbursement 
(one-shot).
2. Several transactions: All trust-account activity is analyzed to determine which clients funds 
were used for unauthorized disbursements (lapping).
3. Trust-account chaos: Usually, this kind of misappropriation is caused by poor record 
keeping. Actual misappropriation of funds may or may not be found. Is the chaos the 
result of poor bookkeeping practices? Are there reasons for the failure to account (such 
as bad health, bankruptcy, intent to defraud, or loss of control due to numerous 
misappropriations)? The answers to these questions may emerge after a complete 
analysis of the trust account’s activity has been made. According to the ethical rules of 
most states, if not all states, any use by an attorney of funds held in a trust account other 
than that for which the funds were placed in trust is considered a serious breach of 
professional conduct that may lead to disbarment, suspension or possible prosecution. 
There can never be a legitimate misappropriation of funds that an attorney holds in a 
trust account.
To uncover a case involving misappropriation of trust funds, the accountant should realize 
that lawyers regularly maintain two sets of bank accounts and related records, consisting of:
1. One or more bank accounts, books of account, and supporting documentation for the 
law practice itself.
2. A trust account together with any records reflecting the trust-account activity carried out 
on behalf of the lawyer’s clientele. These are the most relevant records for investigating 
alleged misappropriation of trust funds. The primary documentation required for trust­
account activity consists of bank statements and bank reconciliations for the trust bank 
account; the client’s ledger, which outlines all receipts and disbursements made by the 
lawyer on behalf of the client concerning a particular transaction; and the client’s file, 
which contains evidence of the transactions (for example, correspondence, the lawyer’s
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reporting letter, statement of receipts and disbursements, statement of adjustments, 
mortgage documents, out-of-pocket vouchers, and billings).
CPAs conducting an investigation of an attorney’s trust account might also want to review 
the financial statements for the law practice. These records can be used to assess the 
successfulness of the lawyer’s practice, and are most relevant when the lawyer is a sole 
practitioner.
See table 6.1, below, for an example of a misappropriation that would only be uncovered 
by a detailed investigation of the banking transactions conducted within a trust account.
Table 6.1 Evidence of a misappropriation of a trust fund.
January 1, 1991 Deposit of $30,000 Agrees with client file
January 5, 1991 Withdrawal of $10,000 Unauthorized by client
January 29, 1991 Deposit of $10,000 Unauthorized by client
January 31, 1991 Balance of $30,000 Agrees with client file
At the end of the month the trust liability to the client, as disclosed in the client file, is 
$30,000. However, $10,000 was temporarily removed during the month by an 
unauthorized transaction. Thus a misappropriation of the trust fund occurred.
Skip Towne, Esq. Case Study
After twenty years in practice, a lawyer, Skip Towne, Esq., had built up a large 
client base, including friends, business people and fellow church-goers. Mr. Smith, 
who was selling his home, retained Mr. Towne’s services. At the time the 
transaction closed on August 3, 1998, Mr. Towne received $176,574 from the 
purchaser’s attorney for deposit into the Skip Towne, Esq. trust account. Mr. Towne 
disbursed $5,000 of the funds in his trust account to cover various closing 
adjustments including outstanding utilities and tax bills. Mr. Towne also distributed 
$21,176 to his own account to cover the legal fees and other disbursements related 
to the closing. The balance ($150,398) due to Mr. Smith, as shown in the Closing 
Statement, was apparently paid in two distinct disbursements to Mr. Smith: an 
initial amount of $65,000 on August 10, 1998, with the balance of $85,398 on 
October 13, 1998. This final payment to Mr. Smith was, however, financed by the 
deposit into the trust account of funds that Mr. Towne received from new clients 
and other nefarious acts.
The specific funds in question, that is, $85,398 on hand as of August 10, 1998—were 
not paid to the benefit of Mr. Smith. Between August 10, 1998, and October 13, 
1998, Mr. Towne made a payment of $80,000 to himself that he used to invest in his 
own real estate venture, and a payment of $5,398 to his other clients, to replace trust 
funds that had already been spent on unauthorized disbursements. To keep the ball 
rolling, Mr. Towne had to misappropriate funds from a number of other clients in 
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order to repay Mr. Smith, in addition to producing false mortgage documents, 
forging signatures, and resorting to other acts of deceit.
Ultimately, Mr. Towne cleared out his trust account, abandoned his law practice, 
and disappeared, leaving behind at least eighty-five clients who had been 
defrauded. He has not been heard from since.
6.2.2 Directory Advertising Schemes
Perpetrators of directory advertising schemes usually target businesses. In this scheme the 
fraudster sells advertising in a nonexistent magazine or directory, and absconds with the 
proceeds. Many directory advertising schemes are perpetrated out of storefront operations. 
A fake (or in some instances, real) directory is presented to the potential victim. The victim 
contracts for the display or classified advertising, which will appear some months hence. By 
that time, the fraudster has collected the funds and disappeared.
6.2.3 Property Improvement Schemes
Fly-by-night operators, promising repairs to property at bargain rates, are a particular 
problem for elderly victims. The typical fraudster is a professional con artist who obtains 
business primarily from door-to-door solicitations. The tools of the trade are not hammers 
and saws, but bogus business cards and counterfeited or preprinted contracts involving the 
payment of up-front money. Note that these property improvement scams are a subset of 
procurement fraud, which is covered in more depth in chapter 7. Various forms of this 
scheme include substituting products, charging for false labor or overhead charges, and 
absconding with retainers and down payments.
Substituting Products
In a product substitution fraud, the fraudster typically promises a property owner a 
particular product or brand, and charges him or her for it but then substitutes an inferior 
brand without an appropriate price reduction. Thus the perpetrator reaps a windfall profit 
through this deception.
Charging for False Labor or Overhead
Many repair contracts call for labor, materials or overhead to be charged at cost, plus a 
specified contractor’s profit as a percentage of that cost. Obviously the more the repairs 
cost, the more the contractor makes. By fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of 
bogus labor charges or overbilling of materials, the fraudster not only increases the profit 
but also can keep the difference between the actual and inflated costs.
Absconding With Retainers and Down Payments
The preferred method that seasoned professionals use is to simply negotiate money in 
advance, then disappear. This is essentially an advance fee swindle perpetrated specifically 
in the property-improvement or repair market. This method is advantageous to the 
perpetrator because it requires the least amount of capital: no storefront, props, or other 
accoutrements necessary—-just “get the money and run.”
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6.2.4 Personal Improvement Schemes
The term personal improvement fraud covers the many schemes that prey on people’s natural 
tendency to want to improve their job skills, appearance, education, or position in life. 
Fraudsters in this category primarily use mail order as an integral part of the scheme. Some 
common forms of personal improvement fraud are described below.
Vanity- and Song-Publishing Schemes
Vanity- and song-publishing schemes are common, and rely on the victim believing that he 
or she has talent in a particular area, such as art or song writing. These schemes are 
normally advertised in magazines or by direct mail. They usually offer to evaluate, for free, 
the victim’s talent. Of course the victim is told after the evaluation that he or she is the 
newest undiscovered artistic genius. And for a hefty fee, the talent company will promote 
the artist’s work. The artist then remits the fee, and the fraudster uses the funds for personal 
benefit, providing little or no services in the process.
Modeling Schools
Modeling schools appeal to the natural vanity of some people. Typically, the modeling 
school tells the student that he or she must have a portfolio of portraits to send to potential 
customers, ostensibly to enhance the victim’s potential for getting modeling assignments. 
The victim is then charged greatly inflated prices for a photographer to take the pictures for 
the portfolio. Many modeling schools are not legitimate. They sometimes tout connections 
to famous people, or claim they have placed famous people, when in fact they have not. 
These schools get most of their business through mail order or newspaper advertising. 
Once a particular area is fleeced, the school pulls up stakes and moves on.
Diploma Mills
For a fee—usually a hefty one—a diploma can be granted to those persons who apply. The 
fraudsters usually claim the heavy fee is for processing the application or for verifying the 
experience necessary to acquire a degree. The hallmark of a diploma mill is the ease with 
which the degree is obtained, and the related cost. Victims usually apply for an advanced 
degree to enhance their career skills; however, diploma mills are not accredited, and their 
diplomas are therefore essentially worthless. Given the nature of this kind of business, there 
is usually some culpability on the part of the so-called victim.
Correspondence Schools
Legitimate correspondence schools offering advanced education do exist. However, there 
are also many correspondence schools with the same modus operandi as diploma mills, 
providing substandard education at superior prices. They are generally not accredited and 
offer little hope of job advancement.
6.2.5 Insider Trading Schemes
Insider trading involves the use of nonpublic information to make stock trades on a 
securities or commodities market. It could include purchasing shares prior to a good news 
release and can also include selling shares prior to a bad news release. The perpetrators of 
such crimes get rich, while other investors are unable to share in the wealth. Some might
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argue that this is a victimless crime, while others would say that the victims are the market 
as a group, because each and every trade is part of the market.
Criminal charges for insider trading have become the trademark of economic crime 
enforcement efforts during recent years. These efforts seek to encourage the confidence of 
investors in the fairness of the markets.
A surge of prosecutions for illegal insider information transactions began in the late 1980s 
when stock transactions were first subjected to sophisticated computer review, enabling 
investigators to identify unusual stock movements. Soon afterwards, when some meaningful 
piece of financial information about a company was released, investigators could quickly 
determine who had traded the stock heavily before the news release. If, for instance, a 
firm’s president executed a transaction, it seemed likely, (though not assured), that he or she 
had acted on the information before it was publicly disseminated. The insider trading laws 
require that specified officers or directors of a corporation must report their trading 
activities. The fraudster, however, conveniently forgets to file the required information.
Of course, the notable cases of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken remain the most infamous, 
and illustrate the staggering sums of money to be made from illegal stock trades. Boesky, 
the Wall Street arbitrage king, was sentenced to three years in prison and fined $100 
million. In his plea agreement, he gave information that led to the indictments of so-called 
junk bond king Michael Milken, who eventually pled guilty to insider trading and was fined 
$600 million.
6.2.6 Homicide-for-Profit Schemes
Homicide cases are quite different from white-collar crime cases in that the perpetrator is a 
violent criminal, whereas most fraudsters are not violent. The tools of a murderer are guns, 
knives, ropes, water (for drowning), fire (for arson) and poison, whereas the tools of a 
fraudster are documents, books and records, computers, and calculators. The victim in a 
homicide case loses his or her life, whereas a fraud victim generally only loses some money.
But there is one main similarity, particularly when there is a financial motive for the 
homicide—the use of forensic accounting in homicide cases is similar to its use in fraud 
cases and may involve corporate- or personal-financial assessments, or both.
Generally, forensic accounting may be applied in homicide investigations for one or any 
combination of the following three purposes:
1. To analyze and determine a possible financial motive for murder.
2. To analyze financial documentation for possible investigative aids that may assist in 
proving murder.
3. To identify possible payments on a contract for murder.
Assessing Financial Motive
In determining a possible financial motive, the investigator must direct the accounting 
analysis primarily toward establishing and measuring any financial benefit to the accused as 
a result of that person’s association with the murder victim. Benefit may be shown in any 
one or combination of the following methods:
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• Payments by the victim to the accused (extortion).
• Assets such as real estate, collectibles, or antiques transferred to the accused.
• Insurance proceeds paid to the accused as a beneficiary under a policy.
• Other benefits, such as obtaining equity in a business or transferring of a partnership 
interest to the accused.
• Other motives that don’t equate to a direct financial benefit, such as the imminent loss of 
assets, involvement in drug trafficking, or marital infidelity.
Accounting evidence is not generally as significant as viva voce evidence. It may, however, 
provide circumstantial evidence of a financial motive.
Assessing Financial Evidence to Assist in Other Ways in the Investigation
When assessing the financial matters of the victim in order to assist in a police investigation, 
the forensic accountant may seek to determine:
• The victim’s business and social relationships and the identity of people with whom he 
or she had dealings.
• The existence of any debts owed either by or to the victim, and whether evidence exists 
to suggest the victim or debtor was resisting payment on them.
• The possibility of eliminating financial matters as a direction in which to pursue in the 
investigation.
Investigators should examine business and personal financial records, as well as financial- 
related evidence from the local real estate deed-mortgage recording office, lawyers, the will 
of the deceased, and insurance policies.
Robert Kilbride Case Study
On March 29, 1998, Mary Kilbride, wife of Robert Kilbride, a veteran police officer, was 
found dead outside her condominium complex. She had fallen from the twentieth floor 
balcony of their condominium. Eight days later, Robert Kilbride flew to the South Pacific to 
join Ms. Cathy Smith, whom he later married in May 1999 in Europe.
Ms. Sleuth, a forensic CPA, was called in to assist with the investigation. The police 
suspected Mary’s death was not an accident—there was a $275,000 life insurance policy on 
her life that was paid to Robert Kilbride in late September 1998.
By way of background, Ms. Sleuth was told that in July 1997, Kilbride resigned his 
position from the police force. Friends and acquaintances said that about this time it 
was evident that Robert and Mary Kilbride were having marital problems.
Ms. Sleuth then worked with the investigating officer to determine all she could 
about the Kilbrides’ life-style. The primary objective of Ms. Sleuth’s accounting 
assistance was to summarize Robert Kilbride’s financial activity for a period of 
approximately one-and-a-half years prior to Mary Kilbride’s death, because of the 
allegation that Robert had murdered his wife Mary for the insurance proceeds. No 
summary books and records were available, a not uncommon situation in 
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investigations of personal finances. Therefore, Ms. Sleuth had to reconstruct the 
financial facts before they could be interpreted.
The volume of financial documents was considerable. Kilbride had numerous 
credit cards, bank accounts and brokerage accounts in the United States, Canada 
and Europe. Kilbride was also involved in numerous business deals of varying 
nature and purpose.
In order to prove Kilbride’s financial affairs, Ms. Sleuth completed the following:
1. A summary of Kilbride’s financial history.
2. An analysis of Kilbride’s estimated net worth as of the end of July 1997 and 
September 1998, based on bank statements, brokerage statements, 
correspondence, contracts, appraisals, loan applications and other financial 
documentation.
3. A source and application of funds analysis of Kilbride’s financial activity from 
March 1997 to December 1998, primarily based on Kilbride’s banking 
documents, credit card statements and brokerage statements.
4. A report on Kilbride’s monthly deficiency based on the information in the 
source and application of funds analysis.
5. Graphs showing the cumulative deficiency from just prior to Mary’s death to 
late September 1998, when the insurance proceeds were received.
These analyses revealed the following, which the investigating officer corroborated 
by viva voce evidence from former coworkers, friends, neighbors and other people 
who knew the Kilbrides.
1. When he left the force, Kilbride had no known source of steady income.
2. The Kilbrides’ combined annual salaries were less than $60,000, yet they lived in an 
expensive condominium and had a leased luxury sports car.
3. After leaving the force, Kilbride’s net worth declined considerably. He began to borrow 
heavily and sell off certain assets, including a rental property. He was also involved with 
various unsuccessful business ventures.
4. By March 1998, substantially all of Kilbride’s net worth was represented by assets he 
owned jointly with his wife. These assets included the equity in their condominium, 
furniture, furs, jewelry and household effects.
5. Between the time of Mary’s death in March and his receiving the life insurance 
proceeds in September, Kilbride spent more than $100,000 traveling throughout the 
United States, Canada and Europe. Although Kilbride had no known employment 
income, he and Ms. Smith rented a villa on the Mediterranean coast. He had 
approximately $15,000 in other income during this period. Kilbride financed his life­
style primarily by selling more assets, obtaining further loans and making heavy use of 
credit cards.
6. In late September 1998, Kilbride received the $275,000 in life insurance proceeds from 
Mary’s death.
7. Also in September 1998, Kilbride sold the luxury condominium; he and Ms. Smith 
continued to live in the Mediterranean villa until he returned to the United States in 
January 1999, when he was arrested.
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In summary, the accounting evidence revealed that Kilbride enjoyed a life-style he 
could not afford. He was living well beyond his means—his expenses so greatly 
exceeded his income during the months before and after Mary’s death that he 
would have been virtually bankrupt if he had not received the insurance money on 
Mary’s life.
This evidence was very useful in establishing a motive for murder, and weighed 
heavily at Kilbride’s murder trial at which he was found guilty.
6.3 Individuals versus the Government
Fraud against the government is a general term for several kinds of schemes perpetrated 
against federal, state, and local governments or government agencies. Typically, frauds 
against the government committed by individuals involve one of the following: income tax 
fraud and benefit-program fraud. (See chapter 7 for a discussion of frauds against the 
government committed by corporations.)
6.3.1 Income Tax Fraud
According to some estimates, most taxpayers do one of the following:
1. Fail to disclose all their income
2. Take deductions to which they are not entitled
The most common income tax frauds involve categories of individuals who receive their 
compensation in cash. These categories include waiters, restaurant owners, bartenders, and 
bellhops.
For the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to be successful with a claim for income tax fraud, 
intent must be proven—it is perfectly legal for taxpayers to manage their affairs to 
minimize their taxes—it is illegal for them to do so in a deceitful manner.
6.3.2 Benefit-Program Fraud
Another major category of fraud against the government generally involves making false 
statements of various kinds in order to obtain funds. The United States and other countries 
with strong social assistance programs are easy targets for fraudsters. The specific programs 
targeted include:
• Welfare benefits
• Medicare and Medicaid benefits
• Unemployment benefits
• Disability programs
• Student loan programs
• Housing programs
Often, rings of fraudsters apply for government benefits, resulting in very high losses to the 
government, and ultimately to the taxpayer through increased taxes.
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According to a January 2001 report, the U.S. government has taken an increasingly active 
role in pursuing health care fraudsters. The rate of criminal convictions quadrupled from 
1992 to 1999. At the same time, recoveries from civil fraud cases increased by more than 
50 percent, and of the $1.5 billion the government recovered from fraud cases, $840 
million was from health care cases, both public and private.
6.4 Individuals versus Financial Institutions
Fraud committed externally against a financial institution can take many forms and can be 
committed by anyone who deals with such organizations, including individuals and 
corporations. The most common offenses committed by individuals—and sometimes 
corporations—are credit fraud, loan fraud, false mortgage security, real estate fraud, money 
transfer fraud, money laundering, and check fraud. These and other frauds against financial 
institutions, committed by individuals, are described below.
6.4.1 Financial Institutions and Fraud
Definition of a Financial Institution
For the purposes of this Handbook, a financial institution is any organization, whether 
domestic or international, that is engaged in receiving, collecting, transferring, paying, 
lending, investing, dealing, exchanging, and servicing money and claims to money. This 
also includes safe deposit facilities, custodianships, agencies and trusteeships.
Under the broadest concept, the term financial institution may be applied to institutions, 
such as cooperatives, export-import banks, investment bankers and mortgage bankers.
Legal Aspects of Bank Fraud
In most jurisdictions, financial institutions are insured by an agency of the government and 
are governed by related criminal statutes. For example, in the United States the broadest of 
all federal statutes is Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1344. It covers all assets owned or 
controlled by a bank, as well as employees and outsiders. It prohibits any action that would 
defraud the financial institution, such as embezzlement, misapplication, false statements 
and related fraudulent behavior.
6.4.2 Credit-Card Fraud
Generally, credit-card fraud can be divided into two categories. In some instances, the 
fraudster uses credit information from one individual to obtain credit for use by another. 
For example, John R. Fraud, with bad credit, obtains the credit information of John Q. 
Smith, and applies for a credit card under the name of John Q. Smith, using John R.
Fraud’s address. John R. Fraud then makes charges on the account. When John Q. Smith 
protests, the credit-card company attempts to locate the real user of the credit card, John R. 
Fraud, who has since absconded.
The other common credit-card fraud involves duplicating credit cards and then using them 
to purchase high-value merchandise, for instance, jewels, furs, and other items that can 
easily be resold before the credit-card company catches up with the fraudster.
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More attention should be paid to credit-card fraud because it is growing in volume and 
taking on international aspects. No longer is credit-card fraud local; the Internet has 
opened the door to global possibilities. A merchant extending credit on an Internet 
transaction has to rely on the honesty of the purchaser and the limited comfort a bank 
authorization provides. All too often, the merchant is stuck for the shipped merchandise 
and no payment.
6.4.3 Loan Fraud
Borrowers sometimes provide false information to a lending institution in order to obtain 
funds to continue business activity, or simply to fraudulently get money that they have no 
intention of repaying. Some of the most common schemes include loans to nonexistent 
borrowers, false applications with false credit information, bribery of a loan officer, 
borrower misapplication of funds, and single family housing loan fraud.
Loans to Nonexistent Borrowers
In a loan-to-a-nonexistent-borrower fraud, the borrower uses a false identity to obtain a 
loan. This scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower, or with the assistance of 
an insider, such as a loan officer.
Fraud committed by individuals can be difficult to detect, particularly if the identity 
documents of the fraudster match his or her details as provided on the loan application. 
Warning signs include:
• The borrower is unknown to bank personnel.
• No public credit report is available.
• The borrower or loan officer requests unusual loan terms.
• Loan application information does not check out.
• The proposed security has an inflated value.
• The proposed inventory (security) has an unrealistic value.
• There is no CPA associated with the financial statements.
• The loan officer’s bonus is based on volume of loans funded.
• The proposed collateral is located outside the bank’s market area.
• The loan proceeds are distributed prior to the loan’s closing.
False Applications with False Credit Information
False information on the credit application can include overstated assets, nonexistent assets, 
understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue and understated expenses. For example, 
a borrower with marginal net worth might inflate the asset and income figures on his or her 
personal financial statements to convince the loan officer of his or her credit worthiness. 
The loan officer and others involved in the bank loan approval process can often detect 
these schemes by observing one or more of the following:
• Appraisals-valuations that defy common sense and local knowledge
• Appraisers who are paid on basis of appraisal amount
• Large loans beyond experience and expertise of the loan officer
• Borrowers who default on the first payment
14 Fraud Supp. 1—3/ 01
Chapter Six: External Fraud for Personal Gain
 
• Numerous payment extensions, or payments that are placed on nonaccrual status
• No audit trail for verifying application information
• Applicant reports receiving loans from many other banks
Bribery of Loan Officers
Statutes (for example, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 201) prohibit any officer, director, 
employee, agent or attorney of a bank from knowingly soliciting or receiving things of 
value in connection with bank transactions. In the usual scheme, a borrower offers an 
officer an inducement to grant a loan that would not otherwise be made (for instance, 
because the borrower has little or no credit, or because the borrower is not using his or her 
real name).
(Text continued on page 15)
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Senior loan officers can often detect these schemes by observing one or more of the 
following:
• The life-style of the originating loan officer is beyond the means provided by normal 
compensation.
• The loan officer has unreasonably high productivity.
• The loan officer’s compensation is based on volume productivity.
• Loan agreements contain terms unreasonably favorable to the borrower.
• There is a pattern of disbursements to particular agents, brokers, appraisers, finders, and 
so on.
• There are multiple loans to the same borrower with the same agents involved.
• The loan or other bank officer has a financial interest in the customer’s project, or 
stockholdings in a bank subsidiary profiting from the business.
Borrower Misapplication of Funds
Borrower misapplication is most common when the borrower has little or no personal risk 
in the collateral, for example, real estate. The highest risk real estate loans are those in 
which the lender provides all the funding on a nonrecourse basis. The most common ways 
borrowers misapply loan funds are as follows:
• Kickbacks or profit interests in construction activities
• Brokerage or real estate fees
• Property management fees
• Related-party vendors
• Closing-statement prorations of rent, taxes, and other items
• Land flips
• Sale of property rights, such as laundry or cable TV
• Misappropriation of operating proceeds or loan proceeds
• Misappropriation of escrow payments
Single Family Housing Loan Fraud
One variation of the misapplication-of-funds fraud is the borrower who purchases single 
family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality as rental property or in some 
instances for resale. When applying to a financial institution, the fraudster usually 
misrepresents his or her ability to finance the property and make payments. Usually loan 
officers uncover these frauds by observing one or more of the following:
• There is an unrealistic change in commuting distance.
• A high-income borrower has little or no personal property.
• New housing expense is 150 percent or more of the previous expense.
• Bank deposits are listed in round amounts on application.
• The borrower reports overlapping dates of current and prior employment.
• The previous employer is listed as out of business.
• A high-income borrower does not use a professional tax preparer.
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• The appraisal shows a tenant as the contact person on an owner-occupied house.
• The initial title report shows delinquent taxes.
6.4.4 Real Estate Fraud
Real estate fraud is essentially a specialized form of loan fraud committed either by 
individuals or corporations. Financial institutions, especially the savings and loan 
associations in the United States, were badly hit in the 1980s due to fraud committed in the 
real estate area. These schemes are often perpetrated in concert with the insiders of 
financial institutions.
Land Flips
A land flip is the practice of buying and selling a parcel of land very quickly, often in a 
single day or month, at a successively higher price to related parties, until a lender—who 
believes the transaction is at arm’s length—provides financing on an unrealistically inflated 
loan amount. The key components of the scheme in sequential order are as follows:
1. The same piece of property is sold back and forth between a borrower—the fraudster— 
and dummy or shell corporations.
2. Each time the land is sold, the price is inflated.
3. To support each sale, the borrower secures an appraisal based on an unrealistic or 
favorable set of assumptions, or performed by a friendly, incompetent or dishonest 
appraiser.
4. The borrower goes to a financial institution—the victim—and mortgages the property 
for its appraised value, keeping the grossly inflated loan proceeds.
5. The fraudster defaults on the loan.
False Appraisals
Fraud perpetrators use false and inflated appraisals to support loans larger than the true 
value of the property. Appraisers are either parties to the fraud or paid off, or they are 
merely unqualified—that is, easily fooled by bogus transactions like land flips—to perform 
the appraisal.
Nominee Loans
Nominee loans are those made in the name of a straw (dummy) borrower or agent—that is, 
a borrower having no substance—while the identity of the real borrower is undisclosed to 
the lender.
Double Pledging Collateral
This scheme involves fraudulently pledging the same collateral with different lenders, 
before the related liens are recorded and registered. This obviously hinders the lender’s 
ability to look to the collateral as a source of recovery when the borrower defaults.
Real Estate Fraud Detection
Lenders or other interested parties can often detect real estate fraud by observing one or 
more of the following warning signs:
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• A single borrower has received multiple loans.
• The same appraiser has appraised two or more different properties for the same 
borrower within a short period of time.
• The same appraiser has made successive appraisals of the same property at high values 
in a short period of time.
• The property was bought or sold many times in a short period.
• The borrower is a shell with no real substance or a holding company whose substance 
lies hidden in its numerous subsidiaries.
• The buyer is obviously shopping for a loan instead of a long-term banking relationship.
• The seller of the property is another bank.
• The borrower has a prior default history.
• The borrower has a history of loan payoffs by obtaining other, larger loans.
• The loan application contains requests for several loans to different persons on the same 
property.
• The borrower requires the loan as a condition before delivering large deposits to the 
bank, with the loan being the inducement for establishing a continuing banking 
relationship.
6.4.5 Money Transfer Fraud
Wires totaling two to three times a bank’s assets may be processed every business day. It is 
rare that wires do not at least equal a bank’s total assets, and they can sometimes be ten 
times the assets for banks that have a large correspondent network. The process is highly 
automated at most banks.
In the most common money transfer fraud, an outsider or bank employee with access to the 
correct identification numbers needed to wire transfer funds, steals the funds. In one case in 
Chicago, a bank insider with knowledge of the wire transfer codes and procedures 
conspired with his friends to wire nearly $70 million out of the country. The scheme was 
detected (early enough to avoid a loss to the bank) when the transfer was made from a 
customer’s account, thereby overdrawing the account balance.
Warning signs for this kind of fraud include:
• Clerks rather than more senior personnel perform actual processing.
• Managerial personnel conduct frequent overrides of the established approval authority 
controls.
• There is evidence of wires to and from offshore banks in countries known for their bank 
secrecy laws.
• There are routine high volume, high dollar transfers.
• There are frequent wires for persons with no account at the bank.
• Access to the wire room is often not properly restricted.
• Employees become very comfortable with the routine of the job and with their 
coworkers.
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Variations of these schemes involve misrepresenting the customer’s identity. The fraudster 
will use pretext telephone calls to obtain correct account information from the bank. Then 
the fraudster obtains the codes from an insider. Thereafter, the fraudster makes a telephone 
call to transfer the funds out of the bank.
6.4.6 Money Laundering
Money laundering refers to the process of turning dirty money into clean money. The primary 
objective is to conceal the existence, source or use of illicit money and thus the underlying 
offence—whether the offence is trade in illegal narcotics, robbery, fraud, illegal political 
contributions, tax evasion, prostitution or any other criminal activity. Money launderers 
may also want to obstruct investigative efforts, preserve assets from forfeiture, and evade 
taxes.
Perpetrators may launder money in the country in which the crime is committed or where 
the funds originated; more often, however, they send the money across an international 
border. Usually they deposit the money in a bank or other institution in a tax haven and it 
comes back clean in the form of salaries, loans, fees or services.
Money Laundering Methods
There are three main methods for laundering money:
1. Through legitimate fronts
2. Through couriers and smurfs
3. Through the cooperation of a bank insider who ignores the reporting guidelines
Each of these methods has certain unique characteristics; however, they also have some 
common characteristics:
1. Large cash shipments
2. Large volume of wire transfers to and from offshore banks (However, not all offshore 
wire transfers involve money laundering—see below.)
Legitimate Fronts. Many money launderers open a legitimate front business that handles a 
great deal of cash—for instance, a casino, restaurant, parking lot, vending machine 
company, or pawnshop—and then deposit the ill-gotten gain along with the legitimate 
income of the business. Perpetrators then commingle the illegal cash with the legitimate 
receipts thereby disguising any illegal sources. They then withdraw the cleaned money or 
wire-transfer it to a final destination.
Interested parties, for example a bank or bonding company, can usually detect this kind of 
fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Accounts accumulate deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• Cash deposits from sources are not identified as customers of the business.
• There is a sudden and unexplained increase in the volume of cash deposits.
Money launderers can use gambling casinos. The ill-gotten cash is used to purchase chips. 
Later the launderers exchange the chips remaining at the end of a controlled (carefully 
limiting losses) gambling session for money and receive the proceeds in the form of a check 
from the casino, thereby creating a seemingly legitimate paper trail.
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Smurfing. One variation of the money laundering scheme is to use special couriers, called 
smurfs, to make relatively small deposits and withdrawals. For example, cash deposits of 
$10,000 or more must be reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a special form 
called a Currency Transaction Report (CTR). To avoid this reporting requirement, smurfs 
make deposits or withdrawals just below this threshold amount.
Banks and other interested parties can usually detect this kind of fraud by observing one or 
more of the following warning signs:
• Withdrawals made in numerous transactions just under $10,000.
• Customers who are not account holders exchanging large amounts of small bills for 
large denomination bills.
• Inquiries as to policies of the bank regarding reporting currency transactions.
• Large dollar volume of cashier’s checks and money orders sold for cash to customers 
who are not account holders.
• Persons shown as unemployed and self-employed on a CTR.
Breaches of the Reporting Guidelines. In still another variation, the money launderer conspires 
with a bank insider, who agrees to make deposits for the money launderer and forego the 
reporting mechanisms. The bank gets free use of the deposited funds, and in some 
instances, the bank officer is compromised through a bribe or kickback. Banks can usually 
detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• An account with many different individuals making deposits, and only a few making 
large withdrawals.
• Accounts with accumulated deposits that are subsequently transferred out.
• High dollar limits and large numbers of bank customers exempted from CTR 
requirements.
• An incorrect or incomplete CTR.
Money Laundering Mechanics
Although laundering and offshore banking conjure up images of financial wizardry and 
international tax lawyers and accountants, most illegal activity involves the simple addition 
of some layers to the basics common to ordinary business transactions. In essence, 
laundering works like this.
Party A, who has come by the dirty money (or legitimate money that needs to be 
laundered) gives it to Party B, who is the laundryman. Party B sends the money offshore 
where it is deposited and funds are subsequently disbursed or laundered and then returned 
to Party A for use.
During the laundering, Party B, having received the money from Party A, sets about 
concealing it. Having the money in currency upon receipt makes the job easier. If the 
money is in paper (checks, and so on), Party B may have to first start the laundering process 
by converting it to local currency. Party B has, or sets up, one or more local companies, of 
which he or she is the owner, manager or employee, depending on the relationship to Party 
A.
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Now the offshore part of the process begins. Party B goes to a tax haven lawyer and 
establishes an offshore company: loan companies, finance companies, or trusts are 
preferable. Party B’s name does not appear anywhere in the legal documents.
The company in the tax haven opens an offshore bank account. Party B travels to the 
haven with the currency, and Party B or the lawyer buys a cashier’s check at the bank with 
the tax haven company as remitter. The lawyer then draws up the necessary loan 
documents to show a loan from the haven company to Party B’s local company. Party B 
then returns home with the cashier’s check. Thus, the money is brought back home as a 
loan (which being capital, not revenue, is not taxable) and is clean.
Party A on his own, or through Party B, now makes use of the laundered funds by drawing 
out salaries, obtaining loans from Party B’s local company, paying dividends, opening a 
corporate expense account, using a company car, and so on.
Party B’s local company files appropriate tax returns and makes note of payments, or at 
least interest payments. Interest is deducted on the company’s tax return. If the company 
loses money, it has a tax offset. Party B does nothing illegal in the local country and, of 
course, makes interest payments on the loan payable to the offshore company, allowing 
further funds to be moved.
If a law enforcement agency questions the loans, the company will obtain full 
documentation from Party B’s attorney in the tax haven. Inquiries beyond documents will 
be blocked by the haven’s secrecy requirements.
Offshore Banks and Tax Havens
There are many reasons, some legitimate and some not, why money launderers transfer 
money and other valuable securities from one jurisdiction to another jurisdiction that has 
secret banking privileges. These foreign jurisdictions are commonly referred to as tax 
havens because, in addition to bank secrecy laws, they had no income taxes so people or 
companies first used them to (legally) minimize or to (illegally) evade taxes.
Tax haven is now a misnomer, since funds may be deposited for reasons other than escaping 
tax. Tax havens have grown in popularity in recent times as one of the few means of 
placing funds beyond the reach of creditors or other investigators. It did not take long for 
criminal organizations and individuals to exploit the sanctuary of the tax haven. With the 
development of multinational banking systems and international business and commerce, it 
became easy to put together sophisticated laundering schemes to move the proceeds of 
crime to foreign banks protected from intrusion by law enforcement officials.
The World’s Tax Havens. Switzerland has a long history as an international tax haven, 
imposing little financial regulation and strict secrecy laws. Many other countries have 
jumped aboard the bandwagon. The key tax havens include—
• Bermuda and the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Caymans, Montserrat, Netherlands 
Antilles, St. Vincent, and Turks and Caicos.
• Central America: Panama and Costa Rica.
• Channel Islands: Guernsey and Jersey.
• Pacific: Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vanuatu.
• Other locations: Liberia, Bahrain, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, and Cyprus.
20
Offshore Facilities. Typically, the tax haven’s biggest domestic industries are banks, financial 
institutions, companies, trusts, agents, accountants and attorneys who collectively constitute 
offshore facilities. Facilities that are available in tax havens include—
• Banks. There are two classes of banks. Class A banks conduct local business transactions 
in the tax haven. Class B banks exist on paper only, as they conduct no local business 
transactions.
• Companies and trusts. Companies can be incorporated in the tax haven; trusts (such as 
family, estate, or other kinds) can be set up.
• Offshore agents, accountants and attorneys. These are an essential element of the offshore 
facilities in a tax haven.
The Tax Haven’s Rationale. Tax havens encourage offshore facilities for economic, political 
and social reasons, all of which benefit their residents. For example, offshore facilities 
generate up to 20 percent of the Caymans’ revenues, balance the budget in Montserrat 
(through licensing fees) and have a huge impact on local economies, particularly those of 
economically emerging countries.
For example, in 1964 the Caymans had one or two multinational banks and virtually no 
companies. By 1981 they had thirty multinational banks, 300 Class B banks, and about 
13,600 companies, the latter handled by a small number of lawyers, accountants and 
agents. The Caymans’ total population in 1981 was about 15,000.
Many havens claim that the United States blames them for problems that it is unable to 
solve domestically. Furthermore, offshore competition is so stiff that it is estimated that if 
one country were to cease being a tax haven three more would start. (When Switzerland 
relaxed its secrecy laws, Bahamian and Caymanian business grew at a rapid rate.) Also, 
bank brokers move from island to island as laws tighten or loosen.
A local Bahamian bank executive summed it up when he said
The Bahamas must do things which are not allowed in the United States because 
to do things which are allowed in the United States is noncompetitive, since in 
every instance the United States does it better than the Bahamas do. The 
Bahamas are therefore compelled in banking and trust operations to appeal to 
unallowable activities and by inference to appeal to activities disallowed in the 
United States.
Secrecy. The vital characteristic of a tax haven is that it allows offshore facilities to conduct 
their affairs behind a veil of secrecy. Tax havens offer not only secret, numbered bank 
accounts but also corporate laws and secrecy provisions that prevent law enforcement 
officials from intruding. In addition, lawyers from tax havens offer a further level of secrecy 
because they too are shielded by the haven’s secrecy laws, they maintain attorney-client 
privilege, they sometimes do not know who their clients are, or they may be coconspirators, 
or any combination thereof.
Tax havens view secrecy as a necessity for keeping offshore business. Business people from 
various parts of the world (the Middle East and South America, for example) consider 
secrecy to be a normal characteristic of business affairs. Flight capital (money being sent out 
of politically unstable countries) has to be transferred secretly. Thus, it is not only criminals 
but also politicians and governments to whom secrecy is attractive.
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Civil secrecy exists in common law as the result of a British case, Union v. Tournier (1907). 
This case established that a banker had a duty to treat his customer’s affairs as confidential. 
Many havens follow this law. Some jurisdictions have passed stringent, criminal laws to 
buttress Tournier—for example, the Bahamas and the Caymans. Corporate laws in the 
havens also aid secrecy by permitting nominee owners and bearer shares, prohibiting 
disclosure of the beneficial owner, not requiring financial statements and audits, and 
allowing the purchase of companies off the shelf.
Quite apart from the law, secrecy prevails in some tax havens by virtue of inadequate 
records, unskilled administrators and corruption.
Vehicles Used to Transfer Funds to Tax Havens. Individuals or businesses can use several kinds 
of institutions to transfer funds to tax havens. These include banks with international 
branches or facilities, smaller trust companies and banking institutions, shipping companies, 
real estate companies, travel agencies, money changers, insurance companies, finance 
companies, brokerage and investment companies, international trading companies, holding 
companies, and multinational corporations. The transfers themselves may be legal or 
illegal. The transfer can be accomplished by means of letters of credit to a bank in a tax 
haven, a bank draft, a wire transfer, or the transport of cash itself.
File Folders. Money launderers can purchase a set of legal papers in tax havens—for 
example, legal documents, financial statements, and banking documents dated some years 
before they are purchased. These documents make it appear that the company has been in 
business for several years. In reality, of course, it never previously existed. These 
companies have no substance.
Tax Havens and Law Enforcement. The combination of offshore corporate entities and secret 
bank accounts in tax havens permits entities to construct a maze of financial transactions. 
The tracing of assets becomes a very complex task. The transferring of questionable funds 
from one tax haven jurisdiction to another greatly compounds the complexity.
Enforcement problems are pervasive, affecting not only criminal but also civil actions (such 
as divorces, bankruptcies, and so on). Investigating cases takes a tremendous effort, and 
conviction is by no means certain. There is no central clearing house to handle offshore 
inquiries.
Investigations into Narcotics Trafficking
Narcotics trafficking is currently the primary source of laundered funds. The sophistication 
and complexity of laundering schemes are virtually infinite and are limited only by the 
creativity and expertise of the criminal entrepreneurs who devise the schemes. Organized 
crime uses banks and other financial institutions in the course of laundering as routinely, if 
not as frequently, as legitimate businesses use banks for legitimate purposes.
Previously, much of the investigation into narcotics trafficking occurred on the street in 
which the drugs were followed to identify the dealers. Although this led to many successful 
prosecutions, it seldom exposed the leaders of the organizations. The problem with a street 
investigation is that the authorities generally cannot make a buy from, or a sale to, the top 
person in the organization without the use of an informant, who is generally unreliable. 
Furthermore, because the sentences received by drug traffickers were often so light,
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perpetrators considered the risk worth taking—and the leaders of the organizations 
continued to be insulated.
Currently, law enforcement authorities obtain financial documentation during seizures in 
order to establish that certain individuals possess goods that far exceed their known sources 
of income. This technique has made possible the successful prosecution of the leaders in 
drug trafficking schemes. Generally investigators use two methods to prove the flow of 
funds obtained from narcotics trafficking:
1. Net worth analyses
2. Sources and uses of funds
6.4.7 Check Fraud
Check fraud is a general term for the attempted negotiation of bad checks at a financial 
institution. Typically con artists prey on banks in an attempt to negotiate fraudulent or 
fictitious instruments. Common kinds of check fraud include forged, altered, and stolen 
checks; new account fraud; and check kiting.
Forged, Altered, and Stolen Checks
Most attempts to defraud banks involve one or more of the following:
1. Checks bearing the forged names of makers, endorsers or payees.
2. Altered checks showing increased amounts.
3. Counterfeit checks.
4. Stolen checks passed by others.
Bank officers and other investigators can detect this kind of fraud by observing one or more 
of the following warning signs:
• Obvious written alterations on checks
• Illegible maker, endorser or officer signatures
• Checks imprinted with a maximum amount, or the term void, or nonnegotiable
• Unprofessional printing
• Business checks presented for cash instead of deposit
New Account Fraud
Check fraud is much more likely to occur in new accounts than in established accounts. 
Bank employees must make special efforts to properly identify the potential new customer, 
without offending existing customers. Banks should establish screening criteria that must be 
enforced by everyone handling new accounts. These employees must take prompt, decisive 
action to manage or close (or both) apparent problem accounts.
Most perpetrators of new account fraud use false identification. Examples include 
fraudulent birth certificates, fraudulent passports, duplicate social security numbers, 
fraudulent voter registration cards, stolen credit cards, stolen driver’s licenses, stolen 
paychecks, front (shell) businesses, fraudulent student-identification cards, and disguised 
identities (including post office box mail address, lock box rental, mail forwarding, 
telephone answering service, and rented office space).
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New-account criminals are professionals. They use false identification to open new accounts 
and steal money before the bank collects the funds. Bank officers can normally detect new- 
account fraud by observing one or more of the following warning signs:
1. The customer resides outside the bank’s normal trade area.
2. The customer rushes to open an account and obtain a loan.
3. The customer’s dress or actions, or both, are inappropriate for his or her stated age, 
occupation or income level.
To help prevent this kind of fraud, banks should consider adopting the following 
procedures:
1. Implement well-defined procedures for increasing employee awareness of new-account 
fraud.
2. Establish specific guidance about acceptable identification and its reporting.
3. Require detailed verification of customer’s information, including—
— Previous checking account history (internal and external investigation).
— Credit reports and credit scoring systems.
— Dun & Bradstreet reports.
— Better Business Bureau reports.
— Special requests for no mail contact.
— Post office box or hotel address.
Check Kiting
Check kiting is a term for building up large apparent balances in one or more bank accounts, 
based on uncollected or floated checks drawn against similar accounts in other banks. As 
banks decrease the amount of time taken to clear checks, this kind of fraud is becoming less 
common. Although many individuals engage to some degree in kiting, a commercial 
customer can perpetrate this scheme by using several bank accounts to increase available 
cash reserves.
The brokerage firm, E.F. Hutton, committed one of the most significant check-kiting 
schemes perpetrated in the United States. They engaged in a $20-million kiting scheme to 
decrease the cost of their funds during the late 1980s. The resultant bad publicity eventually 
led to the company’s demise.
Check Kiting, Illustrated. In commercial bank accounts established over a period of time to 
avoid suspicion, a fraudster starts with little or no money in Bank A and Bank B, and writes 
$5,000 in checks on each for deposit in the other:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $5,000 $5,000 $10,000
Actual Balances -0- -0- -0-
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The process is quickly repeated (for example, the next day) with $8,000 in deposited 
checks:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $13,000 $13,000 $26,000
Actual Balances -0- -0- -0-
A $6,000 down payment is made on a Mercedes from a check written from Bank A.
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $7,000 $13,000 $20,000
Actual Balances ($6,000) -0- ($6,000)
The next day additional checks for $4,000 each are written and deposited into each 
account:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances $11,000 $17,000 $28,000
Actual Balances ($6,000) -0- ($6,000)
The balances are then paid to a travel agent, and the fraudster takes a long trip:
Bank A Bank B Total
Apparent Balances -0- -0- -0-
Actual Balances ($17,000) ($17,000) ($34,000)
Check Kiting Characteristics. Bank personnel usually uncover check-kiting schemes by 
observing one or more of the following warning signs:
• Frequent deposits and checks in same amounts.
• Frequent deposits and checks in round amounts.
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• Frequent deposits of checks written on the same paying bank, which is not the deposit 
bank.
• Little time lag between deposits and withdrawals.
• Frequent Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) account balance inquiries.
• Many large deposits made on Thursday or Friday to take advantage of the weekend.
• Large periodic balances in individual accounts with no apparent business explanation.
• Low average balance compared to high level of deposits.
• Many checks made payable to other banks.
• Bank willingness to pay against uncollected funds (note that not all payments against 
uncollected funds are check kites, but all check kites require payments against 
uncollected funds).
• Cash withdrawals with deposit checks drawn on another bank.
• Checks drawn on foreign banks with lax banking laws and regulations.
Slowing the Bank-Clearing Process. Before the days of sophisticated computer systems, a 
check-kiting scheme could develop using less paper, fewer financial institutions, and smaller 
amounts than are commonly used today. Banks can still be hit with large losses when a 
fraudster slows down the bank clearing process. Typical fraudsters’ procedures include—
• Using counter checks without any computer or Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 
(MICR) coding.
• Providing insufficient information on checks (for example, using an incomplete name of 
a bank and branch, leaving out the account number, giving an illegible signature).
• Making errors on the face of checks such as date and figures.
• Defacing the check (for example, by using staples).
• Placing stop payments on certain documents.
• Having accounts in institutions other than chartered banks (that is, trust companies and 
credit unions).
New Techniques. It is now very difficult to effect a check-kiting scheme employing the same 
procedures as in the past. Banks are reluctant to accept counter checks; more significantly, 
checks usually take only one day to clear. This is true even for checks issued on out-of-town 
or out-of-state banks. The financial institutions claim that, in the near future, checks will 
clear instantaneously. To counteract the tightening of bank procedures, the fraudster has 
had to increase the number of financial institutions used, the dollar amounts, and frequency 
of checks issued.
Check-Kiting Scheme Investigations. The main issues to be addressed when investigating a 
check-kiting scheme are as follows:
1. The loss does not necessarily occur at the time of detection. Banks are usually put at 
increasing financial risk over a period of time.
2. Accounting evidence must show that—
a. Control was exerted over a number of accounts.
b. A loss did occur.
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c. Economic risk has increased as shown by day-by-day analysis.
d. Every time the perpetrator withdraws money from the system of accounts (in excess 
of the deposits put into the system), the bank incurs a loss or risk of loss.
e. The volume of inter-account checks is high.
3. The bank must determine whether it gave implied credit to the accused through daylight 
overdraft privileges, which allow an overdraft balance at the end of a business day to be 
cleared up before the close of the next business day to cover the previous day’s 
overdraft.
4. The timing of the investigation and the availability of legible microfilm documentation 
are important.
5. Documentation of the modus operandi needs liberal use of visual aids.
Accounting Assistance. When investigating check-kiting, the CPA should—
• Identify the fraudster-controlled accounts because the financial institutions where they 
are maintained risk suffering economic losses.
• Identify and demonstrate the loss. This task is difficult because there is a mistaken 
tendency to regard loss as occurring at the termination of the check-kiting scheme. In 
fact, however, the risk of loss usually builds up day by day, over a period of several 
months. Recognition of the economic loss occurs when the perpetrator abandons the 
fraudulent activity for whatever reasons (this is equivalent to the game of musical 
chairs—the loss isn’t recognized until the music stops).
• Perform a day-by-day analysis to show both the buildup of the loss and the increase in 
economic risk to the financial institutions.
• Recognize that a check-kiting scheme could take place over an extended period of time 
without the knowledge of the bank. This is an issue that is frequently raised in court. 
This component is an educational aspect for many: lawyers, police, bank officials, 
laymen, and even CPAs find check kiting difficult to understand.
• Try to accomplish the difficult task of demonstrating to a court of law that this case was 
not merely an unbroken circle of checks and that this shell game, which was apparently 
tolerated by the financial institutions, resulted in economic loss to them.
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Mr. I.M. Kiter Case Study
Recently, between January and the middle of March, an extremely busy, well- 
respected professional, Mr. I.M. Kiter, operated a massive check-kiting scheme that 
employed at least eight bank accounts at three separate financial institutions. For 
two-and-a-half months he was able to falsely inflate the value of his accounts by 
issuing checks to or from his various accounts.
About four weeks before the scheme was uncovered, one of the financial institutions 
was sufficiently concerned about the status of Mr. Kiter’s accounts that it would 
only accept certified checks for deposit. This had the effect of reducing the clearing 
time to zero days or in certain instances to minus one day (the check was certified
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the day before it was deposited). Despite these restrictions, Mr. I.M. Kiter was able 
to continue his check-kiting scheme for the following reasons:
1. The other financial institutions did not require deposited checks to be certified.
2. Some overdraft privileges were permitted.
3. Mr. Kiter spoke with the financial institutions daily and explained away his 
suspicious conduct.
4. Checks were not return marked not sufficient funds (NSF), as required by bank 
policy, because the bank’s normal policies were changed for Mr. Kiter, a good 
customer.
5. The bank permitted daily daylight overdraft privileges.
Forensic accountants performed an analysis of the deposit and disbursement activity 
in the various bank accounts. With the exception of the closing bank overdraft, the 
deposits totaled about $87.5 million, of which more than $85 million represented 
money circulated among the eight accounts controlled by Mr. Kiter. The total 
amount of actual deposits from noncontrolled accounts only amounted to about 
$2.5 million. The ending balance in one of Mr. Kiter’s accounts at Anytown Bank 
was a negative $1.7 million. This overdraft balance resulted in a loss that was fully 
absorbed by Anytown Bank. Forensic accountants also performed an analysis of an 
account maintained by Mr. Kiter at Bigtown Bank for the period March 1 to March 
10. This analysis indicated that Bigtown Bank permitted ongoing overdraft 
privileges to Mr. Kiter in amounts up to almost $1 million. Closer inspection 
revealed the extent of Mr. Kiter’s abuse of the daylight overdraft privileges.
This practice was confirmed by the review of Bigtown Bank’s credit 
correspondence, and demonstrated that the departure from Bigtown Bank’s policy 
allowed Mr. Kiter to continue the check-kiting scheme in an uninterrupted fashion. 
In fact, when the kiting scheme fell apart, it provided Mr. Kiter with a defensible 
position for court purposes (that is, his conduct was condoned or blessed by Bigtown 
Bank).
The practices of Bigtown Bank also raised the questions as to whether the economic 
loss suffered by Anytown Bank was because of the check-kiting scheme, or because 
of the conduct of Bigtown Bank. Evidence introduced during the trial did not 
establish that the banks were aware of the kiting scheme. However, there was 
evidence that Bigtown Bank knew that Mr. Kiter was having some cash flow 
difficulties pertaining to closing a number of real estate deals. Handwritten 
comments from the Bigtown Bank branch manager to his credit department 
indicated that—
1. The bank closely monitored Mr. Kiter’s account.
2. The bank allowed certified checks to cover the overdraft daily.
3. The bank tolerated daily overdraft amounts of approximately $ 1 million.
4. The bank received substantial revenues via overdraft and service charges (an 
example of the bank greed factor).
5. The bank indicated at a meeting held with Mr. Kiter on February 25th that it 
would permit the overdraft arrangement to continue for another sixty days.
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6. Mr. Kiter had social connections and was a source of business for the bank.
Although Mr. Kiter was found guilty, the judge’s ruling implied that prior 
knowledge of the check-kiting scheme on the part of one of the banks weakened 
the prosecution’s case.
6.5 Individuals versus Insurance Companies
Insurance fraud generally consists of a presentation to an insurance company of a 
materially false or misleading written statement relating to either an application or claim 
for insurance. Fraud occurs not only when there is an actual loss (that is, a claim is made 
based on bogus information), but also when there is a risk of loss. This distinction is 
important for insurance fraud because insurance policies relate to risks. Accordingly, if an 
insurance policy based on a material misstatement is placed, the insurance company is the 
victim of a fraud because there was the risk of a claim, even if no claims are made on the 
policy.
Some insurance policies relate to risks faced by individuals, whereas others relate to risks 
faced by corporations. This section deals with both kinds.
Computers have become an important tool in discovering insurance fraud. The most 
common use is to let the computer discover clusters or interrelated data; for example, an 
unusual number of claims filed from the same address. This kind of screening is effective in 
insurance scams because the fraudsters often work in consort, for example, with doctors or 
auto repair shops, to file inflated claims that a search engine seeking commonality can 
discover.
6.5.1 Life Insurance Fraud
Life insurance is a policy that pays the insured’s beneficiary a predetermined amount of 
money in the event of the insured’s death. Common life insurance frauds include homicide 
fraud, staged-death fraud, preexisting health condition fraud, and double-indemnity fraud.
Homicide Fraud
A beneficiary of a life insurance policy may commit homicide to collect benefits. In these 
cases, there are actually two victims—the person who has been murdered (see section 
6.2.6), and the insurance company, which is required to make a payment on the policy.
Staged Death Fraud
An insured might fake his or her death in order to collect benefits. A variation of this 
scheme occurs when a policy is taken out on an insured who is already dead.
Preexisting Health Condition Fraud
An otherwise uninsurable person obtains a life insurance policy through false health 
statements on the application describing preexisting health conditions. The normal, 
minimal medical examination would not be sufficient to expose the condition. The insured 
hopes to die of causes unrelated to the feared condition—that is, a condition that would 
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otherwise prevent the policy from being issued—and without an autopsy being performed, 
so that the insurer will pay the policy benefits.
Double Indemnity
In some cases, a beneficiary of a life insurance policy will report the death as having been 
accidental in order to obtain twice the face value of the policy. A variation of this scheme 
occurs when a beneficiary attempts to make a suicide appear to have been accidental.
6.5.2 Casualty Insurance Fraud
Casualty insurance covers the personal injuries and property damage that result from an 
accident or other covered occurrence. While accidents can occur anywhere and at any 
time, a large number of casualty claims involve injuries sustained in traffic accidents. The 
following are the common casualty insurance frauds:
• Staged accidents
• Mortgage insurance fraud
• Legitimate accidents with false claims
• Personal injury insurance fraud
• Fraudulent claims
Staged Accidents
A staged accident is one in which, for example, an individual will purposely pull out into 
the path of an oncoming vehicle or will allow themselves to be rear-ended in order to cause 
a collision. A fraudulent claim is then made for nonexistent personal injuries or a falsely 
inflated claim is made for real injury. These kinds of insurance fraud usually involve rings of 
individuals, including unscrupulous doctors, attorneys and claim adjusters.
Mortgage Insurance Fraud
Mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the 
purchaser of the property defaults on those payments because of death or disability. A 
typical mortgage insurance fraud is a variation on a staged accident fraud—for example, an 
employee who is laid off from work claims that he is disabled, so his mortgage is paid via 
his mortgage insurance policy.
Legitimate Accidents with False Claims
In many cases, an individual is involved in a legitimate accident and later exaggerates his 
or her personal injuries (usually soft-tissue injuries) to bilk the insurance company.
Personal Injury Insurance Fraud
Personal injury insurance fraud usually involves lying about the circumstances of the cause 
of an injury so as to bring it within the insurance coverage. For example, a worker covered 
by workers compensation insurance injures his back while working at home but reports it 
as a job-related injury to come within the workers compensation insurance coverage.
Fraudulent Claims
A fraudulent claim is one in which, for example, an insured’s auto is brought into a body 
shop for repair after a legitimate accident. The body shop inflates the claim, typically to 
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cover the deductible. The body shop may then pay a cash bribe to the claims adjuster or 
intentionally cause additional damage to the car to maximize its profit.
In another example, an insured seeks the cooperation of a scrap yard that has the 
capability to crush autos. The insured has his auto crushed and files a theft claim. If the 
auto is not recovered within a reasonable span of time, the claim is paid. The insured then 
pays the scrap yard for destroying the vehicle without a trace.
In still another variation, a wrecked vehicle is located and insured. A bogus accident is 
concocted and a fraudulent claim is filed. Using the same vehicle, this scheme is often 
repeated with different insurance companies.
6.5.3 Health Insurance Fraud
Health insurance is a policy that covers someone’s health in the event that the person is 
injured or becomes ill. Common health insurance schemes include mobile labs, bundling 
and unbundling claims, and collusion between an insured and a provider.
An insurance industry representative reported, in January 2001, that fraud claims in both 
the public and private sector reach about $53.9 billion annually. The U.S. government has 
increased the funding of law enforcement agencies in the health-care fraud area, with some 
U.S. attorneys offices setting up special health-care fraud units. According to one U.S. 
attorney, health-care fraud is the most active area of white-collar crime, which includes 
going after clinical labs and individual doctors, among others.
A growing fraud related to credit-card fraud is debit-card fraud. Many banks are now 
issuing a combination ATM/debit card/credit card rather than three separate pieces of 
plastic. Although merchants, generally, cannot check whether there are funds in the bank 
supporting a debit card purchase, they can check a credit card with a phone call. No doubt 
as the problem grows, protective steps will be installed to stop the fraudsters. Until the 
preventive measures catch up, prosecuting and publicizing the fraud will help slow the 
growth of this new threat.
Mobile Labs
In the usual mobile lab scam, a group of people set up a lab in a storefront located in a 
blue-collar, low income area, often where English is the second language. They then pass 
out fliers in the parking lot of a minimum wage manufacturing firm, offering free physicals 
to people who have medical insurance. After filling out a family history, the insured is 
subjected to extensive tests for a variety of maladies, and the average physical ends up 
costing the insurer three to four thousands dollars. When the insured returns for the results 
of the tests, the lab is gone.
Bundling and Unbundling Claims
Bundling and unbundling claims is the practice of physicians or clinics billing separately 
for medical services performed at the same time. For example, an insured woman has a 
hysterectomy performed and at the same time she also has her appendix removed. The 
physician, however, bills the insurance company as if the appendectomy was a completely 
separate procedure.
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Insured-Provider Collusion
In collusion between an insured and a provider, the provider furnishes the insured with a 
bill for services not actually rendered. The insured makes an application for reimbursement 
to the insurance company, and the proceeds are divided between the insured and the 
provider.
6.5.4 Property Insurance Fraud
Property insurance is a policy that covers an individual or corporation’s property from loss 
(whether stolen or destroyed), up to a predetermined amount of money. Common property 
insurance schemes include: staged false theft, repossessed household goods, pawned 
personal property, and arson.
Staged False Theft
In staged false theft, an insured secretes property he or she owns and reports it stolen, or 
alternatively reports property stolen that he or she never owned.
In a recent case involving Michael Jackson CDs, a music distributor had misjudged the 
demand for the CD and had excess inventory on hand. A theft was then staged in order to 
offload the excess stock, which was then destroyed. When forensic accountants revealed 
the lack of demand and the excess inventory, the distributor dropped his claim.
Repossessed Household Goods
Repossessed household goods fraud occurs when, for example, household items (furniture, 
appliances, and so on) are repossessed, and the insured reports the property was stolen.
Pawned Personal Property
When pawning personal property, a fraudster may inflate the value of his or her personal 
belongings, insure them, and then pawn them for a lesser amount of cash. The fraudster 
then reports them stolen and files a claim. Once the insurance payment is received, the 
fraudster then redeems the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance 
payment, and pockets the difference. These schemes can be risky to the perpetrator, 
however, because in most states pawnshops are required to check customer identification 
and keep records of their transactions, in order to facilitate police investigations of reported 
thefts.
Arson
Arson is the purposeful destruction of property by fires, sometimes for profit. For example, 
an insured may be about to lose his or her house, car, or business due to an inability to 
make loan payments. The insured sets fire to the property to collect the insurance 
proceeds. Alternatively, an insured may replace an item with something less expensive 
when he or she remodels after the fire.
Arson can also be committed by companies, which then file claims under their property 
insurance policies as well as their business interruption policies. This is covered in 
chapter 7.
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The terms white-collar crime, economic crime, and commercial crime are not legal ones and are 
often used interchangeably. This chapter covers the distinctions between these terms.
White-Collar and Economic Crimes
Although scholars differ widely in their definition of white-collar crime, the Dictionary of 
Criminal Justice Data Terminology, published by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, defines 
white-collar crime as: “non-violent crime for financial gain committed by means of 
deception by persons whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or semi- 
professional and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also non­
violent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having special 
technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of the 
person’s occupation.” This definition includes most if not all of the crimes and behaviors 
described in this Handbook.
Economic crime has a similar definition regarding its objective and methodology, that is, 
crime committed for economic gain by means of deception; however, economic crime is 
broader in its scope than white-collar crime: it could also include violent crimes committed 
by people without any particular occupational status—for example, armed robbery.
Commercial Crime
The term commercial crime is frequently used as a substitute for the terms white-collar 
crime and economic crime. However, for purposes of this Handbook, a more restrictive 
definition is adopted: that is, commercial crime is white-collar crime committed by an 
individual or a group of individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and, 
indirectly, themselves.
This distinction, that is, between fraud committed against a business or commercial entity, 
and commercial crime committed by a business or commercial entity—is a useful one. 
Historically, our legal system, institutions, and even the procedures adopted by auditors 
have tended to focus more on conventional fraud committed purely for personal gain. In 
recent years, however, awareness has been heightened to the possibility of the business or 
commercial entity itself being the perpetrator.
Frauds against investors and environmental crime are two examples that have received 
increasing, media attention.
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7.1.2 Victims of Commercial Crime
Victims of commercial crime can include—
• Customers—for example, through false advertising and price fixing.
• Competitors—for example, through industrial espionage and intentional copyright 
infringement.
• Creditors—for example, through a planned bankruptcy.
• Investors—for example, through false financial statements and other securities fraud.
• The general public—for example, through environmental abuse.
In addition, the practice of organizational bribe giving may victimize any one of the above 
groups—for example, the general public when a bribe is given in the awarding of a 
government contract.
7.1.3 Extent of Commercial Crime
Two decades ago commercial crime received much less media attention than today, largely 
being confined to a short paragraph or two in the business section of the nation’s 
newspapers, if it was mentioned at all. Today’s front-page stories are a testimony to the 
current widespread public interest in and concern about commercial crime. Scholars 
attribute this growing emphasis to, among other things, a greater skepticism about the 
behavior of persons in authority. The alleged crimes of Whitewater involving President 
Clinton and his associates only deepen the mood of distrust of those in prominent places.
Statistics suggest that there is some reason for distrust. For instance, KPMG Peat Marwick’s 
1998 Fraud Survey reported that false financial statements caused losses of $1 million or 
more in 42 percent of the reported instances, whereas in the 1994 survey, losses of this 
magnitude represented only 24 percent of the total losses.
While it is true that surveys only deal with reported crime, what is clear is that the extent 
and value of reported commercial crime is on the increase. Many experts believe that many 
frauds go unreported and that the extent of unreported commercial crime is also on the 
increase.
7.1.4 Responsibility for Commercial Crime
Some scholars debate whether individuals should be held responsible for crimes committed 
on behalf of their organizations. Although some direct benefit accrues to the perpetrator, far 
more benefit accrues to the organization.
Regardless of whether the organization is held liable, the frauds are a direct result of some 
human action or interaction: if a business is like a dynamite charge, someone must push the 
plunger.
Most criminal statutes require that the guilty person have the required criminal intent. 
However, an organization can be held liable even if it were unaware of or did not 
participate in the fraud. The law recognizes two theories of organizational responsibility:
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1. The identification theory. The organization is held liable when the employees and 
organizations can be viewed as one and the same, for example, a small business owner 
who has incorporated.
2. The imputation theory. The organization is held responsible for the actions of its 
employees through the doctrine of respondeat superiour, a seventeenth century doctrine 
that means “let the superior respond.” The legal theory was developed from civil 
lawsuits to prevent employers from denying financial responsibility for the acts of their 
employees.
7.1.5 Characteristics of Commercial Crime
While commercial crime can take many forms, often it is distinguished by one or more of 
these characteristics: tolerance, diffusion of harm, and rationalization.
Tolerance
While awareness of commercial crime has increased in recent years, there still remains a 
somewhat greater tolerance for this form of crime as compared to violent crimes such as 
armed robbery, or those involving drugs. This greater tolerance may stem not so much 
from the nature of the crime itself, but rather from the perception of the perpetrator as 
being somehow more civilized. Anybody with strength, decent aim, or access to poison, can 
commit murder, but only a limited number of respectable corporate executives or directors 
are in a position to violate antitrust legislation.
Diffusion of Harm
Another notable characteristic of most kinds of commercial crime is that there are often 
numerous victims who are frequently unaware that they have been harmed. Death from 
smog or asbestos poisoning is very likely to be slow and insidious, and its victims will be 
hard-pressed to relate their terminal illness to its precise cause, given the complicated 
nature of other possible contributing factors. A factory worker with cancer is not likely to be 
certain whether it was the toxic chemicals that he handled for fifteen years, the fact that he 
smoked too many cigarettes, or bad genes or bad luck that will shorten his life.
In many other cases of commercial crime, the harm tends to be widely diffused and, for 
each person, rather insignificant. But these can still be significant crimes. Companies can 
earn millions over the course of a year by charging higher prices for products that do not 
meet the standards they are alleged to attain. Few people who pay for a package of one- 
hundred thumb tacks will take the time and energy to count the contents of the package to 
be certain that they have gotten their money’s worth; it would be an easy and safe venture 
to put ninety-two tacks in each package, and some merchandisers find the temptation 
irresistible. Similarly, a customer will most likely remain unaware that the gasoline pumps 
at a service station are calibrated so that they get fewer gallons than those for which they 
are charged. Even if they come to know about these kinds of issues, most customers would 
shrug them off as not worth the trouble it would take to do something to remedy the 
situation; at most, they might take their business elsewhere.
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Rationalization
Perpetrators of white-collar crime are known for providing elaborate excuses for their 
crimes, and the nature of such explanations may be a major distinguishing mark between 
them and street offenders. It has been posited that embezzlers typically claim that they are 
only borrowing the money; they intended to repay it once they had covered the bills and 
other financial demands vexing them. Commercial criminals will similarly rationalize their 
behavior; for example, antitrust violators usually maintain that they are seeking to stabilize 
an out-of-control price situation when they conspire with others to fix prices, and they are 
likely to insist that power-hungry prosecutors and investigators are singling them out.
7.1.6 Investigation and Prosecution of Commercial Crime
The diffuse nature of most commercial crime poses a particular law enforcement dilemma. 
Without complaining witnesses, policing has to be proactive instead of reactive; that is, the 
enforcement officials themselves have to decide where the offenses are being committed 
and how to go about stopping them. Enforcers obviously cannot cope with all the violations 
and must decide on rules to guide their efforts. Should they go after the behaviors that 
cause the most harm? Should they take on the bigger offenders, or concentrate on the 
smaller fry, where their chances of success are much better? They can readily accumulate ten 
convictions in a year against ten insignificant companies, whereas it might take three years 
to win a victory over one huge corporation. Besides, the resources of the large organization 
might allow it to win its case, regardless of the lawless nature of its behavior.
7.1.7 Causes of Commercial Crime
Because businesses are bottom-line driven, it has been posited that they are inherently 
prone to committing crime, yet not necessarily criminal. Without necessarily meaning to, 
organizations inherently invite commercial crime as a means of obtaining goals. For 
example, a department manager’s concern with reaching assigned goals, may lead the 
manager to maximize his or her department’s own interests to the detriment of the 
organization, or to the detriment of society as a whole.
Organizations can also be criminogenic—prone to producing crime—because they 
encourage loyalty. Accordingly, this is because—
1. The organization tends to recruit and attract similar individuals.
2. Rewards are given out to those who display characteristics of a team player.
3. Long-term loyalty is encouraged through company retirement and benefits.
4. Loyalty is encouraged through social interaction such as company parties and social 
functions.
5. Frequent transfers and long working hours encourage isolation from other groups.
6. Specialized job skills may discourage company personnel from seeking employment 
elsewhere.
These reasons in turn cause company personnel to sometimes perceive that the 
organization might be worth committing crime for.
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Another aspect that makes companies criminogenic is their compensation structures, 
particularly for corporate executives who are most likely to be the perpetrators of 
commercial crime. Compensation packages for senior personnel usually include a 
component based on the results of their company or department, either through stock 
options or bonuses. Typically, senior executives have a greater amount of compensation 
tied to results than do other employees. Because commercial crime is so diffuse, and the 
likelihood of being caught is low, senior executives may perceive that the incentives to 
“enhance the success of their organization” through commercial crime will outweigh the 
risks.
7.2 Forms of Commercial Crime
Today, the realm of commercial crime can be said to primarily involve offenses against 
laws that regulate either one or both of the following: the marketplace or the established 
standards of conduct for professional and political life. Some of the most common forms of 
commercial crime are described in this section, along with Case Studies and other 
examples that illustrate the salient features of such crimes.
The first two cover shams, which Webster’s Dictionary defines as “.. . an imitation or 
counterfeit purporting to be genuine [noun]....” and “to act intentionally so as to give a 
false impression [verb].”1 Shams are the result of the activities of a confidence trickster or 
con artist who has been able to obtain money from the public by various means. Generally, 
there are two kinds of shams: corporate shams and investor fraud.
Although these shams are discussed separately in this chapter (due to the size of each 
section), in many cases the perpetrator (the corporate con artist) and the victim (individuals) 
of the shams have similar characteristics, as does the way in which the sham is operated. 
However, they have two major distinctions:
1. In the corporate sham a corporation exists from which the pitch is made. This is in 
contrast to an unincorporated individual making a pitch, not on a corporation’s behalf, 
but on his or her personal behalf.
2. In investor sham the nature of what is being sold to the victim differs. For example, an 
investor sham typically involves making a speculative investment, whereas a corporate 
sham typically involves the purchase of something tangible.
The remaining sections of this chapter include the following kinds of fraud as committed by 
companies: procurement fraud, industrial espionage, finance fraud, securities fraud, 
environmental abuse, economic extortion, health care fraud, and possession of property 
obtained by crime.
7. 2.1 Corporate Shams
Corporate shams generally involve something counterfeit or false. In this case the corporate 
sales pitch appears to offer something genuine, yet there is no underlying substance. The 
perpetrator of the crime is often a con artist acting through a corporate entity. In fact, by 
using the corporate veil as a shield from the public, the con artist gains an appearance of
1Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, 1993.
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respectability and substance that he or she would otherwise lack. The con artist’s wares may 
consist of one or more of the following:
• Products oriented to individual consumers (as opposed to products that companies 
would buy) that are sold by false advertising.
• Franchises or distributorships that the victim purchases in order to run a business.
• Solicitation of money donations towards a charitable or religious cause.
Generally, shams that are carried on through an incorporated business involve pyramid 
sales schemes, mail order sales, advertising to be placed in charitable programs or flyers, or 
donations to charitable organizations. Newer forms of corporate shams that are becoming 
more common are the selling of franchises, and other get-rich-quick schemes, such as the 
selling of vending or arcade game machines: the purchasers then set up their own business 
using the franchise or the equipment bought.
When a con artist hides behind a corporate veil, some or all of the following characteristics
may apply:
1. The con artist uses expensive letterhead, emblazoned with a worldly name and a classy 
address, to impress potential victims.
2. The company has a very informal corporate structure, and a very short life span.
3. The company’s accounting systems are primitive or nonexistent.
4. The company conducts an extensive and appealing advertising campaign.
5. If a product is offered, the product itself may be of questionable value, and there is 
seldom, if any, post sale servicing.
6. The customer is expected to pay for the product via cash or readily negotiable checks on 
(or before) delivery.
7. Once received, the cash is quickly removed from the company through the payment of 
commission expenses, salaries, bonuses or management fees, so that the con artist can 
reap the immediate benefits of the scheme.
The key to the corporate sham, as with any sham, is the effectiveness and the speed with 
which the sales pitch brings results. The method of delivering the sales pitch may range 
from telephone solicitation (via a boiler room operation), to either cold calls, or advertising 
in local newspapers, or both.
Possible red flags for a corporate sham include elaborate representations that demonstrate 
the quality of the product, proposed earnings that are excessively high for the franchise, or 
an apparently hard-sell pitch to raise money for a purported charitable purpose.
Finally, you should be aware of the arguments put forward by defense counsel in corporate 
sham cases. Some of the issues defense counsel might raise include:
• Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware.
• Some of the money received was in fact directed to the promoted charitable purpose.
• The investor is at fault: that is, for not working hard enough at a franchise operation to 
make it succeed, or for not waiting long enough to receive the goods that would have 
eventually been shipped, and so on.
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Merchandise Swindles or False Advertising
Merchandising frauds include all frauds perpetrated against purchasers of merchandise and 
services. If you have ever paid for an item and received something less than advertised, you 
have been the victim of a merchandising swindle or false advertising.
These frauds generally fall into one of the following four categories:
1. Representations that the purchase is a bargain when in fact it is not—for example, 
department stores raise the price of a product significantly one day and then the next 
day drop it back to where it had been, maintaining in their advertising that it now is on 
sale.
2. Collection of money for one product and substitution of another of lesser quality or 
cost—for example, claims have been made that shoes are alligator when in fact they 
were made of plastic.
3. Misrepresentations regarding the quality of the product—for example, a company 
selling glass demonstrated in television commercials that its car window product was so 
perfect that when you looked through it you could hardly believe there was anything 
between you and the outside scene; it was later proved that the ads were filmed from 
inside a car with the window rolled down.
4. Failure to deliver the product or service—for example, in bait and switch tactics, stores 
advertise a specific product at a strikingly low price, but then, when the customer tries to 
buy the item, it is no longer available. It is the customer’s presence and attention they 
want to attract—once they have him or her listening, they assume that slick sales tactics 
can accomplish the rest of the deceit.
Defraud You in Writing Case Study
Between September 1997 and June 1998, Smith and Jones, partners of Defraud You 
in Writing Inc. committed fraud by obtaining funds from the public for goods they 
did not intend to supply.
Smith and Jones operated the business through telephone solicitation whereby 
books were offered for sale, and customers’ names were entered into a drawing for a 
trip to the Caribbean via Acme Tours. Door-to-door sales people would follow up 
on the calls and try to obtain orders for the books. The orders set forth the terms, 
the method of payment, the time and method of delivery, and an announcement for 
a drawing on a certain date. The drawing date was inserted in a blank on the order 
form, the first draw being December 31, 1997.
From the evidence of Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, during the period between 
October 1997 and May 1998, the actual net cash receipts from orders by members 
of the public totaled $75,291 (after allowances for returned checks) on 1,867 orders.
Defraud You in Writing’s suppliers were not paid during this period, so the total 
number of orders filled was 311. In fact, during the three months with the largest 
sales, (December, February and March) no books were ordered from Defraud You’s 
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suppliers. Instead, substantial effort was being made to increase the sales force (and 
thus the revenue), and new premises were being sought
The judge in this case believed that Defraud You in Writing used the 311 orders to 
create a camouflage for the business’ real activity: to obtain funds for orders they 
never intended to fulfill.
As for the drawing, no arrangements had been made with Acme Tours to enable 
the winner to take the trip.
Franchise and Distributorship Frauds
Both franchise and distributorship frauds are characterized by a get-rich-quick business 
opportunity that involves a large up-front purchase of equipment, supplies, and 
promotional materials. Many such schemes are part of a pyramid scam.
Cookie Vend & Run Inc. Case Study
Cookie Vend & Run Inc. was incorporated in March 1997 to sell cookie vending 
machines. CookieVend’s headquarters were located in New York City. Its office 
staff generally consisted of the president, general office manager, secretary­
treasurer, bookkeeper, and three typists.
Shortly after CookieVend’s incorporation, a series of ads were placed in newspapers 
across the country. These ads offered a substantial guaranteed income, which could 
be earned for an investment of $3,000 to $9,000. Although the ads differed 
somewhat from paper to paper, they all offered a part-time job that could net the 
right person an income of $2,000 per month or more.
In addition to the office staff, CookieVend employed a sales staff of approximately 
ten people to interview the respondents to the ads. These sales reps traveled 
independently of each other and were provided with a corporate brochure and 
other material that instructed them on what to promise the new distributors.
Some 180 people purchased these distributorships for an investment of between 
$3,000 and $9,000 each, depending on the number of vending machines purchased. 
Supplies of cookies and insurance were also purchased. CookieVend’s total sales 
from April to December 1997 were approximately $1.2 million.
In the ensuing year, not one distributor was successful in his or her business. The 
complaints were generally as follows:
1. The quality of the vending machines was very poor.
2. Three distributors never received their vending machines (twenty-three 
machines in all).
3. Cookies were stale when received by the distributor.
4. The price of cookies increased from fourteen cents to twenty cents each soon 
after the distributors purchased their machines.
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5. The company did not honor claims of damage to machines in accordance with 
the insurance protection policy on the agreement.
6. The company did not honor its three-year repair warranty on vending machines.
7. The company did not attempt to address any reasonable complaints.
Evidence of Fraud. All of Cookie Vend’s management personnel were found guilty of 
fraud and received jail sentences. The evidence that formed the basis for the case 
against them was as follows:
1. CookieVend’s revenues and expenses showed that its level of profitability was 
directly attributable to the sale of machines. This also showed that the sale of 
cookies resulted in losses, thus Cookie Vend had a motive to sell machines rather 
than cookies.
2. CookieVend’s primary disbursements were for commissions, advertising, travel, 
and business promotion. These expenditures occurred during a period when the 
distributors’ complaints about product quality fell on deaf ears.
3. The profit-loss experience of the distributors was much worse than the profit-loss 
statements represented in the newspaper advertisements. One of the highest 
performing distributors realized a gross profit, assuming all cookies were sold, of 
$375, on an investment of $7,941 over a period of eighteen months.
4. Cookie Vend never purchased a liability policy although the distributors’ 
purchase agreements represented that a policy did in fact exist.
5. The distributor agreement set out a nonrescission clause specifically stating, “The 
distributor is not relying on any oral or written expressions, promises or 
warranties made by anyone to consummate this transaction.”
Charity and Religious Fraud
Jim Bakker, former head of the defunct PTL (Praise the Lord Club) has brought 
international attention to religious fraud. The essence of his scheme was to sell “lifetime 
partnerships” in a luxury hotel, which his followers could use for life. Prosecutors were able 
to show that Bakker’s plan was completely unworkable, because many more partnerships 
were sold than could ever be accommodated. Bakker used the money to pay himself and 
his lieutenants millions of dollars in salaries and bonuses. He was convicted under federal 
mail fraud statutes.
Other kinds of charity and religious groups resort to fraud as a way of obtaining 
contributions. In the most common of the schemes, fraudsters operating in boiler rooms call 
unsuspecting victims and raise funds for allegedly good causes or for worthwhile 
organizations. The funds collected are not used for their intended purpose, or the fraudsters 
fail to disclose that they keep the majority of the funds raised for administration costs and 
give the sponsoring charity or religion only a small portion of the money collected.
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Rob M. Blind Case Study
Between January 1997 and July 1998, Rob M. Blind and I. Swindle committed 
fraud by developing a scheme through the medium of telephone solicitations that 
induced the public to contribute funds allegedly for charitable purposes—to benefit 
the blind.
The operation, Help the Sightless Associates, carried on by Rob and his associates, was 
reasonably simple. They hired three or four blind musicians, who joined other 
sighted employees for a tour of several cities. In each city they planned to visit, they 
conducted a telephone solicitation campaign: literally by going through the yellow 
pages and calling every business listed. The firms solicited were asked to buy an ad 
in a program, which was to be distributed at a concert to be held in that city.
If the firm refused to advertise, it would be asked to buy tickets to the concert that it 
could use, give away, or allow to be given away on its behalf.
The Help the Sightless Associates was not a charitable organization and never applied 
for registration as such. There is no record of them donating anything to the blind 
other than paying the musicians who gave the concerts.
As for the dollar amount of the fraud, according to Mr. Sleuth, forensic accountant, the total 
gross receipts for 1997 and part of 1998 were $252,327. These funds were used in the 
following manner:
Payments to the blind musicians -50 percent




Like corporate shams, investor frauds use techniques designed to produce a quick return or 
benefit to the company that is the subject of the con. The techniques generally used are 
telephone solicitation, personal cold calls, or spreading the sales pitch by word of mouth 
among a particular group of individuals, such as doctors or dentists—who typically have 
high incomes or high net worth, or both, but possess limited financial or investment 
expertise. The con artist may succeed in persuading a member of the group to introduce 
him or her to other members, thus creating confidence in both the scheme and him- or 
herself. The investors are actively encouraged to spread the word to their close friends 
about this opportunity for an investment. These activities are often perpetrated through a 
pyramid or Ponzi scheme—both of which are described below.
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The key to the con is generally a direct pitch to the investors’ greed—that is, promises of 
high returns within a short period. The scheme may entail investment in precious metals or 
precious or semiprecious gems, and has been known to embrace items, such as antique 
coins and commodity futures. Investor frauds have even extended to what is commonly 
known as flips of real estate.
Although many of the characteristics of a corporate sham discussed in section 7.2.1 apply 
equally to investor frauds, there are two characteristics that are unique to investor frauds:
1. An extensive and appealing get-rich-quick advertising campaign is conducted, 
suggesting to the victims that easy money can be made with very little effort.
2. Investors, once the investment is determined to be a con, do not want any publicity that 
would expose the foolishness of their investment.
Chain Referral (Pyramid versus Ponzi) Schemes
Chain referral schemes are based on the same idea as the well-known chain letter. This is a 
particular kind of sham, which could involve products, or may involve only investments. In 
one example of a chain letter, the con artist starts the chain letter by sending a letter to five 
or more people requesting (on some pretext—often preying on people’s superstitions) the 
recipients to mail money to the con artist. The letter also instructs each recipient to send the 
letter to a further five people with the request that money be sent to the names in the first 
two tiers of the pyramid. The third tier recipients in turn repeat the process of mailing the 
request for money and adding themselves to the bottom of the pyramid. Often there is an 
instruction that only four or five tiers should receive the money; the top name dropping out 
with the addition of a new name(s) at the bottom. By the time the chain reaches the seventh 
or eighth level (if the chain continues that long), the multiplier effect creates enormous 
wealth to those higher up in the chain, because they receive money from the geometrically 
growing lower tiers.
Of course, things other than money can be the objects of chain letters. Some involve 
recipes, Christmas cards, and other harmless items. However, chain letters don’t work 
indefinitely. That is because someone in the lower level inevitably fails to mail out his or 
her five letters, and the chain is then broken; usually only those in the upper levels profit.
Chain referral schemes, also called pyramids or Ponzi Schemes (after the notorious Charles 
Ponzi who successfully employed the scheme in the early twentieth century), are based 
largely on the same principal. The difference is that some are legitimate and some are not. 
Pyramid sales structures are generally legitimate, and Ponzi schemes are usually 
illegitimate.
For example, many products sold exclusively in the home, such as Amway merchandise, 
can be legitimate forms of pyramids. Individuals are recruited to sell merchandise. They in 
turn recruit their friends and colleagues to sell, and get a cut of their commissions. This 
recruitment continues on down, with those in the upper levels receiving a portion of the 
commissions from several different layers of sales personnel. However, because of the 
turnover in sales personnel, most people fail to achieve a sufficient level in the chain or 
pyramid to make the touted commissions. They often get discouraged and quit, further 
depressing the chain.
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Illegal pyramids (Ponzi Schemes) exist as well. One common variation is for a fraudster to 
place mail order ads promising wealth to individuals for performing work in their homes 
for services such as stuffing envelopes. When the victim responds to the ad, they are 
informed that the opportunity requires sending in money. In return, he or she receives a 
letter suggesting the victim place a similar ad and collect money in the same way, using the 
same letter. In other words, the fraudster is telling the victims in effect, “do the same thing 
to others that I just did to you.”
Another typical Ponzi scheme involves the diversion of investment funds. This fraud words 
as follows: A company will open its doors as an investment firm, promising better than 
average returns on its investment. When the company receives money from investors A 
through G, the money is diverted to the personal benefit of the principals. When additional 
money is received from investors H through L, those funds are used to pay off investors A 
through G. When funds are received from investors M through Z, this money is used to pay 
off investors H through L, or at least to pay interest, and so on. The money paid out to the 
early investors, therefore, is not from returns achieved on investments, but rather a 
diversion of new investments. This pyramid continues until the scheme collapses.
Many operators simply set up a mail or telephone operation, collect funds, then close the 
operation and move, only to reestablish a similar operation and repeat the scheme. Law 
enforcement officials acknowledge a significant problem with chain referral schemes, but 
readily admit that they are incapable of adequately controlling the problem.
These schemes, or variations of them, cannot go on indefinitely because they require a 
constant stream of money to cover the diverted funds. When the flow of new investments 
fall below that level, there is insufficient cash to pay off old investors, and the scheme 
collapses. The chain referral schemes are not dependent on a particular product or service, 
but rather on the method of diverting funds. Common chain investment schemes include 
franchising, sales distributorships, investment and securities of various kinds, and 
merchandise.
Finally, it should be noted that many chain referral schemes involve small amounts of 
money that are taken from many victims. Because victims typically feel foolish about being 
fleeced, they frequently do not file charges. And even when complaints are made, the 
police do not give these crimes priority because of staffing and budgetary commitments. As 
a result, many chain referral operators stay around a long time.
7.2.3 Finance Fraud
False Mortgage Security
False mortgage security is a term used to refer to security that turns out to be nonexistent or to 
have a value far lower than was represented. This is a kind of loan fraud whereby the 
perpetrator is usually an individual acting through a sham corporation, and the victim could 
be a bank, but is more likely an individual or another corporation.
The usual characteristics of false mortgage security fraud are as follows:
• An investor is persuaded to make a loan or invest funds on the assurance that repayment 
of the loan or investment will be fully protected and secured in some way.
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• When the touted investment fails to materialize, the investor discovers that the assets 
supposedly securing the investment do not exist, are worth much less than the investor 
had been led to believe, or were pledged to numerous other investors rendering them 
virtually worthless.
• The investor is often a financially unsophisticated individual who does not review the 
transaction papers in detail and may not understand them but is persuaded to invest by 
the prospect of a high return (for example, a well above average interest rate).
• The investor usually relies on the promises of the perpetrator or the apparent protection 
afforded by the security.
It should be noted that some assets pledged as security (that is, land or stock) may lose 
value for legitimate reasons such as fluctuations in their market values. In cases of false 
security, however, there is intent to deceive on the part of the person soliciting the funds.
Accounting evidence in most cases can establish and document the funds’ flow in situations 
of this nature. It is more likely that evidence establishing the intent to deceive will be 
obtained by conducting interviews (viva voce evidence) than through the analysis of the 
accounting records. It is often through the interview process that the true nature and intent 
of the transactions are revealed. The nature of the documentary evidence required to 
establish the economic benefit to the fraud perpetrator, and to trace the flow of funds are 
dictated by the nature of the fraud scheme.
Trust Our Paper Inc. Case Study
Trust Our Paper Inc. commenced its syndicated mortgage program in 1995. The 
program expanded rapidly, particularly during 1998, to include loans for property 
development in Plainville. The company solicited—in appropriate private 
offerings—funds from the public for investment in specific mortgages, with certain 
representations made about the nature of each loan and the mortgaged property. 
Unbeknownst to the investors, the mortgaged property was not as marketable or 
valuable as had been represented because it did not have the necessary local 
governmental approval for development.
During 1998, the period of its most rapid expansion, Trust Our Paper experienced 
an increasingly severe negative cash flow from operations. This condition persisted 
until March 1999, when Trust Our Paper went into receivership primarily as a 
result of—
1. The apparent inability of the mortgagors (borrowers) to make interest payments.
2. The apparent inability of the mortgagors to pay principal amounts upon 
maturity.
In reality, the face amount of the mortgages were much higher than the underlying 
value of the property secured by the mortgages.
The problems in this case are best illustrated by a transaction that commenced in 
the summer of 1998, when Trust Our Paper purchased land in Plainville at a price 
of $400,000. It planned to build a 300-suite apartment complex on the land. Before
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the closing of the transaction, Trust Our Paper had been unsuccessful in obtaining 
mortgage financing through normal channels because of an inability to get zoning 
approval for its plans. The location of the land and environmental concerns proved 
to be insurmountable obstacles.
Trust Our Paper then provided a loan of $1 million to ABC Developments Ltd., the 
developer of the property, secured by a first mortgage on the property. Funds were 
solicited from the public—in a properly registered offering—for investment in this 
mortgage. Trust Our Paper represented to the investors that it had used the 
mortgage proceeds for interim construction of a 300-unit residential complex.
However, an examination of the mortgage proceeds revealed a different story. Out 
of the proceeds, $400,000 was used to reimburse Trust Our Paper for the cost of the 
property. Thus, the purchase was financed entirely by the investors through their 
loan to Trust Our Paper. Of the remaining funds, $115,000 was disbursed in 
November 1998 to Green Investments Inc., a troubled company with a deficit of 
$296,000. The balance of $485,000 was disbursed in a similar manner.
The underlying security given to the Trust Our Paper investors was highly 
questionable in light of the following:
1. The mortgage for $1 million was on land purchased for $400,000.
2. The mortgage guarantor advised that the property was unsuitable for financing.
3. The property remained undeveloped.
4. The developers were unable to obtain alternate mortgage financing.
5. The mortgage proceeds were not used as purported.
Thus, the proceeds raised from the public offering were diverted from their 
intended use, that is, to develop the property. This diversion diluted the value of 
the security and jeopardized the achievement of the appraised potential that was 
offered as security.
Advance Fee Fraud
Generally, advance fee schemes involve paying bogus corporations an up-front finder’s fee 
in exchange for a promise to receive an advance on a loan. The victims of these kinds of 
schemes can be both individuals and corporations. Often if an individual is seeking loan 
funds but for whatever reason cannot obtain funding from traditional sources, he or she will 
turn in desperation to these fraudsters.
Once the fee is paid, the perpetrator disappears. In some cases, desperate institutions are 
offered access to illegal money, and they typically do not report the loss of the advance fee 
when the deal falls through. General characteristics of these schemes include one or more 
of the following:
• Deals too good to be true often are not true.
• The agent requests documents on bank stationery, or signatures of officers, or both.
• The bank is asked to give nondisclosure agreements to protect the agent or other parties.
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• The agent asks for an irrevocable agreement to pay commissions, expenses, and a fee.
• There are several complex layers of agents, brokers, and other intermediaries.
• The perpetrators often describe the offerings as special one of a kind offers and state that 
the deal will be killed if anyone is contacted to verify the deal.
• The deal often involves foreign agents, banks, and other sources, such as an unnamed 
wealthy person or government.
Debt Consolidation Schemes
People who find themselves hopelessly in debt frequently turn to debt consolidation 
agencies out of desperation. Debt consolidation agencies do not advance loans, but rather 
act as an intermediary between the debtor and creditor. Some are legitimate, but many are 
not. Bona fide debt consolidation agencies make money by organizing the debtor’s affairs 
and collecting a percentage of the money handled on the debtor’s behalf.
In the typical scenario, the debtor contacts the consolidation agency, and provides a 
complete list of their creditors and the amount of monthly payments currently owed. The 
agency then usually writes letters to the creditors, requesting a debt work-out plan 
providing for lower monthly payments spread out over longer periods of time. The 
creditors are often motivated to accept the arrangement provided they think that the entire 
debt, or the major portion of it, will be repaid or that the debt consolidation plan will 
prevent a bankruptcy filing or default by the debtor. The debtor then makes a lump sum 
monthly payment to the consolidation agency, which then distributes the money to the 
creditors.
Unscrupulous debt consolidation schemes are perpetrated when the agency collects money 
from the debtor but does not forward it to the creditor. In some instances, it is months 
before the debtor finds out that the money has been misappropriated. The victim debtor 
has not only lost money to the unscrupulous agency, but still owes the original debt.
Bankruptcy Fraud
Bankruptcy is designed to give every corporation or individual encumbered by mountains 
of debt a fresh start. In a liquidation or Chapter 7 bankruptcy, all assets and liabilities are to 
be listed on the bankruptcy petition and a trustee is appointed by the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Trustee’s Office in the district where the petition was filed. The role of the trustee is to 
liquidate the assets of the estate and distribute the funds to the creditors pursuant to the 
Bankruptcy Code.
Generally there are three common kinds of fraud committed by companies or individuals 
filing for bankruptcy; they are:
1. Fraudulent conveyances. Prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, cash or other assets 
are transferred to friends, relatives or business associates. Once the bankruptcy court has 
discharged the debtor’s debts, these assets are then transferred back to the debtor. This 
kind of transfer is often referred to as parking assets. These prepetition transfers are often 
disguised to appear as bona fide business transactions.
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2. Concealing assets or asset stripping. The debtor could: convert assets to his or her own 
benefit, simply fail to disclose certain assets in the bankruptcy schedules, or deny the 
existence of such assets when meeting with the trustee or at hearings before a 
bankruptcy judge.
3. Planned bankruptcy. The debtor’s affairs are structured in a way that gives the appearance 
of a failing business, but is actually a lucrative business that needs to avoid the 
circumstances of a particular obligation, litigation, or labor dispute. This is often 
accomplished through the use of transfer pricing or management fees from related 
companies, which may or may not be disclosed to the trustee.
Planned Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy can be attributed primarily to one or a combination of the 
following causes:
• Incompetence of management
• Lack of managerial experience
• Neglect
• Severe economic recession or depression (macro or market sector)
• Disaster
• Fraud
Fraud is not the cause of most business failures.
The victims, regardless of the cause of a business failure, are customers and creditors: 
customers who have ordered or paid for goods that are undelivered at the time the business 
goes belly up, and the various creditors of the business that remain unpaid at that time. On 
many occasions the employees are also victimized because they lose their jobs or are 
unable to collect unpaid wages or both.
A business experiencing financial difficulties can pursue several remedies either to rectify 
the situation or to conclude the operation of the business. The owner may cease business 
voluntarily, or an unpaid creditor may precipitate the closing down of the business through 
the initiation of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings.
Ask the following questions when considering whether a bankruptcy was planned:
1. When did the company realize it would fail? A business failure may appear to be the 
result of management incompetence, inexperience and neglect. Notwithstanding the 
reasons for the financial difficulties, it is crucial to establish whether management 
carried on the business after a point in time when they knew, suspected or should have 
known that business failure was imminent. In that case, the fraud occurs when they 
solicit funds from the public, including creditors, in spite of knowing or suspecting that 
the company might be unable to fulfill the representations and commitments made. The 
business, however, may have continued in the honest belief that it would turn around 
(the rainbow syndrome).
Establishing the point in time at which management knew, should have known, or 
suspected that business failure was imminent requires a detailed review and analysis 
of the financial position of the business. Financial statements, accounting records 
and banking records have to be scrutinized. (See Chapter 10 for further information 
on financial statement fraud.) The examination would disclose not only the 
financial position and any deterioration in it, but also the level of management’s
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knowledge about the situation. Correspondence and other documents from customers 
and creditors, expressing concern or demanding delivery or repayment, together with 
viva voce evidence may also be useful.
2. Did the company pursue remedies? In determining whether fraud exists, the forensic 
accountant must consider whether the remedies available to the business in financial 
difficulty, as noted above, were pursued. In addition, the accountant must ask if honest 
attempts were made to resolve the difficulties or merely to give the impending business 
failure the appearance of legitimacy.
3. Has the business committed an act of bankruptcy? Bankruptcy law defines specific 
activities on the part of a debtor as constituting an act of bankruptcy. These activities 
include one or more of the following:
• The transfer of assets to a trustee or other third party for the benefit of creditors
• A payment to one creditor in preference over another
• The fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property
• An attempt by the debtor to abscond without paying debts
• A failure to redeem goods seized under an execution order issued against the debtor
• The presentation at a meeting of creditors of a statement of assets and liabilities 
indicating insolvency, or a written admission of the debtor’s inability to pay his or 
her debts (the filing of a bankruptcy petition), or both
• An attempt to move or hide any of the debtor’s property
• Notice to any creditors that the debtor is suspending payment of his or her debts
• A failure to meet liabilities, generally, as they become due
• Default in a proposal made as part of the bankruptcy proceedings
4. Was the business failure planned? A planned business failure occurs where management 
has converted the assets of the business to its own, that is, personal benefit and then tries 
to conceal the conversion through formal bankruptcy proceedings. In addition, the 
debtor induces vendors to sell goods on credit when the debtor knows that it has neither 
the intent nor the capacity to pay the creditors. Characteristics of a planned failure 
include one or more of the following:
• The business has developed a reputation for trustworthiness in the business 
community. This reputation may have a short history, and may have been 
established for the express purpose of inducing companies to sell goods to the 
business on credit.
• The business sells tangible and highly marketable products.
• The business seeks to sell, or convert the goods to cash as quickly as possible with 
little care about the selling price because they have no intention of paying the 
suppliers for the goods.
• The proceeds from operations are moved out of the business so as not to be 
identified as an asset of the business at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.
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• The business has little net worth.
• The business has not been a financial success.
• The business departs from its normal business practices with regard to purchasing, 
payments to suppliers, sales, and the granting of credit to customers.
The typical changes in business conduct of a planned failure include:
• The volume of inventory ordered from existing suppliers increases significantly. The 
suppliers will probably extend credit up to sixty days, largely as a result of their wish 
to retain the customer and the established reputation of the company.
• The unsuspecting suppliers will receive little or no payment. They may receive 
payment for the initial order but not for subsequent shipments. The scam will 
probably be completed within sixty days of the date of purchase of the inventory. 
After that time, the suppliers are likely to become suspicious and might take action of 
some kind.
• The company will refuse to sell the inventory to its customers on credit; that is, it will 
sell on a cash-on-delivery (COD) or other cash-up-front basis only. To get customers 
to pay cash, the selling price per unit is commonly at or below the company’s cost 
price per unit, as shown on the supplier’s invoice.
• If inventory still remains after the company has approached its usual customers, the 
inventory may then be offered to new customers. These sales tend to be non-arm’s 
length and may be in cash. Although the sales invoices may indicate the payment 
was made in cash, the deposit of the cash into the business’ bank account does not 
necessarily follow.
• If, after all these efforts to sell, inventory is still left at the site, it can be physically 
removed. The trail will be covered to prevent obvious detection.
A planned bankruptcy is designed, of course, to benefit those in control of the debtor 
entity. The fraudster will make every effort to ensure that no trail is left behind to enable 
the trustee in bankruptcy to retrieve the proceeds of the fraud and return those proceeds 
to the creditors. The techniques employed to block the path of the trustee are limited 
only by the perpetrator’s imagination and will vary according to the circumstances.
7.2.4 Arson for Profit
Arson and a planned bankruptcy share some similar characteristics. In both situations, 
business problems exist and are acknowledged to exist by management. Arson, like 
planned bankruptcy, can become the means of a criminal making the best of a bad 
situation. The perpetrator will, of course, seek to commit the crime without leaving a trail of 
criminal conduct.
The following are the chief characteristics of cases of arson:
1. The fire is of an incendiary nature.
2. An insurance policy is in force.
3. There is a financial or other business-related motive.
4. The financial motive may not be readily apparent.
5. Exclusive opportunity to commit arson may or may not be evident.
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6. The prosecution’s case will often be based on circumstantial evidence.
7. Efforts may have been made to destroy some or all of the accounting and business 
records.
Without a confession or an eyewitness, the evidence in a case of arson is almost always 
circumstantial in nature. The prosecutor usually must depend on circumstantial evidence, 
which must be sufficient to rebut every reasonable hypothesis other than a willful and 
intentional burning. However, evidence supporting the incendiary origin of a fire is often 
interwoven with other evidence that tends to connect the accused with the crime. The 
connection to the accused is often the presence of a motive and the opportunity of the 
accused to perform the act.
Historically, insurance companies have been reluctant to challenge the veracity of loss 
claims arising from major fires that have damaged or destroyed commercial, industrial, 
recreational or residential establishments. The reasons given for this reluctance include the 
following:
• Court proceedings are protracted and expensive, and the ultimate decision is often 
favorable to the insured.
• The insurance company (like a bank) is often perceived as the big, bad guy, thus, the 
insured sometimes gets the benefit of reasonable doubt because they are perceived as 
the little guy.
• The punitive damages awarded to a claimant often far exceed the loss claim if the courts 
feel that there has been an unreasonable delay.
• The only evidence is circumstantial.
• The alleged arsonist has been acquitted in a related criminal proceeding.
Accounting Issues and Evidence
The forensic accountant in arson-related matters should differentiate the business position 
of the company and its owners from the financial position. Although the financial position 
may have a considerable bearing on motive, motive is better understood in the context of 
the business itself and the owners, through an overview of all aspects of the operations and 
ownership of the business.
Ultimately, the financial analysis is designed to determine the mindset of the company, the 
money of the company, and the worker in the company. Accordingly, it is usually 
appropriate to obtain as much background information as possible. A starting point may be 
the acquisition of a business or the commencement of a new business venture. A review of 
the annual financial statements and associated working papers will disclose the company’s 
yearly performance and any underlying business problems. Motive not apparent from an 
analysis of the company’s financial transactions may become apparent from an 
investigation of the social relationships found within a business.
Any review of the status of a business must be objective. It should identify not only matters 
that are unfavorable to management and the owners of the company, but also matters that 
are favorable. The unfavorable matters may well be obvious, for example, a steady decline 
in sales, worsening creditor relations, or a significant withdrawal of funds immediately 
before the fire. On the other hand, an owner may have put a substantial amount of his or 
her own money into the business shortly before the fire.
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Accounting evidence is likely to be extremely significant in establishing motive. The fire 
may have destroyed some or all of the accounting and financial records, as well as 
correspondence and file material that could have a bearing on the case. These records will 
have to be reconstructed to the extent possible; thus, third-party documentation will have 
to be obtained and interpreted.
Issues and Sources of Information. A review of several recent judgments shows that the main 
characteristics in an arson investigation to consider, investigate, and establish in evidence 
are as follows:
1. Ownership, including business structure, style, and relationships
2. Financial motive, that is the financial position of the owners and business, and existence 
of an insurance policy
3. Current events at or around the time of the fire, including the establishment of exclusive 
opportunity, and the origin of the fire as incendiary
Information will be sought from people directly and indirectly connected with the business, 
possibly including its bankers, lawyer, accountant, customers, suppliers, insurers, 
government agencies, and realtors.
The owner should always be given the opportunity to volunteer any personal or business 
records that he or she might have.
See below for a list of questions to consider and documents to examine.
Accounting Evidence. Forensic accountants can assist by investigating several issues, in 
particular those involving ownership and financial motive. They can analyze information 
from several sources and construct a chronology of the financial events leading up to the 
fire. They can analyze the financial records of the owner, the business, and third parties, 
and demonstrate the company’s position at the time of the fire, comparing it with earlier 
periods.
The forensic accountant looks for significant detail when attempting to determine whether 
a financial motive exists. If little or nothing is available in the way of accounting books and 
records and supporting documentation, the forensic accountant will pursue other third 
party sources to secure information for the examination.
Obviously, any financial and accounting records of the business that are available will have 
to be examined and analyzed. As previously noted, it is important to provide the owner the 
opportunity to volunteer whatever personal or business records he or she has. Beyond this, 
the forensic accountant will seek information from others directly or indirectly connected 
with the business.
Key questions to consider include the following:
1. What financial condition was the business really in?
2. Who maintained the accounting records?
3. What accounting records would have been available?
4. What is the ownership structure?
5. Is the financial position of the owner solid?
6. What was the business’s cash flow?
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7. Does the business support the owner?
8. Does the owner support the business?
9. Have the essential matters been established?
10. Is the potential defendant cooperative?
11. What is the history and pattern of earnings?
12. Could ownership benefit from selling out to the insurance company?
13. What did the owner know about his financial state at the time of the fire?
14. Did any significant events occur at or around the time of the fire?
15. Who are the major suppliers and what were the business’ relations with them?
16. Who are the major customers and what were the business’ relations with them?
17. Who are the bankers and what were the business’ relations with them?
18. Who is the external auditor?
19. Who is the outside legal counsel?
20. Is the business for sale and are negotiations currently being conducted?
21. Have there been any recent changes in insurance coverage?
Third-party documents to investigate include:
• Government (usually the Secretary of State of the state of incorporation or of a state in 
which the corporation is registered to do business) business registration records
• Recorded documents (for example, for land or other property)
• Work papers and files of accountants, auditors, or both
• Any secured transactions registered under the commercial code of the relevant state
• Tax returns
• Correspondence with customers and suppliers
• Bank credit files
• Credit files from other creditors
• Bank statements, canceled checks, deposit slips, credit memos, and debit memos (paper 
or microfiche records)
• Payroll information
• General ledger records
• Real estate listings
7.2.5 Procurement Fraud
All organizations including manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and retailers, 
as well as private individuals are involved in the procurement process to acquire goods or 
services. For each and every kind of purchased item, ranging from commodities and 
equipment to a professional’s time via a consulting services contract, there is a different 
kind of procurement fraud that can be perpetrated by the provider of the goods or services.
The risks and warning signs associated with each kind of procurement fraud vary 
depending on what is being purchased, and also by the kind and stage of the procurement 
process: Questions to ask when examining procurement fraud include:
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• Is the purchase competitive or noncompetitive?
• What pricing method was used: fixed fee, cost per unit, cost-plus, or a combination 
thereof?
• Did the fraud occur at the requirements definition stage, the bidding and selection stage, 
or the contract performance and evaluation stage?
Some of the more common kinds of procurement fraud include:




• Secret commissions and kickbacks
Bid Rigging or Price Fixing
Bid rigging or price fixing, is the process of setting the price or terms of the contract 
between the various bidders without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser.
For example, bidders on a highway construction project may secretly meet before bids are 
submitted. During their meeting, they decide who will submit the low bid and what the bid 
should be. They may also decide who will bid on what jobs. This is known as bid rotation.
Bid rigging is usually characterized by the lack of independent competitive bids, or by prices 
that are close together. The entity seeking the bids is victimized by having to pay higher 
prices than the amount that would have been charged had there been no collusion.
False Invoices
Invoices submitted by a contractor for goods that have not been delivered, or for services 
that have not been performed are false.
Inflated Costs
Contractors often use a pricing method in which they invoice on a cost-plus basis. That is, 
the contractor receives payment for the actual cost of the job, plus a certain profit based on 
a percentage of the costs. Clearly, the successful bidder has a vested interest in keeping the 
costs high: the higher the cost, the higher the profit.
Typically, in order to obtain inflated profits, contractors falsify the cost of the product or 
service. This can be done through simple or complex means. Examples of the former 
include adding labor charges for nonexistent (ghost) employees or adding charges for 
materials not actually used. In the more sophisticated schemes, the costs are inflated 
through overhead allocations.
Product Substitution
Procurement contracts sometimes call for very exacting specifications on the materials used 
on the job. Contractors frequently believe the contract specifications are too rigid and, 
therefore, feel justified in substituting a less costly product or service, and keeping the 
difference.
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In one scheme, a contractor bid on a new runway for an airport authority and won the bid. 
The contract called for the depth of the concrete covering the runway to be a certain 
minimum. After hearing rumors from competitors that the contractor was pouring less 
concrete than the minimum, the authority’s auditors checked the work orders and 
discovered that the paperwork reflected the concrete depth to hundredths of an inch. The 
auditor reasoned that concrete could not be poured so exactly, checked the actual work, 
and found the depth to be less than the contract specifications. The auditors concluded that 
the contractor was submitting false reports to the airport authority, and was reaping excess 
profit because it was supplying less material than that called for in the contract.
Secret Commissions and Kickbacks
Secret commissions and kickbacks are one of the most common forms of procurement 
fraud, and also one of the most difficult to detect. It involves the receipt of a secret 
payment, usually from one company (the vendor-payer) to a corporate executive (the agent) 
of another company (the procurer): the agent then exercises influence on the decision­
making of his or her employer in a way that favors the vendor-payer. For example, a 
vendor submits false or inflated invoices for payment, which the procurer’s corporate 
executive knowingly approves. This process is often described visually by the triangle of 
dishonesty shown in figure 7-1.
The key point to note is that secret commissions and kickbacks are a kind of fraud that 
generally accompanies other forms of procurement fraud (such as those described in this 
section).
Vendor
Figure 7-1. Triangle of dishonesty
Influence
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7.2.6 Organizational Bribe Giving
The two main kinds of bribes that benefit organizations are:
1. Bribing politicians and giving illegal campaign contributions.
2. Implementing commercial bribery as related to procurement fraud. Also included here 
are bribes for industrial espionage—that is, paying someone to reveal trade and other 
secrets about competitors.
Political Bribery
There are three generally recognized characteristics of political bribe giving:
1. Government benefits are often extremely valuable (or, for penalties and sanctions, very 
costly), but the demand for benefits can exceed the supply.
2. The government is the sole purveyor of the benefits and sanctions; you must do business 
with the government.
3. The bribe is an attempt to both bypass and guarantee the result of the normal processes, 
which are often lengthy, costly, and uncertain in result.
The most common form of political bribe giving is illegal campaign contributions, which 
have made headlines during the Clinton Administration.
Paying foreign politicians and governments was (and perhaps still is) common in order to 
conduct business in many countries. Since the mid-seventies, when the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act was enacted, paying bribes to foreign officials except in cases of national 
security has been unlawful.
Commercial Bribery
Commercial bribery involves making payments in exchange for the award of a contract, for 
industrial espionage, or for both.
In the triangle of dishonesty, a payment from a vendor to an employee would encourage 
the employee to influence the decision regarding the recipient of a lucrative contract.
Several federal and state laws address the practice of commercial bribery. Both the act of 
asking for or the making of a payment constitutes an offense. In some instances commercial 
bribery may also be a violation of the restraint-of-trade laws. For example, certain industries— 
notably the liquor industry—are specifically prohibited from paying for business. Over the 
years, many well-known, major businesses have been guilty of commercial bribery (a listing 
of names would not add learning other than the giants of industry are involved from-time- 
to-time in nefarious activities).
Industrial espionage can involve direct payments to third parties to secure valuable 
competitive information. It can also be accomplished indirectly, for example, through the 
hiring of a competitor’s employees. In one case, several U.S. military procurement agents 
were charged with giving defense contractors information on more than $500 million in 
Navy purchases that were going to be the subject of the competitive bidding process.
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Industrial espionage is a term that is broadly applied to activities whose main purpose is to 
obtain information or related assets from competitors or potential competitors. The classic 
forms of industrial espionage are trade-secret theft and copyright piracy.
Trade Secrets
There are three basic elements to a trade secret: novelty, value, and secrecy. Secrecy, 
concerns whether an organization handled its alleged secret in a protective manner. If a 
judge deems that an organization failed to protect a secret, that organization will not win 
judicial support if it charges an employee with theft of that secret
Patent laws seek a compromise between capitalistic self-interest in a trade secret and social 
well-being by granting a seventeen-year monopoly to developers of innovative ideas. The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in its only ruling on trade secrets (Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 
1974), declared the likelihood “remote indeed” that a company would not patent valuable 
information that it had developed. However, the Court overlooked the advantage, well- 
known to most companies, that trade secrets can be hoarded far beyond the seventeen-year 
patent limitation, a matter well documented by the success and secrecy of the formulas for 
Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken, among others.
Leakage of trade secret information is said to be particularly likely from employees who go 
to work for competitors, careless secretaries, gregarious field sales personnel, and high-tech 
computer whizzes who often are more loyal to their equipment than to their fellow 
employees or employer. Temporary help is regarded as especially vulnerable: these 
employees do not have any company loyalty and can be planted for purposes of trade­
secret theft. Sharing sensitive information among two or more individuals, neither of whom 
knows the full secret, is one way to reduce the possibility of compromising sensitive 
information. Another method can be used to protect mailing lists. By including at least one 
decoy address in a list, if the list is compromised, whoever uses it will be sending material 
to a fictional person at an address that actually is the list-owning company’s mail drop.
A review of court cases on trade-secret theft shows that defendants are typically smaller 
corporations that have hired scientists from larger organizations where they had previously 
worked for six to ten years. There also appears to be an unusual amount of trade-secret 
theft from family-owned businesses. The defendants in these cases claim that because they 
were outsiders, they believed their chances of advancement were hopeless, so they stole the 
proprietary information to benefit (ingratiate themselves with) their new employers.
Copyright Piracy
Copyright piracy is defined as the infringement of another’s copyright or other business 
rights. It is an activity usually undertaken by manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers that do 
not have any legal right to manufacture or copy the product, but who want to earn a quick 
profit (greed motive) or to ease a financial difficulty (need motive).
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Bigtown Video Case Study
From August 1997 to May 1, 1998, John Smith was the owner, principal 
shareholder, director, president, and general manager of Bigtown Video Inc., a 
video store with three retail outlets. During this time Jack Brown was also a 
shareholder and secretary-treasurer of the company.
Bigtown Video’s business included the sale and rental of prerecorded videocassettes 
as well as the sale of blank cassettes. The videotapes sold and rented by Bigtown 
Video fell into two categories: legitimate and “counterfeit.” The legitimate tapes 
were obtained from sources authorized to manufacture and distribute the tapes in 
compliance with all copyright and distribution rights. They were packaged with 
stylized printed jackets showing the nature and content of the particular film. The 
counterfeit tapes had been duplicated from legitimate tapes, many of which had not 
yet been released to the public in videocassette form. The packaging of the 
counterfeit tapes was like that of a blank cassette package with the title of the film 
handwritten on the side panel. The legitimate tapes were displayed in the front of 
the stores. The counterfeit tapes were kept in the back rooms of the stores in a closet 
or in a drawer.
When cross-examined at trial, Mr. Brown testified that he and Mr. Smith had jointly 
decided to deal in counterfeit videocassettes in late 1997. The decision was made as 
a result of customer demands and financial difficulties. Mr. Brown would buy 
counterfeit cassettes from various sources and make duplicates of them. These 
actions were done with Mr. Smith’s knowledge and consent. Mr. Smith rented the 
counterfeit videocassettes at rates of $5 or more and sold them for prices ranging 
from $60 to $100 or more. From January 1998 until May 1998, the gross profit 
made by the company from each of the three stores was approximately $1,500 per 
week, of which about 60 percent was attributed to the distribution of the counterfeit 
videotapes.
In Mr. Smith’s cross-examination, he revealed that he was fully aware of the 
illegitimate origins of the counterfeit videocassettes supplied to him and that neither 
he, his suppliers, nor Bigtown Video had the right to distribute, rent or sell the 
cassettes. Mr. Smith knew that by dealing in these counterfeit tapes he was 
effectively depriving their owners of copyright and distribution revenues, which 
they would otherwise have been likely to earn but for the use of these illegitimate 
tapes: he was prejudicing the economic interests of the real owner. Mr. Smith made 
no attempt to contact the owners of the copyright or distribution rights in order to 
contribute revenues for his counterfeit use, to obtain these rights, and he had no 
intention of so doing.
Bob Green, a vice-president at Star-Studded Studios, testified about the effect of 
pirated videocassettes on the revenues of his company. He focused on four areas of 
impact and said:
1. That the inferior quality of pirated or counterfeit videocassettes tends to provide 
the viewer with a poor opinion of the film and the consequent negative publicity 
is harmful to the theatrical market.
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2. That people who have seen a counterfeit videocassette are unlikely to buy the 
legitimate cassette upon its release.
3. That for extremely high-grossing films, much of the profit arises out of repeated 
viewings of the film by the public. The effect of a counterfeit videocassette in 
such a situation is to diminish the theatrical value of the film by eliminating the 
possessor’s desire to return to the theater.
4. That with respect to distribution in other territories, the markets for legitimate 
cassettes have vanished due to the heavy influx of counterfeit videocassettes in 
those territories. In cross-examination Mr. Green admitted that he could not 
quantify the loss of profit by theatres from counterfeit videocassettes, nor could 
he reliably estimate the extent of loss for a given film or a given year.
7.2.8 Securities Fraud
There are four main kinds of securities fraud that fall within the category of commercial 
crime:
1. Knowingly providing misleading or false information in financial statements of a traded 
business enterprise. (See Chapter 10 for further information on financial statement 
fraud.)
2. Churning: An activity of brokers who buy and sell their clients’ securities for the sole 
purpose of generating commissions.
3. Mixing (commingling) of funds.
4. Manipulating the market for a stock by altering the stock’s price through influencing the 
factors that affect the market price or by controlling the pool of shares available for sale 
or purchase.
Misleading or False Financial Statements
In large companies, upper level management, whose intent is not necessarily to steal, often 
manipulates financial statement information. These managers wish to manipulate data to 
enhance profitability and thereby earn higher bonuses, or to impress the brass at 
headquarters, or to impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to comply with the goals 
imposed by senior management. In small companies, where false financial results can 
create a direct benefit for senior management, the intent of management is often sinister.
Intentionally falsifying financial statements can be accomplished by one of the following 
methods:
1. Misstatement of financial information by arbitrarily raising profits or lowering costs 
using techniques such as plugging sales or ending inventory, incorrectly capitalizing 
current expenses, deferring necessary repairs, falsifying sales invoices, and altering cost 
invoices.
2. Misrepresentation or omission of significant information.
3. Misapplication of accounting principles.
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In the MiniScribe fraud, the company knowingly inflated inventories to deceive the 
auditors as to the value of assets on hand; the primary goal was to maintain and drive the 
share price of the company up in the public market.
In more recent instances, particularly in the high tech environment, channel stuffing (that is, 
just before year end, shipping inventory to distributors and dealers whether or not ordered, 
and booking the shipments as sales) was a popular method used to inflate sales to achieve 
projected and expected revenue goals. In many instances, product recorded as sold was 
returned shortly after year-end.
Heinz Catch-Up Case Study
Heinz has been a household name representing quality food products for more 
than one hundred years. The company had been well managed, profitable and 
socially responsible. But in the late 1970s, it received considerable unfavorable 
publicity for accounting irregularities. Some of its profit-center managers engaged 
in reducing its profits to create a cushion for the next year. The total amount of 
these pseudo-profit reductions was quite small ($8.5 million) when compared to 
overall sales ($2.4 billion). However, annual sales and profits were not what were 
reported to the IRS, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and company 
stockholders.
The disclosure of these irregularities occurred as a result of an antitrust suit brought 
by Heinz against Campbell Soup. In Campbell’s discovery efforts, it snagged 
evidence that Heinz’ advertising agency was billing for services that had not yet 
been rendered. When a Heinz executive was questioned about the matter, he 
pleaded the Fifth Amendment.
The antitrust suit was settled shortly afterwards, but the disclosure caused Heinz 
headquarters’ personnel to launch an investigation into the accounting practices of 
several subsidiaries. Being highly decentralized, headquarters’ personnel claimed 
they were unaware of the lower-level fudging. Headquarters monitored 
performance through budget forecasts of sales and expenses and an incentive 
compensation plan that paid off if high-end profit goals were met. Headquarters 
also monitored consistent growth in profits. Top management was committed to 
that overriding goal and, the company’s earnings did rise consistently: for example, 
1978 marked the fifteenth consecutive year of record profits.
Heinz had an explicit policy that prohibited its divisions from having any form of 
unrecorded assets or false entries in its books and records. And Heinz didn’t 
measure short-term performance alone. The top nineteen executives, including 
division general managers, had long-term incentive plans in addition to the one- 
year plan.
What existed here initially were income transferals aided and abetted by vendors 
who supplied invoices one year for services that were not rendered until the next 
year. When that wasn’t enough, false invoices were submitted one year and then 
reversed in the following year. But the amounts involved did not have a material 
effect on the company’s reported profits.
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Strangely, the problem at Heinz started in 1974 when it appeared that profits in the 
Heinz USA division would exceed those allowed by the wage and price controls in 
effect at the time. World headquarters sought a way to reduce the division’s profit 
Losses in commodity transactions did not reduce profits enough, so the division 
booked $2 million in advertising services. Yet, instead of treating the expense as a 
prepaid item, the company charged the advertising expenses off immediately. 
Despite the lower profits of the division, world headquarters decided that the 
division had achieved its goal and paid the relevant bonuses.
By 1977, the following practices had evolved at the Heinz USA division:
1. Employees delayed year-end shipments until the beginning of the next year to 
ensure accurate invoicing dates.
2. Employees handled customer complaints about the delays by making the 
shipments, but misdating the shipping and invoice documents.
3. Employees did not record credits from vendors until the following year.
4. Income management became a way of life. One employee was given the task of 
maintaining private records to ensure the recovery of amounts paid to vendors 
on improper invoices.
5. The practice of delayed shipment and prepaid billing to assure that departmental 
budgeted amounts were met permeated the division down to the departmental 
level.
6. Ten separate vendors joined in supplying improper invoices.
7. Employees used other questionable tactics to manipulate income including 
inflated accruals, inventory adjustments, commodity transactions and customer 
rebates.
What can be learned from this case? First, exerting pressure for continuous growth 
in profits may foster improper accounting practices, particularly if coupled with an 
incentive compensation plan that rewards and reinforces continuous growth on the 
high side. Second, autonomous units with independent accounting capabilities 
might be tempted, under the above circumstances, to manipulate performance data.
Heinz isn’t the only case in which autonomous accounting or pressure for performance led 
to manipulations of records. There were similar episodes in the 1980s at McCormick and 
Company, J. Walter Thompson, Datapoint Corporation, Saxon Industries, Ronson 
Corporation, Pepsico, AM International, U.S. Surgical, and Stauffer Chemical. More 
recently, companies like Sunbeam and Cendant have been in the news for the same kind of 
earnings manipulation.
Churning
Churning occurs when a broker buys and sells stock for a client to generate fees, rather 
than to protect the best interests of the client. Broker discretionary accounts are especially 
ripe for churning because they can be used to generate fees for both the brokerage firm and 
the broker, without much involvement or control by the actual investor.
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In one case, two sisters gave brokers $500,000 each to be held in discretionary brokerage 
accounts. The brokers executed more than 1,400 stock trades, allegedly earning themselves 
$400,000 in commissions, while leaving the sisters with $70,000.
Mixing of Funds
Another scheme involves mixing (commingling) client funds with the funds of the 
brokerage firm, or broker, or both. In these cases, brokers will use the client’s stock as 
collateral for corporate or personal loans, and post the winning trades to themselves, while 
posting the losses to their clients. Some brokers also resort to out-and-out embezzlement of 
their client’s money and stock.
Manipulating the Stock Market
Stock market manipulation is a crime perpetrated by a promoter who artificially influences 
the market price of shares in a company for self-benefit or for the benefit of his or her 
holding company at the expense of the investing public. In most cases, the promoter flogs 
his or her holdings to the public, the public pays an artificially high price for the stock, and 
the resulting increase in price lines the pockets of the promoter.
Promoters of the stock are usually self-styled financiers who start off owning the majority of 
the stock. Often other conspirators join the promoter, forming a control group consisting of 
financiers, warehousers, or brokerage salespersons, some or all of whom might be acting 
under a corporate umbrella.
To increase the stock’s price, the promoter subjects it to a multipronged attack. The 
promoter uses such weapons as influencing the demand for the stock and controlling the 
supply of the stock, warehousing the stock (parking), paying secret commissions, wash 
trading, and issuing fictitious press releases, all of which are intended to stimulate more 
trading than would otherwise occur.
The victim is the investing public. In many ways this particular fraud is similar to other 
investment scams that rely on telephone solicitations (boiler room operations) and high 
commission rates (which are often secret).
Reasons to Study This Kind of Crime. It has been argued that stock market manipulation is a 
very specialized kind of crime, restricted to the larger financial centers and, therefore, few 
CPAs are likely to come across them. Nevertheless, because of the great increase in stock 
market investments, residents anyplace in the country may become victims of stock market 
manipulation and may look to their CPA for advice. Further, an increasing number of 
CPAs are providing financial planning services, including investment advisory services, to 
their clients. These CPAs must be aware of stock manipulation schemes to protect both 
their clients and themselves.
In addition, stock market manipulation and the modus operandi may resemble other kinds of 
scams in which the price of an investment is influenced by the laws of supply and demand. 
Therefore, CPAs should be aware of this kind of crime. They could be called upon to 
speak to the public about prevention of white-collar crime in general or investment scams 
in particular. Also, they may become an investor in the stock market themselves.
Possible Red Flags. Red flags possibly signaling stock market manipulation, with the possible 
exception of churning and commingling of funds, are not as readily apparent as they are in 
some other kinds of economic crime. Most red flags seem to originate from an informant 
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close to or aware of the control group. In contrast, the regularly required reports investors 
receive should be reviewed on receipt to assure that there are not patent red flags, that is, 
there is no churning or commingling of funds. Of course, if the fraud involves falsifying 
these reports, discovery will probably be delayed until the fraudster is caught, by which 
time, the investor could well be wiped out.
The SEC and stock exchanges usually carry out investigations to detect this type of crime 
and the investigations are mainly analytical. Unusual price increases or large commissions 
earned by salespeople may be investigated, as may press releases or assets reported on 
financial statements.
Price as Determined by the Law of Supply and Demand The law of supply and demand states, 
in essence, that the price of an item will rise when demand for the item exceeds the 
available supply of that item, and the price will fall when supply exceeds demand.
Throughout a stock manipulation, the promoter attempts to control both the supply of, and 
the demand for, a stock in order to move the price higher. As supply is restricted, the price 
increases. As demand is stimulated, the price increases.
A stock market is a composite of the interests of many individuals and corporations 
offering to buy and sell shares. Individuals, however, are influenced not only by 
information (whether accurate or not), but also by motives such as greed or fear and by 
perceptions that may have little to do with facts or reason. Investors are capable of 
changing their investment decisions quickly, purchasing recklessly in a down cycle or 
staying out of the market entirely in anticipation of disappointing financial information. 
The common desire is to make profits and to prefer investments that are perceived as likely 
to produce profits, whether or not these perceptions are based in reality.
Thus, investors will often overreact in seeking to take advantage of price changes or in 
attempting to correct their errors. A single item of speculative news may dramatically 
change the number of people who are willing to purchase, hold or sell a particular 
investment, dramatically changing the demand for the shares. It is important to note that 
large volumes of shares are often exchanged. Accordingly, time is of the essence in keeping 
losses to a minimum and gaining the greatest possible profits. Precisely when a buy or sell 
transaction takes place can make a big difference in the value of the purchase or sale.
Market prices are generally influenced by the release of corporate information, such as 
news about profits, the announcement of a new product line, or the discovery of a new oil 
reserve, as well as by changes in government policy, forecasts, prospectuses, and in general, 
matters that occur in the ordinary daily conduct of a business.
In summary, the investing public, through the medium of publicly held stock, whether 
traded on an exchange, the NASDQ or over the counter, is able to place a value on a share 
and to decide to buy or sell accordingly. As more people seek to buy shares, the price of a 
share will increase if the number of shares for sale on the market remains the same. 
Conversely, the price will fall if an excess supply of shares is available or if the public 
demand for the shares drops.
The Manipulation Process. Generally, a manipulation begins with the promoter falsely 
increasing demand and restricting or controlling the supply. The combined effect of this 
process is an increase in price. After a certain point, called the blow off the promoter 
attempts to increase supply and dampen demand in order to reduce the price, allowing the 
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promoter to repurchase at a profit. Throughout, the promoter must act as a control valve in 
releasing the stock in order to control the market price, and hence the profits.
Manipulation may be motivated not only by a promoter wanting to make more money, 
but also by the desire to make the asset side of an investor’s balance sheet look good or to 
improve the performance of an investment portfolio.
A promoter may use any combination of the following tactics to encourage the public to 
buy stock at higher and higher prices:
• Using buy or sell pressure by stock brokers who may be receiving secret commissions
• Distributing false press releases and rumors
• Releasing false ownership information
• Promoting fictitious or grossly exaggerated profits, assets or future prospects (or any 
combination thereof)
• Warehousing to help restrict the supply of shares
• Using wash trading (that is, trading that results in no change in beneficial ownership) to 
stimulate public interest due to high trading volumes
• Controlling the first or last trade of the day in order to set the highest possible price for 
the stock
• Dumping into foreign markets
Some or all of the activities generally used in the manipulation process are shown in figure
7-2.
Figure 7-2. Activities frequently used in the cycle of manipulating the stock market
Price Increase: Price Decrease:
• Obtaining control  
• Setting up a distribution network
• Warehousing
• Using wash trading




• Issuing bad news releases
• Repurchasing
A promoter who wanted to manipulate the price of a stock might use any combination of 
the activities listed below
7. Obtaining Control. The first step that a promoter usually takes is to gain control over an 
existing company’s shares of stock to ensure that the public’s selling off large quantities 
of the stock does not undermine his control over the supply of shares. Generally, 70-to- 
90 percent of the voting shares that are issued and outstanding must be acquired to 
exert effective control. The promoter can gain the necessary control by using one or a 
combination of the following:
• Buying the shares of an inactive company that is already listed on an exchange 
(commonly known as cleaning up the market). The shares of the promoter’s unlisted
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company (which do not meet the requirements for listing on an exchange) can then 
become listed by merging the corporations and exchanging the unlisted shares for 
shares of the listed company.
• Buying a shell company that may have been inactive for a number of years.
• Underwriting an issue of new shares of a somewhat controlled company. This 
underwriting usually consists of a new issue of shares in an amount that far exceeds 
the original number of outstanding shares. To a promoter, this is the least desirable 
method, as it requires a prospectus, financial reporting, and an insider trading 
report. In addition, the promoter will have to arrange for his friends to purchase the 
new shares and hold them (park them) on his behalf an unequivocally fraudulent 
transaction.
2. Setting up a Distribution Network, A distribution network is set up with the promoter at 
its head. Immediately underneath the promoter are several distributors in cities that 
have stock traders or brokerages. Each of these distributors has access to a brokerage 
house’s salespeople who then have access to the active traders. Via this network, the 
promoter now has control over what happens in the promoted stock’s market. Secret 
commissions are sometimes paid to ensure that the network complies with the 
promoter’s demands.
The traders let the salespeople know when trades are pending and keeps them 
informed as to the price movement of the promoted stock so that the promoter can 
take compensating action. The salesperson’s job is to give the public a sales pitch as to 
why they should buy the stock and, once in, why they should stay in. In addition, the 
salesperson’s activity will affect the daily trading volume. What members of the public 
do not know in this situation is that the shares they are purchasing are those of the 
promoters.
3. Warehousing. Warehousing places shares into the hands of people who are friendly to 
the promoter. This is essential in order to maintain control of the shares and continue 
to restrict and regulate the supply of shares available. This is often accomplished by 
having friends buy new offerings of the stock and continuing to hold these shares until 
the promoter instructs them to sell.
4. Wash Trading. To promote the public’s interest and increase demand for the promoted 
stock, the promoter manipulates the volume of stock traded through wash-trading. 
Essentially, this procedure consists of a stock purchases and sales with no change in 
beneficial ownership. Wash trading can be accomplished through nominee accounts: 
accounts at banks or trust companies set up under the names of trustees, friends, 
aliases, or false company names. The promoter sells a block of shares and at the same 
time a nominee enters a buy order to match the sell transaction. While the stock is 
kept out of the public’s hands, this active, ostensibly normal trading is reflected in the 
volume numbers the public sees. Hence, the market in the manipulated stock appears 
to be an active one in the public’s eyes.
5. Issuing Good News Releases: One or more timely news releases may be issued to promote 
the stock, attracting further public interest. The news releases may include verifiable 
information but may also consist of unsubstantiated rumors, such as:
• Anticipation of good results from drilling tests in resource-based companies
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• Expectations for a likely acquisition of rights to explore property close to existing 
known resources
• Plans for diversification into a glamour industry
Generally the good news may be described as an intangible promise of future results. 
There is nothing of immediate value today. These good news releases are designed to 
stimulate the public interest and encourage them to buy shares, even at a high price.
6. Backdooring: Backdooring occurs when friends operating as a warehouse, which the 
promoter has previously set up, start selling their shares while the price is still 
increasing—contrary to their agreement with the promoter—before getting the word 
from the promoter to sell. The friends are backdooring the promoter, effectively 
double crossing the promoter. In order to sustain public demand, the promoter has to 
buy the backdoor shares at the market price if the existing public demand is not 
sufficient to support these sales.
7. Blowing Off. After the promoter has successfully stimulated demand, members of the 
public buy significant numbers of shares and then wait for the price to continue its 
anticipated rise. The promoter has already picked a tentative price at which he wants 
to dispose of his holdings. He starts selling his shares, as well as those of his nominees 
and friends. In these circumstances, the sale of unusually large amounts of stock is 
referred to as a blow off The public, expecting a continued price rise, buy the 
promoter’s shares over a relatively short period of time.
The price at which the promoter actually begins to blow off his holdings depends 
primarily on how much public demand the distribution network has created and how 
long the demand is sustained. By blowing off, the promoter has withdrawn all active 
support of the stock price. He ceases wash trading, the reported trading volume 
decreases, and the price begins to fall quickly as supply far exceeds demand.
8. Short Selling. Short selling is the act of selling stock that one does not yet own and is a 
legitimate market activity. The seller is gambling that the price will decrease and that 
he or she will be able to buy back the shares at a price lower than the current-selling 
price. In this situation, the promoter can safely sell short, because he or she knows that 
the price will go down. Thus, the promoter realizes a profit both as the price of the 
stock goes up and again as the price goes down.
9. Issuing Bad News Releases: At this point, the promoter often issues a news release about 
the company’s misfortunes. The exact reverse of the good news release, the promoter 
intends the bad news release to drive down the price of the stock rapidly.
10. Repurchasing. The stock price has now reached rock bottom, and the public is willing to 
sell at any price. The promoter often buys back control of the company when the 
shares reach this low price and changes the name of the company in order to start the 
process again. The same company, under a new name, will go through the cycle again 
in a period of one to two years.
Secret Commissions. Secret commissions were previously mentioned in the distribution 
network discussion. Generally, secret commissions or bribes are given to people in the 
securities industry to induce them to push or promote the shares in the promoter’s 
company and to advise the promoter of orders to purchase shares before the orders are 
entered. Secret commissions may also be paid to the wash traders in order to keep their 
support. Generally, secret commissions are paid in one or more of the following ways:
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• By a check drawn on either a personal or a corporate bank account and payable to the 
recipient, to cash, or to a third party. If the check is paid to a third party, it will be 
endorsed by the named third party and cashed, with the cash being passed on to the 
true recipient of the secret commission.
• By a free delivery to the recipient of stock in signed-off or street certificate form, which 
can then be sold by the recipient on the market.
• By the issuance to the recipient of call options on the stock at a fixed price below the 
current market price.
• By selling a block of stock to a salesperson or another recipient at a fixed price and 
allowing that buyer to sell that block back at a higher price.
The Significance of Accounting Evidence. Accounting evidence is generally very significant in 
the prosecution of stock market manipulation cases because—
• The accountant can perform an analysis to determine whether change in beneficial 
ownership occurred (a wash trading analysis).
• Accounting evidence may be instrumental in identifying payments or receipts of secret 
commissions, if any.
• Accounting evidence can be used to establish the percentage of the public’s 
participation in buying and selling shares when compared to the total transactions in the 
stock by the control group.
• Accounting evidence may assist in establishing that the perpetrators have benefited 
from the sale of the stock.
However, accounting evidence may not be as significant as viva voce evidence in initially 
identifying the control group, establishing the secret commission structure, and identifying 
who was paying and receiving these commissions.
Possible Preventive Measures. Perhaps the most significant stock manipulation preventive 
measure is to make the investing public aware that a salesperson’s pitch will be persuasive, 
will play on the investor’s greed, and will convey a sense of urgency. The following are 
questions that an investor should ask a salesperson to answer on the record concerning the 
specific representations being made about the investment. The answers given should help 
in identifying poor or fraudulent investments.
1. How risky is this stock?
2. What direct costs are paid out of the investors’ funds, such as for commissions, or 
advertising, or both?
3. Can I get written documents (the prospectus at a minimum), and can you mail them to 
me?
4. What is the specific destination (that is, bank account, brokerage account) of my funds?
5. How can I sell the stock if I choose to do so, and how long will it take to dispose of the 
investment?
6. What are the names of the principal owners and officers of the salesperson’s firm, and 
what are the names of the owners and officers of the company in which the investment 
is being made?
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Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. Case Study
In early 1998, Jack Smith started to promote a company called Acme Mines Co., a 
shell company listed on the Westville Stock Exchange. Smith had effective control 
of the outstanding shares. In order to promote public interest and buying, Smith 
made announcements—through investor bulletins and statutory statements to 
regulatory bodies—to the effect that Acme was about to diversify into the movie 
production business and other ventures. The announcement touted:
• An investment of $175,000 in the production of a movie, which would return 25 
percent of the profits to Acme
• A purchase yielding 58 percent control of a movie theater business called 
Everytown Theaters Ltd.
• An acquisition of distribution rights to Krazy Kandy, a confection that would be 
sold from automatic vending machines across the country
On February 4, 1998, Smith changed the name of the company from Acme Mines 
Co. to Gonna Put You in the Movies Corp. (GPY-Movies) to reflect its new 
objectives.
Smith’s next step was to stimulate trading activity in GPY-Movies’ stock on the 
Westville Stock Exchange. To accomplish this, offices were maintained in Bigtown 
and Westville and were operated by Mike Jones, a securities desk-trader, and the 
controller, Dave Brown. Their objectives appear to have been to maintain the 
market with effective control, match orders to create activity (wash trading), and 
systematically sell off the stock for profit.
Smith would tell Jones when to buy or sell. Jones would follow through via a series 
of controlled nominee accounts. Brown’s job was to keep track of all the accounts, 
meet corporate requirements, and generally manage the money and the office in 
Bigtown. The nominee accounts were all in corporate names and could be traded 
by Mr. Smith, Mr. Jones or Mr. Brown.
The office in Bigtown was in the name of Anyco Investment Corp. The accounts at 
brokerage firms in both Westville and Bigtown were in the following names:
1. Metro Trading Associates.
2. Oakville Investments Co.
3. Pineville Trading Ltd.
4. Anyco Investment Corp.
At this time Smith was either an officer or director of each company and effectively 
controlled them. Stock positions in GPY-Movies were established through 
numerous Bigtown and Westville brokerage firms.
The eventual objective was to sell off or distribute the stock for a profit without 
causing an obvious decrease in the market price. To achieve this goal, Smith hired 
Robert Green who started to work out of the Bigtown Office around April 2, 1998. 
Smith instructed Green to sell stock through the accounts of Anyco and Metro
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Trading and to limit the price to $1.26 until an underwriting was effected, which 
was to occur on April 18, 1998.
Green’s procedure was to prearrange all the buy orders so that they could be 
matched with any one of Smith’s selling accounts. Whenever Green learned of a 
buy order, he would notify Jones of its size, price and the name of the brokerage 
firm. This meant that Green had to be in contact with sales reps or their distributors 
who would notify him of forthcoming buy orders. In order to secure their 
cooperation, Smith specifically authorized Green to pay sales reps a 15 percent 
commission over and above the amount sales reps would normally receive. In 
addition, Green, with the assistance of Smith and Brown, arranged for Wally 
Chang, a brokerage house manager, to use his sales force to distribute 300,000 
shares of GPY-Movies throughout the United States for a 12½ percent commission.
On occasion, Smith arranged to provide cash to Green in order to make payments 
to sales reps. Brown made the checks payable to cash and drew them on one of the 
companies’ accounts. Green made his own arrangements as to where and when to 
pay the sales reps.
Smith convinced two sales reps, Black and White, to set up an account in their firm. 
Whenever Black and White were able to persuade one of their clients to buy GPY- 
Movies shares, the offset would come out of Smith’s account in the name of Metro 
Trading. In this way, Smith was able to sell off his position and pay Black and 
White with shares that they in turn sold through nominee accounts. Paul Wilson, an 
analyst, provided Smith with inside information on who was bidding or offering, as 
he was indebted to Smith for a substantial loan.
Thus, Smith and Jones, in an effort to generate personal gain, created a misleading 
appearance of active public trading in shares of GPY-Movies, both by wash trading 
and by the use of secret commissions. The result was a loss to the investing public.
7.2.9 Environmental Abuse
Generally there are two main kinds of environmental abuse that a company can commit:
1. Pollution
2. Misuse of natural resources
Pollution
While a certain level of pollution is tolerated by today’s society, media attention has 
recently focused on companies that have gone too far. Society is, as a whole, becoming less 
tolerant of all forms of pollution, and this is reflected all the way down to the consumer— 
for instance, aerosol spray cans and cigarette smoking in restaurants are no longer tolerated 
in many jurisdictions. Laws have been passed to limit the levels of pollution, but not all 
companies comply with the laws, usually because of the added costs incurred.
Amount of Pollution. The amount of pollution and how it is determined depend on the 
nature and source of the pollution. For example, a perpetrator may have dumped garbage 
at an authorized site but in quantities greater than the dumping license permits. Or, a
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perpetrator may have dumped garbage at an unauthorized site. Or, a perpetrator may have 
polluted the environment in some other way, for example, dumping toxic substances into a 
river, or exceeding the specified limits of emission of certain substances into the 
atmosphere.
Regardless of the nature and source of the pollution, the alleged offender’s accounting and 
administrative records are likely to yield pertinent information about the physical / 
quantities of substances that are themselves pollutants or that result in pollution. Financial 
records can also provide useful evidence as to the alleged offender’s knowledge and intent. 
For example, an accounts receivable listing would reveal the names of the company’s 
customers, but additional documents would be needed to assess the extent of the polluting 
activities. These documents might include invoices, bills of lading, weigh tickets, contracts, 
production reports, and so on.
Depending on the nature of the abuse, the financial records may help to put a dollar value 
on the cost of the damage done. For example, if you can establish that a company dumped 
in excess of the 5,000-ton-garbage limit permitted by its license, the courts can calculate the 
cost of the excess from the company’s accounting records. This cost provides the judiciary 
with a yardstick against which to determine damages.
Dumping Unlimited Case Study
Dumping Unlimited was a carting company that had a license to dump waste 
material at a landfill site near Anytown. The company’s license permitted dumping 
a maximum of 150 tons of material per day at the landfill.
Dumping Unlimited maintained a fleet of garbage trucks, which dumped the 
company’s waste at the landfill site, and they also accepted waste material from 
other haulers on a daily basis.
Based on an analysis of weigh tickets, it was clear that the company was dumping 
quantities in excess of the permitted amount To determine the value of these 
quantities, the excess tonnage was priced at the highest and the lowest price 
charged by the company, giving a range of values attributable to this offence.
Financial Capacity. Companies that are fined for noncompliance with antipollution laws 
often claim that they cannot afford either the costs of compliance at the time when the 
pollution was generated or the costs associated with cleaning up the after effects of the 
pollution.
Both of these issues are best examined by a CPA and involve examining financial 
statements and budgets.
There are relationships between various components in the financial statements, which 
help to identify historical issues relating to both profitability and viability. A review of the 
financial statements for a number of accounting periods will be helpful in determining
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trends that would enable a CPA to compare the company’s financial results with the costs
required to comply with antipollution laws.
In order to assess whether a company can afford the costs of cleanup (particularly when 
that company claims it cannot), a CPA would need a crystal ball. In the absence of a crystal 
ball, the CPA should examine the company’s budgets.
Management predicts the future by way of the budgeting process. Most enterprises that 
take the time to prepare budgets use them as tools for making financial and operating 
decisions. The range of budgets include operating budgets, capital budgets and cash flow 
budgets. A comprehensive operating and cash flow budget enables management to plan 
future operations and to decide how the company will pay for them. Access to past 
budgets, together with the corresponding historical results, allows the forensic accountant to 
interpret the proficiency of the company’s budgeting process and to determine whether a 
company can or cannot afford the cleanup costs.
Mine Cleanup Case Study
In the 1990s the federal government filed suit against Mine Cleanup, a uranium 
mining company, for failure to clean up a former site. The mining company 
claimed it would be put out of business if it was required to pay the $30 million 
required to clean up the site. Mine Cleanup management was attempting to set 
aside the clean-up order.
A thorough review of the company’s financial statements, operating budgets, long 
term forecasts, and cash flow budgets revealed that the company was unable to pay 
the costs in the short term, but that it was possible for the company to comply with 
the cleanup order over an extended period. A negotiated agreement was reached 
between the federal government and the company wherein the government 
essentially provided the long-term financing for the cleanup so that the cleanup 
operations could commence immediately.
Natural Resource Abuse
Laws with respect to natural resource abuse (over-fishing, hunting, logging, mining, and so 
on, as well as neglecting the endangered-species legislation) vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction and generally apply to both noncommercial and commercial harvesting of 
animals, marine life, and endangered species. Accounting evidence has little relevance to 
noncommercial activities; thus the focus in this section is primarily on commercial activities 
involving the following three areas:
1. Fur trapping and fur dealers
2. Commercial fishing
3. Endangered species
Note that companies that are involved in these commercial activities need to be aware that 
conservation officers appear to have a much broader right of access to business premises 
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than that available to law enforcement officers. Generally, the legislation allows the officers 
to search any aircraft, vehicle, vessel, camp, or office, without the requirement of a search 
warrant, if they believe that any fish or game has been killed or taken in contravention of 
the applicable state laws.
Fur Trapping and Fur Dealers. Fur trappers must be licensed to practice their trade in each 
state in which they operate. They are assigned maximum quotas for different kinds of wild 
life. They are generally required to have each pelt examined and registered, at which time 
a stamp is affixed to the inside of the pelt. The trapper is not required to submit written 
reports to the state; the next level in the distribution system does that.
The fur dealer obtains a license to purchase, receive, sell, or otherwise dispose of fur pelts. 
With a few limited exceptions (domestic animals, road kill, and so on) the fur dealer must 
ensure that the pelts being purchased have been examined and suitably stamped. Monthly 
reports are generally required from the fur dealer specifying:
1. The pelts purchased or received, including the name of the trapper or hunter from 
whom the fur dealer purchased or received the furs; the date on which such pelts were 
obtained; and the number and the kinds of animals, for example, beaver, mink, lynx, 
and otter.
2. The pelts sold or disposed of, including who the pelts were sold to by name, address, 
and license number; the date on which the pelts were sold, tanned or disposed of; and 
the number and kinds of animals.
The most common form of abuse is the handling of unauthorized pelts, which are 
purchased from a trapper or hunter, that are typically excluded from both of the monthly 
fur dealers’ reports—that is, they are excluded from the report of pelts purchased, and from 
the report of pelts sold. These pelts typically bear no authorized stamp. The transactions 
often involve some financial consideration to the purchaser, for example, lower prices or 
secret commissions, which could be ascertained upon a review of the fur dealer’s books and 
records. The unauthorized pelts are typically disposed of by being included in bundles of 
authorized fur pelts submitted to a fur auction outlet, or by being directly supplied to a 
tanning operation owned by the fur dealer.
Commercial Fishing. Commercial fishermen are generally licensed to work in designated 
regions within the United States and its waters, and are assigned maximum quotas by fish 
species and poundage. These fishermen are generally required to submit a monthly report 
that accumulates information on the port where the fish were landed, the weight of the 
catch by species, and the average price of fish sold.
Unlike the fur dealer, the commercial fisherman is not required to submit a report stating 
to whom the fish were sold.
The most common form of abuse involves the fisherman exceeding his quotas and failing 
to report the excesses in his monthly reporting. A review of the cash receipts, 
disbursements, and sales journals of the commercial fisherman should detect the abuse 
even though many purchases and sales are cash transactions that take place off the 
company’s books. Because the reporting required is done by weight rather than by supplier 
or number of fish, it is necessary to reconcile the weight of fish caught to the weight of fish 
purchased by customers after allowing for wastage.
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Endangered Species. In most jurisdictions, endangered species of fauna and flora are
protected by laws that prohibit the killing, injuring, interfering with, taking, or attempting
to do any of the above to any of the identified species of fauna or flora or their natural
habitats.
Currently one of the major abuses is the exporting of certain endangered species of wild 
birds, particularly falcons, to other countries at an exorbitant profit to the perpetrators.
7.2.10 Economic Extortion
Economic extortion is a crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through 
intimidation or persistent demands.
Some of the forms of crime described in this section of the Handbook could involve an 
element of economic extortion. For instance, bribes could be required in order to obtain a 
lucrative contract; an owner of a company could be squeezed out by one or more of its 
creditors for reasons other than insolvency; an employee could be forced to divulge an 
employer’s trade secrets; or a company could be forced to pay a contractor to keep quiet 
about its environmental pollution problem. The common element in each of these 
situations is that the likely outcome of noncompliance with the extortionist’s demands is 
perceived to be worse than the actual outcome of compliance.
Often, an extortionist’s methods involve threats of physical violence, public disclosure of 
something that the victim would rather keep private, or financial ruin.
A Piece of the Action (Sport Megaplace) Case Study
In early 1994, Sport Megaplace was established as a state-approved organization to 
control the sale of lottery tickets in Megaplace and to apply the net proceeds from 
these sales to the development of amateur sports within Megaplace.
At that time the sale of lottery tickets included the sale of Tinylotto tickets, which 
was under the control of Mr. Johnson, and the sale of Biglotto tickets, which was 
under the control of Mr. Williams. These men were responsible for dividing 
Megaplace into wholesale distributorships so that both kinds of tickets could be 
sold regularly through wholesalers to retailers and then to the public.
However, Johnson and Williams only allowed others to obtain wholesale 
distributorships if they secretly agreed to pay 50 percent of the future profits to a 
holding company under the control of Johnson and Williams. The silent-ownership 
payments were structured as payments for management, consulting services and for 
office space.
The new distributors were led to believe that this arrangement was legitimate by the 
existence of a wholesale distributor agreement with Johnson and Williams’ 
company, a reporting letter from a lawyer’s office, a declaration of trust agreement, 
a power of attorney agreement, working papers from an accountant, banking 
resolutions and signature cards.
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7.2.11 Customs Duty Fraud
Although customs laws vary from nation to nation, there are common threads and patterns 
of fraud that are inherent in transborder transactions. The following material describes 
typical customs fraud scenarios in Anyland.
The Customs Act applies to goods imported into Anyland. The Act categorizes imported 
goods by tariff schedules and prescribes rates of duty applicable to each item depending on 
its nature, the country of origin, and international treaty arrangements.
The duty payable to Anyland’s Customs Service is a percentage (the duty rate) of the 
imported item’s Value for Duty. Prior to January 1, 1998, the Customs Act based its 
determination of the Value for Duty amount on the fair market value of the goods at the 
time of export in the exporting country. In practice, this fair market value was usually the 
amount indicated on the commercial invoice. Customs officers did, however, have the 
option of disregarding the commercial invoice amount and determining a fair market value 
to be used for Value for Duty purposes using other information sources.
This fair market value determination for applying duty rates to imported goods did not 
comply with international trade agreements to which Anyland was a party. Thus, effective 
January 1, 1998, a revised procedure for determining the Value for Duty amount was 
introduced. The new basis, called the Transaction Value Method, specified the Value for 
Duty amount to be the price paid or payable to the exporter where the exporter and 
importer are dealing at arm’s length. For imports between related parties, the onus is on the 
importer to prove that there was no influence on the commercial invoice price. In these 
situations, Value for Duty is determined on the following sequential bases:
1. Transaction value of identical goods
2. Transaction value of similar goods
3. Deductive value based on a gross profit reduction of the importer’s selling price
4. Computed value
The abuse generally arises when the importer causes the Value for Duty of the imported 
product to be falsely understated, thereby reducing the amount of customs duty paid.
Importers abusing the customs regulations may vary in size of operation, ranging from 
small sole proprietors to large national distributors. The benefits from understating Value 
for Duty amounts can be enormous. In one case, the fine paid totaled $25,000,000, arising 
from a conviction of evading customs duties over a fifteen-year period. There was also a 
civil court claim for $105.2 million against the same company for unpaid duties on goods 
imported over a period of years. Even on a small scale, with duty rates ranging up to 30 
percent or more, understating the Value for Duty amount may provide the importer with a 
10-to-15 percent cost saving and a trade advantage over its competitors.
Because the Value for Duty amount generally is supported by both a commercial invoice 
and customs invoice prepared by the exporter, the duty and sales calculations rely on the 
integrity of the exporter’s documentation. Many customs investigations have determined 
that the documents prepared by exporters understate the actual value at which the goods 
were sold.
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Current customs practices continue to be conducive to fraud. Importers of legally
importable goods are aware of the enormous volume of imports, the emphasis placed on
illegal drug shipments, the shortage of customs officers, and the officers’ inability to fully
inspect all entries that provide a perceived window of opportunity to perpetrate fraud.
Investigation Issues
Red Flags. Customs investigations have uncovered various schemes to falsely reduce 
collectible duties. The presence of one or more of the following red flags may assist in 
identifying a customs under valuation.
7. Apparent excess insurance: Insurance coverage for the in-transit goods substantially exceeds 
the declared Value for Duty of the same goods.
2. Competitor’s complaints: Competitor’s complaints to customs or any other agency 
governing fair trade that it cannot match the importer’s wholesale or retail prices.
3. Poor quality documents: The integrity of the exporter’s documents may be suspect if any 
invoice is: printed on tissue paper, hand typed, not preprinted, or not prenumbered.
4. Letters of credit or bank drafts: Payments for the imported goods exceed the declared 
Value for Duty amount.
5. Presence of blank invoices: If Anyland customs invoices or export declarations, or the 
exporter’s supplier invoices are known to exist at the importer’s place of business and 
are found to be blank except for the exporter’s authorization signature, the importer 
may be preparing such forms for presentation to Anyland’s customs.
6. Related exporter. The importer and exporter are related parties and, therefore, do not 
deal at arm’s length; there could be price collusion.
7. A and B Commercial Invoices: Total costs for the imported goods may be apportioned 
between two separate invoices (often having consecutive invoice numbers, or having the 
same invoice number with A and B suffixes), only one of which is submitted to customs 
for purpose of Value for Duty determination.
8. Unreasonably high values allocated to nondutiable export costs: The dutiable cost of product is 
artificially understated and the nondutiable cost of freight, for example, is overstated on 
the commercial and Anyland customs invoices.
Significance of the Accounting Evidence. After performing an overview, the forensic accountant 
can provide details for each entry and a summary schedule for all entries. This schedule 
quantifies the apparent Value for Dufy shortage and calculates the apparent duty shortages, 
thereby determining the amount withheld.
In preparing this quantification, the forensic accountant assumes that documentation other 
than that used in the customs declaration in fact provides the true Value for Dufy. The 
forensic accountant may need to obtain expert-witness evidence to substantiate this basis 
for valuation—perhaps a specialist from the Customs Service or from a lawyer.
In addition, in reviewing the importer’s accounting books and records, the forensic 
accountant may be able to provide further support for the alleged undervaluation and may 
be helpful in refuting possible defense claims.
Testimony: Viva Voce Evidence. The forensic accountant may seek evidence from various 
other sources. Employees of the importer may be interviewed to provide evidence as to the
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inner workings of the importer and to settle issues of ownership or control of the importing
company. A customs’ broker may provide testimony that, if presented with the documents
on which the forensic accountant’s calculations were based, a higher Value for Duty would
have been declared.
7.2.12 Health Care Fraud
There are a wide variety of health care frauds that have recently been the subject of media 
attention. Many such cases are outside the scope of this section—that is, they relate to fraud 
committed by individuals rather than by corporations. Health care fraud committed by 
corporations typically involves one of the following:
1. Violations of occupational health and safety laws (OSHA).
2. Marketing of drugs that have not been adequately tested or for which the test results 
have been falsified.
7.2.13 Possession of Property Obtained by Crime
This offence refers to either the actual possession of property obtained by a crime, or to the 
possession of proceeds from the disposal of property obtained by a crime.
When a business is suspected to be in possession of stolen inventory, an examination of the 
financial records should be able to establish whether this inventory had been legitimately 
purchased.
A reconciliation of the inventory purchased and sold needs to be performed and compared 
to the inventory on hand at both the beginning and end of the period in question: the end 
date is usually set shortly after the date that the stolen inventory was allegedly obtained. 
The purchases and sales should be ascertained from the company’s purchases and sales 
records, and also from updated accounts payable and accounts receivable listings. If there 
is a positive variance, it could result from an accounting discrepancy, which would need to 
be examined further, or it could result from the possession of property obtained by crime.
If the purchases, on the accounting records, appear to be legitimate, then the integrity of 
the supplier invoices must be assessed. Often, stolen inventory can be made to appear 
legitimate through overstatements on supplier invoices.
Don’t Fence Me In Case Study
Acme Industries was acting as a fence for stolen car parts. These parts were stolen 
by third parties and were sold by Acme to authorized car dealerships at prices 
considerably lower than normal wholesale prices. When Acme’s premises were 
searched on December 8, 1998, parts valued at approximately $667,900 were 
seized.
Forensic accountants were retained to determine, by means of the available books 
of account and supporting documents, whether these parts were purchased legally 
or otherwise. Here are the steps followed to make the requested determination.
46
Chapter Seven: Commercial Crime
1. The accountant began by performing a period examination. The disbursement 
journal disclosed that a payment had been made to a firm of CPAs for services 
rendered to Acme. An interview with this firm revealed the existence of a draft 
set of financial statements for Acme, dated February 28, 1998. These financial 
statements, which were never issued in final form, disclosed inventory valued at 
$16,500, with a note stating, “no physical inventory taken; inventory estimated 
for accounts.” The draft financial statements established the opening date of the 
time period. The closing date was determined by the date of search and seizure, 
December 8, 1998. The period March 1, 1998, to December 8, 1998, was, 
therefore, the period examined.
2. The accountant then updated the financial records of Acme to the date of search 
and seizure. This step disclosed purchases from various suppliers totaling 
$886,167. A similar updating of the sales of Acme resulted in a sales figure of 
$1,007,815.
3. To calculate the book value of inventory, the accountant created a schedule, 
identified as Apparent Inventory of Acme as of December 8, 1998. It set out the total 
value of the goods available for sale of $902,667 (opening inventory of $16,500 
plus the purchases made, during the period, of $886,167).
The schedule set out the updated sales figure and a gross profit margin (sales 
minus cost of sales divided by sales) ranging from 10-to-30 percent. By 
deducting the gross profit margin, an apparent cost of goods sold was calculated, 
ranging from a high of $907,000 at the 10 percent level to a low of $705,470 at 
the 30 percent level. A comparison of the apparent cost of goods sold to the 
value of goods available for sale showed that there should have been no 
inventory as of December 8, 1998 at a 10 percent gross margin. At a 30 percent 
gross margin, the value of inventory at December 8 would have been $197,197.
4. To perform a valuation of the parts seized, the accountant compared the goods 
seized to the inventory on hand calculated at the 10 percent gross margin level, 
indicating an excess quantity of physical parts on hand of approximately 
$672,200. When a gross profit margin of 30 percent was applied, the excess on 
hand was approximately $470,000. Based on the above procedures, Acme had 
in its possession an excess quantity of parts ranging in value from $470,000 to 
$672,200.
Interviews with three suppliers indicated that the invoices used in the calculation of 
purchases between March 1 and December 8, 1998 had been inflated or padded so 
that the invoiced value of goods purchased by Acme was greater than the actual 
value of the goods received. The padded portion of the payments Acme made to its 
suppliers were paid to the wife of Acme’s owner in cash.
Padding the supplier’s invoices made the stolen goods on hand harder to detect or 
easier to explain away, or both. The inflated purchase prices also allowed cash to be 
removed from Acme, tax free, under the guise of an expense. The payments to 
suppliers were converted into cash with the excess (padded) portion of the invoiced 
price being returned to the owner’s wife as cash.
This disclosure made it necessary to revise the calculated value of inventory as of 
December 8, 1998, to reflect the alleged nonpurchases in Acme’s dealings with the 
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three suppliers who were padding their invoices. These alleged nonpurchases 
totaled some $263,000, thereby increasing the value of the excess quantity of parts 
in the possession of Acme to a figure between $735,000 and $935,000. These 
findings not only placed the onus on the owner of Acme to explain the source of 
the excess quantity of parts seized but also disclosed the existence of a fraudulent 
scheme involving the three suppliers.
7.2.14 Coupon Redemption Fraud
Coupon redemption fraud involves the fraudulent collection and conversion of coupons 
designed to promote various kinds of merchandise. For example, a newspaper coupon for a 
box of cereal may require the purchaser to present it at a supermarket to receive twenty- 
five cents off the purchase price of the cereal. Normally, the manufacturer reimburses the 
supermarket for the discount it paid plus a token fee, perhaps several cents, to cover the 
cost of processing the coupon and returning it to the manufacturer.
Unscrupulous grocery and supermarket owners will collect coupons, in some cases from an 
intermediary, and redeem them as though merchandise has been purchased from them, 
when in fact, it has not been. Although the individual amounts can be small, the volume in 
most consumables can make it profitable for stores to engage in these schemes.
7.3 Prevention of Commercial Crime
Four forces can operate to reduce commercial crime:
1. Increased awareness—that is, decreasing the likelihood that a victim will be “taken.”
2. Formal deterrence—that is, the fear of formal, officially imposed sanctions (conviction 
and punishment by the government).
3. Informal deterrence—that is, the fear of informally imposed sanctions, such as the loss 
of respectability or a career.
4. Ethics—that is, the internalization of values that discourage violations of legal codes.
7. 3.1 Increased Awareness
Increased awareness is achieved through education and by experience. However, 
experience can be a costly way to increase awareness. With increased awareness, the 
investor, customer, competitor, and general public are more likely to closely scrutinize a 
situation and ask questions that would raise alarm bells and prevent them from suffering a 
loss. For instance:
• Investors should be wary of schemes pitching high rates of return in a short time.
• Investors also should be wary of schemes with foreign intrigue.
• Investors should thoroughly examine franchise opportunities before any funds are 
invested. Brochures and marketing pitches should be viewed with skepticism, 
particularly in the case of new or unconventional franchisers. Detailed financial 
information, including costs and profit margins of the franchiser for any goods and
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services they are contracting to provide, should be reviewed to determine the motives of
the franchiser.
• Investors should ask stock promoters a series of questions about the stock the promoter 
is pushing to determine the extent to which that promoter is tied to the stock.
7.3 2  Formal Deterrence
A crime control strategy has little chance of success unless offenders are punished. 
However, formal levels of current enforcement are, by all measures, extremely low. One 
novel approach is enforced self-regulation. Under this idea, the government would compel 
each company to write unique rules for itself or its employees. A governmental agency 
would monitor compliance. Two examples of successes in the noncriminal area are the 
Federal Aviation Administration, which monitors self-regulation for the U.S. airline 
industry, and the Federal Trade Commission, which monitors rules that the U.S. 
advertising industry has largely set for itself.
However, there are problems with self-regulation, and the industries that attempt to 
regulate themselves have spotty records at best. In one study of the 320,000 physicians in 
the United States, an average of only seventy-two medical licenses per year were revoked.
It may be that increased enforcement can only come at the expense of a complete and total 
revision of the criminal justice system. Many commercial criminals have little fear of 
detection because of the constant barrage of information that demonstrates the police and 
courts simply cannot keep up with the pace of criminal offenses. Until potential offenders 
have the perception that they will be caught and punished, we should not expect a reversal 
of this crime trend.
However, many researchers believe there are better deterrents to commercial crime than 




The following remedial steps could be adopted to deal with commercial crime:
1. Strengthen consent agreements and decrees (under which companies do not admit that 
what they were doing was wrong, but agree to stop doing it) to provide substantial 
remedies for violations of the agreement and to include systematic follow-ups.
2. Increase fine ceilings, assessing fines according to the nature of the violation and in 
proportion to the company’s annual sales.
3. Enact stiff criminal penalties for violations of health and safety or environmental 
regulations that recklessly endanger the public or employees.
4. Introduce stronger statutes to prohibit companies that previously had violated federal 
laws from receiving federal contracts.
5. Promote mandatory publicity for corporate civil and criminal violations.
6. Increase more extensive use of imprisonment with longer sentences. Replace 
community service with incarceration, except for unusual circumstances.
7. Prevent convicted corporate offenders from being indemnified by their companies.
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8. Prohibit for three years management officials convicted of criminally violating 
corporate responsibilities from assuming similar management positions in their 
company or others.
9. Make directors liable, but not criminally, for being derelict in their duty to prevent 
illegal corporate actions.
10. Enact a new commercial bribery statute to help prosecute corporate executives who 
receive kickbacks from their customers or suppliers.
7.3.3 Informal Deterrence
Most commercial criminals, compared to more traditional offenders, perceive the informal 
sanctions of the loss of career and prestige to be a greater deterrent. They are, therefore, 
theoretically more deterred from misbehaving by those consequences than by 
incarceration.
For example, a bank president, who was told he was about to be indicted, spent most of his 
time asking whether the charges were going to be made public. When told that indeed the 
charges would be public, the banker, promptly committed suicide.
Informal sanctions often exist without formal sanctions. The imposition of formal sanctions, 
however, will usually lead to additional informal sanctions.
7.3.4 Ethics
Behaviorists generally conclude that one of the single most important factors influencing 
group behavior is the attitude of management, who—in many reported instances—have 
been claimed by employees to have exerted pressure on them to engage in unethical 
behavior.
One prime example is the famous Equity Funding Case, which occurred in the early 1970s. 
It was uncovered when a disgruntled former employee went to the authorities. For nearly 
ten years, the Equity Funding Corporation falsified more than 56,000 life insurance policies 
and overstated their assets by $120 million. It was estimated that fifty to 75 employees, who 
managed to keep the scheme a secret for several years, were involved. The trustee 
appointed to sort out the massive fraud, Robert Loeffler, said, “Of almost equal importance 
was the surprising ability of the originators of the fraud to recruit new participants over the 
years.”
Teaching people that certain behaviors are illegal and therefore inappropriate is 
uncomplicated and extremely effective in reducing crime. Moral education that 
discourages illegal behavior, from the top to the bottom of an organization, must be 
continuous. Simply put, people must be informed as to what behavior is acceptable and 
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CHAPTER 8
Computer Crime, Computer Criminals, and 
Computer Evidence
8.1 Overview
The growing use and increasing complexity of the computer have made certain kinds of 
crimes easier to commit, harder to detect, and often very difficult to prosecute. The 
commission of computer crimes has also been facilitated by the spread of the Internet and 
the creation of global intranets in transnational corporations that permit access to 
computers anywhere in the world from points anywhere in the world.
A computer-related crime is simply one in which a computer is used either to commit or 
assist with the commission of a crime, or is itself the target of a crime. Traditional crimes 
committed using computers may include embezzlement, larceny (theft of property and 
proprietary information), fraud, extortion (blackmail), forgery, and counterfeiting. 
Traditional crimes committed targeting computers may include sabotage, vandalism, 
electronic burglary, wiretapping, and the gaining of illegal access either by impersonating 
an authorized user or by exceeding one’s authority. In addition, the U.S. federal and state 
governments as well as the governments of many countries around the world have defined 
a completely separate class of criminal offenses—computer crimes—that specifically 
criminalize a growing variety of behaviors ranging from deliberate distribution of viruses to 
theft or destruction of information from corporate or government computers. Other laws, 
such as the Economic Espionage Act and the USA Patriot Act, have also provided 
additional grounds for prosecuting computer-related crimes. Prison sentences for conviction 
on a charge of computer crime are now given frequently and can be substantial. In the 
United States, under current guidance from the attorney general, federal prosecutors are 
directed to seek maximum sentences for offenders, including computer criminals. Since 
parole has been ended in the federal prison system, it is fair to conclude that those 
convicted of federal computer offenses should be prepared to serve a substantial sentence in 
a federal correctional facility.
In fact, the white-collar crime with by far the fastest growth rate in the United States is 
identity theft. Because computers storing hundreds of thousands of personal records 
including names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, and other key identifiers are often 
insufficiently protected, they are a target of identity thieves. This information is either used 
by the thieves themselves to impersonate the victims or sold to others operating scams of 
various kinds.
Until recently, a person committing a computer crime was assumed to be a hacker who was 
some sort of warped computer geek, information technology specialist, or programming 
genius. Today, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, anyone with access to a 
computer managing assets or confidential information is in a position to commit a com­
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puter crime. The proliferation of computers and their ready accessibility have made them a 
target of opportunity for professional and amateur thieves alike. The result has been billions 
of dollars in losses from computer crimes, according to surveys by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and other bodies. In addition, a counterculture movement of computer 
misusers has published detailed instructions on how to compromise various kinds of 
computers and distributed the software with which to do it. No longer does the hacker have 
to be a computer genius; now all he or she needs to know is how to download and execute 
software and to follow instructions.
The high valuation the investment community places on companies providing computer 
security solutions is testimony to the significance of computer security to the modem 
organization. In light of the threat of cyber-attacks by terrorists or others that has been 
recognized since the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, there is an increasing awareness of the importance that must be given to computer 
and information security.
8.1.1 Security
Assuring security for a computer system is no different from having appropriate protection 
for manual accounting files or of any other recordkeeping system. Because of the disparity 
in technologies, each system requires its own particular security tools and methods. The 
objective, however, is the same: to achieve reasonable and cost-effective controls by which 
an unauthorized act is likely to be prevented or, if not prevented, at least detected. While 
each organization must ultimately decide for itself how much security is enough to meet its 
particular needs, standards, such as ISO 17799 (July, 2005)1, are emerging that can serve as 
baselines against which to measure the state of information security in any given 
organization.
1 See http://www.computersecurity.com/index.htm
Of course, technology has changed radically over the last decade as companies have moved 
from large central systems (mainframes) to interconnected local and wide area networks 
(LANs and WANs). Many companies are looking into alternate technologies, such as grid 
networks, wireless networks, and biometric authentication. Of course, each of these 
technologies brings new security concerns. The Internet, for example, has made global e- 
mail a part of almost everyone’s daily life. But the power of e-mail also makes companies 
concerned that it may be used to send out confidential information. In addition, the 
adoption period for other new technologies such as Instant Messaging (IM) is even shorter 
than it was for e-mail. The software for managing IM is less available whereas e-mail has a 
mature set of utilities to manage and even record messages.
There was a time when security meant locking the door to the room housing the mainframe. 
That is not enough any more. One central machine has been replaced by hundreds or even 
thousands of PCs (each probably exceeding the power of that old mainframe in many ways) 
connected into internal networks and most likely connected to the outside world as well 
through both private and corporate networks plus the global Internet.
Terms such as firewalls (programs and devices designed to prevent invasion of a system by 
an outsider) and intrusion detection systems (software and hardware designed to detect 
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unauthorized activity within a network) had no real applicability to the world of computers 
as recently as 10 years ago but are now essential requirements for any reasonably managed 
corporate or government computer operation.
8.1.2 Evolution of Computer Crime
In looking at computer crime, it is important to remember that computers are just machines 
that carry out programmed instructions. When a crime involves a computer, the computer 
is not the criminal; the person manipulating the program or using the computer to 
perpetrate an illegal act is the criminal. Computers are an instrument of crime in the same 
sense that a phone or fax machine can facilitate the commission of an insider trading 
offense. While certain kinds of crime, such as planting a computer virus, would not be 
possible without a computer, others are simply new versions of old crimes that are now 
facilitated by modem computer technology. As that technology advances, criminal minds 
will inevitably continue to look for new ways to exploit the computer. Remember that some 
of our finer prisons teach computer skills to inmates as part of their education and 
rehabilitation programs!
For example, consider the theft of a new computer chip design. Printed out, the details of 
the design might require a dozen thick notebooks and a large roll of detailed circuit 
diagrams. That same information in computer form would easily fit on a tape cassette 
smaller than the common audiocassettes used for music, or on a “thumb drive” or hard 
drive with a diameter of one inch. The information could also be transmitted in minutes via 
the Internet as a file attached to one or more e-mail messages or even hidden within a 
photograph.
Most experts agree that computer crime is a growing problem and that the tools to prevent 
it are evolving, but so are new ways of committing those crimes. Feeling confident that your 
systems are 100 percent secure is never a good idea. Given the speed of evolution of both 
computers and the methods for committing computer crime, such complacency has 
become downright dangerous!
This chapter should provide you with a basic understanding of computer crime, how it has 
evolved, and the ways that computer criminals are likely to attack organizations such as 
yours.
8.2 Computer-Related Crimes
In today’s organizations, virtually every asset from money to proprietary and confidential 
information is likely to be recorded on some computer’s hard drive, and perhaps on a 
backup computer tape or disk. Every day trillions of dollars are transferred between bank 
accounts relying on computerized records and computerized data communications. 
Millions of individuals rarely see the inside of a bank. Their pay is deposited directly into 
their accounts and when they need cash they head for the nearest automated teller machine 
(ATM). Even many bills can be paid by direct transfers of money from their accounts to 
those of their creditors. Many other transactions that have traditionally required a visit to a 
bank branch can also be accomplished online via the Internet. Yet money may not be the 
most valuable commodity on the computer.
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8.2.1 Intellectual Property
Intellectual property such as business plans and trade secrets can have immense value. 
There are unique differences between stealing information and stealing almost anything 
else. If $100 is stolen from you, the thief has deprived you of your money. Similarly, if your 
car is stolen, the thief has it and you do not. A thief can steal information, particularly that 
stored on a computer, and you can still have it. If the thief is really skilled, your information 
can be stolen without you ever knowing an incident has taken place. Computers can thus 
be used to facilitate the theft of money by manipulating banking or accounting records, and 
goods by manipulating inventory, shipping records, or receivables records. Information is 
usually stolen by copying. Intellectual property theft is usually a combination of computer- 
assisted traditional crimes such as simple theft, insider trading, and so on, and of newly 
defined crimes such as economic espionage (theft of company secrets for the benefit of 
another organization) or computer intrusion (criminalization of unauthorized access into 
another organization’s computers). Computer crime laws exist at both the federal and state 
levels in the United States and have counterparts in dozens of other countries. Some 
countries have very fine infrastructures for the investigation and prosecution of computer 
crimes. Others may have laws in place but lack the infrastructure to pursue prosecutions 
unless the victim provides the expertise to gather and analyze the evidence. Multinational 
organizations should bear this in mind in assessing risk.
8.2.2 Computer Hardware
Another class of computer crime attempts to target computers themselves. The intentional 
infection of your computer by a virus can cause a huge disruption of your business when it 
is triggered to destroy data, particularly if that data has not been backed up. In some cases, 
criminals may take more direct action to damage your computer. These attack profiles are 
sometimes referred to as denial of service attacks, because they are designed to deprive the 
rightful users of access to their systems. Other attacks may be designed to cause 
communication problems; for example, one disgruntled technician decided to bring down 
the communication links between the company’s computers, in effect temporarily 
destroying the network.
8.2.3 Computer Crimes and the Law
Whether a target is the computer itself or the information residing in the computer, the 
attempted attack may well be a crime. For any act to be criminal, however, there has to be 
a law that declares that particular course of action to be criminal. Until the passage of 
specific computer crime laws during the past 25 years, prosecutors had had to find ways to 
apply traditional laws, such as those governing wire or mail fraud, to high-tech crimes. It is 
also important to remember that laws generally apply only within the state or country in 
which they are promulgated. Because the Internet can be accessed from anywhere in the 
world, perpetrators can carry out crimes from anywhere, especially from countries that 
have weak computer crime laws or from which extradition is unlikely. Some laws 
specifically require the victims to show that they had adequately safeguarded the 
information that was stolen or that they provided specific notification to the perpetrator that 
the information was not in the public domain.
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Unfortunately, in our society, there are far too few law enforcement and prosecution 
personnel who are specialists in computer crime investigation. There are very specific 
procedures known as computer forensics that must be followed in handling and analyzing 
computer files and equipment if the evidence of the offense is to be admissible in a civil or 
criminal court. Carelessness in following these procedures may cause a prosecution to fail 
or a lawsuit to be dismissed. Corporations should be aware that even the most well- 
intentioned attempts of their in-house technical or investigative personnel to examine 
computers involved in an offense, unless conducted to very exacting forensic standards of 
data collection, storage and analysis, might result in evidence being rendered permanently 
inadmissible. Once a crime occurs, or a civil lawsuit is filed, a court is going to apply the 
appropriate rules of evidence to determine whether any of the actions taken in collecting, 
storing, or processing the data could have modified the evidence or otherwise damaged its 
integrity.
8.3 A Brief History of Computer Crime
No one knows who the first computer criminal was. Undoubtedly, as soon as punch-card 
equipment came into use in the 1950s, someone figured out how to falsify records and 
make an illicit dollar. However, computer-related crimes have certainly been around since 
the early 1970s. Throughout the rest of that decade, computer crimes tended to focus on the 
manipulation of computer records to obtain money. In the 1980s, we began to see cases in 
which the target of the crime was the information on the computer. Insider trading was 
facilitated by the relative anonymity with which information could be accessed in many 
systems as well as the casual way that security was handled by many firms.
In one of the largest early cases, an insurance company took advantage of its accounting 
firm’s computer naivete to perpetrate a huge fraud. The insurer created thousands of bogus 
policies, identifiable through special policy numbers. When the auditors, as part of random 
checks, wanted to see some of these nonexistent policies, they were told the policies could 
be pulled from their warehouse and would be available the next day. The auditors never 
insisted on accompanying the client to the warehouse, but merely accepted that they could 
have the documents in the morning. That evening, the perpetrators busily created the 
appropriate documentation to prove the validity of the policies. Millions of dollars were 
funneled out of the company through this scheme. This case marked the period when 
auditors learned that it was vital to include computer systems in their audit plans.
In another noteworthy case, the chief teller of a bank located in Brooklyn, New York, 
devised a plan to manipulate dormant accounts using the bank’s new computer system. He 
discovered that he could move money in and out of those inactive accounts simply by using 
his supervisor’s key. Because he was highly trusted, his supervisor would give him the key 
whenever he asked for it without determining why he needed it. This control of the inactive 
accounts through the supervisor’s key assumed the supervisor knew and approved every 
transaction involving these accounts. The careless surrender of the key to the chief teller 
nullified the whole security system and allowed him to withdraw several hundred thousand 
dollars. Even though the manipulations all showed up on the daily accounting reports, there 
were so many thousands of irregularities as a result of the changeover to the complex new 
computer system that the internal auditors were not able to keep up with the volume and 
ignored what they considered low-priority items, such as the dormant account transactions.
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Unfortunately for the perpetrator, while he was a gifted fraudster, he was also a dedicated 
but spectacularly unsuccessful horseplayer. When the attorney general of New York State 
conducted a raid on his bookmaker, the volume of his gambling (generally around $10,000 
to $12,000 per day) was discovered and the source of his funds uncovered. He was 
convicted of theft and imprisoned.
In another case, a young man in California discovered that the phone company had 
installed a system that permitted its employees to order equipment to be delivered to job 
sites using a push-button phone. He obtained the requisite code numbers from manuals 
recovered from the phone company’s trash bins. Using the codes, he ordered the computer 
to arrange the delivery of equipment to downtown manholes. He then collected the 
valuable equipment with his own truck (bought at auction from the phone company and 
repainted in phone company colors), and eventually sold it to foreign phone companies. 
His scheme was discovered when he refused to give his truck driver a raise and the driver 
turned him in. It was shown that he had stolen about $1.1 million in equipment. He was 
tried, convicted, and after a 90-day stay in jail, promptly established a business as a 
consultant to attorneys who defended computer criminals. His ads proudly proclaimed that 
he had “actual courtroom experience.”
Today, computer crime has progressed from crimes committed by individuals against 
individuals and companies to a topic of great concern to governments: Information warfare 
has emerged as a real threat to national infrastructures. Indeed, the use of the Internet as a 
facilitator of communications by terrorists and as an instrument for the potential targeting of 
the information processing infrastructure is a matter of great concern to government and 
corporate security professionals alike.
8.4 Computer Crime Today
Computer crime is in the news. Whether it is the arrest of the creator of a damaging 
computer virus or a person using computers to sell child pornography, the media have 
realized that our society has become worried about technology failures. This media 
attention has had an unintended effect that can be a problem.
If you were to believe the media, hackers are the number one cause of computer crime 
problems. In fact, however, the major problem is computer-facilitated crime committed by 
employees and others who have been granted access to a system. Because the public 
perception of threats is often a key factor in deciding how to spend security dollars, what is 
actually a misperception may lead to an inappropriate allocation of resources with the result 
that the expensive new security measures do not address the real risk. Today, many 
companies are realizing that this misallocation may well be the case.
The problem of preventing computer crime is no different from that of preventing any 
other crime against a business. Accountants used to work to discourage crime by requiring 
separation of duties between people handling cash or other assets and those making the 
entries in the books of the company concerning the assets. By separating access to assets 
from access to the records of those assets, the theory was that two or more people would 
have to conspire to carry out a fraud and thus increase the likelihood of detection.
Along with separation of duties, accountants have traditionally depended on the paper trail 
of records that document transactions. This paper trail required that all transactions be 
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entered into journals that would be backed up by source documents such as invoices, 
purchase orders, receiving reports, canceled checks, sales receipts, and vendor invoices.
Of course, in spite of the best efforts of the accountants, fraud did, does, and will continue 
to occur. Accounting systems are neither foolproof nor fraud proof. Determined criminals 
can still find ways to circumvent or override controls.
Computers haven’t really changed anything. A crook is still a crook. Fraud, theft, and 
embezzlement are still possible in the age of computers. Indeed, some argue that crime has 
become more likely as paper trails are replaced by electronic trails, which are not as easily 
verified by traditional methods. The speed of processing has taken precedence over 
maintenance of effective controls, according to some writers. CPAs should determine how 
to validate the information stored in computer systems. That has become more difficult as 
computer architectures have evolved from central mainframe computers to networks of 
hundreds or even thousands of PCs and file servers distributed throughout the company, 
and sometimes even throughout the world.
As stated earlier, surveys, including those conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Computer Security Institute, and the American Society for Industrial Security, show 
that computer crime is responsible for billions of dollars of loss each year. Many of these 
surveys indicate that the average loss in a computer crime is higher than in other crimes. It 
is often more difficult to prosecute a computer crime than a traditional crime. Evidence 
taken from a computer is very difficult to connect to an individual because computer data 
can be manipulated. Therefore, providing proof not only that the crime occurred but also 
how it occurred and who committed it can be a complex process. Part of the problem, as 
noted earlier, is that there are a limited number of police and prosecutors who are trained 
in the investigation and prosecution of computer crime. However, forensic audit specialists 
that specialize in investigative computer techniques have access to an array of analysis 
programs that can be used to reconstruct data on hard drives and recover data and uncover 
what others think may be hidden. Even data that has been overwritten several times can 
sometimes be recovered, but such tools are not widely available and require skill and 
experience and patience to use. The curse of computer based fraud is that computers can 
be used to try to cover up the trail at the surface level, but the blessing is that some data just 
never seems to go away, having been stored in multiple places and accessible by the highly 
trained fraud professional.
In fact, new opportunities for theft, fraud, and embezzlement have been created by 
computer technology. Accounting records once kept under lock and key in the accounting 
department are now stored on computers that can be accessed remotely. The systems are 
available not only to authorized users (employees who have a job-related requirement to 
access and use the accounting system) but also to data entry clerks, computer operators, 
systems analysts, and programmers. If the computer’s access control security system is not 
set correctly, unauthorized employees or even outsiders can gain access to the system. With 
the proper skills and a criminal inclination, individuals can manipulate systems and change 
programs not only to commit fraud but also to make it difficult to find evidence that the 
fraud has even been committed.
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8.4.1 Classification of Computer Fraud
Generally, there is no accepted chart-of-accounts for computer fraud. If there were, it would 
constantly be changing. But certain computer-fraud activities that could affect a business’s 
chart-of-accounts should be recognized: manipulating computer inputs, manipulating 
programs, and tampering with outputs.
Manipulating Computer Inputs
One of the most frequent bases of computer crime involves the falsification of computer 
inputs. Those inputs may involve putting false transactions into the system, modifying 
actual transactions or, in some schemes, not putting information into the system.
From an accounting standpoint, the main reasons for manipulating inputs are to overstate 
or understate revenues, assets, expenses, and liabilities. The objective of the perpetrator 
determines the manipulation necessary. Sometimes the objective is to provide false data to 
managers, stockholders, analysts, reporters, creditors, or government agencies. Sometimes 
the manipulation is part of an embezzlement scheme, such as entering false invoices into an 
accounts payable system. There can be little question that the manipulation of data is 
among the most common forms of computer-related fraud.
Input fraud should be among the easiest to detect and prevent with effective supervision 
and controls. These include:
• Separation of duties
• Audit trails
• Control totals and access controls (both those that limit access to data entry screens and 
those that place limits on values that can be entered)
• Appropriate testing of sample transactions
However, simple tests of accounting records and documents may not always reveal 
complex frauds. One computer-aided fraud that resulted in an SEC Enforcement and 
Administrative action was the case of Livent. The computer became an integral part of the 
fraud scheme. Lack of proper internal control and security and access controls, as well as 
knowledge of the audit approach by the controller, the former audit engagement partner 
aided a multifaced fraud. The SEC wrote:
Because of the sheer magnitude and dollar amount of the manipulations, it became 
necessary for senior management to be able to track both the real and the phony 
numbers . .. enlist the assistance of the manager of Livent’s information services 
department to write a program that would enable the accounting staff to override the 
accounting system without a paper or transaction trail.2
2 United States of America before the Securities and Exchange Commission. Litigation Release 1095, 
Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9806. See http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-40937.htm
More discussion of the Livent case is provided in the case summary at the end of this 
chapter.
Manipulating Programs
Another major class of computer crime involves altering the instructions computers use to 
manipulate input files and databases. These can range from schemes in which programs are 
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designed to process fraudulent entries without making audit trail entries, to those featuring 
deliberate miscalculations to shortchange bank depositors of fractions of a cent of interest, 
which can then be accumulated and stolen. Programs may be designed with fraudulent 
intent from the outset or may be modified at some point to add the fraudulent activities. For 
example, fraudsters at a rental car company modified a computer program to add one 
gallon to the capacity of the fuel tank of cars returned with less than a full tank of gas. Each 
car was charged for being refilled plus an extra US$3 for the phantom gallon. Multiplied by 
thousands of rental transactions per week, the amount of money collected was substantial. 
In another case, a program developed to calculate mortgage overpayments was adjusted by 
fraudsters to shave one day off of the overpayment period, thus reducing the amount to be 
refunded to the client but leaving one day’s worth of the overpayment to be taken by the 
fraudsters. Again, while the effect on an individual account was small, the overall total 
across all accounts was massive.
Outsourcing program development to either domestic or international programming shops 
creates the risk that an unauthorized code might be introduced that would permit program 
manipulation at some future date. Obviously, any outsourcing plan should call for careful 
and thorough testing of the new code before assuming that it is completely accurate.
The elements of IT general controls practice that mitigates this risk are called program 
development and program change controls. Only authorized and properly documented 
changes to functioning code should be permitted. Access to programs and code should be 
restricted to those individuals whose programming or program implementation duties do 
not set up segregation of duties conflicts by their having access to accounting functions.
Tampering With Outputs
Yet another category of computer fraud involves tampering with the results of computer 
activity: reports and files. This category includes theft of confidential or proprietary 
information such as customer lists, research and development results, company business 
plans, employee information, secret formulas, and so on. According to the previously 
mentioned surveys, these intellectual property thefts are apparently escalating as global 
competition increases. Computers have undoubtedly facilitated the thefts because they have 
provided the capability for fast copying of huge databases and at the same time provided 
the capability for moving the copied data around the globe at tremendous speeds through 
data communications networks. Intellectual property theft by computer is a unique crime 
since nothing is physically removed and there may be no record that the crime even took 
place.
8.4.2 The Most Common Computer Crimes
Regardless of the evolution of computer technology, the manipulation of inputs and outputs 
is still the most common form of computer crime. (For a detailed discussion of financial 
statement fraud, please refer to Chapter 10, “Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement 
Fraud”.)
Computers are frequently manipulated to get to assets, the most popular being cash, 
information that can be converted to cash, or both. To steal cash, input is frequently 
manipulated through submission of falsified documents such as invoices from vendors, 
suppliers or contractors; claims for government benefits; refund or credit claims; payroll, or 
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expense accounts. The phony claims can involve anyone from clerks to senior executives, 
although employees in either the claims approval or accounting functions are most often 
involved. From an accounting viewpoint, the false claim is a fake debit to an expense so a 
corresponding credit can be posted to the cash account to cover the issuance of a check or 
funds transfer.
Executive Computer Crimes
In the higher levels of an organization, the nature of fraud changes. Rather than simply 
grabbing cash, fraudsters may design account manipulation to exaggerate profits by 
overstating sales or booking them before the transaction is completed. A similar effect on 
profits can be created by understating expenses either through simple reduction of the 
numbers or improper deferral to a later accounting period. The playing of the nearly 
infinite range of variations on these themes depends only on the ingenuity of the 
perpetrators. For example, profits may be overstated by increasing ending inventory of 
manufactured goods or merchandise held for sale. These adjustments result in the 
understatement of the cost of goods sold and raise net profits.
Manipulation of operating results is probably more highly motivated today than ever 
before. With increasing stock market volatility as well as an insistence on continuous 
growth and on beating analysts’ expectations every quarter, managers may turn to 
manipulation to borrow time in order to turn around what they believe to be temporary 
problems. With so much of their personal wealth tied up in company stock, managers have 
a tremendous motivation to keep the numbers where the market perceives they should be. 
Or manipulation may be done to make the company a more attractive merger or 
acquisition target on the assumption that in the course of the merger the falsification will be 
overlooked or attributed to some undefined error. Or manipulation may be done for 
personal greed; in many companies, the executive compensation plan is directly tied to 
reported results.
Executives often have the ability to direct that employees circumvent or “override the 
controls” to achieve management objectives, sometimes with fraudulent intent3. Executives 
at PharMor in the early 1990s, a large chain of pharmacies, directed the misstatement of 
computerized inventory amounts over several periods in order to enhance financial results. 
Despite the fact that its auditors, Coopers & Lybrand, found the fraud, creditors and 
suppliers of PharMor played havoc with the auditors in the courts and in settlements for not 
finding the fraud earlier.
As described later, executives of Livent directed the writing of a computer program to keep 
track of the elements of a multifaceted, complex fraud and to hide the fraud from the 
auditors.
8.5 Fraud and the Internet
Some have called the Internet the best thing ever to happen to technologically minded 
fraudsters. The global Internet was, of course, never consciously designed to serve illicit 
purposes, but substantial evidence shows it has turned out to be a facilitator of fraud. This
3 An excellent reference is the AICPA’s Management Override Of Internal Controls: The Achilles' Heel of Fraud 
Prevention. AICPA, 2005.
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section looks at the characteristics of the Internet that make it “fraud-friendly,” the kinds of 
frauds occurring on a global basis, and some of the steps you can take to avoid becoming 
the next victim of an Internet fraud.
8.5.1 Fraud-Friendly Internet Characteristics
How Secure Is the Internet?
The Internet was never designed to be a vehicle for secure communication. Because the 
Internet evolved in a somewhat haphazard way and because no one really “owns” it, there 
is no central “systems administrator” to ensure that the Internet is a secure means of 
communications or to even guarantee its reliability. The Internet is run, to the extent that 
such a huge system can be said to be “run,” by a volunteer group called The Internet 
Society. The standards that let systems all over the world communicate through the Web, e- 
mail, instant messaging (IM), and so on, are orchestrated by another volunteer group called 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
The IETF operates through a system known as Request for Comment (RFC). Proposals are 
written in documents called RFCs, and anyone is welcome to comment on them. Once the 
comment period has expired, the IETF looks at the comments and may decide to modify 
the RFCs or to issue them. The collection of all RFCs constitutes the operating rules of the 
global Internet. Nowhere will you find a guarantee that the Internet is secure, that 
communications cannot or will not be intercepted, that any message or data sent via the 
Internet will arrive on a timely basis or, in fact, that it will arrive at all. There is nothing in 
the RFCs that provides for positive authentication. As long as the Internet is provided with 
an Internet Protocol (IP) address that it can process, the messages go there.
So the would-be Internet fraudster starts out with the advantage that there is nothing in the 
underlying infrastructure that would stand in the way of carrying out almost any scheme 
that can be imagined. Added to this inherent openness is the weakness of procedures that 
have in the past characterized some of the companies that sell and register Web addresses. 
Consider all this, and you can begin to understand how fraudsters have been able to hijack 
Web sites and transfer message traffic intended for elsewhere to servers under their control. 
The bottom line is this: The basic structure of the Internet does not require any particular 
security. That being the case, only someone who is very naive would believe that the 
Internet is a secure vehicle where content should automatically be regarded as credible.
How Truthful Is the Internet?
Truth on the Internet is optional. You can say anything you want on the Internet, true or 
false, reasonable or unreasonable, for any purpose or for no purpose at all. There is a 
famous cartoon of a dog sitting in front of a computer typing away on the keyboard. The 
caption is “On the Internet, no one knows you’re a dog.” The ability to tell lies combined 
with the gullibility of a portion of the population has made some fraudsters very rich very 
quickly. You can create a Web site at no cost at any of a number of services in various 
countries and you can make the Web site look like anything you want.
A few years ago, a high-profile fraud was perpetrated in just that way. A posting on a 
financial bulletin board indicated that a company was about to be purchased by a foreign 
corporation. As evidence of the accuracy of this posting, the person provided a link to what 
appeared to be a page of the Bloomberg news service running a story on the takeover. The 
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price of the stock jumped almost instantly. The only problem was that there was no 
Bloomberg story. The takeover was made up and the Bloomberg page was a forgery. The 
perpetrator of this fraud was caught and prosecuted. There have been a lot of cases like this. 
False stories posted on message boards are legendary. During the Internet “bubble” of the 
late 1990s, even vague rumors could trigger massive buying or selling sprees in technology 
stocks and a number of people decided that this was a good way to get rich quick. Some 
were caught, others were not.
One other aspect of lies on the Internet involves the use of false identities. If you want to 
make a posting seem real, you can have 40 or 50 different “people” posting supportive 
information. Of course, all of them can easily be the same actual person using 40 or 50 e- 
mail addresses set up on various (usually free) services. The identities may be of real people 
whose names have been “borrowed” (without their knowledge or consent, of course) or just 
made up.
Anonymity on the Internet
Anyone can use any of the readily available tools to hide their identity and location on the 
Internet. The Federal Bureau of Investigation recently released a warning that people were 
receiving e-mails purportedly from the FBI asking for personal information. It is very 
simple to change the return address that appears on an e-mail. Anyone who knows where 
his or her e-mail system or browser stores his or her name and return address can change 
them. Further, there are services such as Anonymizer that will send your e-mails through a 
series of servers that will cause your location to be untraceable.
Tools can also provide you with the ability to browse the World Wide Web without having 
your actual location traceable. On a simple level, anyone can go to an e-mail service such 
as Hotmail or Yahoo and have a working e-mail account within five minutes in any name; 
there is no verification process to determine whether any information provided by the 
account holder is accurate. Similarly, free services such as NetZero or Juno will provide an 
e-mail address and very inexpensive Internet access. Sometimes, specials such as those 
sometimes used by AOL can provide free Internet time as an inducement to use the 
service. And terminals connected to the Internet are available at little or no cost at public 
libraries, Internet cafes, shopping malls, and in some airport concourses.
Physical Jurisdiction of the Internet
The Internet is global. It exists in cyberspace, which is unbounded. Just because a message 
seems to come from a given location is no proof that it is actually from there. In one recent 
case, a Web address indicated that the server was in Venezuela; however, it was 
determined that the server was actually in northern New Jersey. How was this done? 
Remember that every URL—for example, www.aicpa.org—must be translated to what is 
called an Internet protocol (IP) address.
An IP address consists of four numbers from 0 to 255, separated by dots, for example, 
123.67.209.41. The Internet uses the IP address to route your message to its destination. 
The translation between the name you type and the IP address is handled by the Domain 
Naming System (DNS). When you register a URL, you have to provide the IP address of 
the DNS that will know the IP address to which traffic bound for that URL should be sent. 
It can be changed at any time.
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Nothing in the technical underpinnings of the Internet prevents you from having a URL 
indicating that you are in Uruguay (for example, www.xyz.uy, where uy is the code for 
Uruguay) associated with an IP address of a server in a completely different part of the 
world. This is something often seen in the .com domain. People and businesses all over the 
world have Internet domain names that end in .com, but both they and their servers can be 
located anywhere.
For the fraudster, it becomes a relatively easy matter to have servers located in some 
jurisdiction that has weak computer crime laws even though the servers will appear to the 
Internet visitor to be local. Internet service providers (ISPs) are the businesses that provide 
the connection between you or your company and the Internet. As with any other industry, 
they vary greatly in size, experience, and security. In the majority of cases, you can 
establish an account on an ISP quickly and easily without ever physically showing up at the 
ISP’s premises. It is all done through the Internet. So, a fraudster could easily set up a 
server through an ISP in a country with weak computer crime laws or in a country unlikely 
to cooperate with countries likely to be on his or her trail.
8.5.2 Computer Crime Laws
The Limitations of Computer Crime Laws
Computer crime laws are not universal. Many countries either have not promulgated strong 
computer crime laws or need to update them. Others have laws on the books, but no 
trained law enforcement or prosecutorial resources to enforce them.
Other countries have no laws whatsoever concerning computer crime. In addition, 
artificially created jurisdictions are on the rise. For example, the “Principality of Sealand” 
exists on a former World War II anti-aircraft artillery platform off the coast of England. An 
entrepreneur has declared it to be sovereign territory, appointed himself prince (and his 
wife princess), and his son (who is the current prince) is converting the platform into a 
computer-server farm where people can install servers that exist outside any normal 
jurisdiction. The prince has said that your data may “reside” on his territory as long as you 
do not break his laws: He does not favor child pornography, large volumes of junk e-mails 
or, according to a recent press release, terrorism. He will not recognize any other 
jurisdiction as having power over Sealand. No subpoenas or court orders from other 
nations will be accepted.
Even if computer crime laws have been enacted and cover a given jurisdiction, they may 
not be strong enough or current enough to be effective. There is a saying that computer 
technology advances at the speed of light, but computer crime laws advance at the speed of 
government. An example of a law that needed updating can be found in the case of the 
person identified as the creator of the “I Love You” computer virus. As the result of an 
international investigation by government computer-crime investigators from around the 
world working together in a model of cooperation, a suspect was arrested in the Philippines. 
The raid on his residence and his arrest were televised and the tape played around the 
world. However, he was almost immediately released after it was determined that the 
deliberate transmission of a worm or virus program was not a specific violation of then- 
enforceable Philippine law. (As you might have guessed, his release was not covered by the 
TV reporters. The statutes of the Philippines have since been revised.)
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There is another problem in bringing identified computer criminals to justice. If a victim 
country wishes to extradite a suspect for trial, several hurdles have to be overcome. First, 
both countries involved, that is, the country of residence of the crime victim and the one 
where the alleged perpetrator is arrested, must be signatories to an extradition treaty that 
covers the offense. Second, the national government of the victim has to want the suspect 
badly enough to go through the considerable paperwork and costs associated with an 
extradition proceeding. At the same time, the country holding the suspect has to have an 
interest in extraditing him or her; there are all sorts of political reasons why that might not 
be the case. And finally, treaties typically have provisions stating that extradition can occur 
only if the alleged offense is, in fact, a crime in both countries. As a result, if the act is not a 
crime where the suspect is being held, extradition may not even be a possibility.
8.5.3 The Tools of Fraud on the Internet
Availability of Internet Tools of Fraud
The tools of fraud are easily available on the Internet. If you want to set up a Web site that 
appears to be that of an investment news service, nothing could be simpler. Just use utility 
programs to copy the page of the legitimate business, apply the right tools, and you can 
build pages that can convincingly spoof almost any other site. Need a logo? Unless a site 
has taken the right precautions, stealing a perfect digital copy of a logo or photo requires 
only a couple of mouse clicks.
Fraud-Friendly Tools
The tools to hide what you are doing are easily available. Programs like PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy),4 can provide the encryption of messages or documents that are so strong that most 
governments around the world cannot break them. Worse, perhaps, are tools that involve 
what is called steganography. This permits a large document to be hidden within a picture 
without making perceptible changes in the image. To further assist the potential computer 




Internet sites keep limited records. People who run Internet sites are not required by law or 
regulation (with very few exceptions) to maintain logs of access. Even where logs are 
maintained, the volumes of information involved become so large that the logs are not 
maintained for long. The result is that where a computer fraud occurs, there may be little 
evidence for investigators to follow to prove a case. This limitation is often not realized by 
companies until an incident occurs. With planning, it is often possible to structure a 
hierarchy of records where the most critical access records are maintained for a longer time 
than, say, routine access to records.
Policing the Internet
There are not enough qualified investigators to cover Internet fraud cases. The reality is 
that qualified computer crime investigators can make substantially higher salaries in the 
private sector than they can in government. Given the increased importance placed on 
security by corporations following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 
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September 11, 2001, however, the demand for those skills is rising. As a result, it is 
anticipated that government law enforcement bodies will find it harder to retain top cyber­
cops, in the face of the substantially higher pay scales in the private sector. Governments 
will not, therefore, be able to investigate all cases. That will be good news for the fraudsters. 
However, it must be said that the government’s overworked computer investigative 
resources do a great job and, when combined with private-sector corporate resources, the 
picture for the fraudster is not as rosy as it otherwise might be. Add to this the policy 
determination by the U.S. Justice Department to seek harsher sentences for criminals, 
including computer criminals, and the risks for the potential fraudster are considerable.
8.5.4 Internet Frauds: The Top 10 and Beyond
Many characteristics of the Internet make it a more fraud-friendly environment than we 
might wish. After all, the impersonality of computer interface makes it easier for fraudsters 
to take advantage of their victims without having to face them; on the contrary, they may 
silently mock their victims for their greed and naivete. Given these characteristics, what 
types of frauds can we see? Fortunately, the National Consumers League, in cooperation 
with the National Association of Attorneys General, the Federal Trade Commission, and 
Project Phonebusters in Canada, operates the Internet Fraud Watch, and keeps statistics on 
frauds. While there is no question that they do not receive reports of all frauds and their 
focus is consumer frauds, they are a good place to start. Following are important frauds that 
are not on their Top 10 list. The percentages noted are from the 2005 January to December 
survey.
The Internet Fraud Watch Top 10
1. Online auctions (42 percent of complaints). These include receipt of counterfeit or shoddy 
products, payments sent without delivery of any products, and abuse of credit cards 
used for purchase payments. With the tremendous popularity of sites such as E-bay 
(which tries hard to control the fraud problem), fraudsters have found this to be a very 
effective way to get people to part with their money.
2. General merchandise sales (30 percent). People who have been scammed on direct sales 
are amazed to find that the diamond-encrusted Rolex watch they purchased for $99 
from some Web site is not completely genuine. In one instance, the victim of a phony 
watch scheme was told that the “bargain” was only possible because it was part of a 
batch of watches on which the watch manufacturer Movado had somehow misspelled 
their own name. This category of fraud also includes all other merchandise complaints.
3. Nigerian money offers (8 percent). This has quickly replaced the mailed letter as the 
preferred way of advertising for new victims in this classic fraud. This involves sending 
out an e-mail informing you that the sender is the widow of the late dictator of the 
country and that he socked away some number like $80 million for a rainy day. Or, 
that the author is an executive of the Nigerian National Oil Company and that he and 
his associates have been receiving kickbacks of 1 percent, 2 percent, or 3 percent of oil 
revenues. In all cases, they have chosen you to assist them in laundering their dirty 
money. In return for supplying your bank account information, letterhead, and so on, 
you will be in for 20 percent or 33 percent or 40 percent or 50 percent of all those 
millions. Sometimes you have to kick in a couple of thousand dollars to show that you 
are committed to the scheme. If you fall for this one you should be committed. Not 
only have people lost many thousands of dollars, some have actually been murdered 
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when they journeyed to Africa to meet their “partners” in the scheme. The average loss 
is reported to be nearly $7,000. What is more surprising is the advancement of this 
scheme in the ratings to number 3 over a few years.
4. Fake checks (6 percent). These complaints are the result of bogus payment checks for 
goods or services.
5. Lotteries or lottery clubs (4 percent). Fraudsters successfully extract from the victim a fee, 
but never deliver the promised winnings, many times referencing foreign lotteries. 
Fraudulent clubs to “pool” contributions and share winnings also ensnare the naive.
6. Phishing (2 percent). This scheme has come to be known by hackers as “phishing” 
(pronounced “fishing”). A well-known example was a message sent by hackers to 
millions of people telling them that unless they updated their “security information” 
they would no longer be able to be users of the E-bay service. Some of these “fish” bit 
and filled out detailed questionnaires with such information as Social Security 
numbers, checking account information, mother’s maiden name, and much else. Only 
after they discovered that they were identity theft victims did they realize what had 
happened. In other cases, phony emails from seemingly legitimate companies, 
complete with company logos and other identifying information representing 
themselves as ISPs, banks and major utilities have been successful in getting the 
unwary to cough up personal information. Why get dirty diving in a dumpster for 
personal information when you can extract that information in comfort? Legitimate 
businesses do not ask for this information via email.
7. Advance fee loans (1 percent). This is another familiar fraud taken into cyberspace. The 
availability of “marketing” CDs containing millions of e-mail addresses combined with 
the essentially zero-cost of sending out large volumes of e-mail messages allow these 
schemes to be profitable even when a very low percentage of people fall for the 
scheme such as paying an up-front fee for a loan.
8. Information/Adult services (1 percent). Pornography is one of the few consistent 
moneymakers on the Internet. Therefore, it is easy to see why entrepreneurial 
fraudsters have jumped on the bandwagon. The schemes range from the simple failure 
to deliver the smut promised and paid for to outright threats of cyber-blackmail, 
sometimes involving planting pornographic images of children on a victim’s 
computers. For consumers still using dial-up services, fraudsters can without your 
permission “connect” you to a remote site (e.g., where a phone number can be used to 
bill charges) and start to run up a charge for “services” which will be presented to you 
with your next phone bill, courtesy of your legitimate phone company. Always check 
your phone bill, and shame on the phone companies for doing business with “fronts” 
for scammers.
9. Work at home (1 percent). This scam is as old as time; it boils down to taking the same 
old scheme and putting it on the Internet.
10. Internet access services (1 percent). These complaints involve ISPs who fail to deliver. 
Often billing themselves as bargain basement ISPs, they cannot survive by providing 
unlimited access for only $2.95 per month.
Beyond the Top 10
Internet Fraud Watch also lists some additional popular frauds against consumers, which 
include the following:
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• Franchise opportunities
• Buyers clubs
• Credit card protection plans
• Credit repair services
• Magazine solicitations
• Pyramid schemes and illegitimate multilevel marketing
• Scholarship scams
• Sweepstakes and prize offers
In the area of frauds against businesses, the Internet has also proved to be a great facilitator. 
The schemes are as broad as the mind can imagine. Here are a few examples:
• Sending out fake electronic invoices for goods or services never provided.
• Selling stolen or false intellectual property. For example, “Hello. You don’t know me 
but I am a research scientist with XYZ Pharmaceuticals. I have the formula for our new 
Ultracillin drug and feel that the company has treated me badly, so I want to sell the 
formula to you.. ..”
• Involving a company in money laundering. Money launderers need legitimate 
companies with whom they can engage in falsified buy and sell transactions to carry out 
their illicit purposes. Sometimes the companies know that they are becoming involved 
in illegal dealings but don’t care. Other times, they claim that they never suspected that 
the duffle bags of cash came from inappropriate sources.
Avoiding Victimization
What can you do to avoid becoming the next victim of an Internet-facilitated fraud? Here 
are some tips.
• Offers that are too good to be true are too good to be true. Unless there is a rational 
explanation, people are not looking to give away products and services at a loss. This is 
not to say that there are not real bargains to be had. Quite the contrary, there are real 
deals out there, but you have to be wary. In one recent case, a computer peripheral was 
offered at a substantial discount ($17.99 for a $99.99 item). Investigation showed that the 
vendor had decided to rename the product and was dumping inventory with the 
discontinued logo. Another case (brand-new and reduced from $100 to $7) involved a 
device made by a manufacturer who had gone out of business. The liquidator was glad 
to get anything for the products. And a cellular phone that sells for $400 without a 
service subscription may really be “free after rebates” if you sign up for service. But for 
the most part, impossible deals are impossible. Why, do you think, did the widow of that 
Nigerian dictator happen to select you from all the other people in the world to offer 
you $17 million for your minimal involvement in helping her to get her late husband’s 
ill-gotten gains out of the country?
• Most reputable manufacturing and sales organizations do not use free e-mail services 
such as Yahoo or Hotmail as their primary cyber-communications vehicle. If the return 
e-mail address is at one of these free services, consider yourself warned!
• Giving your credit card information in an e-mail is essentially always a bad idea.
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• Similarly, sending confidential personal information such as credit card application data 
in e-mail is a bad idea.
• Read the URL. If you are looking at a site that purports to be operated by a major 
corporation, it should be located at that company’s Web site. It should not be at a source 
of free or very low cost Web site hosting such as Tripod, Geocities or Homestead. Be 
careful of Web site redirection in which, through the use of frame technology, actual 
Web addresses are hidden. Also remember that it is easy to set up a Web site that 
contains some unsuspecting company’s name. An offer that has you respond to a Web 
site at  is not the same as one that sends you 




• Check out vendors before sending them a check. Due diligence operates in the cyber­
world just as it does elsewhere. Check out those you plan to do business with. If they do 
not want to provide the information you need to do this, think twice about doing the 
deal.
• If you are the victim of a fraud, report it. Fraudsters depend on their victims not 
reporting their crimes. Even if it is impossible to prosecute them for what they did to 
you, your report may fit into a pattern that can lead to prosecution, to their being denied 
service by their ISP, to filtering by ISPs, or to other outcomes.
8.6 Computer Criminal Profiles
Who commits computer crime? It would be useful to have a profile of the offender to use in 
perhaps predicting who might commit the crimes.
8.6.1 Predictions
In the 1980s, criminologists who focused their attention on white-collar crime argued that 
the perpetrators tended to be trusted employees with unresolvable personal problems, 
usually financial in nature. These included indebtedness as a result of illness in the family; 
problems with alcohol, narcotics, or gambling; expensive tastes; or sexual pursuits.
At about the same time, various studies provided a profile of the computer criminal. In this 
profile the culprit:
1. Is male, white, and between 19 and 30 years of age.
2. Has no prior criminal record.
3. Identifies with technology more than with the employer’s business.
4. Is bright, creative, energetic, willing to accept challenges, and highly motivated.
5. Is employed in the field of either information processing or accounting.
6. Feels a desperate need for money because of personal problems.
7. Feels exploited by his or her employer and wants to get even. The culprit feels that 
promotions, salary increases, bonuses, stock options, and so on, are not fairly 
distributed. Others have gotten more than they deserve through various forms of 
favoritism.
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8. Does not intend to hurt people, just the employer, who is perceived as cold, indifferent, 
uncaring, and exploitive.
9. Does not have a self-image as a criminal.
10. Believes that actions against the establishment are justified for political or social reasons.
11. Perceives beating the system as a challenge worthy of his or her efforts.
In addition, four frequently cited characteristics are symptoms of trouble:
1. High living. Not too long ago, eyebrows were raised at the programmer who showed up 
in the company parking lot in a new Mercedes convertible. However, in the turn-of-the- 
century marketplace, programmers who had been through one or two initial public 
offerings (IPOs) could easily afford any car they want. Nonetheless, a discrepancy 
between lifestyle and income must be regarded as suspicious.
2. Ultra dedication to the job. The bookkeeper or computer programmer who never takes a 
vacation is either very dedicated (increasingly less likely in today’s business 
environment) or afraid that some scheme would come to light if he or she were not 
around to control things. In many states, banking laws, for example, require that bank 
officers take at least one two-week period of vacation and prohibit the officers from even 
visiting their office or accessing it remotely during that period. The theory, of course, is 
that many schemes will fall apart over a period of two weeks if left alone.
3. Aging. As some people age, they grow increasingly resentful of perceived wrongs; for 
example, the awarding of increased salaries and stock to younger employees. Therefore, 
they may feel justified in stealing if they think they can get away with it. For example, a 
period of continued layoffs may seem to the employee like the perfect time to get a final 
bonus by stealing some intellectual property or otherwise causing problems.
4. Chronic lateness. The common wisdom held that people who were constantly late with 
their work were late because they were trying to fabricate or cover up something they 
were doing.
In today’s environment, how valid are these assumptions? Most perpetrators who are 
caught committing computer crimes are male, but a growing number of women are making 
their marks in fraud. Perpetrators also tend to be young. In spite of the previous lists, few 
indicators, however, actually have any kind of predictive power. Does this mean that the 
perpetration of computer manipulations is unpredictable?
Certainly, no simple test will detect whether a person who has never committed a crime in 
the past will or will not commit one in the future given the proper circumstances and 
motivations. However, a review of cases over the past few years reveals one interesting 
phenomenon: Those who committed these offenses often had problems with former employers who 
were glad to be rid of them. Companies that do not perform background checks that include 
contacting former employers and checking for falsification on employment applications are 
the fraudster’s friend. The perpetrators can ignore their pasts and start anew at a company 
that appears to have weak security. Certainly, former employers can lie about an employee 
or refuse to give any reference beyond confirmation of employment. A thorough 
background check should pick up at least some potential problem employees. In one recent 
case, a company hired a woman and decided to save the cost of a background investigation 
because she was coming to work for them directly from another company known to 
conduct thorough investigations. After she sabotaged company systems, it was determined 
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that she had never worked for that other company and that the university that purportedly 
awarded her BA and MBA degrees had never heard of her. That initial lie of past 
employment was accepted and, as a result, her true background was never discovered.
Three other things about perpetrators are important. First, an offender does not have to be 
a computer genius to pull off a major fraud. People who can gain access to a system, either 
because they are authorized to use it or because the security controls are weak, can 
potentially manipulate that system for personal advantage even if they cannot directly 
access the computer. If they can fake the data by filling out a form, they can manipulate it.
Second, it is easy—but dangerous—to limit consideration of risk to employees. Many 
companies today, particularly in high-tech industries, make considerable use of temporary 
employees and independent contractors. All too often, because they are not carried on the 
books as employees, they are not subject to the same background checks and security 
measures. It should be clear that computers do not care whether they are manipulated by 
employees or independent contractors. Anyone who has access should be subject to the 
same controls as regular employees.
Third, there are offenders you will never meet, who will never meet you, but who may 
cause you great difficulties. These are the virus writers and virus distributors who develop 
and spread their plagues simply because they can.
8.6.2 Reasons for Committing Computer Crimes
Criminologists investigating why crimes are committed often use a four-element model, 
sometimes called MOMM: Motivation, Opportunity, Means, and Methods.
Motivation represents the reason one is willing to commit a crime. Motivation can be 
related to both personal or internal conditions and external conditions. Personal motivators 
include the following:
• Economic. Economically motivated perpetrators act to fulfill the need or desire for 
financial gain, money, or other assets or information that can be turned into money.
• Egocentric. Egocentric perpetrators have a need to show off their talents in committing 
what may be perceived by others as a complex crime. Money or other assets are 
sometimes part of the crime, but frequently they are not the underlying motivation. 
Certainly, assets symbolize a measure of the success of the venture and demonstrate the 
prowess and ingenuity of the criminal. Many hackers fall into this category. But for 
many others, their downfall is the need to brag about their exploits and thus gain favor 
in the eyes of their peer group.
• Ideological. Ideologically motivated perpetrators feel compelled to seek revenge against 
someone or something they perceive as oppressing or exploiting, either them personally, 
or even other individuals unknown to them. Terrorist bombings of computer centers are 
an extreme example of this kind of action. The sabotage of systems by disgruntled 
employees or ex-employees is frequently observed. Experts in terrorism have expressed 
significant concern that in a highly technological society, attacks targeting computer 
systems are likely. For example, an attack that disables ATMs in a region will cause 
disruption because banks have sharply reduced the number of tellers available for 
transactions. The lines in front of that limited number of tellers during the hours that 
banks are open would cause disruptions as banks try to figure out how to handle the 
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crowds. If the computerized traffic lights used in some cities were to be attacked, 
massive traffic jams could occur.
• Psychotic. Psychotic perpetrators are people suffering from delusional types of mental 
disease that distort reality by validating feelings of grandeur or persecution, or 
exaggerate hatred or fear of the organization or of particular people in the organization 
(often direct superiors). These feelings can be so strong that they may take extreme 
actions against their perceived enemies to relieve their anxieties. One way of acting out 
these feelings is exemplified by the person who shows up at the office with a gun and 
kills those he or she believes are “out to get them.” Another way this kind of troubled 
individual may lash out at these imaginary adversaries is to attack the computer systems 
that may be perceived as facilitating the work of supposed enemies. The subject of 
workplace violence is an important one, but is outside the scope of this Handbook.
Environmental Motivators
Environmental motivators are those conditions in the corporate culture or even in society 
in general that are claimed as motivators. But no external motivator can force anyone to 
commit a crime. It would be accurate to say, instead, that environmental motivators may 
aggravate personal motives. These include the work environment, reward systems, levels of 
interpersonal trust, corporate ethics, and stress and weaknesses in internal controls or 
security systems that may lead people to believe that they can get away with a crime.
It was indicated earlier that there are no guaranteed ways of spotting a computer criminal 
any more than any other kind of criminal and that people commit offenses for many 
different reasons. Does this mean there is nothing that can prevent computer crime? 
Nothing could be further from the truth. It may not be possible to know specifically who 
will commit a crime, but given the right circumstances someone is likely to try. The next 
section looks at the things a business can do to reduce the chance that it will be victimized 
by a computer criminal.
8.7 Controls for Preventing and Detecting Computer Crime
It would be nice to assume that everyone associated with a business is honest. A totally 
honest workforce would certainly eliminate the need for controls to prevent crime. Of 
course, that assumption is not viable. People will commit crimes for many reasons, some of 
which are rational, others of which may make no sense to the observer. The larger the 
organization, the more likely it is that someone is out to commit a crime. Managers who 
subscribe to this belief are not necessarily paranoid. In fact, most managers can name their 
disgruntled employees.
There are those who will steal under the best of employment circumstances. Scott Charney, 
founding director of the Justice Department’s computer crime section and now head of 
security at Microsoft Corporation, observed that “at any given moment, there is a 
percentage of the population that is up to no good.”
Others would not steal even if they were the worst treated employees of Ebenezer Scrooge 
in A Christmas Carol (the pre-ghostly-visits Scrooge, of course).
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8 .7.1 Internal Control and Security Systems
Internal controls and security systems are designed on the basis of past experience, both in 
the company in which they are installed and in other companies. The challenge here is to 
build in enough controls to discourage and discover criminal behavior without breaking the 
bank in costs or going overboard on security. Companies that have been victimized often 
react by increasing controls to the point at which the controls can become oppressive and 
actually interfere with company operations. Although rational companies set up rules to 
define acceptable and unacceptable behavior, too many constraints make people feel 
oppressed, distrusted, and under constant surveillance. If the employees perceive what they 
consider to be excessive controls that make it difficult or impossible to carry out their jobs, 
they will put infinite energy into finding “work-arounds” that let them get their work done, 
even if these subterfuges violate the controls.
Since its very founding, our society has been based on freedoms and rights. Citizens highly 
value our freedoms of speech, religion, and assembly but these freedoms are not absolute. 
Citizens can speak their minds but cannot freely slander or libel another individual. 
Citizens cannot, as one famous jurist put it, feel free to yell “FIRE” in a crowded theatre. 
Citizens cannot trade on inside information or release secret company information without 
expecting to suffer legal consequences.
Well-designed controls should provide similar checks and balances. The risks, threats, and 
other vulnerabilities in today’s marketplace and technological environment need to be 
considered, while responsibilities to employees, the value of their contributions, and their 
need for satisfaction in the workplace need to be taken into account. This consideration 
includes the provision of a work environment that encourages outstanding performance, 
profitability and efficiency.
A competent systems analyst or information security specialist can design layer upon layer 
of controls. Those in excess of what is required by the nature of the risks are not cost- 
effective. They can place undue burdens both on those who must work under them and 
those who must monitor and control them. A company’s requirement for effective internal 
controls does not represent a justification for a siege mentality or the construction of an 
impregnable fortress. Done effectively, the development of internal controls is a matter of 
proper balance and equilibrium and should not create paranoia.
Looking at the potential for theft and fraud and the actions available to prevent crime 
brings forth several conclusions:
• Most prevention efforts focus on building more accounting, access, or physical security 
controls.
• It is vital to recognize that there are limits to technological and procedural controls. 
Given the speed with which computer and data communications technology evolves and 
the complexity of modern systems, it is difficult for improvements in protection and 
detection mechanisms to keep pace.
• It is also important for companies to recognize that improvements in the working 
environment, including a positive ethical climate and strong interpersonal trust, help 
discourage criminal thinking and behavior and, as a result, are a part of the control 
environment. Some factors in the business environment are likely to encourage 
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computer crime and others discourage it. Clearly, the need is to minimize the criminal 
behavioral motivators and maximize the non-criminal motivators.
8.7.2 Factors That Encourage Computer Crime
The factors that enhance the probability that a company will be the target of theft, fraud, 
embezzlement, and corruption, including computer crime, can be either motivational 
(related to the corporate reward system and company policies) or personal (related to the 
character of a particular perpetrator).
The following are motivational factors that encourage computer crime:
• Inadequate rewards, including pay, fringe benefits, stock and stock options, bonuses, 
incentives, perquisites, job security, meaningful work, and promotional opportunities.
• Inadequate management controls, including failure to communicate expected standards 
of job performance or job-related behavior, ambiguity in work roles, relationships, 
responsibilities, and areas of accountability.
• Inadequate reinforcement and performance feedback mechanisms, including lack of 
recognition for good work, loyalty, longevity and effort; lack of meaningful recognition 
for outstanding performance; delayed or nonexistent feedback on performance 
inadequacies or unacceptable on-the-job behavior.
• Failure to offer counseling when performance or behavior falls below acceptable levels.
• Acceptance of mediocre performance as the standard.
• Inadequate support and lack of resources to meet standards by, for example, not 
providing authority to hire sufficient personnel to meet requirements for quality, 
quantity, and timeliness of work produced.
• Inadequate operational reviews, audits, inspections, and follow-throughs to ensure 
compliance with company policies, priorities, procedures, and government regulations.
• Condoning inappropriate ethical norms or inappropriate behavior. If potential 
perpetrators believe that the company will not report their activities to the police, but 
would rather handle the incident through a quiet resignation, the deterrent effect of a 
potentially long prison sentence disappears.
• Failure to control hostility generated by promotion or destructive competitiveness 
among departments, offices, or personnel.
• Failure to control bias or unfairness in selection, promotion, compensation, and 
appraisal.
• An uncertain future where a company faces merger, acquisition, or failure.
The following are common problems that can become personal motivations for computer 
crime:
• Inadequate standards of recruitment and selection
• Inadequate orientation and training on security matters and on sanctions for violating 
security rules
• Unresolved personal financial problems
• Unresolved problems relating to personal status
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• Failure to verify prior employment history, educational qualifications, financial stability, 
and character before appointments to sensitive positions
• Inadequate control of the level of job-related stress and anxiety
• Inadequate employee communication programs to monitor and help relieve uncertainty 
and anxiety among employees
8.7.3 Factors That Discourage Computer Crime
Computer crime can be discouraged through measures designed not only to prevent crime 
but also to detect attempts to engage in computer crimes. The recommended prevention 
measures are the following:
1. Internal accounting controls. These traditional measures to discourage crime are as 
important in an automated environment as in a manual-processing environment. They 
include the following:
• Separation and rotation of duties. As personnel change jobs, so must their access 
codes be changed to match their current job requirements.
• Periodic internal audits by trained, competent personnel, surprise inspections, and 
computer security reviews.
• Absolute insistence that control policies and procedures be documented in writing.
• Dual signature authorities, dollar authorization limits, expiration dates for signature 
authorizations, and check amount limits. These should be established and audited 
both routinely and by surprise.
• Offline controls and limits, including batch controls and hash totals.
• Feedback mechanisms to permit employees to report problems in security or control 
without fear of retribution.
2. Computer access controls. These controls may include the following:
• Authentication and identification controls, including keys or smartcards, passwords, 
biometrics, callback systems, one-time passwords, time- and day-constrained access, 
and periodic code and password changes.
• Compartmentalization, also known as need to know.
• Use of encryption to protect data while stored or in transit.
3. Firewalls. The use of firewalls and similar safeguards prevents unauthorized access 
through the Internet. Firewalls, however, are only effective when they are properly sited 
within the company network and when they are properly configured. A very small error 
in entering a firewall configuration file may result in the firewall not providing the 
security that users and management expect.
The measures to detect attempts to commit computer crime include the following:
1. A system of logging and follow-up of exceptions should be designed and implemented 
to log unusual activities; procedures should be in place to follow up on reported 
exceptions, such as the following:
• Transactions that are out of sequence, out of priority, or otherwise out-of-standard
• Aborted runs and entries, including repeated unsuccessful attempts to enter the 
system
• Attempts to access applications or functions beyond a person’s authorization
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2. Logging and following up on variances should be able to indicate a problem may have 
occurred or is occurring.
3. General logging should be in place because, when problems are uncovered, logs of 
access, Web activity, and other actions, may be vital evidence in tracking down the 
person involved. Logs should be maintained for at least a few months before being 
erased. Large log files can be filtered so high-risk transactions can be registered at a 
lower volume, thus permitting longer storage of the log.
4. Awareness of employee attitudes and satisfaction levels should be developed and 
maintained.
5. Sensitivity should be developed and maintained to reports that particular individuals are 
having problems, living beyond their means, or talking about “getting even” for 
perceived slights.
6. Newly developed intrusion detection systems should be used that have artificial intelligence 
capabilities to detect unusual transactions flowing through a system. These are evolving 
and have the prospect of being an order-of-magnitude improvement in crime detection 
technology. Several specialized companies can now help manage such systems and 
provide remote monitoring and response assistance 24/7. For many organizations, these 
third-party monitoring services can be a very cost-effective way of maintaining a 
constant watch on their systems.
8.7.4 Information Technology Controls for Compliance with 
Sarbanes-Oxley
Information technology is a complex and important part of any internal control system 
since it records transactions, transfers information, constructs databases, provides e-mail 
systems and gives access to the Internet. It is also open to tampering through unauthorized 
use for the purpose of manipulating data.
To be compliant with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley, reference must be made to the 
COSO framework for the implementation of a system of control that will meet the 





• Data center operations
• Systems software controls
• Access security
• Application system development and maintenance
Application controls manage data processing to ensure completeness and accuracy of 
transaction processing as well as a proper interface between applications.
Within the COSO framework, guidance will be needed for the information technology that 
manages financial information, and disclosure controls and procedures. The 1992 COSO 
Internal Control—Integrated Framework document lightly touched on Information Technology 
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controls within the Framework. However, the 2006 release of the COSO’s Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller Public Companies provides much more 
discussion of the role of IT controls in meeting organizational control objectives. Although 
not officially linked to COSO or to the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements, the COBIT (Control 
Objectives for Information and related Technology) framework of the Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA) is a respected framework for an analysis of IT 
controls effectiveness, but is very detailed. Many IT professionals, however, believe the 
COBIT framework is an acceptable tool in meeting SEC and PCAOB requirements. In a 
recent guidance document entitled “IT Control Objectives for Sarbanes-Oxley,” the IT 
Governance Institute (ITGI) has taken COBIT and linked it to the COSO framework on 
the implementation side and to the PCAOB standards, especially AS2, on the audit side, 
and has simplified and reduced the number of control objectives that are illustrated in 
COBIT.5
5 For further information, see the ISACA Web site at www.isaca.org or the ITGI Web site at www.itgi.org.
6 SAS No. 109 Understanding the Entity and its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement.
AICPA, 2006
7 SAS No. 112 Communicating Internal Control Related Matters Identified in an Audit. AICPA, 2006.
Beyond the public company environment, the same IT framework applies to all entities. 
COBIT and the ITGI publication can be valuable to an entity in understanding the 
elements of IT controls and in self-assessment and upgrading controls. Auditing standards 
for non-public entities also emphasize the role and importance of IT controls, and 
beginning in 2007, the auditor’s explicitly required understanding of risks, will include 
internal controls, which in turn includes significant, relevant IT controls.6 Significant 
deficiencies and material weaknesses identified by the auditor will be annually 
communicated in writing to “those charged with governance” in private companies (this 
Standard is actually effective for most private company audits in 20067).
COBIT takes off from the premise that the job of an IT system is to “[e]nsure the delivery 
of information to the business that addresses the required information criteria.” This result is 
achieved by “[c]reating and maintaining a system of process and control excellence that 
considers all IT resources.”
IT controls must be maintained to avoid the creation of what the PCAOB calls a “material 
weakness” which would result in an adverse report on the effectiveness of internal controls 
for those companies reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Information 
from the early implementers of Section 404 indicates that IT general controls, especially 
access and security controls, were often remediated during the assessment process, even in 
the largest “well controlled” companies.
The criteria of an effective IT system are:
• Integrity: accurate and complete information created through valid and authorized 
transactions
• Availability: information available when needed; software and hardware available 
because safeguarded
• Compliance: meeting the standards of information required for management to comply 
with SEC, Internal Revenue and other laws and regulations
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Secondary qualities applying to all information are:
• Effectiveness: relevance, timeliness, correctness, consistency and utility
• Efficiency: optimum and maximum use of resources
• Confidentiality: protection from unauthorized disclosure
IT system controls need to be treated separately because of the key role they play in 
information assembly and processing and, therefore, the risk their abuse presents to the 
internal control over financial reporting. Massive amounts of sensitive financial data are 
carried in vulnerable databases. Once access is gained, even authorized access by a person 
with criminal intent, data can be manipulated for fraudulent purposes and the reliability of 
the reporting process compromised. According to the IT Governance Institute, the basic 
body of general IT controls is a set of controls over:
• The IT environment
• Computer operations
• Access to programs and data
• Program development and changes
The IT Governance Institute lays out what it calls the “compliance roadmap,” which is a 
series of nine steps to bring a company’s IT system into compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Key among these are:
• Plan and scope
• Perform risk assessment
• Identify significant accounts/controls
• Document control design
• Evaluate control design
• Evaluate operational effectiveness
• Identify and remediate deficiencies
Plan and Scope
Given the fact that the SEC final rules limit control compliance to internal control over 
financial reporting and those system components that do or can influence financial 
reporting, not all IT processes of a given company will need to be reviewed. All 
applications, systems and their physical locations, functions, and uses should be ascertained, 
however, before beginning any review. A careful review of such an inventory may reveal 
that certain production statistics are used to monitor financial information results, or that 
the maintenance of certain regulatory reports might be critical to some elements of a 
disclosure. Thus, there may not be a simple “bright line” that easily classifies the systems 
and their relation to financial reporting.
The financial reporting process and its supporting IT systems and subsystems must first of 
all be distinguished from all the other IT systems. The most important systems affecting 
financial reporting will be those controlling:
• The initiation, recording, processing and reporting of financial information
• The selection and application of GAAP-compliant accounting policies
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• Antifraud programs
• Accounts involving judgments and estimates
• The period-end financial reporting process including journal, general ledger entries as 
well as adjustments to the financial statements
Perform Risk Assessment
Once the components affecting the internal control of financial reporting have been 
identified, the risk assessment can begin. Determination of the risk level will simultaneously 
reveal the documentation and testing required to measure the effectiveness of the controls: 
the greater the risk, the greater the need for testing and documentation. The relative risks of 
centralizing processing here or outsourcing overseas must also be evaluated. If most 
processing is outsourced overseas, the risks at each location must be assessed.
Failures that would have direct and immediate consequences are:
• Security breaches
• Implementation of an unapproved change
• Unavailability of the system/application
• Failure to maintain the system/application
• Calculation, completeness and other integrity failures
Identify Significant Account/Controls
As noted above, the two broad categories of IT controls identified by the COSO framework 
are general controls and application controls. General controls are those that support the 
continuous working of all information systems. These include data center operations, 
acquisition and implementation of operating systems, access security and application 
system development. Application controls govern information processing and are designed 
to ensure completeness, accuracy, authorization and validity.
Document Control Design
This may be the most difficult part of demonstrating effective IT controls for many 
companies. For example, the PCAOB requires that documentation of controls when an 
audit of internal controls is required must be sufficient for the auditor to be able to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the control. This means that management itself needs to have sufficient 
documentation to be able to attest to the effectiveness of the internal control over financial 
reporting. Documentation will be needed to describe the control design and effectiveness in 
providing accurate financial reports, preventing and detecting fraud, safeguarding assets 
and the results of management tests of the system. This documentation can take many 
electronic and paper forms, including manuals, process models, flowcharts, job 
descriptions, etc. Inadequate documentation is considered by the PCAOB to be a 
deficiency in the control over financial reporting. The aforementioned COBIT and ITGI 
guidance documents identify control objectives that are useful in assessing the completeness 
and effectiveness of the design of control procedures.
Evaluate Control Design
The evaluation of control design must review any of the four key types of controls that are 
integral to meeting the control objectives for any of the five components of internal control:
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This review will evaluate their effectiveness in controlling risk by audit assertion. What 
might have been an adequate design to meet a tolerable business risk due to the cost-benefit 
of implementing a better control may now be inadequate to meet the standards of effective 
implementation when independent attestation of controls effectiveness is required by the 
external auditor.
Evaluate Operational Effectiveness
Evaluating operational effectiveness means regular system testing. The general controls that 
govern all systems including those controlling financial reporting should be tested 
frequently since a breakdown at this level will have far-reaching consequences. Effective IT 
general controls can be used to limit the testing in any automated controls operating under 
the general controls. Otherwise, the underlying application controls need to be tested often 
to ascertain continued effectiveness.
Of special concern here is the quality of testing done at any external service organization 
performing outsourced services. For example, payroll is often prepared by a service 
organization, rather than performing this task internally. The risk is that IT controls at a 
service company in, say, India might be adequate to meet company reporting standards but 
may not be sufficiently evidenced to meet US auditing standards. In this case, the company 
is forced to rely on the service organization’s auditor. In the United States, a “SAS 70” 
service auditor’s report is an auditor-to-auditor communication that can be useful to 
management and the auditor in ascertaining that the design (Type 1 report) and 
effectiveness (Type 2 report) of the service organizations controls are worthy of reliance. In 
an audit of internal controls, or where an auditor wishes to place high reliance on the 
service organization’s controls, a Type 2 report, relatively timely with respect to the “as of’ 
reporting date by the company, should be obtained. If such a report is not available, the 
controls of the service organization should be examined directly or the inputs and outputs 
to the service organization should be controlled and tested.
Even more troublesome can be entire functions like IT management or the entire 
accounting system that becomes outsourced as an efficiency measure. Although such 
arrangements can be beneficial, management remains responsible for the function and its 
effective operation from the perspective of maintaining effective control. The more distant 
the service organization is from the other parts of the business, and the less controlled the 
business environment is in which the service organization is located, the higher the risk that 
information or assets will be vulnerable to misappropriation.
Identify and Remediate Deficiencies
The criterion by which an internal control is judged to have a significant deficiency or a 
material weakness is the effect it will have on the ability of the system to produce reliable 
financial statements. Although IT general controls over application controls are important, 
they do not “per se” cause misstatements, but permit them to occur in the underlying 
application controls. The application controls governing financial reporting are the “source” 
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of problems and should be the most thoroughly tested and tested near the reporting date. 
All remediation must have taken place in time for management to meet the “as of" date that 
will appear in the annual report and 10-K.
8.7.5 Security Countermeasures to Computer Crime
The focus of Chapter 4 of this Handbook is computer security in general. General reference 
works go into much more detail concerning computer practice and computer security than 
can be provided here.8 The focus of this section is the specific measures that are often used 
to prevent computer crimes by those either inside or outside an organization. While some 
measures are applicable to almost all situations, it is vital that each organization considers 
those controls that are appropriate to its particular circumstances.
8 For example, Information Technology Audits by Xenia Parker. CCH. 2006.
Security Holes
One of the unpleasant realities of today’s systems environment is that the systems used, 
including operating systems, firewalls, and security packages, as well as application systems, 
are not perfect when they are released by the manufacturers to their customers. Security 
problems are discovered regularly. Information about ways to exploit security holes is 
quickly reported worldwide by independent bulletin board systems, government-funded 
sites such as the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon 
University, private sector monitoring sites such as that of Internet Security Systems (ISS), 
and the software manufacturers themselves. Sometimes the problem and the ways to exploit 
it are reported before a repair patch can be developed. It has become absolutely vital, 
therefore, that every organization monitor these information sources to be certain that all 
relevant holes in security are understood and closed as soon as possible.
If the hole is not closed, and experience indicates that this is often the case, a company can 
continue to operate with known holes in its security. It is also vital that the internal auditors 
understand the importance of monitoring and closing software holes and that this is 
included in the review plan.
Not all updates recommended by vendors are critical security issues. Some are for 
efficiency, some are to provide new features, some correct functionality problems. Each 
company must evaluate which updates are critical. A substantial cost is involved in 
constantly updating systems, and each update could introduce new problems.
It should also be noted that in addition to patches, there is a second, closely related issue 
called configuration. Unless the right selections are made in setting up software for use, 
security may be at a lower level than it ought to be. Improper configuration may result in 
security features being turned off or security warnings being ignored.
Computer Access Control
Controls that allow only authorized people access to sensitive systems include the 
following:
• Passwords. Use passwords that are long enough to be difficult to guess. Passwords should 
not be composed of simple words, names of relatives, and so on, and should be changed 
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regularly. Some organizations have had good results by requiring every password to 
combine upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters.
• Compartmentalization. Restrict users to the specific files and programs they have a job- 
related need to access. This requires updates as necessary to conform access to needs of 
people moving from assignment to assignment within the organization.
• Use of biometrics. Use fingerprints, iris recognition, hand geometry, and other new 
technologies for added measures of control.
• Use of one-time passwords. Use hardware or software that generates a new password for 
each access. This may be generated through the passage of time or using a calculator­
like device to enter a randomly generated “challenge” number and get a response 
number that is then entered into the computer to validate identity.
• Automatic log off. Use this measure to prevent unauthorized access to the system when 
authorized users fail to log off.
• Time-day controls. Restrict personnel access to those times when they are supposed to be 
on duty. An extension of this concept for companies using automated time clock systems 
is to deny access and report a violation if access is attempted when an employee is not 
shown in the time clock system as being present.
• Dial-back, systems. Use these systems when access is through a dial-up system. On 
accepting a user ID and password, the system hangs up and dials an established number 
at which the approved user is standing by. This is very helpful when a person works at a 
predictable location, for example, the home office of a telecommuting employee.
• MAC address controls. Where an employee is located at the end of a broadband 
connection, it may be possible to limit connectivity to your system only to those physical 
devices you have authorized. Every Ethernet adapter, for example, has what is called a 
Machine Address Control (or MAC) address unique to that adapter.
• Random personal information checks. Implement this means of identifying unauthorized log­
in attempts. The system randomly transmits a question that only the authorized 
individual could answer and denies access unless the right answer is received. If several 
personal questions are on file, this technique can be very effective.
• Internet authentication. Use this control for telecommuting employees. With 
telecommuting on the rise, many companies are taking advantage of low-cost, high- 
bandwidth Internet connections such as asymmetric digital subscriber lines (DSL) and 
cable TV modems, which offer download speeds of up to 1.5MB per second and 
uploads of 400KB per second for nominal monthly charges, and include continuous 
access, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The connection between a user’s 
computer and a company server can be encrypted with simple tools like SSL (Secure 
Sockets Layer).
8.7.6 Solutions
When investigating computer crimes, investigators and forensic accountants often discover 
what could have been done to prevent the crimes. The following are some of the most 
frequently found items. The organizations failed to:
• Have written policies and security rules for the use of computers and systems.
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• Have temporary employees and independent contractors follow the same security rules 
as regular employees.
• Adjust access as people changed responsibilities internally.
• Keep up with and close security holes in applications, firewalls, and operating systems.
• Maintain virus protection on a fully updated basis.
Some of the suggestions to improve computer security include implementing the following:
• More effective policies for security over proprietary information
• Better interaction between the human resources department, the systems department, 
and corporate security functions
• Better internal accounting controls
• Better supervision of those with sensitive access to systems
• Better employee instruction in security issues
• Better computer audit software
• Better software security
• Better physical security in the workplace
8.8 Computer Fraud, Computer Evidence, and the Science of 
Computer Forensics
8.8.1 Why Computer Evidence Has Become a Vital Consideration in 
Fraud Investigations
With virtually every document in today’s organizations prepared on some kind of 
computer, the odds are that evidence of fraud will be found on the spinning surface of a 
hard drive, or stored on a backup tape or optical platter (CD/DVD). Some of the data 
needed by the fraud investigator or forensic accountant will be easily retrievable. But there 
are many instances in which data that would prove vital to an investigation is not available 
to the average user. That does not mean that the data are not there; it simply means that tools and 
technologies that would not be used in everyday computer usage must be brought to bear. And because 
of the sensitivity of the data and the possibility that any data brought to light may represent 
potential evidence that might be important in a civil or criminal proceeding, it is vital that it 
be handled in a way consistent with good evidence-preservation procedures.
To explain computer evidence, and how it can be retrieved and authenticated for use in a 
fraud investigation, this section begins with a brief consideration of why data can exist in 
ways that are outside of a user’s control.
8.8.2 The Complexities of Data Storage: Looking Under the Hood
You don’t have to know how an internal combustion engine works to drive your car or 
know how a TV works to watch your favorite shows. Similarly, you don’t have to know 
how a computer works to use it, but when it comes to computer evidence issues in fraud 
investigations, it pays to have some level of knowledge.
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The first thing to remember is that you tell the computer what you want to do (by clicking 
icons or entering data or text on the keyboard). In a very real sense, however, the computer 
is actually being run by the operating system (for example, Windows, Mac OS, Linux, or 
Unix) and the application program that is used to perform the functions you want to 
perform (for example, Word or WordPerfect for word processing, and Outlook or Lotus 
Notes for e-mail). In fact, the operating system mediates almost everything, passing your 
inputs to the applications and the outputs of the applications to the screen, storage drives, 
printers, or data communications lines. The operating system also can provide for 
connections between applications. For example, if you have written a document and want 
to save it as an Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) file, the operating system can 
transfer your document from your word processor to the Adobe Acrobat software, and then 
store the resulting PDF file on the hard drive.
Application programs also generate evidence that is often overlooked. For example, word 
processing programs generate automatic backup copies of files during editing. When you 
choose to print a document, the application creates a temporary file with the current 
document in it so you can continue the editing process while you wait.
A brief look “under the hood” shows how much computer-based evidence is potentially 
available, provided you know how to obtain it, analyze it, and use it most effectively to 
support investigations. There are cases, however, in which the examination of files may 
result in a breach of privacy or even constitute a crime under relevant laws, such as the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act. Investigators who wish to access computer files 
should consult with a qualified lawyer to make sure that they will not get themselves or 
their investigation into trouble. There are many places on a typical PC where potential 
evidence relevant to a fraud investigation could be stored.
Standard Files
Data on a PC can simply be in a regular file easily accessed or copied with the normal 
operating system tools. Looking at the file without taking the proper forensic precautions 
can cause changes in the internal structure of the file that could create severe problems in 
later forensic analysis or in getting data admitted as evidence. For that reason, viewing 
standard files without the right tools and techniques may result in the file being changed 
and may render the information inadmissible.
When a file is “erased,” the first letter of the file name is changed to a special character; the 
actual data that makes up the file are not deleted or overwritten. This special character tells 
the operating system to act as if the file is not there and indicates that the areas on the hard 
drive where the data are stored are available for reuse. The data are still there; however, the 
operating system is just treating it as invisible. Until the data are actually written over, 
however, forensic specialists can see the contents; in effect they have the ability to “un­
erase” the file.
A higher level of erasure, called “formatting” (using the Format C: command in DOS), is 
commonly believed to destroy all data on a hard disk completely. This is not always true. 
Formatting is often done in what is called a high-level format, which resets the index of files 
on the hard drive but does not erase the actual data. The right tools often make it possible 
to recover either entire files or portions of files. Sophisticated programs are used by 
governments and by forensic auditors that can read information that has been written over, 
even many times. Other software that attempts to completely clean the information from 
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the computer needs to be used when a full erasure is desired, but even the commercial 
versions of those programs can be interrogated and some data recovered.
E-mail Files
E-mail has become ubiquitous. Billions of messages are carried across the global Internet or 
moved within corporate mail servers every day. People use e-mail so routinely they may 
use it to transmit information that should not be sent in this way. It is often vital to be able 
to search and review e-mail message traffic to identify potentially useful evidence.
Different e-mail systems operate in different ways. Some use network-based disks as their 
primary message storage, while others download all of the messages to the end user’s PC 
and delete them from the server. Microsoft’s Outlook, for example, works by storing 
messages on the network mail server and transmitting the data to the PC as needed. 
Recovering e-mail files can be complex.
Unless you have specialized recovery tools, even the straightforward process of getting e- 
mail messages off a backup tape can be a big job, requiring you to rebuild the mail server 
completely. With the right tools, it is possible to search and extract data from e-mail backup 
files efficiently.
Instant Messaging
Instant messaging (IM) has become a very popular means of communication between 
people who are online simultaneously. Although IM traffic is not always recoverable, it is 
sometimes possible to recover some portion of the records to see who was communicating 
with whom, when, and what they were saying. In some industries, such as the investment 
business, where orders are accepted through IM or e-mail links, regulation may require an 
organization to maintain copies of IM traffic (and e-mail, voicemail, and phone call 
recordings) for a specified period.
Temporary or Transitory Files
Application programs such as word processing or spreadsheet programs often create 
temporary files to be used while the program is running but are often erased before the run 
ends. The key to harvesting application programs for electronic evidence is the user does 
not control these files and usually does not know that these files have even been created 
and erased. One example of this is a print buffer file, a file created by a word processor to 
transmit data to the printer and erased as soon as the document is printed. When these files 
are recoverable, it is possible to see what the user printed but never intended to store. In 
one case, such evidence helped identify an employee in a securities trading room who was 
writing threatening messages to a coworker. The perpetrator entered the data on her word 
processor without saving it, hit the print icon, and then shut down the program, believing 
the message had not been saved. When the files were recovered, it was possible to 
determine the exact time they were printed and then to use a security camera video to see 
who was sitting at that machine at that time.
Swap Files (Cache Files)
The operating system maintains a number of files for managing storage, temporarily storing 
memory data on the hard drive, and other purposes. One of the key files of this type is 
called a swap file, which the operating system uses to store megabytes of data and all of the 
decisions about what is stored and when it is stored. The typical user is unaware of the 
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existence of this hidden file, which can contain a wide variety of information whether the 
user ever intended it to be stored or not. The swap file can be searched and analyzed in the 
course of a computer forensic examination.
Audit Trails, Usage and Firewall Logs, and Systems
The various components of modem systems applications, firewalls, and proxy servers often 
keep logs of their activities. Because these log files sometimes are available only for a short 
time, it is important to act quickly to capture them to maximize the amount of information 
that will be available to assist the investigations team. Most users are unaware of the 
existence of these files, although in sophisticated cases of hacking or systems intrusion, 
perpetrators often try to disable or destroy the log files that record their misdeeds. For this 
reason, it is obviously vital that systems managers take steps to severely limit who can gain 
access to the log files, turn log recording on and off, and erase them.
Compressed Files
Despite existing hard drive storage space, the advent of inexpensive CD-ROMs capable of 
holding 700MB of data, DVD-ROMs that can carry almost 5GB of data, and the promise of 
even larger storage media, it is still common to find files stored in various compressed 
forms to save space. Compression permits more data to be transmitted in less time. File 
compression is particularly popular for files intended to be transmitted across the Internet 
where some parts of the transmission line may operate only at dial-up speeds. The most 
popular format is the zip format. While these files are compressed, in general they can be 
treated like any other file. Some software that creates and processes zip files can also 
password protect them. The password is subject to reverse engineering and generally can 
be recovered with the right software and hardware tools.
Encrypted Files
Encryption subjects an original file (plain text version) to various substitutions and 
mathematical operations to generate a file (encrypted version) that cannot be read by 
unauthorized people. The rules by which plain text files are converted into encrypted files 
and vice versa are called encryption algorithms. To use cryptographic algorithms, both the 
sender and receiver have to have a value known as a key. If a file is encrypted using the 
rule that each letter will be replaced by the letter that follows it in the alphabet, with “z” 
being replaced with “a”, that system provides for a certain level of security, but it can be 
easily broken. This algorithm is called single substitution (in which each letter is always 
substituted for another letter) and the key is to use the following letter in the alphabet.
Until the 1970s, cryptographic algorithms existed in hundreds of variations, but all shared 
one characteristic: The key used to encrypt a file had to be used to decrypt it. This is called 
symmetric key cryptography. In the 1970s, two groups of mathematicians devised a 
completely new form of cryptography called asymmetric key cryptography, or public key 
cryptography. These systems are based on generating keys as pairs of numbers (each of 
which can be hundreds or thousands of characters in length) with a unique relationship. 
The paired keys are called the public key and the secret key. If a message is encrypted 
using the public key, it can only be decrypted by the secret key; if the message is encrypted 
with the secret key, only the public key can decrypt it. The public key can be freely 
distributed and can even be put into a directory accessible to the world. If User A wants to 
send User B a message, User A encrypts it using User B’s public key. User A knows that 
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only User B can read it because that requires the secret key, which only User B has. Of 
course, User B has no assurance that the message actually came from User A, but if User A 
were to encrypt the message twice, once with User B’s public key and once with User A’s 
secret key, the situation would change. Because User B needs to use his secret key, he 
knows the message was destined for him. Because User B also needs to use User A’s public 
key to decrypt it, he has assurance that it came from User A.
In forensics, investigators encounter encrypted files. Some encryption systems can be 
defeated either through reverse engineering of the password by using commercially 
available software or through brute-force methods such as trying every combination until 
you hit the right one. For shorter keys, brute-force methods can be very effective, given the 
speed of modem computers. For long keys, the decryption process can be effectively 
impossible. Although there are sometimes ways to get the password, the general rule is that 
not all encrypted files can be read. Sometimes a plain text file can be recovered even after 
encryption because the cryptographic system did not do a thorough job of deleting it.
Browser History and Cache Files
A page viewed on the Internet using a browser program such as Internet Explorer, 
Netscape, or Opera is the result of processing information sent across the Internet. 
Generally, pages are defined using languages such as HTML (HyperText Markup 
Language) or XML (Extensible Markup Language). They can be made up of dozens of 
independent elements. Every picture, graphic line and other element is actually a separate 
file that could have been gathered from servers around the world through a process 
invisible to the user. Two areas on a hard drive store information about the identity and 
content of Web pages visited by the user. The history file contains a list of Web sites visited 
over weeks of browsing, but it can be erased or overwritten. The cache file stores the 
various files downloaded to create the pages seen in the browser. By storing (or caching) 
them on the local drive, it becomes possible to review pages and recreate them quickly. 
These files are very important in forensic investigations involving Internet browsing habits 
and can provide very useful information about what was accessed and when.
Cookie Files
No discussion of Internet browsers is complete without considering the potential value of 
the cookie file. In Internet terminology, a cookie is a small file that is written to the hard 
drive by the Web sites you visit. Cookies can be read by the Web site that issues them. For 
example, registered users of Amazon.com may have wondered how Amazon recognizes 
them when they return to the site. The answer is that when registered users go to Amazon’s 
Web site, Amazon’s site reads the cookie and uses the data stored in it to establish the 
computer’s identity. Some cookies are issued by companies that provide tracking services 
across many Web sites. For example, companies offering pornography on the Web can 
subscribe to cookie services such as Sexhound or Sextracker to discover which of their 
other serviced Web sites have been visited by the user. Cookies can have great forensic 
value in determining those sites visited by a user. Cookie files are generally invisible to the 
user but, through the menus of the browser, cookie files can be erased.
Embedded Information (Metadata)
Information stored by a program can contain more data than meets the eye. Consider, for 
example, a typical word processing system like Microsoft Word. Obviously, Word stores 
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the text of your file, but it also stores far more. Basic information is stored in the 
“Properties” fields, which contain such potentially useful data as:
• The date and time the file was created, last updated, last accessed, and last printed
• Who was logged into the computer when the document was last saved
• How many times the document has been edited, and the total time it has been open for 
editing
• Who was logged in when the document was created
Clearly, this information can be of great value to the fraud investigator. If a person said that 
he or she wrote the document but never changed it, or claimed that it was printed long after 
the actual print date, such testimony can be impeached by metadata (data about data). 
Many application programs save metadata. It is vital that the fraud investigator understand 
this to avoid overlooking potentially valuable information.
Application Data Not Visible to the User
Aside from the metadata, the file can also contain changes made to the document using the 
“Track Changes” in the “Tools” menu. Word can also store multiple versions of a 
document within one file, with only the latest visible to the casual user. Knowing that this 
data may be present is again important to the fraud investigator, as it can have a significant 
impact on a case.
Slack Space
Storage space on a computer hard drive is divided into allocation units, usually called 
clusters. The cluster is the smallest amount of data that can be associated with a file. If a file 
needs more data than can be stored in a cluster, the operating system assigns it more space 
in one-cluster units, which are not necessarily contiguous. Thus, the operating system 
associates every file with one or more clusters, but never fractions of clusters. Files are of 
different lengths and are not necessarily the size of a cluster or an exact multiple. If a file 
takes up more than one cluster, every cluster but the last one will be filled (if the last cluster 
were filled, the computer would have to assign another one). The last cluster of the file 
stores whatever amount is needed to finish the job. At that point, a special character (end of 
file character, or EOF) is written. Anything that exists between the EOF character and the 
end of the cluster is called slack space.
Slack space can be very important in a forensic examination. Assume File XYZ—an 
important file in your case—was erased, leaving the clusters assigned to the file available for 
reuse. One of the clusters was reused, but only the first 10 percent of the cluster was 
overwritten with new data, which was followed by an EOF character. Whatever was there 
before the overwrite (in this case a part of the XYZ file) is still there, invisible to the 
operating system because the operating system is programmed to stop reading a cluster 
when it hits an EOF character. The system assumes that the file is complete, and ignores the 
rest of the cluster. With forensic tools, the slack space can be searched and read, and that 
can provide access to what might otherwise be unavailable data.
Hidden Files
Every file on a system has characteristics. One of these is called hidden. Hidden files are 
actually there and are no different from any other file except they do not appear on 
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directory listings. Forensic specialists can find these files. Sometimes, when they have been 
deliberately hidden, they can contain information of great value to the investigator.
Taking a broader view, data does not necessarily have to be physically stored on a PC. 
Here are some options to consider:
• File server disk drives
• Removable storage devices
• Disks that are part of network attached storage (NAS) systems or storage area networks 
(SANs)
• Backup data storage, including tapes and optical disks
• Onsite storage away from the computers
• Offsite storage, formal or informal
• Vendors
8.8.3 Computer Forensics Versus Data Recovery
The science of extracting information from computers in connection with various forms of 
investigation is called computer forensics (CF) and has become an important tool for 
investigators working in both the public and private sectors. This section looks at how CF 
works and provides some guidelines for fraud investigators to enable them to make the 
most efficient and effective use of CF in their work.
CF must be performed in a lawful way. Various jurisdictions have laws covering ownership 
of computers and computer data and the circumstances under which they may be 
examined. Fraud examiners should review such matters with counsel. For the purposes of 
this section, it is assumed that the examiner has determined that there is no legal 
impediment to a CF examination.
It is important at the outset to differentiate between CF and a technology previously 
discussed, data recovery. Data recovery is used where there is hardware or software 
damage to a storage device. The objective of data recovery is simply to recover the data; it 
is not necessarily associated with a CF investigation. Of course, since any CF investigation 
must begin with a fully operational disk or tape, data recovery techniques are an important 
tool and must be used if the device is damaged.
8.8.4 What Is Computer Forensics?
CF is the science of analyzing digital systems and data for information relevant to an 
investigation that may end up in the civil or criminal courts. Like all other forms of 
forensics, it has both capabilities and limitations. It is not infallible. It cannot guarantee that 
information being sought will be found. CF professionals must carry out their examinations 
objectively and report them accurately, whether or not their findings support their clients’ 
position. The value of forensic science itself depends on this level of independence and 
intellectual honesty.
CF can be divided into four areas for discussion:
• Data acquisition
• Data analysis
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• Reporting of results
• Qualification of CF experts
Data Acquisition
Before any analysis can occur, the CF engineer or analyst must have files or drives to 
analyze and an indication of what is to be examined.
Acquisition of material on files or drives must be carried out with methodologies that meet 
a recognized standard of completeness and accuracy. For example, any methodology must 
be able to capture not only the visible files but also the various forms of data not normally 
available to the user. For this reason, CF engineers use only a limited number of techniques 
for capturing data from computers. The objective of their data capture methodologies is to 
ensure that nothing was added or subtracted during the data capture process. The 
investigator can use software packages specifically designed for computer forensics that are 
known through careful testing and court experience to be forensically accurate. In addition, 
the investigator can use hardware that can be connected directly to either a computer or a 
hard drive to make a perfect copy of every byte of data on the drive, including those that 
do not have any informational content. For example, if a 120 gigabyte hard drive contains 
only 2 gigabytes of user data, a forensic copy would still be 120 gigabytes long. Backup 
tapes and files can also be used for forensic examination, but they carry only visible 
records. Also remember that the image file may prove useful to the forensic accountant as a 
source of files for examination.
All data, once retrieved, must be safeguarded. Where appropriate, standard chain-of- 
custody documentation and materials (for example, seals and bags) should be used so the 
investigator can show that no modification of the retrieved data could have occurred. 
Where it is unclear whether chain-of-custody control is needed, fraud examiners should err 
on the side of caution. Until the results of the CF examination are complete, it is impossible 
to say with certainty what is going to be found or its importance to the case, so it is better to 
institute chain-of-custody procedures on a routine basis and discontinue them only when a 
decision has been made not to use the data as evidence in the case. Even if chain-of-custody 
turns out not to be needed for the CF examination, it may be important to show the 
authenticity and reliability of the files used for forensic accounting processes.
The other form of data required before an examination can begin is that needed to guide 
the examiner in conducting the work. For example, there may be a relevant period of time 
to be reviewed, or a list of names, companies, accounts, or other ways to differentiate 
relevant from irrelevant material. Experienced CF examiners will work closely with their 
clients to help them create the most useful key word lists and other catalogues of relevant 
material.
Acquisition of data may seem impossible, for example, when a machine has an inoperative 
hard drive. Drives may be physically damaged or the software impaired either accidentally 
or deliberately to prevent analysis. Data recovery, as discussed earlier, can restore data 
from damaged hardware or software into a form useful to CF analysis.
Data Analysis
Forensic analysis uses a variety of specialized software packages to examine the collected 
data. Some of these tools are designed to extract information from backup tapes. For 
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example, techniques exist to extract e-mail accurately from e-mail server backup files 
without having to completely rebuild the server. As discussed in Section 8.8.2, “The 
Complexities of Data Storage: Looking Under the Hood,” forensic tools are used to search 
a number of areas not generally visible to users, including:
• Erased files. CF tools can recognize the entries for erased files in file allocation tables and 
determine whether the space has been reused. In many cases, it is possible to restore 
either an entire file or at least parts of the file.
• Slack space. Files that have been erased and have had their storage clusters assigned to 
another file may still be retrievable in part by an examination of slack space. Specialized 
CF tools can read beyond the first EOF mark in a cluster and can search slack space 
very efficiently.
• Swap/page files. While parts of the swap file will undoubtedly be machine-language 
computer programs, there are also likely to be fragments of text, spreadsheets, and 
databases that may prove useful in a CF examination. This area may also include data 
from e-mail messages or instant messaging sessions.
• Temporary files. Like any other erased program, temporary files are capable of being 
accessed by CF tools until they are overwritten.
• Print buffer files. CF professionals can often find these files and examine their contents.
• Compressed files. The CF organization should either have one of the software programs 
available to search these files in their compressed form or be able to decompress them.
• Password protected files. Systems users have various techniques to protect their files from 
casual observers. Programs such as Microsoft Word, WordPerfect, Excel, and others 
provide the capability to encrypt a document and password protect it. Such capabilities 
are also now being built into some e-mail and instant messaging programs. Other 
programs are available that perform this encryption as their basic function. A well- 
known and popular program of this kind is PGP (Pretty Good Privacy.) The reality is 
that software exists that can crack the encryption on many common packages, but it may 
require anything from minutes to days of work on a complex of decryption machines. 
For others, the encryption is so strong (cryptographers use the term cryptographic 
robustness that without access to the password or pass phrase used, decryption may be 
impossible in any practical sense.
• Browser history and cache files. These files can be examined during a CF analysis to 
determine browsing activity. Although these files can be erased, as with any other file, 
the data that is not overwritten is still subject to search and may be retrievable.
• Cookie files. Normally, cookies are invisible to the user (although it is not hard for a 
browser user to find the files) and for this reason are often forgotten. Cookies can be of 
great interest in a CF investigation to enable the investigator to see where the browser 
was pointed, and when various cookies were written to the hard drive.
• Metadata. Metadata is really data about how the user has manipulated the operating 
system and application programs. E-mail files also typically contain significant fields of 
metadata. CF analysis of metadata can be of great importance in a case.
Some organizations performing CF analysis may use commercial CF tools exclusively. 
Other organizations may have internal research and development groups that provide them 
with proprietary capabilities that may exceed those of standard commercial products.
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However, in this case, the fraud examiner should inquire into the forensic adequacy of such 
tools.
Reporting of Results
Fraud examiners should carefully and critically review every CF report provided to them. 
Information in a CF report must be defensible and forensically accurate. Here are some 
points to question:
• “We conducted an examination of Jane Roberts’s computer.” The examiner should be 
precise about what was examined, and should be careful to not draw conclusions. It is 
probably more accurate to say, “We conducted an examination of a Dell Model XXXX 
computer, Serial Number XXXXXXX, bearing a Doe and Company Property Tag 
numbered XXXXX. We were informed by Joe Smith, General Counsel of Doe and 
Company, that this computer was routinely used by Jane Roberts. When imaging the 
computer, we noted that the room in which it was located (7-234) had Jane Roberts’s 
name on the door, and that there were several diplomas and awards on the walls, all of 
which had Ms. Roberts’s name on them.”
• “This file was entered into the machine by Jane Roberts.” What evidence can the CF 
examiners show to prove who was sitting at the keyboard at the time the file was 
entered? They may be able to show that her account was logged in or produce other 
evidence, such as a phone log record stating her office phone was in use at the time the 
file was entered. But without such direct or corroborative evidence, it is better to simply 
stick to what was found on the machine without drawing conclusions that may not be 
objectively supportable.
Of course, this is no different from the test to which any expert’s report would be subjected. 
All CF reports must be reviewed to be sure that no conclusions are reached without a 
documented basis. Even though a CF examination may seem and even be highly technical, 
the conclusions must still be supportable and completely understood by the fraud 
examiner.
Qualifications of CF Experts
Like any other experts, CF witnesses must qualify to be accepted by the courts. You need to 
be confident both that their training, experience, education, and reputation will make them 
acceptable and that they have the ability to carry out the kinds of examination that you will 
require. You must also feel confident that, if they appear in court, they will be able to 
withstand a sharp cross-examination.
Sometimes a brilliant technician is a terrible witness.
8 .8.5 Making the Best Use of Computer Forensics in Fraud 
Investigations
CF can be complex, time-consuming, and expensive. There are ways to balance costs and 
expected outcomes, although, as in any other forensic science, there can be no guarantee of 
success.
• Time may be your enemy. Consider separating the process of data capture from data 
analysis in your planning. Computer data can be easily lost, either when the storage 
media is destroyed or the data is removed by software so thoroughly as to eliminate any 
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chance of recovery. For this reason, any information possibly necessary for an 
investigation could be made available by having it copied in a forensically sound 
manner. Once the copy is made and sealed under chain-of-custody control, it should be 
safe and available for analysis when and if needed. If the data is not captured quickly, it 
may be subject to deliberate or inadvertent alteration or destruction.
• There may be processes in place that will automatically destroy data on a regular basis. 
E-mail systems, for example, may be programmed to retain data only for a limited 
period. Once erased, this data may be difficult to reconstruct. Archival tapes may be 
recycled and reused at fixed intervals, and their content may be overwritten. At the very 
least, consider having counsel issue a document preservation letter or obtain a court 
order to stop data destruction. This letter or order should specifically address automated 
time-based destruction processes. While the content of the letter or order must be 
customized by counsel to the particular situation, the following example may be of 
interest:
Please be advised that [Plaintiffs/Defendants/Third Party] believe 
electronically stored information to be an important and irreplaceable 
source of discovery and/or evidence in the above referenced matter. 
The discovery requests served in this matter seek information from 
[Plaintiff’s/Defendant’s] computer systems, removable electronic media 
and other locations. This includes, but is not limited to, e-mail and other 
electronic communications, word processing documents, spreadsheets, 
databases, calendars, telephone logs, contact manager information, 
Internet usage files, and network access information.
The laws and rules prohibiting destruction of evidence apply to 
electronically stored information in the same manner that they apply to 
other evidence. Due to its format, electronic information is easily deleted, 
modified, or corrupted. Accordingly, [Plaintiffs/Defendants/Third Party] 
must take every reasonable step to preserve this information until the 
final resolution of this matter. This includes, but is not limited to, an 
obligation to discontinue all data destruction and backup tape recycling 
policies.
If this correspondence is in any respect unclear, please do not hesitate to 
call me.
Obviously, in drafting this letter, the more intelligence you have about the party on 
whom it is being served, the better. This is an area in which your CF resources may be 
of assistance to counsel in customizing the details to provide the best coverage.
• Plan the examination carefully. You should, in discussions with your CF provider, agree 
on what kinds of tests and reviews are to be conducted, on which machines or archives 
the tests will be run, the search terms to be used for each part of the project, and the 
time and resources that will be involved. Also determine how you will receive your 
results (for example, printed form, CDs, or DVDs). Determine whether you will need 
specialized software to review material provided to you in machine-readable form, 
particularly if you do not have the specific software that was used to create the files. 
There are commercial packages that can provide you with the ability to access such files 
without having the original software. Some CF providers supply proprietary software 
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with their reports to assist you in both being able to read their results and conducting 
additional searches for new key words or other terms on your own.
8.9 Selected Computer Crimes
8.9.1 Brief Case Synopses
It is useful to look at actual cases of computer crime to see the challenges businesses face if 
targeted by an offender. In each of these brief case studies, consider how your 
organization’s existing security system would have fared, how your own organization would 
have reacted, and how likely it is that your current system of internal controls would have 
identified the problem and traced it back to the guilty parties.
ER Fraud Case Study
A computer operator at a hospital was charged with embezzling $40,000 by 
submitting false invoices that were processed through the hospital’s computer 
system. At the same time, the hospital’s assistant data processing manager accepted 
a $41,000 bribe from a consultant who stole an additional $150,000 by submitting 
false invoices for computer services. Both the operator and the assistant manager 
had prior convictions for computer-related crimes. Because computer personnel 
were not directly involved in patient care, hospital policy did not require a 
background check. An inexpensive reference check with previous employers could 
have possibly prevented the crime because the offenders would probably not have 
been hired when it was revealed that they had falsified their employment 
applications.
Even Experts Have Bad Days Case Study
A partner at a major international consulting firm received an anonymous call 
suggesting that one of the firm’s senior information systems managers was 
defrauding the firm through a scheme involving false invoicing for supplies such as 
laser toner cartridges and backup tape cartridges. A confidential internal 
investigation was carried out and no problems were revealed. Every invoice could 
be shown to tie directly to the actual material that had been delivered. The report 
seemed to be false but a member of the firm’s management committee decided that 
someone independent of the company should take a second look. Investigators 
were hired and they discovered that the material had been delivered, but they could 
find no record of the firm that supplied the materials. A simple background check 
on the vendor showed that it was just a shell formed by the senior information 
systems manager. He had developed a scheme in which he would place orders with 
the shell company (actually, with himself) and then order the same material from a 
reputable supplier who sent it to his home overnight. He would open the boxes, 
remove the original vendor’s invoices, insert his own invoices (which were exactly 
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15 percent higher than what he had paid) and then reship them. This simple scam 
resulted in a loss to the company of more than $300,000.
As shown in this case, vendor fraud can occur even in situations where all the 
materials are actually received. No employees had questioned why so many orders 
were being placed with a company no one had ever heard of when major vendors 
could provide the same material in less time and at a lower cost.
The Invoice Looked Good Case Study
The scam was brilliant. The accounting manager had found a way to get his 
employing company to pay for his gambling losses in Las Vegas. Every time he 
needed to send a payment, he simply created an invoice for services at some distant 
office. The invoices were always from different companies but on all of them he put 
a stamp on which he wrote their vendor number in the company’s system. Of 
course, the vendor number was one the accounting manager had assigned to the 
holding company that owned the casino. Of course, the casino was always glad to 
see him on his quarterly visits: It didn’t care whether the check was made out to it 
or to its parent company. Because the computer system would not reject the invoice 
as long as the vendor number was valid, the computer generated the check in the 
weekly check run; it was signed by another machine and mailed out with thousands 
of other checks.
The scheme worked for years, until the outside auditors decided to conduct an 
internal control review. They discovered there was no match between vendor 
names on invoices and vendor numbers. In checking a vendor list, one of the 
auditors recognized the name of the casino’s parent company and wondered why 
this unlikely organization would be a vendor. The manager told the auditor that the 
company held meetings at the casinos owned by the company. Unfortunately for 
the manager, the auditors checked his story, and the scheme was revealed.
Breaking the Bank Case Study
A European bank sustained losses estimated at $65 million over a two-year period 
when the head of the foreign currency transfer department and her assistant, who 
had broken the bank’s computer transfer codes, were able to move money into 
outside accounts. The fraud was discovered through an audit and the two 
perpetrators were arrested. Afterwards, everyone asked how it was possible for such 
a large amount of money to be stolen with no one noticing and raising the alarm. 
Further investigation showed that the bank was involved in complex money 
laundering and tax evasion activities. Apparently, the two managers believed that 
with all the manipulation going on no one would notice their independent scheme. 
They were almost right.
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A New Form of Fraud Case Study
An employee of an insurance company in Florida had the dubious honor of being 
one of the first people convicted under that state’s computer crime law. The 
employee was a benefits clerk with the company and used her expertise in the 
company’s systems and procedures to steal more than $200,000 in two years. She 
filled in the forms that benefits examiners used to approve claims and entered them 
into her computer terminal. She used a variety of names and policy numbers—all 
real—and created the paperwork to back up the claims. Her mistake was always 
using only three mailing addresses for the checks: her own, her father’s, or her 
boyfriend’s. The security department of the company discovered the fraud by 
looking for unusual patterns of payment addresses.
Welfare? Yes, We’re Faring Very Well, Thank You! Case Study
It may be impossible to discover exactly how much they stole but a state 
Department of Social Services learned that one of its supervisors worked in 
collusion with a clerk to steal $300,000. This was a simple matter of input 
falsification. The clerk and supervisor submitted dozens of false claims for benefits 
and collected the payments. The fraud was discovered when a data input clerk 
noticed that the authorization data on one of the forms she was entering was 
incomplete. She called the eligibility worker whose signature had been forged by 
the supervisor to check on the incomplete form. When that person denied 
authorizing the claim or signing the form, an investigation was performed and the 
fraud was discovered.
When Time Stood Still Case Study
Wouldn’t it be great to get the results of horse races before they ran? Imagine 
always betting on long shots when you know the winner. Just a dream? Not for the 
computer operator at a government-run betting agency in Australia. He figured a 
way to reverse time. Just before certain races, he reset the system clock to read three 
minutes earlier than it actually was. As soon as the race was run, he called his 
girlfriend, who was an off-track telephone-betting clerk. She immediately entered 
bets on the winner. Because the computer believed that the race had not yet started, 
the bets were accepted. Then, the operator would reset the clock. Unfortunately, we 
cannot report that the scheme was uncovered by brilliant work by internal auditors, 
external auditors, corporate security personnel or even outstanding police work. 
The operator’s girlfriend turned him in when she discovered he was seeing another 
woman.
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Livent: Computer Programs Written to Conceal Management Fraud
Livent was a Canadian based producer of live theatre. They also were listed on 
NASDAQ. Between 1990 and 1998 senior management engaged in numerous 
frauds to misappropriate funds and report inflated earnings. The chief financial 
officer was the recent former audit partner in charge of the engagement, and 
participated in the fraud. Kickbacks were directed to senior management who 
authorized excessive charges for and manipulated descriptions of services. Those 
costs were improperly carried to long-term fixed assets. In addition, excess costs on 
losing shows were improperly charged or transferred to shows that were still in 
development or had a longer period for amortizing costs, hiding the overall losses. 
Each quarter the company removed expenses and liabilities from the books, only to 
reinstate them after the quarter. The execution of the changes on a batch basis via a 
specially written computer program was designed to hide the nature of the activity 
from auditor scrutiny by making the adjustments look like original transactions. The 
SEC Administrative Proceeding states:
“Because of the sheer magnitude and dollar amount of the 
manipulations, it became necessary for senior management to be 
able to track both the real and the phony numbers. At Eckstein’s 
direction, Malcolm maintained computer files of the manipulations 
that tracked the details of expense capitalizations, expense rolls and 
show-to-show cost transfers from 1995 through the first quarter of 
1998.”9
9 United States before the SEC, previously cited.
8.9.2 Case Study: A Closer Look
There are thousands of cases of serious computer crimes on the books. Some were 
presented in the previous section. To provide a closer look at the way these cases are 
investigated, one full-length case study is included. This case involves deliberate actions by 
an insider who disrupted the e-mail capabilities of an organization.
The Case of the Suicidal Computers Case Study
It happened, as do so many unpleasant things, in the dark of night. A dozen 
computers—each dedicated as an e-mail router for a major financial services firm— 
apparently made a mutual decision, precisely at 5:00 A.M. one morning, to commit 
suicide. At that time, each of the computers, suddenly and without warning, 
proceeded to completely reformat each of their hard disk drives. From that moment 
on, e-mail within the huge global organization stopped. Any message that was sent 
outside of the local office was not going to be delivered.
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Within an hour, the problem was noticed. Within two, it was apparent that the 
problem was not small and was not going to be easy to fix. Because many of the 
important daily operating communications of the company went through e-mail, it 
was clear that a back-up plan would be needed to replace the damaged 
communications links. While one group of managers developed a plan to keep the 
organization functioning, the chief information officer passed the word to the 
company’s communications manager to fix the problem. The data communications 
manager immediately contacted the manufacturer. Because the organization was a 
large and valued customer, the manufacturer put two systems engineers on the next 
available flight.
At the same time, the director of corporate security recognized that, while it was 
possibly an accident—perhaps a programming bug—that caused this crisis, it was 
probably a deliberate act of sabotage. If it were, he knew he would need proof to 
determine who had caused it. The director of corporate security also understood 
that proof requires evidence that could be admitted in a court of law. Fortunately, 
the director had previous experience in computer fraud cases in which evidence 
that might have existed was destroyed in the attempt to fix software problems. 
Therefore, two calls were made: The first was to the chief executive officer of the 
company, who gave him authority to investigate the incident and, if it were shown 
to be deliberate, to identify and punish the perpetrator. The second call was to a 
private investigations firm that specialized in high-technology incidents.
The investigators understood that they could not interfere with the repair efforts; 
nevertheless, they immediately went to the data center. They briefed the repair 
team, and made a simple request: Please, do not destroy or change anything that 
might be the cause of the incident without checking with us first; and keep detailed 
notes of your findings.
Over the two days it took to identify the problem and complete repairs, the 
investigators collected evidence, both in the form of software and in written 
statements from the software engineers.
During the investigation, it was discovered that one e-mail server had not 
reformatted itself. Because of a hardware problem, it had been shut down when the 
incident occurred. When the engineers discovered this, they examined the unit. 
One of the company’s technicians noticed that the program that controls the 
processing of daily backups indicated it had been modified a few weeks earlier.
The technician who was responsible for backup knew that she had not changed the 
program in months. Nevertheless, the program had been changed. It still performed 
its normal backup but there was a new routine that checked the date every time the 
program ran. On a specific date, the program had just two lines of code to be 
executed and those two lines instructed the computer to reformat its hard drives 
immediately without warning and without any report being generated. The 
investigators took possession of the server since it was now apparent that the act was 
deliberate.
Over a 48-hour period, the problem was solved and all systems were checked for 
the existence of the deadly software. Before the engineers from the computer 
manufacturer left, the investigators assigned them one additional task. Using the 
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notes they made during the previous 48 hours, each of the engineers wrote a memo 
documenting his or her findings in the context of what was now a potential criminal 
investigation. These statements were quickly reviewed and then signed and sworn 
to before a notary. This action converted a memo into a sworn affidavit, which 
could have great value in any future court action.
With the e-mail system back in operation, the data center management worked with 
the investigative team to determine who could have inserted the killer code into the 
dozen servers. Because of security measures built into the system, very few people 
had the authority to make those changes. In fact, the investigators were told, only 
four employees had that authority and all were exemplary employees, so far 
beyond suspicion that no one could conceive of any of them having done this. Yet it 
had to be one of them. Who else could it be?
That was the question put to the head of the e-mail management group, where the 
four suspects worked. She was convinced that none of the four employees was 
responsible; however, she had another candidate under consideration. He had 
resigned some weeks earlier, but, as a member of the group, he would have had the 
authority. Why had he left? Because he felt that he was misunderstood and 
insufficiently appreciated. He believed he knew far more than the others in the 
group, including the group head, about e-mail technology. He had publicly gone to 
senior data center management to request a promotion to group head. When his 
managers decided that they would keep the present manager, this disgruntled 
employee had given notice and told others that the company did not deserve him.
An examination of the former employee’s computer revealed evidence of the 
destructive code that had caused the shutdown. Several versions of the code were 
found, including the key line that delayed the destruction until several weeks after 
he left the company. On the evidence presented by the investigators, the case was 
referred to law enforcement. The police accepted the case and reviewed the 
evidence. The case was brought to the county prosecutor, who determined the 
actions to modify the computer’s program were a violation of the state’s computer 
crime laws and that he would prosecute.
8.10 Conclusion
One of the peculiar things about the field of computer crime is that one can say almost 
anything and go unchallenged. The only thing people seem to agree on is that most 
computer crime is probably never reported either because it is never discovered or because 
the company is embarrassed and chooses to handle it administratively. Often the company 
will forego prosecution if the offender resigns and agrees never to discuss the incident. This 
is why people who commit computer crimes can, in effect, get away with it and go on to 
another company with their reputations apparently intact.
This chapter has tried to show that it’s a myth that only those with tremendous computer 
skills can commit a computer crime. Any employee, temporary worker, or independent 
contractor with authorized access, as well as anyone with unauthorized access can do it. 
Since most computer crimes involve input or output manipulations, the individuals most 
50 Fraud Supp. 6—2006
Chapter Eight: Computer Crime, Computer Criminals, and Computer Evidence
able to commit these crimes are not developers but employees in departments that use the 
systems. This is not to say that systems people do not commit computer crimes; they do, 
but they are not typically likely to do so.
Further, the commonly held belief that most computer crime is committed by outside 
hackers who gain access to systems through almost mystical abilities is also a myth. Most of 
the incidents involve actions by insiders. Again, enough occurrences do involve those 
outside the organization to make defensive systems such as firewalls absolutely necessary.
A third myth is that computer-related thefts including fraud and embezzlement are not 
detected by audit but by accident. If that were true, and it is not, it would imply that the 
criminals are somehow more intelligent or more skillful or perhaps more cunning than the 
noncriminals. This is also not the case. Sound internal security, accounting, and audit 
systems are very effective and do catch the bad guys. It is when these controls are not in 
place or when they are implemented with insufficient resources that the criminals get the 
upper hand.
As computer security becomes an increasingly important aspect of technology, it is likely 
that better mechanisms to prevent and detect computer crimes will evolve. But to gain the 
needed protection, it will be necessary for companies to adopt the technology and to 
implement it properly. Again, those who fail to assign sufficient resources to prevent 
problems are doomed to have such troubles.
Finally, once a security weakness is identified in a system, whether by hackers or security 
experts, and the knowledge of the hole becomes public, it is important that it be closed 
quickly. There is nothing more discouraging than having to tell a victim company that it 
was hit by a perpetrator who used a well-known hole to enter its system and that all along 
there had been an easy-to-install, free patch out there but that it was never installed.
8.11 Computer Crime Checklists
Internal and external auditors and IT department management can use the following 
checklists “Evaluating a Company’s Electronic Data Management Policies,” “Evaluating the 
Corporate Environment for Computer-Crime-Friendly Characteristics,” and “The State of 
Authentication,” to help them understand and recognize the red flags that may indicate the 
presence of fraud in their organizations and those of their clients. Generally, all No answers 
require investigation and follow-up to determine whether remedial action is needed. The 
results should be documented. Use the “Ref’ column to cross-reference the checklist to any 
additional working papers.
These checklists are intended for general guidance and information only. Use of these 
checklists does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and it is not intended as a 
substitute for audits or similar procedures. If computer crime is suspected, seek the advice 
of a knowledgeable computer-forensics professional.
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Table 8.1 Evaluating a Company’s Electronic Data Management Policies
Evaluating a Company’s Electronic Data Management 
Policies Checklist Yes No NA Ref
Note: This table is adapted from the publication “Top Ten Tips 
for Effective Electronic Data Management,” previously provided 
on the Kroll Ontrack website as part of the Legal Tools section of 
the site, (www.krollontrack.com)
1. Has the company put in place the policies and procedures 
needed to actively manage electronic data storage systems?
2. Does the company maintain current records of the types of 
hardware and software in use, and the onsite and offsite 
locations of all electronic documents?
3. Does the company have a written records management 
policy for both paper and electronic documents that 
schedules on and offsite retention periods as well as 
destruction?
4. Does the company train everyone to carry out their 
responsibilities under the data retention and destruction 
policies?
5. Does the company have a written policy covering:
a. Employee use of hardware and software?
b. Employee use of unauthorized software?
c. Responsibility for data security?
d. Company rights of surveillance?
e. The change of passwords at specific time intervals?
f. The de-activation of passwords when an employee is 
transferred or terminated?
6. Are there adequate security measures covering the 
transmission of data into and out of the company? Has any 
data of high sensitivity been designed to be encrypted in 
transmission?
7. Is there a litigation response team in place that can respond 
to data preservation requests and discovery orders to ensure 
compliance? The team should be comprised of outside and 
in-house legal counsel, representatives from human 
resources, business-line management, and IT.
8. Does the technology used to destroy electronic documents 
produce a record certifying complete destruction? Have 
“standards” for data writing over files been referenced and 
adhered to in the data erasure process?
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Table 8.1 (continued)
Evaluating a Company’s Electronic Data Management 
Policies Checklist Yes No NA Ref
9. Do policies enumerate the data retention requirement of 
regulatory agencies (e.g., SEC) or jurisdictions (e.g., States) or 
laws (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) to ensure that electronic 
documents are retained in accordance with requirements?
10. Does the company have a procedure to halt automatic 
destruction of e-mails and other data that might be required 
to be retained?
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Table 8.2 Evaluating the Corporate Environment for Computer-Crime-Friendly 
Characteristics
Evaluating the Corporate Environment for Computer- 
Crime-Friendly Characteristics Yes No NA Ref
1. Do pay rates and employee benefit programs compare 
favorably with the industry and area where the company is 
located?
2. Are there grounds for actual or possible employee 
discontent?
3. Does management define and communicate clearly to 
employees the expected standards of work performance and 
on-the-job behavior?
4. Does the company have effective and consistent programs in 
place to recognize and reward good work and to provide 
feedback for inadequate or unacceptable performance or 
workplace behavior?
5. Does the company provide counseling when work or 
behavior is substandard?
6. Are the performance and behavioral standards reasonable 
and achievable?
7. Does the company provide the resources and support 
necessary to meet or exceed standards?
8. Are there reasonable and adequate internal controls, reviews, 
audits, inspections and reporting mechanisms to assure that 
company policies, procedures and rules are being followed?
9. Does the company demonstrate through policy and practice 
that it will not condone violation of ethical norms or
inappropriate behavior? Does the top management 
demonstrate the proper “tone at the top” in its practices and 
actions?
10. Does the company recognize destructive competitiveness 
between employees and managers and intervene to stop it?
11. Does the company have objective standards that avoid bias 
or material unfairness in hiring, promotion, pay, appraisals, 
assignments, overtime, etc., and does it have a mechanism in 
place to appropriately investigate and handle complaints in 
these areas?
12. Is the company facing a merger, acquisition or business 
failure that may give employees an increased desire to 
“watch out for themselves?
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Table 8.2 (continued)
Evaluating the Corporate Environment for Computer- 
Crime-Friendly Characteristics Yes No NA Ref
13. Does the company have an anti-fraud program with an 
anonymous tip fraud “hot-line” number that is known to 
employees?
14. Does the company communicate the protections afforded by 
Whistleblower and other laws and regulations to its 
employees?
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Table 8.3 The State of Authentication
The State of Authentication Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Are all system users required to log on using a User ID and a 
password?
2. Are there written and enforced policies requiring users to 
safeguard their password and not to share it with others?
3. Does more than one person use the same user account?
4. Are there written and enforced policies for password 
construction?
5. Are there written and enforced policies requiring regular 
password changes and prohibiting re-use of old passwords?
6. Is there a mechanism by which an employee can report the 
possible compromise of a password and change it?
7. Is there a mechanism to recover lost passwords that prevents 
anyone other than the responsible employee from re-using it 
to access an account?
8. Is there a policy regarding termination of system access when 
an employee leaves the company?
9. Are non-employees such as consultants and temps required 
to sign a confidentiality and computer-use agreement before 
being assigned a password?
10. Do passwords limit employee access to authorized 
applications only?
11. Do supervisors or “super users” have access to the system 
only through personally identifiable accounts?
12. Are accounts reviewed regularly to assure that each 
represents an actual employee or authorized non-employee, 
and that there are no accounts unaccounted for?
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Table 8.4 Sarbanes-Oxley and Internal Control Over IT
(continued)
Internal Control Over IT Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Has management received and read COBIT from ISACA 
or the IT Control Objectives for Sarbanes-Oxley from the IT 
Governance Institute?
2. Are the CEO, CFO and CIO familiar with the COSO 
and COBIT frameworks?
3. Have the IT systems and subsystems controlling 
financial reporting been identified?
4. Is the IT system designed to prevent the creation of 
deficiencies, significant deficiencies or material 
weaknesses through the application software?
5. Can the IT system provide the integrity of information, 
availability and compliance required by the SEC final 
rules? Note: This consideration is linked to the 
information and communication component in COSO.
6. Can the IT system provide the security from 
unauthorized access or disclosure required to ensure 
the integrity of the financial reporting process? 
Unauthorized access can be prevented at the 
application software level or at the network level, 
depending on the security software design employed.
7. Is the process of program development secure against 
tampering? Are programs tested against the 
specifications and user needs before they are brought 
on-line?
8. Is there a strategic plan for the IT system? Are upgrade 
assessments scheduled to ensure that systems are 
“current” but not disrupted by minor changes and 
unimportant updates?
9. Is someone responsible for the management of third- 
party services?
10. Are all overseas service providers monitored closely for 
their effect on the financial reporting process and 
compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley? Are direct tests or a 
Type 2 “SAS 70” report available on outsourced 
processes?
11. Is a quality assurance methodology in place for the 
introduction of new applications?
12. Are all aspects of the IT system well documented?
13. Is the system tested regularly and all deficiencies and 
changes documented?
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Table 8.4 (continued)
Internal Control Over IT Checklist Yes No NA Ref
14. Is there a well-documented approval process in place 
for all changes to hardware or software?
15. Are the effects of all changes on other parts of the 
system investigated and well documented?
16. Has a risk assessment determined the likelihood and 
consequences of a failure anywhere in the system?
17. Is there a monitoring process in place covering all 
relevant IT general controls components—access and 
security, new program development, program changes 
and operations?
18. Is the “tone at the top” of the IT function assessed and 
evidenced?
19. Is there a mechanism or process for determining when 
and who to call when specialists and consultants are 
needed for various IT related special tasks?
20. Are test results for the IT controls over the financial 
reporting process compiled in a report for review by 
management?
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Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
9.1 Overview
9.1.1 Purpose and Scope
The primary focus of this Handbook is fraud prevention, not fraud investigation. Likewise, 
this Handbook is intended primarily for the CPA, whether in public practice or in industry, 
who is responsible for fraud prevention, rather than the full-time fraud investigator.
However, professional fraud investigators will also find this Handbook useful in many ways, 
and occasionally there may be some crossover between the two functions; nevertheless, the 
distinction between the two is an important one. Prevention cannot come without an 
understanding of how fraud is perpetrated and the means by which it is concealed. To 
reach this understanding, it is necessary to have a firm foundation in fraud investigation 
techniques.
The experienced fraud investigators achieve their status through professional training and, 
most important, extensive experience in the investigation of fraud. It is well beyond the 
scope of this Handbook—indeed, it would be a virtually unachievable goal for any text—to 
synthesize the knowledge and expertise gained by an experienced forensic and 
investigative CPA over many years. There is simply no substitute for experience.
Nevertheless, virtually all CPAs should be concerned with fraud prevention, investigation 
and reporting, whether internally to an employing company, to a client, or to a court. 
Occasionally and despite the best fraud prevention efforts, a known or suspected fraud 
situation may surface. It is important in such circumstances that the CPA—
1. Be capable of acting competently: that is, perform the acts that should be performed and 
avoid or not perform those acts that should not be performed.
2. Understand the role of the forensic accountant and others who may be called in as part 
of the fraud investigation.
This chapter should serve to introduce the CPA to fraud investigation and reporting. It is 
not intended as a substitute for professional expertise in fraud investigation. Until the 
requisite experience is gained, in all cases involving fraud or suspected fraud, the 
inexperienced CPA should seek the assistance of a lawyer knowledgeable about fraud and a 
CPA experienced in forensic accounting.
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9.1.2 Forensics and Forensic Accounting
The term forensic can be defined as, “belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of law.” 
This term describes the standards that are applicable to the discipline in question—that is, a 
forensic medical examiner would conduct autopsies to a standard required for court 
purposes, and a forensic accountant would conduct financial analyses to a standard 
required for court purposes. Thus, a forensic accountant may also be involved in civil 
litigation cases, which do not necessarily involve fraud.
But what is that standard? Generally, the forensic standard involves considering all the 
relevant evidence that could affect the professional’s opinion and yet withstand rigorous 
cross-examination from counsel who is keen to undermine or disprove the professional’s 
opinion so that the professional can properly assist the court reach its decision. It also 
involves a strong understanding of the legal system.
It follows then, that forensic accounting is a discipline involving accounting to a standard 
required by the court—the criminal and civil courts, as well as arbitration, mediation, and 
other forms of business dispute resolution that require expert evidence to a similar 
standard. It involves the application of financial skills and an investigative mentality to 
unresolved issues, conducted within the context of the rules of evidence. As a discipline, it 
encompasses financial acumen and a strong knowledge and understanding of business 
reality and the workings of the legal system. In the context of a fraud case, extensive fraud 
investigation expertise is essential. Its development has been primarily achieved through 
on-the-job training, as well as experience with investigating officers (in fraud cases), legal 
counsel and in the courts.
Accounting practitioners who concentrate their professional practice on matters requiring 
them to testify in court as to the findings from an investigation of accounting and financial 
evidence are termed forensic accountants. The ultimate test for the forensic accountant is 
acceptance by the courts of law—both criminal and civil—of him or her as an expert 
witness providing testimony in the area of accounting and financial matters.
While the American Institute of CPAs and the state Boards of Accountancy currently do 
not prescribe any standard specifically related to forensic accounting, it is clear that the 
standards for this practice are determined in the first instance by the courts of law. At the 
same time, a CPA is required to meet the general standards of professional practice as 
stipulated by the governing State Board of Accountancy and American Institute of CPAs.
9.2 The Five-Step Investigative Approach




3. Analyzing and testing.
4. Reporting and testifying.
5. Case Resolution.
For a more detailed checklist, see the table at the end of this chapter.
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9. 2.1 Planning
As with almost all endeavors, planning is critical. A well-planned investigation maximizes 
the chances of success; poor planning can lead to disaster. In the early stages of a forensic 
accounting or investigative engagement, it’s especially important to (1) establish the 
scenario, (2) identify areas of concern and uncertainty, and (3) define the nature and scope 
of the investigation.
Establishing the Scenario
The amount of information available during the earliest phase of an engagement will vary 
from case to case. Establishing what is known is of special importance. This is true because 
it has a direct impact on the nature and scope of the investigation.
A known or suspected fraud almost always comes to light through one of the following 
three broad scenarios:
1. Accounting irregularities. One of the most common irregularities is a discrepancy between 
the book value of an asset and its value as determined through physical counts or 
confirmations. For example, a physical inventory count may reveal a major shortage 
compared to the perpetual inventory records, or accounts receivable confirmations may 
reveal much lower values than the accounts receivable subledger. Other common 
examples include bank reconciliations that do not balance, and complaints from 
customers that their statements are incorrect. Any irregularity that comes to light during 
an internal or external examination would also fall into this category. The common 
theme in all of these examples is that the company’s records—its information system— 
have raised a red flag that signals the possibility of fraud.
2. Immediate physical evidence. Physical evidence may be readily apparent or uncovered 
upon inspection. Obvious examples include the aftermath of sabotage or arson. Human 
or electronic surveillance techniques might also yield immediate evidence (for example, 
with respect to employee theft or the diversion of inventory).
3. After-the-fact incriminating information. Incriminating information is a grab-bag category 
that comes in various incarnations: outright confessions brought on by guilt, anonymous 
tips, memos in brown envelopes, whistle-blowing employees, irate spouses looking to 
get back at their fraud-perpetrating husband or wife, honest citizens just trying to do the 
right thing, and so on.
In any fraud investigation the first step is to establish which of these three scenarios exists, 
and the nature and scope of the related evidence.
Identifying Areas of Concern and Uncertainty
The next step in the planning phase is a blending of the Boy Scout motto: be prepared and 
Murphy’s Law: whatever can go wrong, will Immediate areas of concern depend on the 
scenario identified in the previous step. Dealing with sabotage requires the immediate 
beefing up of security at other likely targets to prevent further damage. Dealing with a 
specific employee who is suspected of fraud—such as an accounts receivable clerk who 
might be perpetrating a lapping scheme, or a shipping department employee 
misappropriating inventory—you would want to secure all possible evidence and remove 
the suspect employee from the scene. Removing the employee from the scene need not be
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done in a direct, accusatory way. For example, if the fraud red flag is not common 
knowledge among the work force, the employee could be sent on a week’s training course.
Beyond the immediate concerns of asset protection and evidence preservation, it’s 
important, to the extent possible, to identify the uncertainties in the investigation—any 
pieces of the puzzle that are missing, so to speak. What are the major strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing evidence and supporting material? What additional evidence is 
likely to be available? What additional research, investigation and analysis are likely to be 
required to obtain any needed additional evidence and make it useful? Without at least a 
rough idea of where you’re going, you most likely will not arrive at any valid conclusions.
Perhaps most important, you should think of any constraints, obstacles and pitfalls you are 
likely to encounter along the way. Obviously, forensic accountants and investigators need 
to be concerned about legal constraints in conducting their investigation. For example, as a 
general rule, only law enforcement authorities in possession of a valid search warrant can 
legally search a residence or a vehicle. (There are several exceptions, but for practical 
purposes none of them would apply to a fraud investigation.)
Less clear may be situations such as searching employee lockers. Judicial authorities have 
established that if employees have been put on notice all along that their lockers are subject 
to inspection, they probably can be searched. If this notice is lacking, legal counsel should 
be consulted, which should be the rule followed in all cases. Other concerns of investigators 
include lawsuits for false accusations or wrongful dismissal, and constraints imposed by 
collective bargaining agreements. The point is that a fraud investigation can be a legal 
minefield that must be navigated very carefully and deliberately, not haphazardly. To keep 
from hitting a mine, the safest course to set is early consultation with appropriate legal 
counsel and an experienced forensic CPA.
In addition to legal constraints, factors such as the company’s reputation and relationship 
with its employees must be considered. For example, you would not want to alienate all 
your employees through hasty implementation of draconian investigative or security 
measures, just because of one bad apple.
Defining the Nature and Scope of the Investigation
The last step in the planning phase is to define the nature and scope of the investigation. 
This should be a fairly simple and straightforward process if the first two steps—establishing 
the scenario and identifying areas of concern and uncertainty—were properly thought out.
The nature and scope of the investigation are defined by several interrelated attributes 
including—
• The nature of the main objective—for example, prevention of further incidents, 
dismissal of the perpetrator, proving the case for criminal prosecution, establishing a loss 
claim, and so on—and the ranking of the objectives when there is more than one.
• If a criminal prosecution is envisaged, the point at which to involve the police.
• The level of secrecy or cover required in conducting the investigation.
For example, if the scenario involves an anonymous but seemingly credible tip implicating 
a purchasing employee in a kickback scheme, the objective may be to prove the case for 
criminal prosecution. The nature of the investigation will be fairly secret, because the
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parties involved are unlikely to confess and you would not want to alert them to the 
investigation. Because kickback (that is, secret commission) cases can be difficult to 
establish, the scope of the investigation could become extensive, including background 
investigations of both the bribe giver and bribe taker, surveillance, and possibly even 
setting up a sting operation.
9.2.2 Evidence Gathering
Once the planning phase is complete, the general objectives of the investigation must be 
translated into specifics, for example, identifying the documents and other information to 
analyze, conducting interviews, and obtaining third-party information required for 
corroboration.
Throughout the process, two important questions to keep in mind are what logical 
alternative interpretations exist for the evidence, and what eventual use will be made of the 
evidence. In particular, the forensic accountant must be able to understand the difference 
between relevant and irrelevant information, and must be willing to apply the standards of 
evidence required by the court.
Information Gathering Techniques
The forensic and investigative accountant is not a police officer. He or she does not have 
the resources of a police officer and, even when working to assist the police, must work 
within his or her own expertise, and within the rules governing professional conduct. 
Among the most important investigative tools are those that enable the forensic accountant 
to gather and analyze information available in the public domain in conjunction with other 
information gathered during the investigation.
For example, in investigating an individual, it may be possible to gather background 
information concerning certain aspects of an individual’s financial circumstances (for 
example, mortgages and other secured debts, old court judgments, and so on), educational 
and employment references, professional qualifications, and other details such as whether 
he or she has taken his or her annual vacation. Also worth exploring is corporate 
information such as jurisdiction of incorporation, authorized share capital, and the identity 
of all officers and directors since incorporation can often be obtained from the appropriate 
state office, usually the Secretary of State of the jurisdiction where the incorporation took 
place. In some jurisdictions, shareholder identities can be obtained. In many instances, 
private offshore corporations have less information available than publicly traded North 
American companies.
Public domain information may also provide critical clues or evidence. For example, 
comparison of a company’s statistics and trends to others in its industry, that is, 
benchmarking, may identify unexplained variances that alert the forensic accountant to 
possible questionable activities or that warrant further investigation. At the very least, the 
background data will provide context for the detailed findings from the examination of 
nonpublic data.
There are many sources of public information about organizations, industries, and 
institutions. Very often a university reference library or a government resource center can 
provide access to documents, reference textbooks, computerized databases, and other 
sources of information that can assist in understanding and analyzing a case.
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Documentary Evidence
At the beginning of any case involving documentary evidence, there are two key questions. 
What documents should be obtained? And where will they come from? These questions are 
usually resolved after discussions with available witnesses and an initial assessment of the 
findings to date. Depending on the circumstances, it may be necessary to involve the 
authorities to obtain a search warrant or begin legal proceedings so that a court could order 
the seizing of documents.
The main goal is to gather all documents that might be useful, bearing in mind that 
irrelevant documents can always be returned to their proper place. It is necessary to decide, 
in consultation with legal counsel, whether to be selective (that is, review all documents but 
take only those deemed necessary), or whether to remove or secure all of the documents 
from the premises by taking the filing cabinets, and so on. It is difficult to lay down hard 
and fast rules, but clearly the primary purpose is to obtain all documents that might be 
relevant without resorting to a fishing expedition.
The minimum requirements for financial documentation, for the period under 
investigation, are likely to be the following:
• Books and records, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining either to the 
management of the company or to an individual.
• Documentation pertaining to the movement of assets into and out of a company.
• Relevant correspondence.
• Personal documentation, such as bank-account records.
Documents, including seized documents, should be properly identified and catalogued. 
Documents must be handled carefully. They should not be written upon, altered, stapled or 
unstapled during the course of the investigation. The investigating accountants, in 
particular, should bear this in mind.
Documents should be examined in detail and categorized as follows:
1. Documents required for evidence.
2. Documents required for rebuttal of the defense arguments.
3. Documents required for other reasons.
4. Documents that can be returned.
Once the documents have been sorted into these groups, photocopies can be made to 
provide working copies for the investigating accountant to use when preparing schedules, 
and in general for the working paper files.
Documents will subsequently be selected, from among those photocopied, for use in the 
presentation of evidence in a court of law. They should be compiled and assembled into a 
document brief.
Admissibility of Accounting Evidence
It is important during the evidence gathering stage to consider the two forms of 
documentary accounting evidence that may be presented in a court of law:
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1. Primary, that is, the original, individual accounting documents obtained from the parties 
concerned or other sources.
2. Secondary, that is, summaries and schedules based on the original documents, which are 
produced by an accountant after examining the primary evidence.
The issue of whether secondary accounting evidence should be admissible has been argued 
in the courts for many years. Two opinions that allowed secondary accounting evidence, 
are described below.
In the first case, the court ruled, and was upheld on appeal, that a summary of 
documentary evidence was admissible. The court said, however, that the summary was in 
itself not evidence of the underlying facts; rather, it was strictly an aid to understanding 
primary evidence that had already been established. The judge made the following 
observations about the use of secondary evidence:
1. No more reliance could be placed on the survey than was placed on the primary 
evidence it was intended to summarize.
2. The summary did not prove the veracity and content of the primary evidence.
3. Any summary of primary evidence must show every weakness previously determined as 
existing within the primary evidence.
In the second case, the court ruled that an exhibit prepared by an accountant, based on the 
documentation before the court, be introduced into evidence because it helped to simplify 
and trace the many transactions previously discussed in the court. The defense was 
concerned that the exhibit expressed the independent opinions of the accountant who 
prepared the material and, therefore, was not objective. However, the judge ruled that any 
opinions reflected in the exhibit were opinions that were readily ascertainable from the 
documents themselves—the primary evidence.
Interview Techniques and How to Conduct Them1
1 Adapted from Fraud Investigation Methods (self-study CPE course) by Joseph Wells, CFE, CPA, Austin, TX: 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2003.
CPA practitioners—whether they stop to realize it or not—use interviews extensively in the 
routine performance of their tasks. Some of these interviews are long and complicated, 
such as when an auditor is learning about and documenting a company’s internal control 
structure. Still others are simple and direct. But the point is that audits and other such 
examinations are conducted through observation and inquiry.
Knowing how to conduct a proper interview will help improve a CPA practitioner’s overall 
effectiveness, regardless of whether or not these interviews involve possible fraud. As a 
matter of fact, the interview techniques described herein can be used in virtually any 
situation. For all purposes, the types of questions that can be asked are broken down into 
five types: (1) introductory, (2) informational, (3) closing, (4) assessment, and (5) admission 
seeking. The last two categories are used only when the interviewee’s truthfulness and 
complicity is suspect.
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Interview Preparation
Before embarking on an interview, the practitioner should review appropriate working 
papers and other documents in order to ensure that important information that has not 
been overlooked.
The practitioner should determine what type of information can be supplied by each of the 
potential witnesses. Generally, the most vulnerable witness should be interviewed after the 
more reluctant witnesses. This provides a broader base of information that can be used to 
formulate future questions. However, the timing of interviews is at the discretion of the 
examination team.
Characteristics of a Good Interview
Good interviews share common characteristics. The interview should be of sufficient length 
and depth to uncover relevant facts. Most interviewers tend to get too little, rather than too 
much, information. The interview should be conducted as closely as possible to the event 
in question, because with the passage of time, memories of potential witnesses and 
respondents become faulty, and critical details can be lost or forgotten. A good interview is 
objective in scope and it should be aimed at gathering information in a fair and impartial 
manner.
Characteristics of a Good Interviewer
All good interviewers share certain characteristics. Above all, they are “people persons,” 
and are talented at human interaction. Successful interviewers are the types of people with 
whom others are willing to share information. The good interviewer does not interrupt the 
respondent with unnecessary questions since during an interview, much pertinent 
information results from volunteered information, as opposed to responses to a specific 
question. The good interviewer displays interest in the subject, and in what is being said. If 
the respondent perceives that the interviewer is biased or is attempting to confirm foregone 
conclusions, the respondent will be less likely to cooperate. Accordingly, the interviewer 
should make every effort to demonstrate a lack of bias.
Professionalism in the interview often involves a state of mind and a commitment to 
excellence. The interviewer should be on time, be professionally attired, and be fair in all 
dealings with the respondent. It is absolutely vital that the interviewer not appear to be a 
threat, for if persons perceive they are the target of an inquiry, they will be less likely to 
cooperate. An organization’s dress code should be considered when attending an interview. 
For example, in some situations, a tie could be viewed as a threat.
Interview Rules
Interview One Person at a Time. One of the basic rules of interviewing is to question 
only one person at a time since the testimony of one respondent will invariably influence 
the testimony of another. There are few hard and fast rules with regard to interviewing, but 
this is one of them.
Privacy. Another basic rule is to conduct interviews under conditions of privacy. The 
interview is best conducted out of the sight and sound of friends, relatives, or fellow 
employees since people are very reluctant to furnish information within the hearing range 
of others.
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1. Introductory Questions
One of the most difficult aspects—perhaps the hardest part—of conducting an interview is 
getting started. In many instances the interviewer and the respondent have not previously 
met. The interviewer has a tall order: meet the person, state a reason for the interview, 
establish necessary rapport, and get the information. The introduction is accomplished 
through questions rather than statements. Questions allow the interviewer to assess 
feedback from the respondent. This is an important aspect of the introduction. If the 
respondent is reluctant to be interviewed that fact will become established through the 
introductory questions.
Establish the Purpose of the Interview
The purpose of the interview must be established during the introductory phase. 
Obviously, when the interviewer makes official contact with a respondent some reason 
must be given. The reason or purpose of the interview should be general, not specific. The 
specific interview purpose will be related to the respondent later in the interview process. 
The stated purpose for the interview should be one that is logical enough for the 
respondent to accept and easy for the interviewer to explain. Normally, the more general 
the reason that is given, the better.
If the CPA is conducting interviews under the auspices of the attorney-client privilege (see 
Legal Section), it is normally appropriate to announce that to the respondent. Under those 
conditions, the person being interviewed should be told that the results of his/her interview 
may be disclosed to third parties.
Ask Non-Sensitive Questions
Sensitive questions should be scrupulously avoided until well into the interview, and then 
such questions should be asked only after careful deliberation and planning. During the 
introductory phase, emotive words of all types should generally be avoided. Since they 
normally put people on the defensive and make them less reluctant to answer and to 
cooperate.
Example. Generally, during the introductory phase of an interview, it is best 










Ask a few questions
Shortage or paperwork problems
2. Informational Questions
Informational questions are non-confrontational, non-threatening, and asked for the purpose 
of gathering information. The great majority of the interviewer’s questions fall into this 
category. Types of questions include the following:
• Conducting an interview to gain an understanding of accounting control systems.
• Interviews concerning documents.
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• Gathering information regarding business operations or systems.
• Pre-employment interviews.
• Background information, if not known.
Informational questions seek to elicit unbiased factual information. The interviewer will be 
alert to inconsistency in facts or behavior. Informational questions—as well as others—fall 








Open questions are those questions worded in such a way that “yes” or “no” answers become 
difficult. Furthermore, the answer is not dependent on the question. The typical open 
question calls for a monologue response, and it can be answered in several different ways. 
During the information phase of the interview, the interviewer should endeavor to ask 
primarily open questions in order to stimulate conversation. Some of the best open 
questions are subtle commands.
Example. Open questions typically start with “what,” “what about,” 
“how,” “could it be,” etc.
• “What were your job duties as assistant controller?”
• “How do you normally process these types of invoices?”
• types of payments required Mrs. Smith’s approval?”
Closed Questions
Closed questions are those questions that require a precise answer, usually “yes” or “no.” 
Closed questions also deal with specifics such as dollar amounts, dates, and times. As much 
as possible, closed questions should be avoided in the informational part of the interview, 
but used extensively in completing the interview, described later.
Leading Questions
Leading questions contain the answer as a part of the question. Most commonly, they are 
used to confirm facts that are already known. Although leading questions are usually 
discouraged in court proceedings, they can be used effectively in interview situations.
Double-Negative Questions
Negative questions or statements are confusing and often suggest an answer opposite to the 
correct one. They should not be used. Example: “How could it not be that you do not 
know?”
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Complex Questions
Complex questions and statements are too complicated to be easily understood when they 
cover more than one subject or topic, require more than one answer, and/or require a 
complicated answer. They should be avoided.
Attitude Questions
The attitude of the interviewer can be conveyed by the structure of a question or statement 
and the manner in which a question is asked. When the interviewer wishes to establish a 
friendly mood, for instance, “attitude” questions can be employed.
Question Sequences
As a general rule, questioning should proceed from the general to the specific; that is, it is 
best to seek general information before seeking details. A variation is to “reach backward” 
with questions, by beginning with known information and working toward unknown areas. 
An efficient method of doing this is to recount the known information and then frame the 
next question as a logical continuation of the facts previously related.
It is common, especially in accounting and fraud-related matters, for figures or numbers to 
be critical. Unfortunately, some witnesses are unable to recall specific amounts. The 
interviewer can jog the memory of the respondent by comparing unknown items with 
items of known quantity.
Example. To jog interviewee’s memory regarding numbers or figures, try the 
following:
Interviewer. “Was the amount of money involved more than last year’s 
figure?”
Controlled Answer Techniques
Controlled answer techniques or statements may be used to stimulate a desired answer or 
impression. These techniques direct the interview toward a specific point. For example, it 
may be possible to get a person to admit knowledge of a matter by phrasing the question as 
follows: “I understand you were present when the internal controls were developed, so would you 
please describe how they were constructed?” This phrasing provides a stronger incentive for the 
respondent to admit knowledge than does: “Were you present when the internal controls were 
developed?”
To stimulate the person to agree to talk or provide information, you may use an example 
such as, “Because you are not involved in this matter, I am sure you would not mind discussing it 
with me?” This provides a stronger incentive to cooperate than: “Do you have any objection to 
telling me what you know?” Avoid negative construction, such as: “I don’t guess you would 
mind answering a few questions?”
Free Narratives
The free narrative is an orderly, continuous account of an event or incident, given with or 
without prompting. It is used to get a quick summary of what is known about a matter. Be 
sure to designate specifically the occurrence you wish to discuss.
Sometimes the respondent must be controlled to prevent unnecessary digression. 
Otherwise, use a minimum of interruptions, and do not stop the narrative without good 
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reason. The respondent will sometimes provide valuable clues when talking about things 
only partially related to the matter under inquiry.
Informational Question Techniques
Below are suggestions to improve the quality of the interview during the information­
gathering phase.
• Begin by asking questions that are not likely to cause the respondent to become 
defensive or hostile.
• Ask the questions in a manner that will develop the facts in the order of their 
occurrence or in some other systematic order.
• Ask only one question at a time, and frame the question so that only one answer is 
required.
• Ask straightforward and frank questions, and generally avoid shrewd approaches.
• Give the respondent ample time to answer. Do not rush.
• Try to help the respondent remember, but do not suggest answers. Be careful not to 
imply a particular answer through facial expressions, gestures, methods of asking 
questions, or types of questions asked.
• Repeat or rephrase questions, if necessary, to get the facts.
• Be sure that you understand the answers. If they are not perfectly clear, have the 
respondent interpret them at that time instead of saving this for later.
• Provide the respondent with an opportunity to qualify his/her answers.
• Separate facts from inferences.
• Have the respondent give comparisons by percentages, fractions, estimates of time and 
distance, and other such comparisons to ascertain accuracy.
• Get all of the facts. Almost every respondent can give you information beyond what was 
initially provided.
• Once the respondent has given a narrative account, ask questions about every item that 
has been discussed.
• Upon conclusion of the direct questioning, ask the respondent to summarize the 
information given. Then summarize the facts, and have the respondent verify that they 
are correct.
Note-Taking
The interviewer will need to take notes frequently during the interview. Start each 
interview on a separate sheet of paper. This procedure can be especially helpful should 
documents from a particular interview be subpoenaed. Do not try to write down all the 
information you are given during an interview, only the pertinent facts. Taking too many 
notes will make the interview process cumbersome and may inhibit the respondent. If a 
quote is particularly relevant, try to write it down verbatim. Enclose all direct quotes in 
quotation marks.
Do not slow down the interview process for note-taking. Instead, jot down key words or 
phrases, then go back over the details at the end of the interview. In general, it is better to 
err on the side of taking too few notes rather than too many.
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Maintain Eye Contact Maintain eye contact with the respondent as much as possible 
during note-taking. Just as eye contact personalizes all human communication, it creates a 
more comfortable environment and facilitates the flow of information during the interview 
process.
Opinions. Avoid making notes regarding your overall opinions or impressions of a 
witness. Such notes can cause problems with your credibility if they are later produced in 
court. Be careful not to show excitement when taking notes. During interviews of targets 
and adverse witnesses, take notes in a manner that does not indicate the significance of the 
information; that is, never allow note-taking to “telegraph” your emotions.
Writing down Questions. Whenever possible, do not write down a list of interview 
questions. Let the interview flow freely. Inadvertently allowing the respondent to read a 
written list of questions can provide an opportunity for him/her to fabricate an answer. 
Certainly, writing down key points the interviewer wants to discuss may be appropriate.
Documenting Results. Expand the notes from the results of questioning as soon as 
possible after concluding the interview—preferably immediately afterward. If this 
procedure is followed, the fraud examiner will not have to take copious notes during the 
interview. Law enforcement officials are generally required to maintain notes. In the 
private sector, notes can usually be destroyed once a memorandum has been prepared 
summarizing the interview.
Observing Interview Reactions
The interviewer must be knowledgeable about the behavior of individuals during an 
interview situation. Most nonverbal clues to behavior fall within one of the following 
categories: proxemics, chronemics, kinetics, or paralinguistics.
• Proxemic communication is the use of interpersonal space to convey meaning.
• Chronemic communication is the use of time in interpersonal relationships to convey 
meaning, attitudes, and desires.
• Kinetic communication is the use of body movement to convey meaning.
• Paralinguistic communication is the use of volume, pitch, and voice quality to convey 
meaning.
Interview Methodology
Make a Transition from the Introduction. Once the introduction has been completed, 
the interviewer needs a transition to the body of the interview. Usually this is accomplished 
by asking the person an easy question about themselves or their duties.
Begin with Background Questions. Assuming the respondent does not have a problem 
answering the transitional question, the interviewer should then ask a series of easy, open 
questions designed to get the respondent to talk about him/herself.
Observe Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior. When the respondent is talking about 
him/herself, the interviewer should discreetly observe verbal and nonverbal behavior. 
Observing behaviors during the initial stages of the interview serves as a baseline for 
observing later reactions.
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Ask Non-Leading (Open) Questions. Open questioning techniques are used almost 
exclusively in the informational phase of the interview. The questions must be inquisitory 
and not accusatory. Remember, the most effective questions are constructed as a subtle 
command. Once the respondent has answered open questions, the interviewer can go back 
and review the facts in greater detail. If the answers are inconsistent, try to clarify them. But 
the interviewer should not challenge the honesty or integrity of the respondent at this 
point.
Approach Sensitive Questions Carefully. Words such as “routine questions” can be 
used to minimize the significance of the inquiry. It is important for information gathering 
purposes that the interviewer does not react excessively to the respondent’s statements. The 
interviewer should not express shock, disgust, or similar emotions during the interview. 
Examples of ways to discuss fraud within a company follow. The questions are posed in a 
hypothetical way to avoid being accusatory.
Example: Examples of non-accusatory questions:
Interviewer:
• “Part of my job is to prevent and uncover waste, fraud, and abuse. You 
understand that, don’t you?”
• “Please tell me where you think the company is wasting assets or 
money.”
• “What, in your opinion, can we do in your department to save more 
money for the company?”
• “Where do you think the company is vulnerable to someone abusing 
his/her position?”
3. Closing Questions
Closing the interview on a positive note is a must in informational interviews. The closing 
serves several purposes. First, it is not unusual for the interviewer to have misunderstood or 
misinterpreted statements of the respondent. Therefore, the interviewer should review key 
facts to ensure that they have been understood. Secondly, the closing questions phase also 
seeks to obtain facts previously unknown. It provides respondents additional opportunity to 
say whatever they want about the matter at hand. If appropriate, the interviewer can ask if 
there are other documents or witnesses that would be helpful to the case. Do not promise 
confidentiality; instead say, ‘Til keep your name as quiet as possible.” Finally, the interviewer 
should leave the discussion on a positive note.
Persons being interviewed often do not volunteer additional information regarding other 
witnesses or evidence. Therefore, provide the respondent an opportunity to furnish further 
relevant facts or opinions. At the conclusion, attempt to determine which facts provided by 
the respondent are the most relevant. Do not attempt to go over all the information a 
second time.
Example. Before ending the interview, go over each of the key facts given by 
the witness in summary form. This gives the respondent an opportunity to 
provide additional facts or opinions.
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Interviewer: “Ms. Jones, I want to make sure that I have my information
straight. Let me take a minute and summarize what we’ve discussed.”
Go over each of the key facts, in summary form. The questions should be closed, so that 
the witness can respond either “yes” or “no.” To obtain additional facts, ask respondents if 
there is something else they would like to say. This gives the correct impression that the 
interviewer is interested in all relevant information, regardless of which side it favors. Try 
to actively involve the respondent in helping solve the case— “If you were trying to resolve this 
issue, what would you do?”
Ask if the respondent has anything else to say. This gives the respondent one final chance 
to make any statement. Also, ask if the interviewer may call at a later time with any 
additional questions, thus leaving the door open for additional cooperation.
Leave the respondent a business card or a telephone number. Invite the respondent to call 
with anything else relevant. In some cases the interviewer should attempt to obtain a 
commitment that the respondent will not discuss the matter. This step is not recommended 
with adverse or hostile respondents.
Physiology of Deception
It is said that everyone lies and does so for one of two reasons: to receive rewards or to 
avoid punishment. In most people, lying produces stress. The human body will attempt to 
relieve this stress (even in practiced liars) through verbal and nonverbal clues.
Conclusions concerning behavior must be tempered by a number of factors. The physical 
environment in which the interview is conducted can affect behavior. If the respondent is 
comfortable, fewer behavior quirks may be exhibited. The more intelligent the respondent, 
the more reliable verbal and nonverbal clues will be. If the respondent is biased toward the 
interviewer, or vice versa, this will affect also behavior.
Persons who are mentally unstable, or under the influence of drugs, will be unsuitable to 
interview. Behavior symptoms of juveniles are generally unreliable. Racial, ethnic, and 
economic factors should be carefully noted. Some cultures, for example, discourage 
looking directly at someone. Other cultures use certain body language that may be 
misinterpreted. Because professional pathological liars are often familiar with interview 
techniques, they are less likely to furnish observable behavioral clues.
4. Assessment Questions: Norming or Calibrating
Norming or calibrating is the process of observing behavior before critical questions are 
asked, rather than during questioning. Norming should be a routine part of all interviews. 
Persons with truthful attitudes will answer questions one way; those with untruthful 
attitudes will generally answer them differently. Assessment questions ask for agreement 
with matters that are against the principles of most honest people. In other words, dishonest 
people are likely to agree with many of the statements, while honest people will not. 
Assessment questions are designed primarily to elicit a verbal or nonverbal reaction from 
the respondent. The interviewer will then carefully assess each reaction. Suggestions for 
observing the verbal and physical behavior of the respondent include the following:
• Use your senses of touch, sight, and hearing to establish a norm.
• Do not stare or call attention to the person’s behavior symptoms.
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• Be aware of the respondent’s entire body.
• Observe the timing and consistency of behavior.
• Note clusters of behaviors.
On the basis of a respondent’s reaction to assessment questions, the interviewer then 
considers all the verbal and nonverbal responses together (not in isolation) to decide 
whether or not to proceed to the admission-seeking phase of the interview. The presence of 
several verbal and/or nonverbal clues is usually necessary to conclude deception on the 
part of the respondent.
Verbal Clues
Changes in Speech Patterns. Deceptive persons often speed up or slow down their 
speech, or speak louder. There may be a change in the voice pitch; as a person becomes 
tense, the vocal chords constrict. Deceptive persons also have a tendency to cough or clear 
their throats during times of deception.
Repetition of the Question. Liars will frequently repeat the interviewer’s question, in 
order to gain more time to formulate an answer. The deceptive individual will say, “What 
was that again?” or use similar language.
Comments Regarding Interview. Deceptive persons will often complain about the 
physical environment of the interview room, such as, “It’s cold in here. "Or sometimes they 
will ask how much longer the interview will take.
Selective Memory. In some cases the deceptive person will have a keen memory for 
insignificant events, but when it comes to the important facts, the person, “just can’t seem to 
remember. ”
Making Excuses. Dishonest persons will frequently make excuses about things that look 
bad for them, such as, “I’m always nervous; don’t pay any attention to that.”
Oaths. Dishonest persons often will add what they believe to be credibility to their lies 
through emphasis. Expressions such as “I swear to God,” “Honestly,” “Frankly,”or “To tell the 
truth, ” are frequently used.
Character Testimony. A liar often will request that the interviewer, “Check with my wife,” 
or “Talk to my minister. ” This is often done to add credibility to a false statement.
Answering with a Question. Rather than deny allegations outright, the liar may answer 
with a question such as, “Why would I do something like that?” As a variation, the deceptive 
person will sometimes question the interview procedure by asking, “Why are you picking on 
me?”
Overuse of Respect. Some deceptive people will go out of their way to be respectful and 
friendly. When accused of wrongdoing, it is unnatural for a person to react in a friendly 
and respectful manner.
Example. Overuse of respect may be a sign of deceit:
Respondent: “I’m sorry, sir. I know you’re just doing your job, but I didn’t do 
it.”
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Increasingly Weaker Denials. When an honest person is accused of something he/she 
did not do, that person is likely to become angry or forceful in making the denial. The 
more the person is accused, the more forceful the denial becomes. The dishonest person, 
on the other hand, is likely to make a weak denial. Upon repeated accusations, the 
dishonest person’s denials become weaker, sometimes to the point of complete silence.
Failure to Deny. Dishonest persons are more likely than honest persons to deny an event 
specifically. An honest person may offer a simple and clear “no, ” while the dishonest 
person will qualify the denial: “No, I did not steal $43,500  from the Company on June 27.” 
Other qualified denial phrases include: “To the best of my memory, ” “As far as I recall, ” or 
similar language.
Avoidance of Emotive Words. A liar will often avoid emotionally provocative terms 
such as “steal, ” “lie, ” and “crime. ” Instead, the dishonest person frequently prefers “soft” 
words such as “borrow,” and “it” (referring to the deed in question).
Refusal to Implicate Other Suspects. Both the honest respondent and the liar will have 
a natural reluctance to name others involved in misdeeds. However, the liar will often 
refuse to implicate possible suspects, no matter how much pressure is applied by the 
interviewer because the culpable person does not want the circle of suspicion to be 
narrowed.
Tolerant Attitudes. Dishonest persons typically have tolerant attitudes towards miscreant 
conduct. The interviewer in an internal theft case may ask, “What should happen to this person 
when he/she is caught?” The honest person usually will say, “They should be fired/prosecuted. ” 
The dishonest individual, on the other hand, is much more likely to reply, “How should I 
know?” or, “Maybe he/she is a good employee who got into problems. Perhaps he/she should be given 
a second chance. ”
Reluctance to Terminate Interview. Dishonest persons generally will be more reluctant 
than honest ones to terminate the interview. The dishonest individual wants to convince 
the interviewer that he/she is not responsible, so that the investigation will not continue. 
The honest person, on the other hand, generally has no such reluctance.
Feigned Unconcern. The dishonest person will often attempt to appear casual and 
unconcerned and therefore adopt an unnatural slouching posture, reacting to questions 
with nervous or false laughter or feeble attempts at humor. The honest person, on the other 
hand, will typically be very concerned about being suspected of wrongdoing, and will treat 
the interviewer’s questions seriously.
Nonverbal Clues
Full Body Motions. When asked sensitive or emotive questions, the dishonest person will 
typically change his/her posture completely, as if moving away from the interviewer. The 
honest person will frequently lean forward toward the interviewer when questions are 
serious.
Anatomical Physical Responses. Anatomical physical responses are those involuntary 
reactions the body has when frightened, such as increased heart rate, shallow or labored 
breathing, or excessive perspiration. These reactions are typical of dishonest people 
accused of wrongdoing.
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Illustrators. Illustrators are the motions made primarily with the hands to demonstrate 
points when talking. In response to nonthreatening questions, the illustrators may be done 
at one rate, while during threatening questions, the use of illustrators may increase or 
decrease.
Hands over the Mouth. Frequently, a dishonest person will cover his/her mouth with the 
hand or fingers during deception. This reaction goes back to childhood, when many 
children cover their mouths as they tell a lie. Such gestures are done subconsciously to 
conceal the statement.
Manipulators. Manipulators are those motions such as picking lint from clothing, playing 
with objects such as pencils, or holding one’s hands while talking. Manipulators are 
displacement activities to reduce nervousness.
Fleeing Positions. During an interview, dishonest people will often posture themselves in 
a “fleeing position, ” where the head and trunk face the interviewer and the feet and lower 
portion of the body point toward the door in an unconscious effort to flee from the 
interviewer.
Crossing the Arms. Crossing one’s arms over the middle zones of the body is a classic 
defensive reaction to difficult or uncomfortable questions. A variation is crossing the feet 
under the chair and locking them. These crossing motions occur mostly when the 
interviewee is being deceptive.
Reaction to Evidence. While attempting to be outwardly unconcerned, the guilty person 
will have a keen interest in implicating evidence. The dishonest person will often look at 
documents presented by the interviewer, attempt to be casual about observing them, and 
then shove them away, as if wanting nothing to do with the evidence.
Most actions that are designed to interrupt the flow of speech are stress related. Examples 
include
• Closing the mouth tightly.
• Pursing lips.
• Covering the mouth with the hand.
• Lip and tongue biting.
• Licking the lips.
• Chewing on objects.
Genuine smiles usually involve the whole mouth; false ones are confined to the upper half. 
Persons involved in deception tend to smirk rather than to smile.
Crossing. The body or legs may be crossed to reduce stress. When the hands are crossing 
the body, it is a defensive gesture to protect the “soft underbelly.”
5. Admission-Seeking Questions
CPAs are rarely required to directly challenge the honesty or complicity of individuals, but 
it does happen. Imagine, for instance, a situation where, during a normal audit, you 
discover a material asset misappropriation that appears to have been committed by the 
chief financial officer. It becomes obvious that someone will have to question the CFO for 
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more details. Should that be you, the practitioner? Should it be a private fraud examiner? 
A law enforcement official? An attorney?
The answer, of course, depends entirely on the circumstances. Today’s CPA practitioner, 
unlike two generations ago, is responsible for helping to detect fraud. As a result, you 
should clearly understand how experts get suspects to confess. To police officials, this is 
often known as interrogation. In the private sector it is more common to call the process an 
admission-seeking interview. Since this process is fraught with legal pitfalls, it should be 
conducted with extreme care by qualified individuals.
The interviewer should ask accusatory or admission seeking questions only when there is a 
reasonable probability that the respondent has committed the act in question. An 
assessment of culpability may be based on verbal and nonverbal responses to interview 
questions, as well as documents, physical evidence, and other interviews.
Conducting an Admission-Seeking Interview
The interview should be scheduled when the interviewer can control the situation. 
Normally it should not be conducted on the accused’s turf and is best conducted by 
surprise.
Interview Room
The location should establish a sense of privacy. The door should be closed but not locked, 
and there should be no physical barriers preventing the target from leaving. This helps 
avoid allegations of custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is generally considered to 
occur when the suspect is being held against his/her will.
Distractions should be kept to a minimum. Ideally, there should be no photographs, 
windows, or other objects in the room. Chairs should be placed about six feet apart, and 
the accused should not be permitted to sit behind a desk. This is to prohibit a psychological 
barrier for the accused to “hide behind.” Note taking during the interview should be done 
in a way that does not reveal their significance.
Presence of Outsiders
Do not suggest to the accused that he/she should have counsel present although, this right 
cannot be denied. If counsel is present, you should have an understanding that he/she will 
be strictly an observer. Attorneys should neither ask nor object to questions. A CPA 
practitioner must be very careful in questioning a witness whose lawyer is present. In fact, it 
is discouraged in most instances. If the situation cannot be avoided, consider having your 
own lawyer on standby. Other than the accused and two fraud examiners, no other 
observers should usually be permitted in the admission-seeking interview. If the accused is 
in a union, a representative may have the right to attend. However, this could present legal 
problems in “broadcasting” the allegation to a third party. It is very difficult to obtain a 
confession with witnesses present. The fraud examiner should, therefore, consider whether 
the case can be proven without the admission-seeking interview.
Miranda Warnings
As a general rule, Miranda warnings are not required by CPA practitioners unless there is 
some form of state action involved. However, if it is likely that the results of the investigation 
will be turned over to law enforcement for prosecution, it is wise to consult legal counsel to
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ensure that subsequent prosecution is not tainted by failure to follow the proper 
procedures.
6. Steps in the Admission-Seeking Interview
Direct Accusation. The accusation should not be made in the form of a question, but a 
statement. Emotive words such as “steal,” “fraud,” and “crime” should be avoided during 
the accusatory process. The accusation should be phrased so that the accused is 
psychologically “trapped” with no way out.
Example. The accusation should usually be in the form of a clear statement. 
However, experts usually avoid emotive words such as “crime,” “fraud,” 
and so forth.
Wrong:
• “We have reason to believe that you....”
• “We think [suspect] you may have....”
Right:
• “Our investigation has established that you
— Made a false entry. (Avoid “fraud.”)
— Took company assets without permission. (Avoid using “theft,” 
“embezzlement,” or “stealing.”)
— Took money from a vendor. (Avoid “bribe” or “kickback.”)
Observe Reaction. When accused of wrongdoing, the typical guilty person will react with 
silence. If the accused does deny culpability, those denials will usually be weak, and in 
some cases the accused will almost mumble the denial. It is common for the culpable 
individual to avoid outright denials. Rather, the person will give reasons why he/she could 
not have committed the act in question. The innocent person will sometimes react with 
genuine shock at being accused. It is not at all unusual for an innocent person, wrongfully 
accused, to react with anger. As opposed to the guilty person, the innocent person will 
strongly deny carrying out the act or acts in question.
Repeat Accusation. If the accused does not strenuously object after the accusation is 
made, it should be repeated with the same degree of conviction and strength.
Interrupt Denials. Both the truthful and untruthful person will normally object to the 
accusation and attempt denial. It is very important in instances where the fraud examiner is 
convinced of the individual’s guilt that the denial be interrupted. An innocent person is 
unlikely to allow the interviewer to prevail in stopping the denial.
It becomes extremely difficult for the accused to change a denial once it is uttered. If the 
person denies the accusation and later admits to the same accusation, he/she is admitting to 
lying. This is very hard to do. The interviewer’s job is to make this task easier. Several 
techniques can stop or interrupt denials. A guilty person more than an innocent one is 
likely to stop short of an outright denial (“I didn’t do it. "), and more apt to furnish the 
interviewer with explanations as to why he/she is not the responsible party.
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It is important to emphasize that both the innocent and culpable will make an outright 
denial if forced to do so. Accordingly, the interviewer should not solicit a denial at this 
stage of the admission-seeking interview.
Delays. One of the most effective techniques to stop or interrupt the denial is through a 
delaying tactic. The interviewer should not argue with the accused, but rather attempt to 
delay the outright denial.
Usually, the innocent person will not “hold on,” or let the interviewer continue to develop 
the theme.
Reasoning. If these techniques prove unsuccessful, the interviewer may attempt to reason 
with the accused, and employ some of the tactics normally used for defusing alibis. Present 
the accused with evidence implicating him/her. Normally, the interviewer should not 
disclose all the facts of the case, but rather small portions here and there.
Establish Rationalization. Once the accusation has been made, repeated, and denials are 
stopped, it is time for the interviewer to establish a morally acceptable rationalization that 
will allow the accused to square the misdeed with his/her conscience. It is not necessary 
that this theme be related to the underlying causes of the misconduct. It is common and 
acceptable for the accused to explain away the moral consequences of the action by seizing 
any plausible explanation other than being a “bad person.”
If the accused does not seem to relate to one theme, the interviewer should go on to 
another until one seems to fit. Thereafter, that theme should be developed fully. Note that 
the theme development explains away the moral—but not the legal—consequences of the 
misdeed. The interviewer is cautioned not to make any statements that would lead the 
accused to believe he/she will be excused from legal liability by cooperating.
Rather than being confrontational, questions posed should constantly seek agreement from 
the accused. The interviewer must strike a balance between being in control of the 
interview and still appearing compassionate and understanding. No matter what the 
accused has supposedly committed, the interviewer should not express shock, outrage, or 
condemnation.
Example. If the person being interviewed feels that the interviewer 
empathizes or understands the situation, it may cause the person to be more 
candid and ultimately confess to the crime.
Interviewer:
“All of us have done things that we’re not proud of. I’ve done things that 
I’m not proud of, but that doesn’t mean I’m a bad person. However, there 
comes a time when we have to admit our mistakes and make amends.”
“When people get in desperate circumstances, sometimes they do things 
they wouldn’t otherwise do.”
“If my boss had done that to me, I would’ve been angry too. I can see that 
you might have wanted to get back at him.”
Diffuse Alibis. Even if the accused is presented with an appropriate rationalization, it is 
likely that he/she will continue to deny culpability. Once the interviewer is successful in 
stopping denials, the accused will normally turn to various reasons why he/she could not 
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have committed the act in question. The purpose of this stage is to convince the accused of 
the weight of the evidence against him/her. Miscreants usually express a keen interest in 
evidence that tends to implicate them. Alibis can generally be diffused by using one of the 
methods listed below.
Display Physical Evidence. It is common for most guilty persons to overestimate the 
amount of physical evidence. The interviewer wants to try and reinforce this notion in the 
way the evidence is presented to the accused. The physical evidence, usually documents in 
fraud matters, generally should be displayed one piece at a time in reverse order of 
importance. In this way the full extent of the evidence is not immediately known by the 
accused. When the accused no longer denies culpability, the interviewer should stop 
displaying evidence.
Each time a document or piece of evidence is exposed to the accused, its significance 
should be noted by the interviewer. During this phase, the accused tries to accept that 
he/she has been caught. The interviewer should, therefore, expect that the accused will 
attempt to lie his/her way out of the situation. Like denials, the interviewer should stop the 
alibis and other falsehoods before they are fully articulated.
Once alibis are diffused, the interviewer should return to the theme being developed. The 
following is an example of this technique: A purchasing agent has established a fictitious 
company and embezzled money by approving payments from his employer to a shell 
corporation.
Example.
Respondent: “I couldn’t have done this. I am required to have invoices 
approved by my supervisor.”
Interviewer: “Here is one of the invoices in question (display document). You 
have signed your supervisor’s name.” (Do not mention whether or not you 
have talked to the supervisor or whether you have subjected the invoice to 
document analysis.)
“Look Bob, it is useless for you to try to deny the truth. We have lots of 
evidence. Let’s just try to work this out, but you’ve got to help me, O.K.?” 
(Do not accuse the person of lying. This just prolongs the process.)
Discuss Witnesses. Another technique for diffusing alibis is to discuss the testimony of 
witnesses. The objective is to give enough information about what other persons said 
without providing too much. Ideally, the interviewer’s statement will create the impression 
in the mind of the accused that many people are in a position to contradict his/her story.
The interviewer should not furnish enough information to the accused so that he/she can 
identify witnesses. This may place witnesses in a difficult position, as the accused could 
contact the witness in an effort to influence testimony. The accused could seek reprisal 
against potential witnesses, although this rarely occurs.
Discuss Deceptions. The final technique is to discuss the accused’s deceptions with the 
purpose of appealing to his/her logic, not to scold or degrade. Lacking physical evidence, 
this technique is sometimes the only one available. As with other interview situations, the 
word “lying" should be avoided.
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Present Alternative. After the accused’s alibis have been diffused, he/she normally will 
become quiet and withdrawn. Some people in this situation cry. If so, be comforting. Do 
not discourage the accused from showing emotion. In this stage the accused is deliberating 
whether or not to confess at this point, the interviewer should present an alternative 
question to the accused. The alternative question forces the accused to make one of two 
choices: one alternative allows the accused a morally acceptable reason for the misdeed, 
while the other paints the accused in a negative light. Regardless of which answer the 
accused chooses, he/she acknowledges guilt.
Benchmark Admission
Either way the accused responds to the alternative question, either “yes” or “no”, he/she 
has made a culpable statement, or benchmark admission. Once the benchmark admission is 
made, the miscreant has subconsciously decided to confess. Alternative questions are 
structured so that the negative alternative is presented first, followed by the positive 
alternative. In this way the accused only has to nod, or say “yes,” for the benchmark 
admission to be made. The accused will also commonly answer in the negative.
Should the accused still not respond to the alternative question with the benchmark 
admission, the interviewer should repeat the questions, or variations thereof, until the 
benchmark admission is made. It is important for the interviewer to get a response that is 
tantamount to a commitment to confess. Because only a commitment is sought at this 
point, the questions for the benchmark admission should be constructed as leading 
questions, so they can be answered “yes” or “no,” rather than requiring any sort of 
explanation. That will come later.
Reinforce Rationalization
Once the benchmark admission is made, the interviewer should reinforce the confessor’s 
decision. Then the interviewer should make the transition to the verbal confession, where 
the details of the offense are obtained. Reinforcing the rationalization developed earlier will 
help the confessor feel comfortable, believing that the interviewer does not look down on 
him/her.
Verbal Confession
Transition to the verbal confession is made when the accused furnishes the first detailed 
information about the offense. Thereafter, it is the interviewer’s job to probe gently for 
additional details, preferably including those that would be known only to the miscreant. 
As with any interview, there are three general approaches to obtaining the verbal 
confession: chronologically, by transaction, or by event. The approach taken should be 
governed by the circumstances of the case.
During the admission-seeking interview, it is best to first confirm the general details of the 
offense. For example the interviewer will want the accused’s estimates of the amounts 
involved, other parties to the offense, and the location of physical evidence. After these 
basic facts are confirmed, the interviewer can then return to the specifics in chronological 
order. It is imperative that the interviewer obtain an early admission that the accused knew 
the conduct in question was wrong. This confirms the essential element of intent.
Because of the nature of the psychology of confessions, most confessors will lie about one 
or more aspects of the offense, even though confirming overall guilt. When this happens 
Fraud Supp. 5—2005 10.15
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
during the verbal confession, the interviewer should make a mental note of the discrepancy 
and proceed as if the falsehood had been accepted as truthful.
Discrepancies should be saved until all other relevant facts are provided by the accused. If 
the discrepancies are material to the offense, then the interviewer should either resolve 
them at the end of the verbal confession or wait and correct them in the written confession. 
If not material, such information can be omitted altogether from the written confession. 
The following information should be obtained during the verbal confession:
The Accused Knew the Conduct Was Wrong. Intent is required in all matters 
involving fraud. Not only must the confessor have committed the act, he/she must have 
intended to commit it.
Facts Known Only to Confessor. Once the intent question is solved, the questioning 
turns to those facts known only to the confessor. These facts include, as a minimum, the 
accused’s estimates of the number of instances of wrongful conduct as well as the total 
amount of money involved. The questions should not be phrased so that the confessor can 
answer “yes” or “no.”
Especially in fraud matters it is common for the accused to underestimate the amount of 
funds involved as well as the number of instances, no doubt because of a natural tendency 
of the human mind to block out unpleasant matters. Take the figures with a grain of salt. If 
the accused’s response is “I don’t know,” start high with the amounts and gradually reduce 
them.
Establishing the Motive for the Offense. Motive is an important element in establishing 
the offense. The motive may be the same as the theme the interviewer developed earlier, 
or it may not. The most common response is “I don’t know.” The interviewer should probe 
for additional information, but if it is not forthcoming, then attribute the motive to the 
theme developed earlier.
When Offense Commenced. The interviewer will want to know the approximate date 
and time that the offense started.
When/If Offense Was Terminated. In fraud matters, especially internal fraud, the 
offenses are usually continuous. That is, the miscreant seldom stops before he/she is 
discovered. If appropriate, the interviewer should seek the date the offense terminated.
Others Involved. Most frauds are solo ventures, committed without the aid of an 
accomplice.
By asking who else “knew,” the interviewer is in effect not only asking for the names of 
possible conspirators, but also about others who may have known what was going on but 
failed to report it. This question should be leading, not “did someone else know?” but 
rather “who else knew?”
Physical Evidence. Physical evidence, regardless of how limited it may be, should be 
obtained from the confessor. In many instances illicit income from fraud is deposited 
directly into the bank accounts of the perpetrator. The interviewer will typically want to ask 
the confessor to surrender his/her banking records voluntarily for review. It is 
recommended that
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• A separate written authorization, or
• Language be added to the confession noting the voluntary surrender of banking 
information.
A separate written authorization is generally preferable. If other relevant records can be 
obtained only with the confessor’s consent, permission to review those should be sought 
during the oral confession. In some instances it may be advisable to delay this step until the 
written confession is obtained.
Disposition of Proceeds. If not discussed previously, the interviewer should determine 
what happened to any illicit income derived from the misdeeds. Typically, the money is 
used for frivolous or ostentatious purposes. It is important, however, that the confessor sees 
his/her actions in a more positive light. The interviewer should avoid comments or 
questions relating to “high living.”
Location of Assets. In appropriate situations the interviewer should find out if there are 
residual assets that the confessor can use to reduce losses. Rather than ask the accused, “Is 
there anything left?” the question should be phrased as, “What’s left?”
Specifics of Each Offense. Once the major hurdles are overcome, the interviewer should 
then return to the specifics of each offense. Generally, this starts with the first incident and 
works in chronological fashion.
Because these questions are information seeking, they should be open phrased so that the 
answer is independent of the question. It is best to seek the independent recollections of the 
confessor first before displaying physical evidence. If the confessor cannot independently 
recall incidents, documents can be used to refresh his/her recollection. Generally, it is best 
to resolve all issues on each incident before proceeding to the next.
Example. In determining the specifics of the offense, the interviewer should 
usually ask,
“Who has knowledge of this transaction?”
“What does this document mean?”
“When did this transaction occur?”
“Where did the proceeds of the transaction go?”
Interviewing is difficult, and seldom mastered without considerable practice. The preceding 
techniques, when properly employed, can serve to develop truthful, reliable, legally valid 
information.
Private Investigators
It may also be necessary to engage private investigators to conduct surveillance of 
suspected perpetrators, for example, to observe their activity and record their presence at 
various locations and times, including meetings with certain individuals.
Forensic accountants who regularly work with private investigators as part of their team 
should be consulted for a recommendation regarding how to use investigators effectively, 
and whom to use.
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Search and Seizure Mechanisms
In criminal matters, law enforcement agencies often obtain a search warrant to obtain 
documentary evidence. The forensic accountant may assist them in specifying on the 
search warrant those accounting, banking and other records that are to be seized as 
evidence of fraudulent activity. Depending on the jurisdiction, the forensic accountant may 
also be named on the warrant to attend its execution at the premises to be searched, in 
order to help identify those documents that are to be seized as evidence.
In civil matters, depending on the jurisdiction, different search and seizure mechanisms 
may also be available. The forensic accountant could provide assistance in obtaining 
evidence through the use of a seizure order, granted pursuant to a court application. Under 
the court’s supervision, an order would permit counsel to recover documentary evidence 
from the other party. This evidence could otherwise have been destroyed or concealed.
Similarly if there is a concern that the assets of an individual under investigation may be 
dissipated, an injunction may be obtained from a court. This injunction would prohibit the 
individual under investigation from conducting his or her affairs in a manner that would 
financially prejudice the other party in a case prior to the court rendering its decision.
The rules governing civil suits in most jurisdictions allow discovery proceedings, which 
include answering either orally or in writing questions under oath and the production of 
documents, or some equivalent process. During discovery, the forensic accountant can
(Text continued on page 11)
10.18 Fraud Supp. 5—2005
assist counsel in requesting documents to be produced by the other party and in 
determining questions to be put to the witnesses for the other party.
The Role of Computers
Over the years, the role of computers in investigations has increased exponentially; for 
example, the use of the Internet as a research tool and the development of faster, more 
efficient software to assist in the investigative process.
Investigative software now includes many packages that are designed to assist the forensic 
accountant, investigator or lawyer with his or her work. For instance, scanners can be used 
to scan in huge volumes of paper evidence that can then be searched via keywords or 
phrases and organized using a database for quick reference later in the case. Queries can be 
generated in a matter of minutes, which search through databases of millions of 
transactions, to identify the proverbial needles in the haystack. Similarly, specialized 
software is now readily available for procurement fraud investigation and to recover file 
fragments from personal computers.
The work product of the forensic accountant is also generated by computers and generally 
includes a written report accompanied by various supporting information—for example, 
document briefs, chronologies of events, accounting schedules (either summaries or 
analytical schedules), graphs and charts.
9.2.3 Analyzing and Testing
During the analysis stage, the financial issues being investigated are evaluated in detail. 
Appropriate conclusions are drawn, either in terms of a finding of fact (for example, 
whether a particular transaction or event took place) or the resulting quantification of the 
alleged fraud. If the investigation has been properly planned and appropriate evidence is 
available and has been gathered, this step should go fairly smoothly.
The ultimate test of the evidence may come when the perpetrator is confronted with it. A 
trained interviewer in possession of all the facts can often elicit an immediate confession 
from an unprepared suspect. In many cases, the suspect is relieved that the matter is finally 
over because he or she no longer has to endure the stress of covering up the fraud.
Of course, there are many cases that are not resolved as quickly, proceeding instead to 
lengthy civil or criminal court challenges. The planning, evidence gathering, and analyzing 
and testing phases of the investigation must yield a product that, in the end, can withstand 
the court challenges.
9.2.4 Reporting and Testifying
The forensic accountant must be able to present his or her findings in a way that is 
understandable, and must do so in an appropriate format. The American Institute of CPA 
Practice Aids should be referred to when preparing the final report. In general, however, the 
appropriate format might be one of the following:
• A reporting letter, for example, a communication to counsel outlining the scope of the 
review and findings.
• An affidavit or deposition, that is, a sworn statement of findings with supporting 
documentation.
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• A formal communication to the court, such as a report that sets out the forensic 
accountant’s opinions and underlying findings, and that provides details as to how those 
findings are substantiated.
Often the findings must be communicated through oral testimony in court. Once again, that 
is why every phase of the investigation up to this point must be conducted with the legal 
evidence standards in mind. Forensic accountants must be prepared for examination under 
oath about all their activities. This examination can come at any time and in any form, for 
example, as an affidavit, a deposition, or oral testimony at the actual trial. They must be 
able to qualify as an expert witness based on their education, experience and knowledge. 
Finally, they must be prepared to respond to cross-examination and to the submission of 
different financial evidence and alternatives by the other side.
Keep in mind that conventional accounting evidence is only one part of a much larger pool 
of evidentiary material, which includes one or more of the following:
• Testimony of witnesses.
• Police witness interview notes.
• Statements of claim.
• Statements of defense and counterclaim.
• Examinations or production of documents relating to a civil matter or search warrants.
Additionally, the forensic accountant may carry out research to identify any precedents that 
may assist in reporting and presenting evidence.
Preparing and Presenting Accounting Evidence
Certain guidelines should be considered when preparing and presenting accounting 
evidence. Although set out primarily from the point of view of the investigator or legal 
counsel, forensic accountants (especially those who act as expert witnesses) should also be 
aware of these guidelines, which include:
1. Make yourself fully aware of the evidence, or lack of it, from an accounting standpoint:
a. Be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the case based on the available 
documents.
b. Be aware of any investigation that may be needed to complete the accounting 
picture.
2. Thoroughly familiarize yourself with the final accounting picture as set out in the 
accountant’s report, schedules, and document brief.
3. Decide what accounting evidence to call, if any.
4. Prepare evidence for the court:
a. Request that the accountant prepare the appropriate report, schedules, and document 
brief.
b. Request that the accountant prepare appropriate visual or other aids.
c. Make available, as required by the rules of procedure, to the other side accounting 
material including the report, schedules, and document brief.
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d. Accomplish the following at the meeting with the other side.
• Explain the accounting material.
• Ensure that there is an opportunity for explanation and production of documents 
by the other side.
• Consider the admissibility of accounting material without formal proof.
5. Conduct a final pretrial witness interview of the accountant:
a. Ensure that all documentation is introduced as exhibits.
b. Confirm that the accounting schedules are properly cross-referenced to the document 
brief.
c. Review the format of the examination of expert witnesses, including:
• Areas to be covered.
• Sequence of examination.
• Exact nature of opinion evidence, if any.
• Use of visual aids.
6. Make final preparations for tendering the accountant’s evidence in court:
a. Place exhibits in proper numerical order.
b. Index the accountant’s document brief with exhibit numbers.
c. Confirm the logistics of using visual aids.
d. Confirm the availability and legibility of copies of accounting schedules and visual 
aids.
Qualifying as an Expert Witness
The simulated testimony reproduced below shows how a CPA’s qualifications as an expert 
witness can be established.
Examination—of Mr. I.M. Sleuth, CPA by Jim Jones, Esq. (Prosecutor)
Q. Mr. Sleuth, where do you reside, sir?
A. I live in Bigtown, Megaplace.
Q. And what is your occupation?
A. I am a CPA and a Certified Fraud Examiner.
Q. And do you practice on your own or with someone else?
A. I practice in partnership with other CPAs under the firm name of Sleuth & 
Company.
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Q. And how long have you been operating the accounting partnership?
A. Close to twenty-two years now.
Q. And prior to that were you associated with any other firm?
A. Yes, prior to that I worked for a period of six years with a national firm 
following my graduation from school.
Q. And in what year did you qualify as a CPA?
A. In 1972.
Q. And since that date have you had occasion to testify in court with respect to 
accounting matters?
A. I have.
Q. And approximately how many occasions would that have occurred on?
A. An estimate of some fifty occasions.
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, I offer Mr. Sleuth as an expert witness on the basis of his 
qualifications that I have elicited.
Mr. Green (Defense Counsel): No objection, Your Honor.
His Honor: Thank you.
Q. Mr. Sleuth, I understand that you have prepared a number of documents 
relating to various transactions dealing with Acme Manufacturing?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Mr. Sleuth, I show you a document, a rather large document, marked Exhibit A. 
I would ask you to look at that document and tell me if you recognize it?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And did you prepare that document yourself?
A. Yes, I did, with the assistance of staff under my direct supervision.
Q. And I wonder if you would hold it in such a way that the jury will be able to see 
the structure of that document itself. It appears to consist of a number of 
columns, vertical columns, am I correct?
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A. That’s correct.
Q. And the document is headed what?
A. It’s headed, Analysis of Sales for the Period August 1, 1998 to October 5, 1998.
Observing the Accountant Witness: A Positive Approach
The following list presents the ideal a CPA should, under the direction of legal counsel, 
strive for when giving oral testimony.
• The answers given should be responsive to the questions and as brief as possible, 
without losing sense.
• The statement of qualifications as an expert witness should be well outlined, factual, and 
not overly laudatory.
• There should be no show of bias when describing the scope and purpose of the services.
• The accountant should indicate the source of all documentation and acknowledge that 
all documents used to support his or her findings are currently before the court.
• The accountant should be prepared to consider new evidence provided it is relevant to 
the case.
• The accountant should be specific about the time period covered and the dollar amount 
of his or her findings.
• The accountant should be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion in an 
organized and logical fashion that is easy for the judge (and if it is a jury case, a lay jury), 
to follow.
• The accountant should make good use of visual aids.
• The accountant should speak slowly and deliberately, leaving sufficient time for the 
judge (and jury) to absorb his or her evidence.
• The accountant should periodically check that the judge (and jury) is following his or her 
evidence.
• The accountant should direct his or her answers to the judge (and jury) rather than to the 
lawyer conducting the examination or cross-examination.
• The accountant should make a clear presentation.
• The accountant should be certain that the terms of the engagement are well organized 
and clearly set forth.
• The accountant should see to it that the accounting schedules are well referenced, 
including the visual aids, and can easily be tied to the supporting documents.
• The accountant should be calm and collected.
• The accountant should demonstrate knowledge of the documents and the case, and an 
understanding of the testimony of the other witnesses preceding him or her; that is, there 
should be a positive demonstration and total commitment and understanding of the 
matter before the court.
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The Accountant Witness—A Negative Approach: What Not to Do
The following list presents the negatives an accountant can exhibit when giving testimony:
• Confusion.
• Lack of preparation.
• Self-described expert (that is, self importance: impressed with himself or herself and his 
or her credentials).
• The accountant demonstrates bias in the presentation and explanation of the scope and 
purpose of his or her services.
• Failure to present findings or conclusions.
• Lack ready notes in his or her file.
• Findings convey no definite time period.
• Findings convey no definite dollar amount.
• Poor visual image.
• Poor posture.
• Incomplete supporting documents.
• Argumentative and belligerent.
• Openly nervous.
• Off-hand answers to questions.
9.2.5 Case Resolution
Fraud is a crisis for an organization and its employees. Good crisis management demands 
that the investigative process not end with the reporting of findings or the giving of 
testimony. Briefly, this means the victim organization should—
1. Seek or enforce restitution from the perpetrator (for example, seize any assets pursuant 
to a court order).
2. Learn and adjust from the experience—in particular, ensure that controls are 
implemented to prevent a recurrence.
3. Keep channels of communication open between the crisis survivors—that is, the 
organization and its employees—to ensure the crisis does not damage their relationship 
or impair the organization’s ability to function effectively and efficiently.
4. Implement regular, diligent monitoring and follow-up on the above points.
9.3 Forensic Accountants
Forensic accountants must possess a range of skills in order to carry out their investigations 
in a professional manner. These skills include not only thorough accounting knowledge but 
also knowledge of business and an awareness of the legal process. With these skills, the 
forensic accountant can investigate, analyze, document, report on, and testify as to the 
financial aspects of an investigation into a fraud or other so-called white-collar crimes.
In many instances, the forensic accountant may be requested to quantify the amount of a 
fraud loss in a criminal matter or the financial damages in a civil matter. While a criminal
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matter must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a civil matter must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Both require a demonstration of similar techniques and 
skills from the forensic accountant.
9.3.1 Professional Skills and Attributes
The seven major categories of a forensic accountant’s professional skills and attributes are:
1. Accounting and audit knowledge, including good business knowledge.
2. Fraud knowledge.
3. Law and rules of evidence knowledge.
4. Investigative mentality and critical skepticism.
5. Psychology and motivation awareness.
6. Communication skills.
7. Computers and information technology comprehension.
A closer inspection of each category follows.
Accounting and Audit Knowledge
Professional training in accounting and auditing provides not only accounting and audit 
knowledge but also a practical understanding of business operations, business finance, 
corporate structure, industry practices, and standards of conduct.
The majority of those who identify themselves as forensic accountants are CPAs. These 
individuals have sought and found careers for themselves in an area that allows them to use 
their skills as CPAs, together with other personal attributes that are necessary in 
investigating business fraud and commercial crimes.
Audit skills are an important foundation for a forensic accountant. Due to the sensitivity of 
the work involved, forensic accountants must be able to focus on the need for a 100 percent 
substantive examination of all documentation related to a particular matter.
The accountant with good audit skills must have the ability to prepare and use complete 
and accurate documentation; thus the accountant must know how to catalog the available 
information. He or she must also be able to determine the other existing information 
sources, which initially may not be available but which can, with research and diligence, be 
uncovered, obtained, and utilized. With his or her accounting and audit skills, the 
accountant can inquire about, locate and identify investigation-related documents—whether 
they are present initially or obtained during the course of the investigation.
For most CPAs, audit experience includes both audit and nonaudit engagements covering a 
wide cross-section of business enterprises and their operations, from small sole 
proprietorships to large multinational corporations, both public and private. This familiarity 
with business enterprise is an important element in the forensic accountant’s investigation 
of business frauds and similar matters.
Fraud Knowledge
In addition to professional training in accounting and auditing, the most important aspect of 
the forensic accountant skills mix is exposure to and knowledge of many different kinds of
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fraudulent transactions. This will allow the forensic accountant to identify red flags and to 
piece together patterns and theories that may otherwise elude an accountant who has not 
had the same degree of exposure to fraud.
Forensic accountants do not merely compute, they analyze. The analytical process is not an 
easy one, as each case is unique and therefore calls upon the forensic accountant’s 
experience, formal training, and other important attributes. Specifically, he or she must be 
able to identify accounting problem areas, prioritize these problem areas or issues as 
required, and refine or change the focus of the investigation as new information is obtained 
and assessed. Often, an original theory may be only the beginning of an investigation, or it 
may be refined to a specific issue warranting further review. In providing assistance to the 
courts, this ability to properly focus the investigation is important.
The importance of experience cannot be overemphasized. The forensic accountant must 
also be able to look beyond the form of the documentation, to understand its substance and 
foundations, and to assess whether it is consistent with other business realities. The forensic 
accountant must understand the nature of the documents that he or she is reviewing and 
question their business reality. More than anything, a forensic accountant is distinguished 
by having “been there before.” Knowledge of many different kinds of fraud, based on first­
hand investigative experience, means a more effective plan of investigation, knowing when, 
how, and who to interview as well as the format for communicating findings in reports to 
clients and if necessary to the court.
Law and Rules of Evidence Knowledge
It is important for the forensic accountant to be knowledgeable about both criminal and 
civil laws, since these laws have a direct impact on matters involving the forensic 
accountant. Specifically, a forensic accountant must be able to understand both criminal 
and other statutes that may have been contravened, in order to identify possible issues. 
There is also a need to understand the rules of evidence to ensure that all findings are 
admissible in court, if necessary. Specifically, investigative accountants must have an 
understanding of the rules of evidence—for both civil and criminal matters—which consist 
of:
• What evidence is.
• How it is obtained.
• How it is preserved.
• How it is presented before the courts.
• How the forensic accountant’s own work can become part of the evidence brought 
before the courts or before some other tribunal responsible for determining what has 
occurred.
To provide accounting assistance in a matter involving fraud, the forensic accountant must 
possess a general understanding of the issues by which the courts can judge an act to be 
fraudulent. He or she must be knowledgeable as to the court’s tests for fraud—for example, 
the presence of dishonest intent as seen in the perpetrator’s actions, or more particularly, 
the mens rea or criminal intent of the perpetrator at the time the act occurred. He or she 
must review and analyze accounting, banking, financial and other business records, and
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identify both specific acts and patterns of conduct that are suggestive of dishonest intent to 
deprive a victim of an asset.
Investigative Mentality and Critical Skepticism
The forensic accountant must possess an investigative outlook, tenacity, and the ability to 
identify indicators of fraud. Collectively, these attributes could be termed as the 
investigative mentality. This mentality encourages the forensic accountant to seek substance 
over form—to identify and analyze data and to conduct interviews to determine what has 
actually occurred in a business transaction, rather than what simply appears to have 
happened.
The investigative mentality is sometimes manifested by the smell test—the ability to assess 
relevant transactions or events to determine their reasonableness and to the extent possible, 
their veracity. In other words, in light of all the known facts, does a particular action appear 
reasonable and logical? Is the action or pattern of behavior plausible in the circumstances, 
or is there an odor that begs for further investigation?
The investigative mentality can also be thought of as professional, critical skepticism. It is 
not a shotgun approach; rather, it is a specific and precise set of judgmental procedures 
suitable for the circumstances that allows the forensic accountant to identify and assess all 
relevant facts and develop hypotheses. These hypotheses can then be researched further 
and tested more extensively as the investigation proceeds. The forensic accountant never 
discounts any aspect of an investigation on face value: Only after examining all available 
evidence and weighing its totality will he or she determine an item to be irrelevant to the 
issues at hand.
Another analogy—that of the watchdog-bloodhound—further illustrates the forensic 
accountant’s investigative mentality attribute. A CPA is more akin to a watchdog—he or 
she looks for material misstatements in financial statements caused by error or fraud, but 
will respond affirmatively if warning signs of fraud appear through audit procedures. The 
forensic accountant, however, is more of a bloodhound—actively seeking out the presence 
of evidence, all of which when viewed together may indicate the occurrence of a fraudulent 
act.
While the investigative mentality requires a disciplined approach and a methodology, it 
also requires creativity in being able to identify and seek out further sources of evidence 
and to analyze this new information. Attention to detail is critical as the success or failure of 
the case may depend on the identification of evidence that, on initial review, may appear 
insignificant or irrelevant. The issues of materiality or sampling relevant in an audit 
assignment do not restrict a forensic investigation. Those restrictions may cause fraudulent 
acts to be overlooked, and they are inadequate in establishing evidence.
Psychology and Motivation Awareness
Another attribute of the forensic accountant is an understanding of the human element. 
Documents do not commit fraud; computers do not commit fraud; rather, people commit 
fraud. In assessing information, documentation and accounting records, one of the 
seasonings that the forensic accountant can apply to the mix is his or her understanding of 
individuals, including what motivates an individual to commit fraud and the attributes of an 
individual who commits fraud. This understanding, together with the ability of the forensic
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accountant to examine information not just from an accounting viewpoint, but also within 
the context of the overall picture or business reality, is important
In general, it can be said that individuals react to satisfy needs. The forensic accountant 
must recognize the presence of such needs during his or her investigation, whether it is the 
need of an employee for greater income to maintain an extravagant lifestyle or the need of 
a sales manager to maintain sales volumes in a declining market so as to ensure his or her 
continued employment. Such needs often provide the motivation for acts that an employee 
may label differently but which are, in essence, fraud.
In a situation where an individual has both the need and the opportunity, a fraudulent act 
may be the result.
Communication Skills
Forensic accountants, as expert witnesses to the court in findings of fact, must be able to 
clearly and effectively communicate information. This means that they must be able to 
communicate without bias in written form, including the use of accounting schedules, 
charts, and exhibits. They must also be able to communicate to others the nature and extent 
of the work undertaken and the findings that have evolved from that work so that it can be 
understood both in a court of law and in other forums.
When the forensic accountant testifies as an expert witness in court, he or she must be able 
to explain the procedures, analyses, and findings of the investigation in such a way that the 
basis for his or her expert testimony—both facts and, if necessary, opinion—is understood 
by the judge and, if there is one, the jury. The forensic accountant’s knowledge of the 
available evidence and possible alternate explanations of the events must be as complete as 
possible, to ensure that the findings are not compromised on cross-examination.
Understanding Computers and Information Technology
Today’s computers have replaced yesterday’s ledgers, and in fraud investigation it is 
important to be as up-to-date as the alleged perpetrators of fraud. Thus, the skills of a 
forensic accountant should include the ability to understand the opportunities computers 
provide to potential perpetrators of fraud as well as the ability to use computers in analysis 
and documentation of an alleged fraud.
Because succinct presentation to the judge and jury is so critical, knowledge of computer 
graphics is also helpful. The forensic accountant’s findings often include quantitative 
analyses that are conducive to presentation in the form of graphs and charts that depict and 
summarize the information. Typical graphs and charts include summaries of the source and 
use of funds, as well as flow charts showing the movement of assets at various times.
9.3.2 Ethics
Independence and Objectivity
Independence and objectivity are integral concepts in the ethical training of CPAs. While 
the need for these attributes is well established in the audit area, they are extremely 
important in investigative work. The forensic and investigative accountant is not an 
advocate; rather, he or she provides the skills and input of an independent expert. Even a 
bias with respect to a single, small matter—whether actual or perceived—may call into 
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question in the eyes of the court other unbiased evidence presented by the forensic 
accountant. He or she must therefore report objectively at all times.
Respect for Access to Information and Privacy Laws
One factor that must not be overlooked in the role of investigator is that the information 
that is gathered must be collected in an ethical and legal manner. One cannot misrepresent 
one’s self when gathering information, nor can the process of collecting information be 
abused.
Most important, the rights of an individual whose activities are being reviewed must not be 
abused.
9.3.3 Kinds of Services Offered
Proactive versus Reactive Services
Forensic accounting services can be proactive or reactive. Proactive services include 
training on fraud awareness and fraud prevention measures, presented elsewhere in this 
Handbook. Reactive services are investigative and analytical in nature and are rendered 
after the event. Much of the information in this chapter addresses reactive services.
Civil versus Criminal Services
Another way to identify the kinds of services that a forensic accountant renders is to 
consider the forum in which a dispute is finally resolved. For example:
• A criminal forum must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• A civil case has a less onerous burden of proof than a criminal case. The trier of the facts 
must reach his or her conclusion based on the preponderance of the evidence.
• A nonjudicial tribunal, for instance, an alternative dispute resolution proceeding 
(arbitration) can differ from a court of law by being either stricter or more lenient.
• Finally, if the circumstances are such that no reference is made to an outside tribunal, 
but rather two parties are to resolve a matter on their own, then the level of proof 
required is only what the other side will accept.
Other Categorizations
Services of a forensic accountant can also be categorized in other ways, for example by the 
type of procedures performed. These procedures can include—
• Performing an initial review of documentation to determine whether further research or 
investigation is required or necessary.
• Providing an affidavit or deposition outlining the results of a review of documentation.
• Providing a report identifying the scope of the work performed and findings.
• Assisting counsel in obtaining a search warrant (that is, in a criminal case).
• Providing expert testimony in court.
The nature of the industry in which a forensic accountant is performing an investigation can 
be another method of classification. For example:
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• Service industries could include transportation, banking, securities brokerage, retail, real 
estate, construction, professional services (such as services of CPAs and lawyers), 
mortgage brokerage, and telecommunications.
• Manufacturing industries could include construction, farming, food processing, all forms 
of manufacturing, mining, petroleum, and publishing.
The above classifications could then be further refined, and others added. For example, 
government and nonprofit sectors are other areas where forensic accountants are called 
upon to provide their services.
9.4 Checklist: Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud
CPAs can use the following checklist when dealing with a known or suspected fraud in their 
organizations or in those of their clients. No answers may require investigation and follow-up, 
the results of which should be documented. Use the column to cross-reference the 
checklist to the appropriate work papers.
The checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. If fraud is of vital 
concern to an organization or if serious fraud is suspected, seek the advice of legal counsel and 
a CPA experienced in fraud investigation.
Table 9.1 Dealing With a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Planning
a. Has the main scenario of the fraud been established, including 
the sources of information pointing to fraud (that is, 
accounting irregularities, physical evidence, or incriminating 
information)?
b. Have immediate areas of concern been identified, such as the 
need to protect assets from further damage (for example, by 
boosting security) and to preserve key evidence for further 
investigation (e.g., by removing the key suspect from the 
scene, through a leave of absence or other appropriate 
means)?
c. Have legal and other constraints been identified, (that is, the 
provisions of any collective bargaining agreement) and has 
legal counsel been consulted?
d. Has a preliminary assessment been made to determine:
• The quality of the information currently available
• Additional information that is needed
• How to obtain the information
e. Have the nature and scope of the investigation been defined, 
including: ___________________
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• The main objective(s)
• Whether (and when) to pursue criminal charges
• The level of secrecy required
• Administrative matters (for example, engagement letters; or 
if external forensic accountants are used, budgets)
2. Evidence Gathering
a. Has a detailed list been prepared of the evidence that is to be 
obtained or seized?
b. Have all sources of evidence been considered (for example, 
books and records, documents, correspondence, public 
domain information, background financial information and 
personnel history, etc.)?
c. When evidence is obtained, is it assessed for:
• Relevance
• Alternative interpretations (for example, simple error)
• Eventual use and admissibility (for example, as court 
evidence)
d. Are proper evidence-handling procedures in effect, (for 
example, taking photocopies; not writing on, altering, stapling 
or unstapling originals)?
e. Especially for larger investigations, has evidence been 
categorized in a way that will facilitate its future retrieval and 
use?
f. Has the nature, timing and scope of any interviews (especially 
of suspects) been carefully considered?
g. Are interviews conducted by or with trained and experienced 
interviewers, with appropriate safeguards to prevent bogus 
harassment or other charges (for example, safeguards could 
include leaving the door ajar during interviews and having 
assistants interrupt at predetermined times)?
h. When appropriate, has the use of reputable private 
investigators been considered?
i. For any evidence to be seized, does the search warrant or 
court order have the proper scope so that all of the required 
evidence falls within its reach?
(continued)
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Table 9.1 (continued)
Dealing With a Known or Suspected 
Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
j. Especially for larger investigations, have computer databases 
and other appropriate tools been used to store and cross­
reference evidentiary materials?
k. Has security over all evidence been established, including, if 
appropriate, off-site storage of copies (electronic, paper, or 
both) for key evidence and documents?
3. Analyzing and Testing
a. Has all evidence been systematically analyzed?
b. Were appropriate conclusions drawn?
c. Has the evidence been thoroughly checked and tested and 
reviewed with legal counsel to ensure it is up to court 
standards?
4. Reporting and Testifying
a. Has a forensic accountant prepared a well-organized, 
unambiguous report, summarizing the findings of the 
investigation?
b. Has the report undergone a quality-control review?
c. Has adequate preparation been done for testifying in court, 
including a full run-through?
d. Is the person giving the testimony experienced, and if 
necessary, has he or she previously qualified as an expert?
e. For expert witnesses, have fairness and impartiality, and the 
appearance of such, been present throughout the process (for 
example availability to both sides)?
5. Case Resolution
a. Has a plan and process been put into effect to seek and 
enforce restitution from perpetrators?
b. Have controls and procedures been put into place to prevent a 
recurrence?
c. Have channels of communication been kept open and other 
appropriate steps taken to maintain good employee relations 
and mitigate any other adverse effects of the crisis?
d. Has a program been established to monitor the results of the 
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CHAPTER 10:
Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
10.1 The Pervasive Nature of Financial Statement Fraud
10.1.1 Introduction
Allegations of financial statement fraud have dominated the headlines early in the new 
millenium. Once prominent companies such as Enron, Xerox, Rite Aid, Adelphia, Tyco, 
and WorldCom now symbolize corporate disgrace. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), federal law enforcement agencies and Congress have been 
investigating financial statement fraud throughout corporate America. Fear that financial 
statements might be concealing rather than revealing information has driven frightened 
investors from the public marketplace. In this atmosphere, it is more important than ever 
for financial professionals to understand financial statement fraud and how it might be used 
to deceive boards of directors, senior management, auditors, and investors alike.
10.1.2 Overview
Financial statement fraud involves the alteration of financial statement data, usually by a 
firm’s management, to achieve a fraudulent result. These altered financial statements are 
the tools then used by a company’s managers to obtain some reward. The reward may 
consist of direct compensation such as receiving a bonus that otherwise would not be paid 
without using altered, incorrect financial data to embellish management’s operating 
performance. On the other hand, the compensation may be direct in that managers avoid 
being fired for failing to achieve promised results. Compensation may also be indirect; for 
example, management may use fraudulent financial statements to raise additional capital 
that in turn allows a firm to expand and presumably enhance the value of shares held by 
management.
10.1.3 What Constitutes Financial Statement Fraud?
What constitutes financial statement fraud has been the subject of much debate because the 
line between fraud and discretion is not always clear. It is easy to define fraud as a 
conscious effort by management to produce financial statements with materially wrong 
account data. It is almost as easy to identify as fraud misleading accounting entries that 
management cannot justify under any applicable accounting standards. Fraudulent acts 
become less obvious, however, when cloaked in the mantle of accounting standards that are 
incorrectly applied. For example, the applicable accounting standard in the United States is 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), principles that may allow management 
some discretion as to when to recognize revenue or expenses.
Honorable people can debate the most appropriate use of a principle when looking at the 
gray or more broadly permissive areas of GAAP. Less-than-honorable people, however, 
might make use of these gray areas to produce financial statements that mislead. This 
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practice is found most often in concert with other misleading applications of GAAP. 
Fraudsters almost always fail to discuss this choice of GAAP principles in the notes to 
financial statements.1 Without knowledge of the impact of GAAP gray-area judgments on 
the financial statements, unsuspecting readers may mistakenly assume that revenues and 
expenses were accrued in a manner consistent with prior financial statements when, in fact, 
they were not. The end result may be that continuing operations appear to be profitable 
while, in reality, there may be serious problems that the misuse of GAAP gray areas can 
cover up for a short period of time. Thus, when accounting decisions purportedly in 
conformity with GAAP produce financial statements intentionally1 2 designed to mislead the 
reader, those decisions cross the line into fraud.
1 In this chapter, the term company refers to any legal or business entity that prepares financial statements, 
including partnerships, limited liability companies, and corporations.
2 Failure to disclose is probably a GAAP violation; therefore, while the accounting for a certain transaction 
may appear to be supported by GAAP, failure to disclose so as not to make the financial statements 
misleading takes the company out of GAAP compliance. As with proving any type of fraud, one must show 
that the fraudster was scienter or knowingly aware that his or her actions were designed to mislead.
3 Promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
10.1.4 SEC Definition of Fraud
These concepts are codified in the United States securities laws, especially SEC Rule 10b-53, 
which states the following:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails, or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase 
or sale of any security.
Publicly traded companies must conform to GAAP and to the rules and regulations 
promulgated by the SEC under United States securities laws. The SEC drew heavily on 
accounting literature when it recently addressed the issue of accounting gray areas. SEC 
standards (discussed below) that have their origin in GAAP will provide substantial 
guidance to determine financial statement fraud not only for publicly traded companies but 
also for all firms issuing financial statements in conformity with GAAP.
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10.1.5 Common Methods of Committing Financial Statement Fraud
Research carried out for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission4 (the COSO Report), a voluntary private sector organization dedicated to 
improving the quality of financial reporting, found the most common kinds of fraud were:
4 Mark S. Beasley, Joseph V. Carcello, and Dana R. Hermanson. Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987-1997: 
An Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. COSO, 1999. See also Top 10 Audit Deficiencies, Beasley, Carcello, and 
Hermanson. Journal of Accountancy, April 2001.
1. Overstatement of earnings
2. Fictitious earnings
3. Understatement of expenses
4. Overstatement of assets
5. Understatement of allowances for receivables
6. Overstatement of the value of inventories by not writing down the value of obsolete 
goods
7. Overstatement of property values and creation of fictitious assets
The following sections will discuss the various kinds of financial statement fraud and the 
corresponding motives for each kind, the early indicators of financial statement fraud (both 
quantitative and qualitative) and the means to detect some of the most difficult-to-find kinds 
of fraud. At the end of this chapter, there is a checklist that addresses internal control issues 
designed to provide early detection of financial statement fraud.
10.2 Kinds of and Motives for Financial Statement Fraud




Financial statement fraud generally falls into one or more of the above categories.
10 .2.1 Earnings Manipulation
Earnings manipulation is the direct alteration of accounting data for the purpose of 
fraudulently changing reported net income. For example, booking a sale that clearly does 
not meet the requirements for revenue recognition increases revenues. Conversely, 
capitalizing marketing costs as an asset, contrary to guidance in GAAP, decreases current­
period expenses. Notice also that both examples affect the balance sheet as well: 
Recognizing fictitious sales probably inflates accounts receivable; deferring marketing 
expenses creates some type of amortizable asset Since the primary intent of these 
manipulations is, however, to increase earnings rather than create assets, these practices are 
classified as “Earnings Manipulation.”
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Motives for Earnings Manipulation
The motives for earnings manipulation usually stem from the need to report higher net 
income. Management compensation agreements, for instance, may require the achievement 
of some absolute level of net income or an increase in net income over some benchmark in 
order to trigger bonus payments. Pressure to increase “shareholder value” may provide 
another motive to create earnings increases. Because stocks are valued at some multiple of 
price to earnings, an increase in earnings usually increases share price even if the multiple 
stays constant. When earnings are growing rapidly, the multiple is more likely to expand.
Earnings manipulation may also help support the share price of a publicly traded company 
while management and insiders sell their holdings. Such a reprieve may be important if 
time restrictions prevented the granting or sale of those shares at an earlier date. Examples 
of stock granting or sale restrictions include:
1. Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans that postpone ownership
2. Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers from acquiring shares until 
specified dates or the occurrence of specific events
3. SEC Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares that can be sold on United 
States securities exchanges on a given trading day
4. Income tax provisions that afford more favorable treatment to capital gains in shares 
held for a sufficient period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the restriction 
being that the government would receive more of the sale proceeds if the share sales 
were classified as short-term capital gains)
5. Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding significant blocks of stock past 
some event such as an annual shareholders meeting before they can be sold
Finally, earnings manipulation may help a company obtain or retain its listing on a stock 
exchange. The initial and continued listing requirements of many exchanges provide for 
some type of net income test. Although companies failing this test may qualify for initial or 
continued listing under other tests such as overall market capitalization, companies whose 
share prices have declined sharply in a Weak market may find net income manipulation to 
be their only hope. Losing an exchange listing may relegate the company to the over-the- 
counter market where there are no requirements for the presence of a minimum number of 
market makers, that is, the securities firms that stand ready to buy or sell shares to maintain 
an orderly market in the company’s stock. Without a minimum number of market makers, 
investors face the prospect of greatly reduced liquidity. A shareholder wishing to sell his 
shares risks having to wait a long time for a buyer to come into the market. Therefore, a 
listing on a recognized exchange that mandates a minimum number of market makers is an 
important benefit to a publicly traded company, a benefit that unscrupulous management 
may implement earnings manipulation to retain.
10.2.2 Earnings Management
A subtler variant of earnings manipulation is earnings management. Although both involve 
the orchestration of accounting data, the latter attempts to exploit the interpretive 
opportunities inherent in GAAP to produce reported earnings that conform to outside 
expectations. Earnings management stops just short of outright fraud while earnings 
manipulation crosses the line.
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Corporate managements are under more pressure today than ever before to increase 
“shareholder value,” that is, the price of the stock. Superstar analysts raise performance 
expectations by generating earnings estimates that strongly influence stock prices. 
Management may believe that if the company does not “massage” the numbers to meet 
analysts’ expectations, the stock price may decline and decline precipitously if analysts feel 
compelled to scale back their growth estimates.
In this environment, the moral issue of reporting earnings that truly measure the company’s 
economic activity is a matter of management intent. The very nature of accrual accounting 
leaves open the possibility that management judgment, even within GAAP, may be colored 
by the intent to show the company in the best possible light. Accrual, deferral, and 
allocation procedures designed to permit the relation of revenues and expenses, and gains 
and losses across periods, also allow management considerable leeway as to when to 
declare any monies are earned. When within this process does discretion become the intent 
to deceive? Within what limits should management be acting to permit investors to price 
the company’s securities in the market? How much earnings “smoothing” actually 
misrepresents the trend of economic performance as opposed to the irregularities of cash 
flows? Earnings management is fraudulent when it uses improper accounting to hide true 
company performance. Arthur Levitt, chairman of the SEC, expressed the Commission’s 
concern about this subject in a speech given in 1998:
Flexibility in accounting allows it to keep pace with business innovations. Abuses 
such as earnings management occur when people exploit this pliancy. Trickery is 
employed to obscure actual financial volatility. This, in turn, masks the true 
consequences of management’s decisions.5
5 Arthur Levitt, “The ‘Numbers Game,’” a speech presented to the New York University Center for Law and 
Business, Sept. 28, 1998. Available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt .
6 SAB No. 99, Materiality, is available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm
He expressed his concern about where this could lead:
As a result, I fear that we are witnessing an erosion in the quality of earnings, and 
therefore, the quality of financial reporting. Managing may be giving way to 
manipulation; integrity may be losing out to illusion.
In Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, Materiality6 the SEC reviewed the United States 
accounting literature and presented the staff's findings on earnings management.
Failure to Perform Punishes the Stock Price
Within this range of discretion, managements of publicly traded companies, especially 
growth and high-tech companies, have been under tremendous pressure to perform, from 
both analysts and investors. Failure to report continued profit growth can result in dramatic 
punishment to the stock price even when the shortfall is by only a few cents per share. Even 
performances that are good by historical standards can cause a price decline when they are 
below analysts’ expectations. This kind of market reaction has been an incentive for 
companies that are just meeting analysts’ forecasts or even falling slightly below to show a 
modest increase in reported profit.
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Companies reporting consistently rising earnings are rewarded with high price/eamings 
(P/E) multiples. As the chain of good quarters extends, the multiple tends to increase and 
vice versa. P/E multiples are effectively inverted capitalization rates that have built-in 
assumptions for future discount rates applied to expected future cash flows. If earnings grow 
steadily from period to period, analysts are better able to predict future earnings. The 
market tends to reward a company having such a record with a lower discount rate that 
reflects a lower level of uncertainty about future earnings. This lower discount rate then 
increases the present value of future earnings and thus makes the stock or claim on those 
earnings more valuable.
Managements Regularly Meet Analysts' Forecasts
Recent academic studies have shown the regularity with which managements meet analysts’ 
forecasts quarter after quarter and the small number of shortfalls. Managements themselves 
can influence analysts’ estimates through meetings and other contacts with the result that 
the whole earnings estimation process seems to be manipulated. It has also been observed 
that analysts with underwriting houses tend to make higher growth forecasts than 
independent analysts.
It is hard to resist the conclusion that managements are often driven to rework the earnings 
components. Their bonuses are tied to operational performance and their stock options are 
tied to stock price performance. In addition, their overall performance will determine 
accessibility of capital for their companies. A good earnings report can improve the terms 
of a security offering to the benefit of both the firm and its management. The fact that 
shares of firms making seasoned equity offerings underperform during the years 
immediately following the offering suggests that accruals were maximized in the year of the 
offering and earnings were allowed to deteriorate immediately thereafter.
Discovery of earnings manipulation can lead to the dismissal of senior executives, lawsuits 
by shareholders, and sharp declines in the price of the company’s stock. There is also a 
decline in the number of analysts following the company and an increase in the number of 
short sellers.7
7 For an excellent survey, discussion, and bibliography of the academic and practitioner literature on this 
broad topic, see Patricia M. Dechow and Douglas J. Skinner, “Earnings Management: Reconciling the 
Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners and Regulators,” Accounting Horizons, June 2000, pages 235- 
250.
Four Main Kinds of Earnings Management
SEC Chairman Levitt focused on four main fraudulent practices used to enhance earnings:
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Big-Bath Restructuring Charges
These are large one-time charges associated with a restructuring. Management may take a 
big-bath charge on the assumption that the company stock price will get pummeled 
whether the restructuring charge is large or small. Using that logic (which may actually be 
correct), management opts for the big charge by establishing large reserves for shutting 
down operations or shifting operations to other areas. If the reserve estimates are too big 
and actual expenses do not consume all the reserves, management can later reverse the 
unused portion back into income. As an added bonus, the reversal back to income may 
occur at a time when earnings need a boost because of disappointing current operating 
results. Hence, Chairman Levitt observed that overestimation can leave charges that are 
“miraculously reborn as income when estimates change or future earnings fall short.”
Sunbeam Case Study
At the end of fiscal 1996, the Sunbeam Corporation took a $338 million 
restructuring charge that included various operating costs actually chargeable to 
future periods. In October 1998, the SEC required Sunbeam to reduce the 
restructuring charge to $239 million. As a result, the company’s 1996 earnings were 
restated upward, while its 1997 earnings were restated downward by 65 percent to 
$38 million from $109. New management who had joined the company in 1996 
took the big-bath restructuring charge to create the appearance of a turnaround. 
When the big-bath charges had been washed out, however, the so-called 
turnaround was largely nonexistent.
In May 2001, the SEC brought fraud charges against five former executive officers 
of Sunbeam as well as Sunbeam’s former engagement partner.
Writeoffs
After one company acquires another, research and development (R&D) work performed in 
one or both of the companies may be redundant because of a change in corporate direction 
under the new management. For that reason, companies may write off some in-process 
R&D projects that have yet to be expensed because they do not fit into the new corporate 
plans. Some companies, however, have taken advantage of the opportunity to write off 
substantial amounts of in-process R&D, by applying a principle similar to the big-bath 
restructuring charge. Management believes that the company can take a large, one-time hit 
to earnings without further hurting its stock price when the financial community is already 
expecting some writeoffs because of the acquisition. By taking the writeoff at the time of the 
acquisition, these R&D expenses will not weigh on future earnings.
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MCI WorldCom Case Study
In August 1998, WorldCom disclosed an expected in-process R&D charge of $7 
billion in connection with its acquisition of MCI. In September 1998, after the 
transaction closed and following discussions with the SEC, the charge was reduced 
to $3.1 billion. When such charges were no longer available, WorldCom used 
reserves in 1999-2000 and the improper capitalization of current period expenses in 
2001-2002, to manage its reported financial results.
3 Com Acquisition of US Robotics Case Study
During the first quarter of fiscal 1998, 3Com recorded an accounting combination 
and merger restructuring charge of $426 million for the June 1997 merger of 3Com 
and U.S. Robotics. Shortly thereafter, the SEC required 3Com to reduce the charge 
to $270 million. In its Form 8-K disclosing the reduction, 3Com indicated that the 
adjustments were intended to reflect three factors: a change in the timing and costs 
associated with product swaps, a more accurate reporting of costs associated with 
the elimination of duplicate facilities, and a revision of goodwill writeoffs relating to 
premerger acquisitions. These changes were made in deference to the SEC’s 
position that the cost of replacing discontinued products should be reflected not at 
the time of the merger but at the time the cost is actually incurred.
Cookie-Jar Reserves
Fraudulent managers like to cloak their deception in an accounting rule, although in reality 
the accounting rule is not properly applied or other accounting rules are broken. The use of 
loss reserves is a good example of the abuse of a GAAP principle in order to manage the 
final earnings figure.
Cookie-jar reserves are reserves set aside during periods of strong financial performance 
and used to increase earnings or make up revenue shortfalls in periods of weak financial 
performance. They may take a variety of forms such as sales returns, loan losses, warranty 
costs, tax cushions, or inventory adjustments.
When financial performance is strong, earnings may be reduced by overstating reserves, 
overaccruing expenses, or taking excessive one-time writeoffs. In later periods of weak 
financial performance, reversing the accruals and reserves to reduce current-period 
expenses increases earnings. In a calendar quarter in which a company expects to 
outperform market expectations, it might create a reserve for future losses on such items as 
long-term contracts to create the effect of lowering earnings closer to the market consensus 
forecast. Then, in a future quarter, after the company has predicted that it will not make 
enough income to meet market expectations, management can reverse out some of the 
reserves on the grounds that future contract losses no longer appear probable.
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On the surface and viewed in isolation, the creation and reversal of the loss reserves may 
appear unrelated to earnings expectations. GAAP provides for the booking of loss 
contingencies in Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for Contingencies, if the loss contingencies are both 
quantifiable and probable. In reality, however, the possibility of losses on future contracts 
most likely existed prior to the establishment of the reserve and continued to exist after the 
reserve was reversed into income. The reserves then become an accounting artifice used by 
management to manage earnings to meet market expectations. Moreover, management 
violated GAAP, in this example, either by creating the reserve without justification or 
reversing the reserve without any change in the degree of likelihood that the loss would in 
fact occur. Such reserves are known as cookie-jar reserves because management can reach 
into the cookie jar and pull them into income whenever the need arises.
W.R. Grace Case Study
In June 1999, the SEC accused W. R. Grace of manipulating the reported earnings 
of its primary health care subsidiary National Medical Care, Inc. Management had 
established reserves for unanticipated health care reimbursements and used them in 
subsequent periods to reduce expenses and show a steady growth rate in its health 
care subsidiary. But, contrary to GAAP, there were no liabilities to justify the 
reserves. When the SEC uncovered the scheme, the agency sued the company, its 
management, and auditors. The Commission also required Grace to establish a $1- 
million education fund for earnings management training.
Materiality
Underlying the discussion of financial statement fraud to this point is the assumption that 
the accounting manipulations cited are all material in that the manipulations significantly 
change the information presented in the financial statements. Much of the accounting 
literature contains provisions that except immaterial amounts from a given accounting 
standard. However, the evolution of the definition of materiality has introduced another 
element of judgment into determining whether or not there is fraud.
Fortunately, the SEC decided to weigh in on this matter when it issued SAB No. 99, which 
helped clarify some of the key materiality concepts. One of the issues addressed head-on by 
the SEC was the use of quantitative materiality to waive accounting violations. A blind 
application of quantitative materiality essentially looks at the monetary amount of an 
accounting entry (or series of entries) that was indefensibly improper. If the amount was less 
than some arbitrary standard such as five percent of net income, neither management nor 
company auditors would insist on changing that entry even though it blatantly violated 
accounting standards. The SEC said that although quantitative standards may serve as a 
starting point for investigating potential accounting irregularities, relying exclusively on an 
arbitrary percentage to avoid application of appropriate accounting standards has no basis 
in accounting literature (or in U.S. securities laws).
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The FASB in 1980 issued Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative 
Characteristics of Accounting Information, which addressed materiality as follows:
The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is material if, in the 
light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude of the item is such that it is 
probable that the judgment of a reasonable person relying upon the report would 
have been changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.
In other words, materiality is viewed from the standpoint of the reader of financial 
statements. If the correction of an erroneous accounting item would probably cause the 
reader to come to a conclusion different from the conclusion reached upon reading the 
uncorrected statement, then the item is material. Prior to the release of FASB Concepts 
Statement No. 2, the United States Supreme Court, in reviewing a securities case involving 
materiality issues, ruled that a fact is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the . .. 
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.”8 Therefore, both accounting literature and the 
Supreme Court look to the reader or user of the financial statements and ask whether it is 
probable or substantially likely that the reader would have come to a different conclusion. 
If the answer is yes, then the item in question is material.
8 TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
ABS Industries Case Study
In October 1999, the SEC brought an action against ABS and four of its former 
officers and employees for engaging in a scheme to manage earnings. ABS’ financial 
results overstated sales by 3.21 percent and overstated income before taxes by 2.48 
percent. The SEC determined that although these amounts were not quantitatively 
material, they were, however, qualitatively material given management’s intent.
10.2.3 Balance-Sheet Manipulation
In addition to the creation of fictitious accounts receivable and improperly capitalized 
expenses as discussed above, management can also manipulate assets. By recording as 
purchases certain transactions for which title has not passed, by using improperly extended 
depreciation of useful lives, and by failing to write down or write off useless assets, the value 
of a company can be misrepresented. Management may inflate inventory by failing to bring 
the correct amount into the cost of sales, a practice that has the added fraudulent benefit of 
inflating gross profit and earnings as well. Finally, management may manipulate capitalized 
acquisition costs through improper purchase price accounting.
Management manipulates liabilities by failing to record amounts owed to others or by 
keeping debts off the books. Management can also attempt to classify liabilities, especially 
loans to shareholders, as equity.
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The motives for balance-sheet manipulation usually relate to reporting requirements 
established by lenders and regulators who tend to focus more heavily on balance-sheet 
items. A bank loan covenant, for example, may require a certain amount of shareholders’ 
equity, a maximum debt-to-equity ratio, and/or a minimum current ratio. If the borrowing 
company’s balance-sheet accounts violate the loan covenants, the company may be in 
default under the terms of the loan and be subject to accelerated repayment of the loan or 
be precluded from any future loan advances. To make matters worse, a publicly traded 
company probably would have to report to securities regulators that it was in default under 
its loan covenants and, as a consequence, suffer a decline in its stock price. Similarly, 
companies in regulated industries such as insurance and banking must maintain certain 
amounts of capital to meet regulatory requirements. Failure to do so may result in sanctions 
or even closure by the regulators. Therefore, motives for balance-sheet manipulation, while 
perhaps being more case-specific than those discussed previously for earnings fraud, 
nonetheless pose a real threat to accounting integrity.
Comparator Systems Case Study
In May 1996, the SEC suspended trading in the securities of Comparator Systems, a 
Southern California company that claimed to be in the business of producing 
fingerprint identification technology. The SEC was concerned about the adequacy 
and accuracy of publicly disseminated information as well as about the valuation of 
certain assets reported in Comparator’s financial statements. Shortly thereafter, the 
SEC obtained a permanent injunction against the company and its principal 
executive officers on evidence that Comparator’s assets provided no future 
economic benefit, had been recorded improperly, or simply did not exist. 
Comparator’s purported assets included patents and licenses, investments, accounts 
receivable, and prepaid fees. The patents, however, had expired or passed into the 
public domain, the investments represented interests in private companies not 
engaged in business activities, the accounts receivable balance reflected the 
company’s claim for stock allegedly stolen by a former employee, and the prepaid 
fees consisted of stock issued to Comparator’s officers and consultants. These bogus 
assets were substantially overstated but allowed Comparator to maintain its listing 
on the National Association of Securities Dealers automated quotation system 
(NASDAQ) SmallCap exchange and sell its worthless stock to unwitting investors.
10.2.4 Falsification of the Income Statement
Falsification of the income statement may be accomplished by overstating revenue, 
understating expenses, or some combination of the two, during a specified time period. 
Using either method, the effect will be to overstate net income on the income statement, 
overstate owners’ equity on the balance sheet, and thereby increase reported earnings per 
share; or to overstate expenses and understate results of operations during one period with 
the intent of artificially overstating net income in future periods.
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Overstatement of Revenue
Under GAAP, revenue should not be recognized until it is both realized (or realizable) and 
earned. FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements 
of Business Enterprises, states that revenue is realizable when a product is “exchanged for cash 
or claims to cash” and revenue is earned “when the entity has substantially accomplished 
what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the revenue.”
If revenue has not been realized and earned, revenue recognition is improper. Examples of 
improper revenue recognition include:
1. Fictitious revenues
2. Premature revenue recognition
3. Sales of development stage products
4. Conditional sales





10. Reciprocal exchange transactions (swaps)
Revenue recognition remains a leading source of financial statement misstatement, so much 
so that Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial 
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), states that revenue 
ordinarily should be presumed to be a fraud risk area (AU 316.41) and suggests that audit 
procedures such as confirmations of terms with customers and trend analyses by product 
line be directed toward this area. In 2004, 2005, and 2006, the area of revenue recognition 
has been a focus in Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections of 
public company auditors.
Fictitious Revenues
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Report 
found that the most common method of revenue recognition fraud resulted from recording 
fictitious revenues. Fictitious revenues are revenues recorded on the sales of goods or 
services that never took place. Fictitious revenues may involve fictional or legitimate 
customers. In either case, transactions may be recorded in the sales journal and inventory 
records without adequate documentation. In some cases, false invoices and shipping 
documents are prepared to conceal the fraud and product may be sequestered in the 
warehouse, shipped off-site, or stored with freight forwarders.
Kurzweil Applied Intelligence Case Study
From 1992 to 1994, Kurzweil Applied Intelligence engaged in a fraudulent revenue 
recognition scheme that inflated Kurzweil’s revenues and earnings reported in 
financial statements accompanying its initial public offering (IPO), as well as its 
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annual and periodic reports filed with the SEC. Among other things, Kurzweil 
senior executives forged signatures on sales quotes, executed side letters that 
negated its customer’s obligation to purchase product, and recognized revenue from 
distributorship agreements where the distributor did not have the intent or ability to 
pay without resale. To perpetuate the fraud, goods were shipped to and stored at an 
off-site independent warehouse to create the false appearance that products had 
been sold and shipped to customers, and invoices were held for fraudulent sales 
where the customer would not expect to receive an invoice.
As a result of this fraudulent scheme, Kurzweil’s CEO and senior vice president of 
sales were able to sell securities in the IPO at prices they knew to be artificially 
inflated and received annual bonuses based upon overstated sales. Given their 
personal stake in the scheme, Kurzweil’s executives went to great lengths to conceal 
the fraud from its independent auditors.
In July 1995, the SEC filed civil charges against the company and its officers for 
overstating revenue and earnings. Those charges were settled in administrative 
proceedings against the company, four executive officers, and three mid-level 
employees in Kurzweil’s accounting function. In December 1996, Kurzweil’s CEO 
and senior vice president of sales were sentenced to federal prison terms of 33 and 
18 months, respectively, based upon convictions for conspiracy, securities fraud, 
and falsification of corporate books and records.
Premature Revenue Recognition
The COSO Report found that the second most common technique to inflate revenue 
involves premature recognition. Unlike fictitious revenues, for which there is no evidence to 
support a sale, premature revenues are recorded on sales expected to occur but are not yet 
completed. Revenue is recognized prematurely on incomplete sales in which tide has not 
yet passed from the seller to the buyer. Since the transfer of ownership completes the sale, it 
is not final until all the obligations associated with the sale have been completed. A classic 
example of premature revenue recognition results when revenue is recorded on a sale 
expected to close in the next quarter.
Historically, premature revenue recognition cases involved new public companies. The 
reason is that when a company goes public, analysts from a number of Wall Street firms 
will initiate coverage and begin to track the company’s performance relative to 
management’s projections for the year. That coverage creates considerable pressure on 
financial management to meet the expectations of Wall Street. This pressure is what gets a 
lot of companies into trouble. In order to meet analysts’ expectations, some companies 
apply aggressive accounting techniques in order to increase the bottom line. If those 
techniques fall short of the target, the sales function is directed to “do whatever it takes” to 
enable the company to make its numbers.
Today, revenue recognition improprieties occur in well-established companies. However, 
the motive is often the same: Financial management may inflate reported revenue in order 
to meet analysts’ consensus earnings estimates.
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Financial management is not always aware of schemes within the company to inflate 
revenue, often because documents are fabricated and the conduct is concealed from the 
accounting function, which may not have adequate internal controls in place to detect the 
fraud. In other cases, internal controls may not keep up with the company’s growth. In still 
other cases, the internal controls that do exist are circumvented by the individuals directing 
the fraud.
Most of the time, schemes to inflate revenue are intended to be short-term fixes. For 
companies seeking to establish credibility in the market, it may begin by holding the 
quarter open a few days to enable the sales function to close just a few more additional 
sales, or, sales that are expected to close the following quarter may be pulled ahead into the 
current quarter. In these types of cases, the rationalization is, “It’s just a few, we’ll make it 
up next quarter.” The same rationalization is used to justify earnings management in well- 
established companies.
The problem is the shortfall is not easily recouped. As companies pull in potential sales that 
are further and further out into the future, it becomes less and less likely that the company 
will be able to make up the shortfall. As one sales manager involved in this type of 
predicament described it, “it’s like robbing Peter to pay Paul.” As time goes on, there is no 
way out—other than devising new schemes to prop up the numbers.
California Micro Devices Case Study
One example of a revenue recognition case that spiraled out of control involved 
California Micro Devices. Cal Micro made semiconductor components, which it 
sold to a number of blue-chip companies, including IBM, Motorola, and Kodak. 
The company went public in 1986. Within two years of its public offering, its 
auditors at the time detected revenue and expense cutoff errors and proposed $2 
million in adjustments. The company listened to its auditors and restated its 
earnings—only to do the same thing all over again the next year.
There were several motives to manipulate reported earnings. For example, the 
company was under pressure to meet analyst expectations, attract strategic partners, 
and increase the value of a secondary stock offering. To accomplish these goals, the 
company engaged in nearly a dozen revenue recognition schemes. For example, the 
company recorded revenue on sales that shipped in later quarters, on shipments 
before the customer agreed to accept delivery and on shipments held at the freight 
forwarder or in sales representative’s houses until customers agreed to accept 
delivery.
To conceal this scheme, senior executive officers altered the company’s books and 
records and lied to its auditors. For example, the company prepared two accounts 
receivable reports. One was a real report that listed actual receivables, and the other 
was for its board of directors and the marketplace. In addition, management told 
the board that the high number of receivables resulted from the high number of 
shipments at quarter-end—a phenomenon known as a “hockey stick” sales pattern. 
Management also told the board that many of the receivables resulted from 
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arrangements with distributors who had 180 days to pay. Of course, management 
neglected to mention that the customers had unconditional rights of return.
By the time of the fiscal 1994 year-end audit, more than $8 million of those 
receivables were uncollectible, but Cal Micro managed to get a clean bill of health 
from its auditors, a then Big Six accounting firm. Just under $1 million was written 
off as bad debt, and the remainder (around $7 million) was written off as a 
nonproductive technology acquisition.
In October 1994, the company disclosed the accounting irregularities and shortly 
thereafter terminated its CEO and CFO. In January 1995, forensic auditors 
determined Cal Micro had recorded $38 million in bogus revenue. In September 
1997, the CEO and CFO were indicted on criminal charges for their knowledge of 
the fraud and for their sales of substantial amounts of Cal Micro stock while revenue 
was artificially inflated. In July 1998, they were convicted of securities fraud.
Sales of Development Stage Products
Revenue may also be overstated through the recognition of sales on development stage 
products that require further development or product refinement. Even if products are 
accepted by customers who agree to serve as a “beta-test” site for the new product, such 
arrangements are typically made on a trial or evaluation basis. Therefore, revenue 
recognition is inappropriate. Likewise, revenue recognition is inappropriate if a vendor 
delivers an incomplete or dysfunctional product that will require repair or maintenance 
after delivery to the customer.
The premature recognition of revenue on development stage products often occurs in the 
software industry. Revenue recognition on software licenses is governed by AICPA 
Statement of Position (SOP) 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition. Under SOP 97-2, revenue 
may be recognized from software sales only if persuasive evidence of an agreement exists, 
delivery has occurred, the vendor’s fee is fixed or determinable, and collectibility is 
probable. If the software sale contains other elements, such as software upgrades or other 
enhancements that are integral to the functionality of the software license, then revenue 
must be recognized in accordance with contract accounting, which delays revenue 
recognition.
MicroStrategy Case Study
In December 2000, the SEC filed charges against three senior executive officers of 
MicroStrategy Inc., its CEO, CFO, and COO, for materially overstating revenue 
and earnings on sales of software and information services during the period 1998 
through 2000. The Commission alleged that, among other things, MicroStrategy 
improperly recognized material amounts of revenue, up front, on certain multiple 
element deals in which MicroStrategy had a continuing obligation to provide 
significant services or future products which were not separable from the sale of a 
license to the Company’s existing software products. Several of these deals had a 
development component that required MicroStrategy to develop additional or 
customized applications of the product. Despite its continuing obligation to provide 
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additional software, licenses, and services, MicroStrategy improperly recognized the 
revenue up front by mischaracterizing the transactions as the sale of software 
product, contrary to SOP 97-2. As a result of these and other errors, MicroStrategy 
overstated revenues by approximately $66 million. In the settlement of the ensuing 
civil action, the defendants received substantial sanctions, including an order to pay 
$10 million in disgorgement and $1 million in penalties. In a separate settled order, 
MicroStrategy’s corporate controller and accounting manager were also sanctioned 
for their roles in the fraudulent scheme.
Conditional Sales
Conditional sales are sales with terms that have not yet been completed. As in the case of 
premature sales, recognizing revenue from conditional sales is improper because the risks 
and rewards of ownership have not passed from the seller to the buyer. Examples of 
conditional sales include sales subject to funding contingencies or performance conditions. 
Even if delivery has occurred, and the customer has physically accepted delivery, the sale is 
not complete until the contingencies have been removed.
Kendall Square Case Study
In the mid 1990s, Kendall Square Research Corporation, a Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, manufacturer of specialized computer systems for research 
applications, overstated approximately 50 percent of its reported revenues over an 
eighteen-month period by improperly recognizing revenue on conditional sales to 
universities and research institutions. Because these organizations were dependent 
upon grants from the government and from private foundations to support their 
activities, Kendall Square routinely sold its computer systems subject to funding 
contingencies, pursuant to which the customers were not obligated to pay until they 
received funding. Recognition of revenue on these sales violated GAAP because the 
revenue was not realizable until the funding contingency expired and because 
payment was not reasonably assured, as required by FASB Concepts Statement No. 
5 and Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 43, Restatement and Revision of 
Accounting Research Bulletins.
Sales With a Right of Return
In the ordinary course of business, there is nothing wrong with giving purchasers a right of 
return, as long as an appropriate reserve has been established. However, return rights are 
not always properly reserved, and may be concealed in side letters with other contingencies 
to create the false appearance that revenue has been realized and earned.
Under GAAP, it is improper to recognize sales with a right of return unless the seller has 
estimated the likelihood of returns and booked an appropriate reserve. More specifically, 
FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition when a Right of Return Exists, provides that to 
recognize revenue when a right of return exists, “the amount of future returns [must] be 
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reasonably estimated.” Based upon this estimate, sales must be offset by expected returns to 
report revenues accurately. The recognition of sales that do not meet the requirements of 
FASB Statement No. 48 results in the overstatement of revenue.
Consignment Sales
A consignment sale is a type of contingent sale that is subject to acceptance by a third party. 
A distributor, for example, may take product on consignment and agree to pay for the 
product when it is resold to a third-party customer. Revenue may not be recognized on 
consignment sales until the third-party customer accepts the product. Consignment sales are 
fraudulent if material terms are not reflected in the consignment contract and instead 
appear in side letters or oral communications reflecting the true nature of the sale.
Channel Stuffing
Channel stuffing occurs when a distributor agrees to accept more product than is needed, 
typically in exchange for substantial discounts or other inducements. Although the practice 
is not improper, per se, material terms are often concealed in side letters or oral agreements 
that provide significant discounts and/or the right to exchange or return unsold product. If 
this occurs, the distributor is, in effect, accepting product on consignment without accepting 
the risks of ownership. Revenue recognition under these circumstances violates GAAP.
Vendor Rebates
The two primary types of vendor rebates are transaction rebates and incentive rebates. A 
transaction rebate is a discount or refund from the manufacturer on each product purchased. 
Transaction rebates are normally recorded immediately as a reduction to cost of goods sold 
because the rebate is earned at the time the product is purchased from the manufacturer. 
Incentive rebates, by contrast, usually require the purchaser to meet specified purchase levels. 
Under FASB Statement No. 5, incentive rebate income may not be recognized until the 
required purchase levels have been met. The recognition of incentive rebates before 
meeting the requisite purchase levels overstates income.
Barter Transactions
Most commercial transactions involve the exchange of monetary assets or liabilities for 
goods or services. The amount of the monetary asset or liability exchanged typically 
provides the basis for measuring the value of the transaction.
Barter transactions involve the exchange of noncash assets or liabilities. There are two types 
of barter transactions. One involves an exchange of nonmonetary assets or liabilities with 
another entity (reciprocal exchanges), and the other involves a transfer to another entity of 
a nonmonetary asset for which for which no assets are received or relinquished 
(nonreciprocal transfer).9
9 APB Opinion No. 29, Accounting for Nonmonetary Transactions.
Reciprocal Exchange Transactions (Swaps)
Revenue may be recorded in reciprocal exchange transactions if certain requirements are 
met. There must, however, be economic substance to the transaction. So-called “round-trip” 
deals, which typically involve a swap of assets or services without any real gains, lack 
economic substance.
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The SEC is investigating whether telecommunications and energy companies conducted 
swaps of network capacity to improperly inflate reported revenue. For example, Global 
Crossing agreed to buy $18 million in services from Enron to be paid over a period of eight 
years, and simultaneously agreed to sell $18 million in services to Enron and be paid 
immediately. Although Global Crossing recorded the liability on its balance sheet, it 
recorded the entire revenue amount in its income statement. The accounting for these 
transactions is under scrutiny. The SEC and the Justice Department are conducting similar 
investigations into the restatement of $1.1 billion in revenue by Qwest Communications 
resulting from its improper accounting of capacity swaps in 1999, 2000, and 2001.
Understatement of Expenses
Another method used to falsify the income statement involves the understatement of 
expenses. Under GAAP, the matching principle requires that revenue and its related 
expenses be recorded in the same accounting period. If the costs associated with revenues 
recorded in one period are deferred to a later period, net income is overstated for the 
period the revenue is recognized and understated for the period the expenses are recorded.
Examples of the understatement of expenses to artificially inflate net income include the 
following:
1. Deferral of operating expenses
2. Understatement or omission of sales discounts and allowances
3. Improper capitalization of current period expenses
Deferral of Operating Expenses
Expenses may be improperly deferred in order to meet budget projections or consensus 
earnings estimates. If costs are expensed during periods subsequent to the period in which 
the cost was incurred, the expenses are not properly matched against the income they 
helped produce. The recording of expenses in the wrong period often signals a lack of 
internal accounting controls.
Livent, Inc. Case Study
Livent, Inc. was a Canadian theater company that produced a number of successful 
Broadway Shows, including Phantom of the Opera, Showboat, and Ragtime. In January 
1999, the SEC brought enforcement proceedings against nine former employees of 
Livent, for their involvement in a scheme to inflate income by falsifying expenses, 
among other things. This scheme operated for a period of eight years, from 1990 
through 1998. The Commission’s complaint also alleged kickbacks from customers 
and a revenue recognition component. This discussion will focus on the expense 
items.
Livent manipulated reported expenses by:
1. Transferring preproduction costs for the shows to fixed assets such as the 
construction of theaters
2. Simply removing certain expenses and related liabilities from the general ledger
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3. Transferring costs from shows currently running to other shows that had not yet 
opened
The scheme was pervasive. It involved the CEO, president, CFO, senior vice 
president of finance, COO, and three controllers. Five of these individuals traded in 
Livent securities while earnings were artificially inflated. In 1998, the company 
restated its financial results. The restatement totaled nearly 100 million dollars.
Of the nine individuals the SEC charged with civil fraud, two were indicted in a 
parallel criminal proceeding, and two others pled guilty to violations of federal 
securities laws. In addition, in a civil injunctive action, the Commission charged 
Livent’s general counsel, who had been aware of the scheme and participated in 
drafting revenue generating contracts subject to side letters, which were concealed 
from the outside auditors.
Understatement or Omission of Sales Discounts and Allowances
The easiest way to understate expenses is to simply omit them altogether. The omission of 
expenses artificially inflates net income and owners’ equity. For example, the omission of 
sales discounts and allowances will overstate revenue and net income on the income 
statement, and understate liabilities and overstate owners’ equity on the balance sheet.
Aurora Foods, Inc. Case Study
In January 2001, the SEC brought charges against three former senior officers and 
five employees of Aurora Foods, Inc., a producer and marketer of branded food 
products, for underreporting trade marketing expenses and thereby inflating 
reported earnings in 1998 and 1999. Specifically, Aurora was found to have 
underreported more than $43 million in trade marketing expenses, the expenses 
incurred to induce grocery stores to purchase its products. Examples include case 
discounts and similar incentives. Rather than properly recording these expenses, 
Aurora’s senior management attempted to conceal them from the company’s 
auditors by directing subordinates to make false entries in various accounts on 
Aurora’s books. For example, Aurora employees were directed to move trade 
promotion expenses into accounts receivable through false entries in the accounts 
receivable ledger and subsidiary ledgers and through manual adjustments in the 
trade promotion accrual. Although one division manager objected to these 
practices, she, too, was sanctioned for following the inappropriate instructions of her 
superiors.
Improper Capitalization of Current-Period Expenses
Capital expenditures are costs that benefit the company over more than one accounting 
period. Accordingly, capital expenses are amortized over a period of years. Cost of goods 
sold or cost of sales, by contrast, directly correspond to the generation of current revenue 
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and only provide benefits during the current accounting period. As a result, these costs are
expensed immediately. If period expenses are improperly capitalized, net income is
improperly overstated.
WorldCom, Inc. Case Study
In June 2002, the SEC brought charges against WorldCom, Inc., the second biggest 
U.S. long-distance telephone and data services provider, for fraudulently overstating 
income before taxes and minority interests by $3.8 billion during fiscal 2001 and 
the first quarter of fiscal 2002. The SEC’s complaint alleges that WorldCom falsely 
portrayed its financial condition through the improper capitalization of “line costs,” 
which were WorldCom’s costs of leasing space on competitors’ telephone lines. 
Under GAAP, these costs must be expensed in the period incurred and may not be 
capitalized. In contravention of GAAP, WorldCom’s senior management is alleged 
to have directed the transfer of line costs to capital accounts in amounts sufficient to 
enable the company to meet Wall Street analysts’ consensus earnings estimates. 
Among other things, this fraudulent scheme allowed the company- to avoid 
reporting losses in 2001 and 2002. Investigations by the SEC, the Department of 
Justice and various Congressional committees are continuing.
Some Comments on Financial Statement Frauds
Some financial statement misstatements are “self-correcting” in that misstatements in one 
period will likely be reversed in the next period. For example, an overstatement of ending 
inventory increases income in the year of the overstatement, but next period the 
misstatement rolls into Cost of Sales and unless there is a significant additional profit in that 
year, the misstatement often has to be matched or increased to meet earnings goals in the 
next period. Often such schemes fall apart soon after they start to involve material amounts, 
and physical counts and book records become increasingly divergent. Some misstatements 
self-correct after longer periods such as depreciation or amortization misstatements. 
Fictitious sales often lead to detection when cash flows and aging receivables raise 
questions, but the brazen Parmalat fraud seemed to escape detection for a long time 
because of the manufacturing of false balance sheet assets and the offloading of liabilities to 
related entities.
In other cases, the issue may continue until detected or until reversed. For example, excess 
or deficient accruals of one sort or another may provide a source of future management 
manipulation of income, or may just sit on the balance sheet for a long time if they are not 
distorting overall financial results.
Another example of misstatements that do not self-correct is misstatements in valuing the 
compensation from stock option grants. In 2006, misdating of stock options (spring-loading 
or backdating) to maximize the executive award value was discovered and the scheme 
involved a large number of companies that should have known that this was both a 
fraudulent and deceptive process and it caused a misstatement of the proper compensations 
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expense for stock option awards. In as much as stock options began being expensed just a 
short time ago, the related compensation expense is now part of the income statement and 
not just a footnote disclosure. The SEC and IRS are conducting an increasingly wide 
investigation on this issue. The PCAOB Staff issued an Alert in July 2006 reminding 
auditors to include the controls surrounding the stock option granting and expensing 
practices into the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley required reporting on internal controls.
10.2.5 Reducing the Risk of Fraud in Closely Held Companies
Much of this chapter focuses on publicly traded companies both because information about 
frauds committed by these entities is readily available and because regulators have been in 
the forefront of fraud detection and prevention. Nevertheless, every type of fraud discussed 
here can occur in closely held private companies; only the motives and timing are slightly 
different. Although the managements of closely held companies might not have to worry 
about securities analysts’ expectations, there may be outside shareholders demanding better 
earnings performance. These demands might lead management to employ any of the 
earnings manipulation schemes discussed above. Of course, if management bonuses are a 
function of increased earnings, there is a motive for earnings manipulation regardless of 
whether the company is publicly traded or not. If the outside investors are passive, the 
moment of performance assessment will most likely be the end of the fiscal year. 
Management of public companies, on the other hand, may feel pressure to hit targets 
quarterly if they have to report to regulators.
Family businesses with nonparticipating owners are particularly vulnerable to frauds by 
management family members. Although the notion of “family” conjures the exact opposite 
of this risk, the reality is that jealousy and rivalry can generate rationalizations that motivate 
the fraudulent shifting of cash flows to the management family member. Indeed, audits are 
critically important in such situations and provide the kind of oversight deterrence that can 
dissuade a tempted fraudster. By focusing on related party transactions and considering 
fraud as required in SAS No. 99, there is some assurance that the common practices of 
misappropriation are subject to detection.
The need to value shares in a closely held company may also give rise to earnings 
management. If shares are being valued for sale or any other purpose such as collateral for 
a bank loan to a major shareholder, earnings management may be employed to achieve the 
appearance of a steady rise in earnings. This misleading rise in earnings could induce an 
appraiser or stock valuations specialist to assign a higher growth rate to projected earnings. 
It is just as likely, however, that the appearance of consistently rising earnings could suggest 
the use a lower firm-specific risk premium to calculate the present value of that projected 
earnings stream since earnings would appear to be less volatile. The end result of earnings 
management in a closely held company is thus similar to the effect of earnings management 
on the P/E multiple of publicly traded companies.10
10 To learn more about the issues in private company valuations, in 2004, the AICPA published a practice 
aid entitled Valuation of Privately-Held-Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation.
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For a closely held company, the prevention of fraud in the financial statements starts with 
requiring that financials presented to the board of directors and to outsiders be in 
conformity with GAAP. The timing of cash flows in cash-basis accounting can lead to the 
manipulation of financial statements.11 Accrual-basis accounting looks to economic events to 
determine whether a debt is incurred or whether revenue is earned; the time of the 
occurrence of those events may be quite different from that at which cash is paid or 
received. What limits the possibility for fraud in accrual-basis accounting is the reduced 
opportunity to hide a debt or record unearned revenue since the standards of recognition 
are more explicit than those for cash-basis accounting.
11 For that reason, U.S. tax law generally requires corporations to report on an accrual basis when gross 
receipts exceed an average of $5 million per year over the prior three tax years.
12 Middle market is a term used by bankers to segment their lending markets. The term is used here because 
closely held firms frequently interact with banks on matters involving their financial statements.
Although GAAP is not required for private companies, it is difficult for those companies to 
communicate with outsiders, such as lenders and investors, without producing GAAP-based 
financial statements. In a sense, GAAP is the common financial language of the United 
States because it contains a set of rules and standards developed and tested over many years 
that are known to readers of financial statements. Certain foreign firms whose shares are 
not traded on U.S. exchanges may use local accounting standards or International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) for domestic reporting but would find raising capital in the 
United States problematical without translating those statements into GAAP.
Additional fraud prevention measures include implementation of the internal controls 
discussed in Section 1.3, “Internal Controls and ‘Fraudproofing,’” in Chapter 1 of this 
Handbook and promoting an ethical environment, as covered in Chapter 2, “Promoting an 
Ethical Environment” For middle-market firms,11 2 i.e., those with annual revenues of $10 
million or more, the findings of the COSO Report are especially applicable since research 
concluded that smaller companies are more susceptible to fraud.
The importance of financial statement fraud prevention measures increases directly with 
company size. For a very small company, fraudulent financial statements that slightly inflate 
earnings or assets could be used to secure a bank loan or small investment but little else. 
Steps taken to prevent fraud at that level should reflect the potential for damages resulting 
from such misstatement. For larger, middle-market companies or small companies 
fraudulently representing themselves as larger companies, potential damages are more 
serious; steps taken to prevent fraud should therefore be more visible and systematic. For 
example, a middle-market company should implement reviews of internal controls at least 
once a year by outside auditors and more frequently by internal accounting staff. If budgets 
allow, a significant fraud-prevention measure should include hiring an internal auditor to 
assess the effectiveness of the controls of each business unit for a year. Assessments of the 
adequacy of internal controls would help significantly with early fraud detection.
The reporting of irregularities to independent board members is one of the most important 
fraud-prevention measures available to closely held companies. The opening of such a 
formal reporting channel increases the likelihood that corrective action will be taken. 
Without such a reporting channel, management, even if not directly involved in a fraud, 
might be inclined to sweep the problem under the rug for fear of reprisal or 
embarrassment. If the closely-held firm has no outside directors, a significant fraud- 
prevention step would be the appointment of such director(s).
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Under SAS No. 112, (a revision of SAS No. 60) Communicating Internal Control Related 
Matters Identified in an Audit starting with year-end 2006 audits, managements and “those 
charged with governance” will receive written reports annually on internal controls issues 
that are considered significant deficiencies or material weakness of which the auditor is 
aware. The presence of such conditions is often a strong indicator that an “opportunity” will 
be available to facilitate a misstatement or fraud. A minor fraud, because of its nature, is 
often considered a significant deficiency if not a material weakness that would be included 
in this communication.
It is worthwhile to say a few words about some other variables in private company financial 
reporting. Private companies do not have to engage auditors to perform an audit. Although 
other parties may require an audit (e.g., creditors, banks, venture capitalists, family 
members), lesser accountant services such as reviews and compilations are available, and 
are increasingly being considered by smaller entities as the bar continues to be raised on 
the requirements auditors should be performing on every audit. However, the services can 
provide vastly different protections than an audit. In a review, the accountant evaluates the 
reasonableness of the reported amounts and disclosures through inquiry, observation, and 
generally the application of analytical procedures. Fraud is considered, as the inquiries and 
considerations of SAS No. 99 are applicable, but the detailed tests that might reveal more 
issues are not required. Most importantly, the auditor is not responsible for understanding 
internal control. An “opinion” is not given, but matters coming to the auditor’s attention or 
any identified GAAP departures are communicated. In a compilation, the accountant often 
acts simply as a “compiler” of information in the accounting records into financial 
statements and performs no audit procedures and provides no assurance. Footnote 
disclosures need not be complete, provided the omission is not considered to be for 
deceptive purposes. The accountant need not even be independent of the entity to perform 
this service. Companies and owners need to understand the services and their potential 
implications and risks to the financial statement users.
Frauds and large losses need not be limited to companies publicly trading securities. A well 
publicized fraud that cost creditors a billion dollars (and later the auditors hundreds of 
millions of dollars) was Phar-Mor, a discount drug store chain with over 300 stores and 
25,000 employees that inflated earnings by overstating inventory for several years in 
anticipation of an upcoming public offering. Although the inventory misstatement and 
fraud was detected before materially misstated financial statements were issued, the 
creditors were outraged that the fraud had not been detected earlier. Due to the strong 
growth record and profitability (false) of the company, its business risk to the audit firm was 
assessed as “low.” The unusual story of the flamboyant founder and COO of Phar-Mor, 
Michael Monus, convicted of 109 federal counts and sentenced to nearly 20 years in federal 
prison, is interesting reading and a mini-case study in the risks of strong entrepreneurial 
management and “tone at the top.” Filing for bankruptcy protection in 1992 and emerging 
in 1995, the company went out of business in 2002.
10.3 Special Areas of Financial Statement Fraud
Certain items on a firm’s financial statements appear to be especially vulnerable to fraud. 
The following discussion will highlight major fraud-prone areas and the steps that can lead 
to early detection. The seven areas identified are:
1. Failure to record loss contingencies and asset writeoffs
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2. Manipulation of acquisition reserves
3. Cost shifting to improve current operating results
4. Recognizing fictitious revenues
5. Improper disclosures and material omissions
6. Special purpose entities; the Enron Case
7. Methods to conceal financial statement fraud from auditors
The common thread running through all these areas is that detection requires the auditor to 
look for something not present in the financial statements. Auditors are accustomed to beginning 
with a trial balance listing of all accounts and determining the procedures necessary to 
complete the audit. An item that does not show up on that trial balance at all, however, 
may never come to the attention of the auditor. For instance, in order to detect a failure to 
book a loss reserve for a contingent liability, one must first discover the existence of the 
contingency. From an auditing perspective, in the case of a failure to record a loss 
contingency, there is no loss contingency balance to audit; the accounting entry simply 
does not exist. Similarly, using acquisition reserves to hide current-period expenses means 
that the expense item or category is absent from the income statement and is buried in 
some balance-sheet account relating to a prior business combination.
Cost shifting, that is, the movement of expenses from one entity or period to another, is 
equally hard to find. When the auditor looks at the accounts for the one business as of a 
given date, he or she does not see expenses shunted over to another affiliate or to another 
time period. In the case of fictitious revenue, although the auditor at least has income 
statement revenue accounts to examine, the existence of side letters with customers which, 
for example, grant those customers the right to return product, does not show up as a 
contingency or in the footnotes. In practice, an auditor is not likely to be told that side 
letters exist.
Clearly, these are the toughest kinds of financial statement fraud to detect. Nevertheless, for 
each fraud discussed above, the auditor should look for warning signs. Those red flags may 
be small in dollar amounts but may nevertheless point to significant irregularities. The 
following discussion assumes that a certain subset13 of management has attempted to 
manipulate financial data and looks at these issues in the context of audit planning and 
execution to determine what additional steps an auditor could take that might lead to 
detection of the fraud.
13 If financial statement fraud is traceable to a significant number of senior managers, the auditor should 
consider taking additional steps. For internal auditors, those steps would include discussions with legal 
counsel. Outside auditors should consider issuing a qualified opinion or, more likely, resigning from the 
audit engagement altogether.
10 .3.1 Failure to Record Loss Contingencies and Asset Writeoffs
Loss Contingencies
A loss contingency is defined in FASB Statement No. 5 as “an existing condition, situation, 
or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible .. . loss ... to an enterprise that 
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will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur or fail to occur.”14 FASB 
Statement No. 5 continues to state that the “ [r]esolution of the uncertainty may confirm ...
14 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, paragraph 1.
15 Ibid., paragraph 1.
16 Ibid., paragraph 4.
17 Ibid., paragraph 8.
18 Ibid., paragraph 3. Footnote disclosure of the loss contingency may be required if the future event is less 
than probable but is “reasonably possible;” if the chance of a future event is more than remote but less 
than likely, FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10, requires disclosure in the financial statements of the 
nature of the contingency and an estimate of the potential loss.
the loss or impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.”15
FASB Statement No. 5 lists examples of loss contingencies that include:
• Collectability of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation
• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase related property) that have been
sold16
A firm is required to accrue a loss contingency when that contingency is both probable and 
able to be estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 states:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency . .. shall be accrued by a charge to 
income if both of the following conditions are met:
a. Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates that 
it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a liability had been incurred at 
the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be 
probable that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the 
loss.
b. The amount of loss can be reasonably estimated.17
A future event is probable if it is “likely to occur.”18
Having set the ground rules, we can examine some specific examples in the following 
sections:
1. Warranty and product claims reserves
2. Asset writeoffs
Warranty and Product Claims Reserves
If a manufacturer experiences postproduction problems with a certain product, it may 
begin to experience higher-than-expected returns or, more likely, claims for reimbursement 
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or repair. Those claims may arise under a specific warranty, under product tort law or 
under consumer protection laws and regulations. At this point, the manufacturer must 
assess its overall cost exposure. It might be possible to estimate the extent of future claims 
as a percentage of production based on past experience with other products subject to 
similar problems. It might also be possible to estimate the cost of each claim, i.e., the cost of 
replacement or repair for each defective unit of product. If both an estimate of future claims 
and the cost of each claim are available, then the amount of loss can be reasonably 
estimated. FASB Statement No. 5 requires the booking of a loss contingency if the future 
claims are likely to occur. If, however, the manufacturer is already seeing large numbers of 
claims prior to or soon after the close of its financial reporting period,19 it is reasonable to 
assume that the likelihood of future claims is high and that a FASB Statement No. 5 reserve 
should be accrued with a charge to current earnings.
19 Actually, FASB Statement No. 5 requires the assessment of contingencies arising from “information 
available prior to issuance of the financial statements” (emphasis added). Therefore, if claims relating to a 
prior period come to the attention of management during the preparation of financial statements for that 
prior period, management should consider booking a contingency as of the end of that period.
20 For purposes of this discussion, we focus on failure to accrue a probable loss contingency. However, 
violations of GAAP (and securities laws if the company files with the SEC) may occur if the firm has a
However, a manufacturer under pressure to achieve increased earnings may be very 
reluctant to accrue a warranty or product claims reserve. Management may take the 
position that the problem does not exist or cannot be quantified. But, an alert auditor may 
detect certain red flags that indicate a problem does indeed exist and that its extent can be 
estimated. The red flags that indicate the existence of a contingency include:
1. The incidence of claims prior to the issuance of financial statements (discussed above)
2. Discussions with (and bills from) outside legal counsel
3. Internal correspondence within production and research staffs as to the need to 
address a critical problem with a product already on the market
4. Internal correspondence among department heads of production, R&D, general 
counsel, and senior management about postproduction problems and product claims
5. External correspondence between the manufacturer and its customers about a given 
product concerning special price concessions or special return privileges
6. The incidence of special or overbudget freight charges to accommodate returns and/or 
the shipment of replacement product
7. Shifting of production schedules to manufacture replacement product
8. Halting manufacture of the product in question
9. Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects to applications engineering 
relating to redesign of existing products
10. Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to customers on a regular basis 
over a period of weeks or months that indicate some arrangement to compensate for 
product defects
Once it has been established that a loss contingency exists or is likely to occur,20 the next 
step is to determine whether the potential loss can be quantified. In this case, if the firm 
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itself does not have actual experience with product claims or if that experience is not 
relevant to the product in question, the auditor should look outside the firm. Industry 
statistics on product liability and the incidence of claims are generally available from trade 
associations, government regulators, or independent research organizations. In the course 
of examining internal correspondence between department heads and within departments, 
however, the auditor will likely find some internal estimates of the extent of the problem. 
This becomes especially obvious if the correspondents are attempting to justify the 
allocation of additional staff and financial resources to combat the problem or to explain 
why production was shifted or halted. In short, the members of management not directly 
involved in manipulating the financial statements may speak quite frankly about the loss 
contingency.
Asset Writeoffs
An asset is not always worth its balance-sheet carrying value. Even if an appropriate 
depreciation schedule is established when the asset is acquired, over time the needs of the 
business enterprise may change. Because of rapid changes in engineering and materials 
applications, for example, manufacturing processes may need to be updated to remain 
economically competitive. The machinery used in the old processes may become obsolete 
well before the machines themselves actually wear out and are depreciated down to salvage 
value. Similarly, changes in customer demand may force a manufacturer to discontinue a 
certain product line and render useless equipment specially designed to build that product. 
Firms operating in highly competitive markets may lose business to a low-cost competitor 
and be forced to idle production lines. Occasionally, in order to obtain or retain a customer 
relationship, a firm may even deliberately quote a price for its products that does not cover 
the cost of acquiring and operating the equipment used to produce those products. In all 
these cases, management should assess whether the equipment carrying value is impaired, 
especially if there are no reasonable prospects of finding an alternative use for the 
equipment. In the event an impairment loss should be taken, however, management may 
fraudulently postpone that charge if it causes earnings to fall below a managed earnings 
 ,21target.
To detect this fraud, the auditor must be particularly adept at seeing through management’s 
pretensions to get to the facts. The best place to begin is to review fixed assets with 
divisional or production personnel. FASB Statement No. 121, Accounting for the Impairment of 
Long-Lived Assets and for Long-Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of provides a list of possible events 
that may give rise to an impairment:
1. A significant decrease in the market value of an asset
2. A significant change in the extent or manner in which an asset is used or a significant 
physical change in an asset
3. A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the business climate that could affect 
the value of an asset or an adverse action or assessment by a regulator  *
reasonably possible loss contingency, according to FASB Statement No. 5, paragraph 10, but fails to make 
the required disclosure of that contingency in its financial statements.
21 In this section, we are discussing asset writeoffs in the course of operations. Acquisition-related writeoffs 
are discussed in the preceding section entitled “Big-Bath Restructuring Changes.”
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4. An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the amount originally expected to
acquire or construct an asset
5. A current-period operating or cash-flow loss combined with a history of operating or 
cash flow losses or a projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses associated 
with an asset used for the purpose of producing revenue22
22 FASB Statement No. 121, paragraph 5.
23 Ibid., paragraph 6.
24 If there are no narratives, the auditor can probably obtain a list of potential downside possibilities simply 
by asking the line managers.
25 For a definition of financial forecast, see the AICPA Guide for Prospective Financial Statements, Section
200.04.
The auditor may wish to draw questions for firm personnel from this list and look for 
evidence of changes in production and product demand to determine whether an asset is 
impaired.
Clearly, if equipment has been moved off the shop floor into storage and there are no plans 
for future use of that equipment, an impairment loss is highly likely. The more difficult 
issues arise if equipment is still in use but profitability is less certain. Profitability is at issue 
when assets may be impaired because FASB Statement No. 121 states that "[i]f the sum of 
expected future cash flows (undiscounted and without interest charges) is less than the 
carrying amount of the asset, the entity shall recognize an impairment loss. . . .”23 Since 
most management reporting systems, however, measure profitability by product line or by 
customer, it is hard to imagine how a business could survive in today’s competitive 
environment without this information. Indeed, the activity-based costing initiatives begun in 
the 1980s were a direct result of the need for management to understand a product’s 
contribution to overall firm profitability. Although auditors may not be accustomed to 
reviewing product line profitability reports, these reports source revenues to the costs to 
produce them and can answer directly whether a given production process has been 
historically profitable.
Historical data are the basis of management plans and profitability forecasts. If the auditor 
can obtain such forecasts directly from the personnel with line responsibility for production, 
those personnel might be inclined to render a more accurate forecast since they are 
unaware of management’s earnings target. One should keep in mind that line managers 
may have an incentive to show as positive a picture as possible to avoid production 
shutdowns. Also, line managers may also receive hints or outright requests from 
management to produce an overly favorable forecast. In either case, however, if the 
forecasts are accompanied by written narratives, the narratives will generally list all the 
downside possibilities in order to provide political cover for the line manager should events 
not turn out as planned.24 The auditor may be able to assess the reasonableness of the 
forecast, given the known conditions at the time and the likelihood of those downside 
possibilities.
Proving fraud in a forecast is difficult because a forecast is by its very nature a best-guess.25 
If that forecast, however, was based on facts known to be incorrect, such as a major 
customer’s known unwillingness to buy the product, then the forecast was fraudulently 
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constructed. A forecast may also become fraudulent if it is used at a later time to justify a 
management decision even though the management knows that significant facts have 
changed. For example, a forecast may accurately reflect that, at the time of preparation, 
there was a possibility that a certain major customer wanted to buy the product. If, 
however, by the balance-sheet date, management knows that the customer is not interested 
and there are no alternative buyers, it would be fraudulent to assert that the forecast is still 
accurate and then use it to justify not writing down the value of assets used to produce that 
product.
Another area of asset writeoff that can fall victim to fraud involves investments in securities 
of private companies. Such securities are difficult to value because transaction prices are not 
publicly available. If the security held is stock and there have been substantial historical 
operating losses with little hope of future profitability (i.e., the decline in value is other than 
temporary), that stock may be impaired according to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting 
for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities. Likewise, FASB Statement No. 115 states 
that for debt,
... if it is possible that the investor will be unable to collect all amounts due 
according to the contractual terms of a debt security not impaired at acquisition, an 
other-than-temporary impairment shall be considered to have occurred. If the 
decline in fair value [of any security] is judged to be other than temporary, the cost 
basis of the individual security shall be written down to fair value as a new cost 
basis and the amount of the write-down shall be included in earnings (that is, 
accounted for as a realized loss).26
26 FASB Statement 115, paragraph 16.
Without recent prices for the sale of stock and debt in a private company, the auditor might 
have to look at financial information from the investee company. The investor, if it holds a 
significant position in the investee, should have financial information on file (if not, this 
should be a red flag that something may be amiss). Those data would likely include results 
of operations that would give historical profitability. For future profit estimates, one should 
look to company forecasts and assess the validity of those forecasts based upon the known 
relationships, if any, between management of the investor and investee. If common 
representation within management or on the boards of both companies exists, further 
inquiry may be necessary to determine the validity of any forecast. Losses over several past 
years may be sufficient to establish impairment, as the following case study taken from a 
SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release demonstrates.
Windpower, Inc. Case Study
Windpower, Inc., a small private company, began doing research in windmill 
production and technology in 1978 with a view to later commercial development. 
The following year, the same group of investors established Breezy Valley Energy, 
Inc. and transferred Windpower’s R&D work to Breezy Valley in 1980. Breezy 
Valley reimbursed Windpower $31,308 for work done to date and from then on 
Windpower lent Breezy Valley money for R&D. In fact, these loans formed the 
primary source of funds for Breezy Valley.
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According to Windpower’s financial statements for the nine months ended March 
31, 1981, loans outstanding to Breezy Valley at that date amounted to $108,434. By 
the end of the following fiscal year, the aggregate loans totaled $208,146 and by 
March 31, 1983, they reached $321,725. In Windpower’s financial statements for 
1981 and 1982, the loans are accounted for as a receivable; during fiscal 1983, this 
receivable was exchanged for Breezy Valley preferred stock.
In September 1983, Windpower filed a Form S-1 in connection with a proposed $4- 
million IPO. In this filing, Windpower’s investment in Breezy Valley was carried as 
an asset valued at historical cost rather than written down as Breezy Valley’s 
prospects dimmed. Windpower’s investment as reported in its various forms, 
represented 62 percent, 77 percent, and 80 percent of the total assets at the end of 
fiscal 1981, 1982, and 1983 respectively while cumulative operating losses increased 
at Breezy Valley from $118,420 in fiscal 1981 to $265,542 in 1982, and reached 
$437,092 by the end of fiscal 1983. Revenues for Breezy Valley had declined such 
that it was bringing in only $1 for every $7 going out in expenses; future earnings 
prospects were unattractive because Breezy Valley seemed unable to market its 
products.
Conclusion and Analysis
On the grounds of its failure to write down its investment in Breezy Valley to net 
realizable value in accordance with GAAP, the SEC suspended the effectiveness of 
Windpower’s registration statement for the $4-million public offering. Since this 
case predated the issuance of FASB Statement No. 115, the SEC looked to FASB 
Statement No. 5 and found that Windpower should have applied the provisions of 
FASB Statement No. 5 which states in paragraph 8 that:
An estimated loss from a loss contingency . . . shall be accrued by a charge to 
income if both the following conditions are met:
a) Information available prior to issuance of the financial statements indicates that 
it is probable that an asset has been impaired or a liability has been incurred at 
the date of the financial statements. It is implicit in this condition that it must be 
probable that one or more future events will occur confirming the fact of the 
loss.
b) The amount of the loss can be reasonably estimated.
Windpower’s financial condition met the requirements of paragraph a) since the 
investment in Breezy Valley was impaired and recovery was unlikely because of the 
growing losses and limited prospects of generating sales. The requirements of 
paragraph b) were also met since the amount of the loss was exactly equal to the 
known aggregate amount of the loans. Clearly, the impairment requirements of 
FASB Statement No. 115, if it had been in effect, were also met.
On the basis of this failure to take account of the reduced value of Windpower’s 
investment and the slim prospects of recovery, the SEC instituted proceedings 
against Windpower’s auditor and two of its partners for improperly certifying that 
Windpower’s financial statements had been prepared according to GAAP and 
audited according to GAAS. The SEC accepted Offers of Settlement and 
Undertakings from the auditor and its two partners.
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10.3.2 Manipulation of Acquisition Reserves
When one company acquires another using the purchase method of accounting for the 
transaction under Accounting Principles Board Opinion (APB) No. 16, Business 
Combinations, the purchase price paid is allocated to the assets of the acquired company 
using the fair value of those assets. Any excess of purchase price over the fair value of assets 
acquired is booked as goodwill. Liabilities can also be transferred or accrued; those 
liabilities assumed by the purchaser effectively increase the amount paid. If, as is usually the 
case, the cash portion of the purchase price covers the fair value of assets acquired, then 
liabilities assumed over and above the cash paid will increase goodwill.
One type of liability managers of an acquiring company may wish to set up are loss 
contingencies as provided under FASB Statement No. 5,27 presumably for potential 
problems inherited or created when the target company was acquired. These loss 
contingencies or reserves, as they are more commonly known, typically increase the 
goodwill paid for the acquired company, i.e., the entry establishing the loss contingency is a 
credit to a reserve liability and a debit to goodwill. That goodwill is then amortized into 
income, usually over a forty-year period. Examples would include reserves for warranties 
on discontinued products or reserves for bad debts that would no longer be serviced as the 
acquiring company consolidates operations of the target, and closes or sells off unwanted 
segments. Management may also wish to set up severance reserves for employee layoffs. If 
those contingencies later materialize, the expense (debit) of performing the warranty work, 
writing off the debt or paying severance is then taken to the reserve as a credit balance on 
the liability section of the balance sheet.
27 Other accounting literature discussing when and how contingencies can be incurred in connection with a 
business combination includes SEC SAB No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges and Emerging Issues 
Task Force (EITF) Issues No. 94-3, Liability Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other 
Costs to Exit an Activity (Including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring), and No. 95-3, Recognition of 
Liabilities in Connection with a Purchase Business Combination.
Most important, the expense of a reserved item does not run through the income 
statement. Instead, since setting up the reserve itself created or increased goodwill from the 
purchase transaction, amortization of the goodwill attributable to the reserve comes into the 
income statement but only a small portion, perhaps as little as one-fortieth, is expensed in a 
given year. Therefore, establishing the reserve allows management to avoid taking the 
entire expense into income in the current period and, by the amortization of goodwill, to 
spread that expense over a much longer future time.
From this discussion, one can readily see that management has an incentive to reserve as 
much as possible when making acquisitions. Moreover, management does not need to 
attempt to set up all necessary reserves by the date of the acquisition; FASB Statement No. 
38, Accounting for Preacquisition Contingencies of Purchased Enterprises, provides for a twelve­
month period after the acquisition date to adjust the purchase price. It is here that 
management actions need to be carefully reviewed. Without restrictions on the booking of 
reserves after an acquisition, the current management of the acquiring company could 
constantly (and conveniently) create reserves to absorb current losses from acquired 
businesses.
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At some point, however, current management must take responsibility for current period 
results. The twelve-month cutoff provided in FASB Statement No. 38 is the outside limit; 
the period for adjusting the purchase price should end when management “is no longer 
waiting for information that it has arranged to obtain and that is known to be available or 
obtainable”28 at the time of the acquisition. Management crosses the line and commits fraud 
when it creates material purchase reserves for losses that were not foreseeable at the time of 
purchase, especially if management creates those reserves and adjusts the purchase price 
more than twelve months after the purchase date. Likewise, management also commits 
fraud when it uses reserves to absorb losses unrelated to the reasons for which the reserves 
were established.
28 FASB Statement No. 38, paragraph 4.b.
Fabulous Deals, Inc. Case Study
As the divisional controller was about to go into a budget meeting, the Deal Club 
corporate CFO and corporate controller handed him new numbers inflating his 
revenue estimates by $200 million. He was already staying up past midnight 
designing fictitious accounts under the corporate controller’s instructions to create 
numbers that met analysts’ estimates.
But this scene was not to be enacted until 20 years after Bill Battler, a wealthy 
Harvard MBA, had taken over Deal Club, a small discount-shopping club, in 1976 
and went public with it in 1983 at 25 times sales despite losing $2.5 million on only 
$4 million in revenues the previous year. By 1997, Battler had built it into a 
business reporting $2.3 billion in annual revenues. Battler had grown the business 
by persuading large credit card companies to promote the club to their cardholders. 
He also founded or acquired more than a dozen similar clubs in the travel and other 
industries and brought them under Deal Club’s umbrella. Proud of a reported 70- 
percent membership renewal rate that provided what Battler called an “annuity­
like” stream of predictable earnings, he saw the stock move to the $25 area with a 
P/E of about 30.
Enter Carl Charise. A former tax lawyer, Charise founded Fabulous Franchises, Inc. 
in 1990 and went public with it in 1992 at $4 a share. The company had the 
franchise rights to a number of hotel chains with a total of 500,000 rooms, real 
estate brokerages, rental cars, vacation time-sharing, and other businesses. Fabulous 
Franchises made money by charging a franchise fee and taking a percentage of 
earnings from its operators. Earnings were growing at an annual rate in excess of 60 
percent because of Charise’s good management and aggressive acquisition policy. 
The stock price hit a record $79 in 1996 creating a return of 2,000 percent since 
going public. In addition to an office at company headquarters in North Carolina, 
he kept an office in Manhattan from which he constantly wooed Wall Street 
analysts with the Fabulous Franchises story.
As each company grew bigger, growth opportunities became fewer. Battler and 
Charise began telling the analysts to lower expectations since both companies 
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needed bigger and bigger acquisitions which were becoming harder and harder to 
find. In January 1997, Battier approached Charise proposing that Deal Club take 
over Fabulous Franchises. In the following months, discussions turned from 
acquisition by Deal Club to a merger of equals.
Superficially, the two companies seemed to make likely merger partners. The 
millions of well-to-do customers passing through Fabulous Franchises’ operations 
were a natural market for Deal Club memberships and would create a new profit 
center. The merger would utilize the synergy of Fabulous Franchises’ strong 
earnings and Deal Club’s high multiple to add billions to market capitalization.
Trouble in Paradise began, however, when the two conflicting corporate cultures 
started to take a closer look at each other. Bill Battier proved to be an absentee 
visionary and the company ran itself in a casual manner that sometimes slipped into 
carelessness. Divisions were left to run things their own way; accounting systems 
were unsophisticated; financial reporting was slack and there seemed to be no long­
term planning. These practices were defended as “entrepreneurial” and had, 
indeed, unarguably produced a business with $2-billion-a-year in sales.
Carl Charise, on the other hand, was not only extremely charming to Wall Street, 
but also a very competent CEO who ran a tight ship. When his people demanded 
detailed nonpublic information including hard numbers, Deal Club executives 
backed off. In fact, instead of producing numbers for the new management team, 
the Deal Club President produced one for himself, namely, a $25-million negotiated 
payout, to be paid in the event that he was not made COO of the merged company 
after two years. The whole situation made Fabulous Franchises nervous but Deal 
Club’s outside auditors, Fiddle & Fakit, gave assurances that the books were in 
excellent condition. Nevertheless, in the midst of all this prickliness, Deal Club kept 
delivering spectacular quarterly earnings. Fabulous Franchises executives could not 
confirm any information, however, and therefore remained apprehensive.
After the two companies closed the merger under the name Fabulous Deals, Inc. in 
late 1997, more unusual behavior began to surface at Deal Club. Bill Battler insisted 
that the old Deal Club remain financially autonomous and that CFO Haggis 
McFudge and controller Patricia Candel remain in place. Deal Club’s divisional 
controllers would not report to the merged company’s chief accounting officer but 
to McFudge and Candel, who would consolidate results before passing them on. 
This arrangement was reluctantly agreed to, but the financial reports continued to 
come in slowly and, meanwhile, Fabulous Deals risked missing the 10-K filing 
deadline with the SEC. In the face of this problem and Charise’s threats to take the 
matter to the board, Battier agreed to remove McFudge and Candel from the 
process.
More peculiar matters began to come to light when the new chief accounting officer 
had a meeting with McFudge, Candel, and others about the new reporting system. 
The former president of Deal Club asked him how to move $165 million from 
merger reserves into income “creatively” for fiscal 1998. It was also revealed that 
earnings had actually been increased by $100 million using the same trick in 1997. 
When Charise heard this news, he began to fear he would have to restate earnings 
with all that implied for the stock price which he had so assiduously worked to
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support through his good relations with Wall Street. Former Deal Club executives
tried to explain the matter away, and Fiddle & Fakit assured Charise that the
restatement would not be necessary.
The biggest bombshell, however, exploded a few weeks later at a routine budget 
meeting when two mid-level Deal Club executives revealed that Deal Club’s growth 
story was a complete fiction and that all the numbers had been fabricated. The 
story, as it came out that day and over the next few weeks, showed that under 
instructions from McFudge and Candel, more than 20 controllers at 17 of Deal 
Club’s 22 divisions had committed fraud by creating $511 million in phony pretax 
income that translated into a one-third increase in earnings for the three years 
ended fiscal 1997. The fraud had grown each year until 1997 net income was 61 
percent fiction. As the former Deal Club executives told the story, McFudge and 
Candel had said the bogus numbers were necessary to meet analysts’ forecasts.
When Charise publicly announced that Deal Club’s 1997 earnings were being 
restated downward by $115 million, Fabulous Deals’ stock price plunged to $19 
from $36 to reduce market capitalization by $14 billion. At 108 million shares 
traded, the volume was the largest one-day turnover for any stock in the history of 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) up to that time. Three shareholder lawsuits 
had been filed by the end of the day and about 70 more followed. By the time the 
stock price finally bottomed at $7.50, more than $29 billion in market capitalization 
had been vaporized.
Conclusion and Analysis
The scandal seems to have been driven by the perception by McFudge, Candel, 
and others that meeting analysts’ expectations and maintaining the upward 
momentum of the P/E and stock price were more important than accepting the ups 
and downs, the good years and bad, of business and the impact such developments 
implied for the stock price. Externally perceived performance became more 
important than reality. The extent of Bill Battler’s involvement remains an open 
question.
The scandal was only able to go on as long as it did because of the failure of Fiddle 
& Fakit to detect accounting irregularities of this magnitude. In the first three 
quarters of 1995, 1996, and 1997, the unaudited financial statements were doctored 
by adjusting revenues upward and expenses downward at the largest Deal Club 
subsidiary. These adjustments were $31 million, $87 million, and $176 million, 
respectively. If the auditors had looked at these interim statements, they would have 
seen a pattern of unsubstantiated changes to income and expense items. At year- 
end, before Fiddle & Fakit arrived to do the audit, these irregularities were reversed 
and the fictitious earnings replaced by earnings converted from cookie-jar reserves. 
Fiddle & Fakit were so lax in their work that they failed to question this use of 
reserves. They even allowed a $25-million transfer from reserves to be classified as 
“immaterial.” Acquisition reserves were even used to pay for $597,000 in expenses 
requested by Bill Battler for the operation of his private plane in years prior to the 
acquisition. These expenses, assuming they were properly reimbursable, should 
have been classified as operating costs.
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This failure is even more troubling since Fiddle & Fakit had had the Deal Club 
account for years and McFudge, Candel, and others were former Fiddle & Fakit 
employees. Bill Battler had even fought to retain Fiddle & Fakit as auditors after the 
merger. Fiddle & Fakit paid $335 million to settle a shareholder class action suit and 
is embroiled in other suits involving Fabulous Deals and Bill Battler. Fabulous Deals 
has agreed to pay $2.85 billion in class action settlements.
10.3.3 Cost Shifting to Improve Current Operating Results
If management desires to improve earnings fraudulently, it can remove expenses from the 
current-period income statement to make operations appear more profitable. There are two 
ways in which expenses incurred by a firm can be shifted; they can be moved to the:
1. Balance sheet to be brought onto the income statement at a future period
2. Income statement of another related entity to remove the cost altogether
Shift to the Balance Sheet
The matching principle, which states that the timing of expenses should be related to the 
timing of revenues,29 restricts the first shifting method. Under this principle, if the cost was 
incurred to earn revenue in the current period, as a general rule, the cost should be charged 
to that revenue in the current period. There are some expenses that offer the prospect of 
providing benefits to future periods, and management may attempt to justify capitalizing, 
and then amortizing them into income over future periods. This practice, however, may run 
afoul of specific accounting guidance and, if management intentionally ignores this 
guidance, it will create fraudulent financial statements. For example, to meet earnings 
projections, management may begin capitalizing the salaries of marketing personnel on the 
argument that the work performed by those personnel will benefit future-period sales.
29 See FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, paragraphs 145-149 for a summary 
of the issues regarding expense recognition.
30 There is an exception that allows the capitalization of sales commissions paid to agents selling insurance 
policies under FASB Statement No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by Insurance Enterprises, paragraph 28 et seq. 
In the case of insurance sales, though, actuaries are able to establish estimates of how long those policies 
will remain in force and thereby generate premium income to the insurance carrier. Those estimates then 
provide a reasonable basis for amortizing the commissions and other acquisition costs over future periods.
31 FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, paragraph 148.
Although there may be some conceptual merit to the argument, capitalizing sales personnel 
salaries runs directly counter to an example contained in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, 
Elements of Financial Statements, paragraph 148, because it is difficult to determine the 
amount and length of time of future benefits.30 Implementing the principle of conservatism, 
FASB Concepts Statement No. 6 states that such expenditures are “recognized as expenses 
in the period in which they are incurred because the period to which they otherwise relate 
is indeterminable or not worth the effort to determine.”31 Finally, even if capitalization is 
justified, the manipulation of financial statements may also occur when management 
switches from currently expensing costs to capitalizing them without proper disclosure. 
Failure to disclose may cause readers of financial statements to believe that profits have 
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improved in the year of the policy change compared to previous periods when, in reality, 
the improved operating results may be solely attributable to shifting expenses to the 
balance sheet.
The Asset Quality Index, described in the discussion entitled “Quantitative Predictors,” 
below in section 10.4.1, is one of the early warning signs of this type of manipulation. This 
index looks at the percentage of noncurrent assets to total assets for the current year over 
the previous year. If the index is greater than one, management has increased the 
percentage of noncurrent to total assets. This type of behavior is frequently associated with 
the sale of stock, especially during the period leading up to seasoned equity offerings for a 
company whose stock is already publicly traded. (A seasoned equity offering consists of the 
sale of new, additional shares by a public company). A survey of academic research also 
found that management frequently got away with this type of manipulation.
Two recent studies provide evidence that managers manage earnings at the time of 
seasoned equity offerings (Rangan, 1998; Teoh, et al. 1998). It is well known that shares of 
firms that make seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) underperform the market in the years 
following the offering. These two papers show that:
1. The reported earnings of firms that make SEOs are unusually high at the time of the 
SEO.
2. These high reported earnings are attributable to unusually high accruals (including 
“discretionary” accruals).
3. These firms’ earnings performance is unusually poor in the years following the SEO.
4. There is a strong association between the extent of earnings management and 
subsequent stock price performance. Shares of firms with the highest accruals at the time 
of the SEO tend to perform worse in the years after the SEO than shares of other firms.
This evidence is consistent with the view that investors do not “see through” earnings 
management at the time of the SEO. Rather, as time passes after the SEO and the earnings 
management becomes apparent through subsequent earnings disappointments, the 
overpricing reverses and these stocks underperform the market.32
32 Dechow and Skinner, op. cit.
33 In the Matter of W.R. Grace & Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1140 (June 30, 
1999). This case also raised materiality issues in that the manipulation of subsidiary earnings was less than 
a rule-of-thumb threshold of 5 percent of consolidated Grace earnings. But since the SEC found that 
management placed increased importance on the subsidiary’s earnings, the SEC determined that the 
manipulation was material.
Clearly, the incentive is to create a short-term illusion of higher profits to sell stock at an 
inflated price.
Shift to Related Entity
Sometimes fraudsters can deceive by moving costs from one entity to another under 
common control. This is useful to the fraudsters in situations in which investors or analysts 
are looking intently at the performance of a certain business segment, and management 
wants to show rising earnings in that segment to give the illusion of significant future 
growth. Events similar to this played out in the W.R. Grace case,33 although that 
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management also used reserves as the tool to shift expenses. As outlined above, in June 
1999, the SEC brought a managed earnings case against Grace for manipulating the 
reported earnings of its primary health care subsidiary, National Medical Care, Inc. 
Management had established reserves for unanticipated health care reimbursements and 
used those reserves in subsequent periods to reduce expenses and show a steady growth 
rate in its health care subsidiary. However, there were no liabilities to justify the reserves, 
which consequently were not in conformity with GAAP. Fraudsters may also want to 
improve a subsidiary’s earnings in order to enhance it for sale by shifting costs to the parent 
or to affiliates and by using reserves, as illustrated in the example of Grace.
Another example of cost shifting was the previously discussed Livent case.34 This scheme 
operated from 1990 through 1998. There were three areas of expense manipulation:
34 In the matter of Livent, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1095, January 13, 1999.
35 While this is true for large and small firms, the AICPA prepared a report entitled Small Firm PCAOB 
Inspection Deficiency Analysis in May 2006. This report analyzed the audit deficiencies referenced to firms 
with fewer than 100 public clients. Of the 242 reports examined, 43 revenue recognition issues were 
identified, more than twice the number of the next most frequent deficiency.
1. Livent transferred preproduction costs for the shows to fixed assets, such as set 
construction.
2. Livent removed certain expenses and related liabilities from the general ledger.
3. Livent transferred costs from one show currently running to another show that had not 
yet opened.
Livent shows that this type of cost shifting is especially hard to detect. Business downturns 
usually bring these schemes to the surface because, if the company overall is suffering, 
there is no place to hide the additional costs. To try to detect cost shifting before a 
downturn, auditors would be well served to look for credits appearing in expense accounts. 
Such credits may indicate that the entity incurring the cost accrued the expenses on its 
books as debits, and then transferred the expenses out with offsetting credits. It is not safe, 
however, to assume that the subsidiary incurring the expense initially recorded it as such. 
There may be a special reserve or liability account on the balance sheet set up to record the 
initial debits with the transfer credits appearing later. As the expenses are being booked, 
significant debit balances in the liability account will grow until the transfer is made. Such 
debit balances in a liability account should stand out. Also, if the transfers take place over 
time, there is likely to be some correspondence spelling out the procedures, especially if the 
initial debit is to an unusual account such as a liability reserve.
10.3.4 Recognizing Fictitious Revenues
The COSO Report found that more than half the financial reporting frauds in the period 
from 1987 to 1997 were attributable to overstating revenue. Revenue recognition issues 
have occupied the accounting profession for many years as well. In 2006 revenue 
recognition based audit deficiencies remain amongst the most noted deficiencies by the 
PCAOB.35 In 1984, the FASB issued FAS Concepts Statement No. 5. That statement set out 
two basic requirements for recognizing revenue:
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a. Realized or realizable. Revenues and gains generally are not recognized until 
realized or realizable. Revenues and gains are realized when products (goods or 
services), merchandise or other assets are exchanged for cash or claims to cash. 
Revenues and gains are realizable when related assets received or held are 
readily convertible to known amounts of cash or claims to cash. Readily 
convertible assets have (i) interchangeable (fungible) units and (ii) quoted prices 
available in an active market that can rapidly absorb the quantity held by the 
entity without significantly affecting the price.
b. Earned. Revenues are not recognized until earned. An entity’s revenue-earning 
activities involve delivering or producing goods, rendering services or other 
activities that constitute its ongoing major or central operations, and revenues 
are considered to have been earned when the entity has substantially 
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits represented by the 
36 revenues. . . .
The staff of the SEC identified a long list of additional accounting pronouncements dealing 
with revenue recognition, including:
• FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases
• FASB Statement No. 45, Accounting for Franchise Fee Revenue
• FASB Statement No. 48, Revenue Recognition When Right of Return Exists
• FASB Statement No. 49, Accounting for Product Financing Arrangements
• FASB Statement No. 50, Financial Reporting in the Record and Music Industry
• FASB Statement No. 51, Financial Reporting by Cable Television Companies
• FASB Statement No. 66, Accounting for Sales of Real Estate
• APB Opinion No. 10, Omnibus Opinion—1966
• ARBs No. 43 and No. 45, Long-Term Construction-Type Contracts
• SOP No. 81-1, Accounting for Performance of Construction-Type and Certain Production-Type 
Contracts
• SOP No. 97-2, Software Revenue Recognition
• Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) Issue No. 88-18, Sales of Future Revenues
• EITF Issue No. 91-9, Revenue and Expense Recognition for Freight Services in Process
• EITF Issue No. 95-1, Revenue Recognition on Sales with a Guaranteed Minimum Resale Value
• EITF Issue No. 95-4, Revenue Recognition on Equipment Sold and Subsequently Repurchased 
Subject to an Operating Lease 367
36 FASB Concepts Statement No. 5, paragraph 83 (footnotes omitted).
37 SEC SAB No. 101, Topic 13, A.1.
In SAB No. 101, the SEC set out its interpretation of the above literature and concluded 
that:
The staff believes that revenue generally is realized or realizable and earned when 
all of the following criteria are met:
a. Persuasive evidence of an arrangement exists
b. Delivery has occurred or services have been rendered
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c. The seller’s price to the buyer is fixed or determinable
d. Collectibility is reasonably assured.38
38 Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
39 SOP 97-2, paragraph 8.
40 See SAB No. 101, Revenue Recognition in Financial Statements, Question 1. The hypothetical situation posed 
in the SAB actually stated the normal and customary business practice was to obtain written agreements 
and did not mention the existence of a company policy to obtain written agreements. The staff's position 
was that companies could not book as revenue sales lacking written agreements when the normal and 
customary business practice for the industry was to obtain written agreements.
With regard to a fixed or determinable selling price, the SEC staff amplified its position by 
looking to SOP 97-2 which defines a fixed fee as a “fee required to be paid at a set amount 
that is not subject to refund or adjustment.”39 Even though SOP 97-2 deals with software 
revenue recognition, the staff believed that the requirement of not being subject to refund 
or adjustment was applicable to all transactions. If the buyer retains a right to a refund of 
the purchase price, then collectibility cannot be assured. Indeed, it would be difficult to meet 
the FASB Concepts Statement No. 5 realization test if the cash or other payment tendered 
was subject to refund at the buyer’s discretion. Yet, refund arrangements are a common 
area for revenue recognition fraud.
If company management wishes to inflate revenues by booking fictitious sales, in all 
likelihood one or more of the SEC’s conditions will have been violated:
1. Lack of an agreement
2. Nondelivery
3. No fixed price
4. Receivables are not collectible
Lack of an Agreement
As the reporting quarter draws to an end, companies straining to achieve a revenue target 
face pressure to close sales by the last day. That pressure may lead to the fraudulent 
booking of premature or nonexistent sales. In the rush to close transactions by a certain 
date, sales personnel may represent to management that there is an oral agreement with a 
customer when, in fact, there is none. For this reason, the SEC standard requires 
“persuasive evidence,” which generally means some written documentation from either the 
buyer or a third party such as a purchasing agent. If a company requires a written 
agreement in order to credit a salesperson with a sale, the agreement might be held up, 
perhaps under review in the buyer’s legal department, at the end of the quarter. The 
salesperson may then represent (perhaps accurately) that the buyer has signed off on the 
sale; without a signed contract, however, recognition of the sale violates the company 
policy. Such a policy is put in place to assure the company conforms to GAAP. Violating 
that policy causes a GAAP violation if, in footnotes to the financial statements or elsewhere, 
management represents that sales are not recognized without a written agreement.40 Such a 
violation might also point to an internal control issue for the auditors to consider.
Good sales cutoff procedures can generally detect lack of proper agreements. If written 
agreements are fabricated, detection is much more difficult. The random sampling of orders 
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booked as revenue near the end of a quarter should provide a list of customers to call to 
verify that documents are authentic. For a document fabrication scheme to succeed over 
several quarters or years, however, the fabricated agreements must be replaced by authentic 
agreements and real sales or there will be significant reversals of prior period sales. 
Therefore, auditors can compare, perhaps on a random basis, contracts on file at the end of 
a given reporting period with contracts on file for the same transaction at later period. If the 
original (fake) contract has been switched, there probably was an attempt at fabrication. 
Conversely, if the authentic document does not appear, the sale may never have been 
completed, in which case there would be a reversal in the subsequent period. Numerous 
such reversals would point to revenue recognition problems.
Nondelivery
What constitutes delivery varies from industry to industry but generally occurs when title 
and risk of loss pass to the buyer. Delivery of some products require shipping documents 
that provide an auditable paper trail. Delivery of products such as software, though, may 
occur over the Internet at near instantaneous speed. But even here there should be some 
documentation or electronic receipt verification.
Attempts at achieving fraudulent deliveries usually involve some person or entity willing to 
hold the product until such time as its sale can be arranged. As part of the fraud scheme, 
the recipient executes documents or emails that appear to confirm delivery. This recipient 
is sometimes part of the scheme or can be a customer who inadvertently accepts delivery 
before completing the sale. The latter may be easier to detect because customers receiving 
products before they are wanted tend to complain to company management. The third- 
party recipients who park goods temporarily may be harder to detect but usually require 
some payment for their services. Payment may come in the form of above-average 
discounts if the third parties resell the products over future periods or there may be special 
terms allowing for product returns. An analysis of average product selling prices may point 
to one customer who stands out from the rest by receiving better deals. If returns from a 
given customer are abnormally high, that fact, too, may indicate special arrangements, 
especially if the returns occur in a later reporting period. If one customer receives such 
favorable treatment, the auditor should make additional inquiries as to why. In addition, 
delivery schemes involving resellers typically become more apparent when other resellers 
cannot sell the product as expected because of a change in market conditions. If a reseller is 
still taking substantial deliveries of product while many others are experiencing sales 
declines, the auditor should attempt to understand why that reseller’s channels of 
distribution are clear when others are blocked.
No Fixed Price
Sometimes prices are difficult to determine, particularly if the product is to be combined 
with other products before being sold to an end user. Such sales may involve a royalty 
payment that is a function of the selling price. It would be inappropriate to book anticipated 
future royalties as current revenues until the amount of those royalties becomes fixed upon 
ultimate sale. Minimum royalties, however, may be booked when they become due. Fraud 
occurs when royalties are recognized on fictitious or anticipated ultimate sales. Such royalty 
arrangements, however, typically require the royalty payor to report to the royalty recipient 
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the quantity of ultimate sales on a periodic (usually quarterly) basis. This permits an 
accounting of the final sales that can be used to verify reported royalty income.
The more deceptive form of fraud used to circumvent the fixed price requirement is the 
clandestine use of side letters or arrangements that allow for refunds or discounts at the 
buyer’s option or in certain circumstances. Under tight market conditions or perhaps 
because the product is new and untested, it may be necessary to use these side letters to 
make a sale. The most likely candidates for this type of fraud are sales personnel with some 
discretion and authority such as divisional managers and above. Implementation of such a 
scheme requires their authority to alter records or invent excuses should the buyer exercise 
his rights under the side agreement. As a general rule, side letters are the result of some 
type of internal control failure when the divisional manager is able to effect economic 
outcomes and alter accounting records. These side letters are quite hard to detect because 
the buyer usually realizes he is receiving a special deal and does not want to publicize it. Of 
course, the fraudsters in the selling company will attempt to keep such agreements secret.
These schemes must come to the surface when the buyer exercises his rights under the 
agreement. A more senior member of management is usually involved to cover up the 
refund with a fabricated reason or another transaction. Nevertheless, there is usually some 
documentation of the refund if corporate controls are in place. The auditor who suspects 
the existence of side letters can certainly look for refunds and discounts that are out of the 
ordinary. Keep in mind that the customer probably demanded the right to obtain a refund 
or discount in the course of negotiations for the sale. To catch the existence of side letters 
before refund demands are made, a suspicious auditor may review sales files for 
correspondence, notes, or other evidence of such demands from the prospective customer. 
If installing the product requires personnel such as engineers, those personnel not reporting 
to the fraudsters may know details of the side agreement but innocently believe there is no 
issue to report to senior management. It is also likely that if fraudsters used side letters with 
one customer, there might be side letters with other customers as well.
Receivables Are Not Collectible 
Financially weak firms may not pay their bills. To prevent sales to firms in poor financial 
condition, some type of customer approval process independent of the sales function needs 
to be in place to assess customer health, especially if the customer is placing large orders. 
This review function should be integrated with the approval process for customer refunds 
and discounts to prevent the implementation of side letters, which also affect collectiblity, as 
discussed above. From an auditor’s point of view, an unusual concentration of orders from 
small or distressed customers, particularly near the end of a reporting period or a sales 
campaign, should raise concerns.
Buffalo Chips, Inc. Case Study
When the accounts receivable accountant tripped over a box on the Buffalo Chips 
loading dock in October 1993, she knew something was wrong at the company. 
From the packing slip, she recognized a $250,000 order she had invoiced in the 
previous quarter. As it turned out, booking revenues before products were shipped
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was only one of the fraudulent accounting practices used at Buffalo Chips to deceive
its auditors and investors.
In 1979, Buffalo Chips was a small Silicon Valley startup with a promising patent 
for semiconductor chips but had burned through its venture capital without 
bringing a product to market. Soon after Jim Johnson, a former engineer with 
defense and electronic-component firms, took over the company for no salary but 
20 percent of the stock, the company became cash positive and had sales of nearly 
$2 million. Jim soon acquired the rest of the company. Mel Leeds was brought 
aboard in the accounting department and quickly became CFO. Johnson and Leeds 
had different personalities but shared a taste for expensive homes, cars and golf 
clubs.
Johnson had built up sales in specialty resistors and capacitors assembled on silicon 
chips by trading on his old connections in defense and electronics. Now he was 
successful in winning contracts to supply components to major American 
companies. Production capacity was increased by taking the company public and 
purchasing a microchip manufacturing facility from another producer. By 1987, 
revenues topped $30 million and 215 people were on the payroll. As the company 
grew, management was under relentless pressure from analysts to expand the P/E 
multiple and raise the stock price with a string of quarterly earnings increases.
Johnson was an overbearing manager insisting on making decisions down to the 
level of $25 purchases of office equipment. The turnover of senior management was 
high with the result that the average level of executive experience declined. As early 
as 1987, product ordered for subsequent quarters was being shipped to meet current 
revenue objectives. Phony packing documents were created and product was stored 
onsite in empty offices and offsite in garages and elsewhere. The external auditors 
forced the company to restate 1989 earnings to correct “revenue and expense cutoff 
errors” and recommended Leeds be fired. Johnson kept him on, however, but 
changed his title and some of his responsibilities, then raised his salary. In 1992, a 
new president tried to correct the situation but without success. He resigned after 
five months. The new CFO, Mario Innocente, who had been unemployed for 
nearly a year before joining Buffalo, did not.
Johnson told the executive in 1993 he wanted to see double-digit revenue growth 
every quarter because he wanted to attract new capital from a prospective partner 
and could raise another $40 million through a secondary offering if the stock price 
rose from its current $11 to $20. In 1994, Banzai Alloys bought 10 percent of 
Buffalo, promised an infusion of $24 million, and agreed to sell Buffalo’s products 
overseas. The stock price jumped to $21.25 per share and the value of Johnson’s 
holdings increased to $40 million. Leeds sold some of his holdings and netted more 
than $500,000. In the meantime, company executives booked bogus sales to both 
real and fictitious companies, treated product returns as sales, and produced false 
financial reports to deceive auditors, bankers, and their own board of directors. 
False annual reports and 10-Q and 10-K filings were signed off and misleading 
information was given to analysts.
Accounts receivable was now bursting with phony sales. To cover up, Innocente 
prepared two accounts receivable reports, one for internal use and the other for the 
board and investment bankers. The internal report showed that 51 percent of 
receivables were actually current; the outside report showed 82.4 percent. Even 
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when a board member questioned the peculiar fact that receivables exceeded 
quarterly revenues, he was fobbed off with the answer that the Asian distributors 
had 180 days to pay and thus their receivable could be booked as current. He did 
not know that Asian sales were booked to distributors who had an unconditional 
right of return, that is, the products were, in effect, shipped on consignment. Cash 
collections fell to 25 percent of the quarterly target.
With the books in such bad shape, a secondary offering was now out of the question 
since the financial statements for the first nine months of fiscal 1994 could not 
survive an audit. It was initially suggested that $3 million in uncollectable 
receivables be written off but, toward the end of the fourth quarter, the amount had 
ballooned to $8.3 million. In consultation with Leeds, the new CFO decided to 
allocate the write-downs to product returns and bad debts. The writeoff would be 
offset by recognizing revenues of $7 million from Banzai as nonproduct technology 
sales.
When the figures were published, analysts became suspicious of the $8.3 million 
and $7 million figures and began to ask questions about the accounting for 
receivables. The stock price dropped to $13 from $22 in one day and several 
shareholders filed lawsuits. A press release from the board of directors explained 
the accounting irregularities and the stock continued its downward path to $6. 
Johnson, Leeds, and Innocente departed and new auditors restated a $7.7-million 
profit as a $16.6-million loss. Johnson and Leeds were indicted on the criminal 
charges of fraud and insider trading and received sentences of 36 and 32 months 
respectively and had to pay a fine of $100,000 each. Johnson had to surrender his 
1.5 million shares of Buffalo Chips valued at about $2.5 million in restitution to 
shareholders.
Conclusion and Analysis
How did this happen? First of all, the company was led by Jim Johnson, an 
ambitious and overbearing CEO, who found a compliant CFO in Mel Leeds. This 
proved to be a potent mix of personalities. Johnson had indeed shown great drive 
and competence in turning the struggling start-up company into a profitable 
concern under his leadership. But as the company grew and went public in order to 
expand, it came under the scrutiny of Wall Street analysts. Management was now 
under pressure to meet analysts’ earnings expectations. It was also necessary to keep 
revenues and earnings up in order to attract a new partner and raise additional 
capital through a secondary offering. Unfortunately, real revenues and earnings 
could not support these ambitions.
As revealed in court, the company concocted nearly a dozen revenue recognition 
schemes. These included recording revenue on:
• Sales shipped in subsequent quarters
• Sales shipped before the customer agreed to accept delivery
• Sales shipped to customers without receiving an order. These sales were not 
reversed when the goods were returned
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• Shipments held at the freight forwarder or stored offsite, sometimes at the homes
of employees (Company shipping staff had deals with the forwarders to sign off
on the paperwork as if real deliveries had been made.)
• Sales shipped to fictitious customers
• Sales shipped to customers with unconditional rights of return, that is, goods 
were shipped on consignment and recorded as sales
This scheme was concealed by the creation of a false accounts receivable report for 
the board of directors and investment bankers. The bankers and the board were 
deceived by the explanation that the high levels of receivables reflected large 
shipments made at the end of a quarter. They were not told that some sales were to 
customers with unconditional rights of return. After the whole scheme collapsed, 
forensic auditors discovered that Buffalo Chips had recorded $38 million in phony 
revenue.
The SEC later alleged the auditors had recklessly failed to comply with generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and had exercised improper professional 
conduct in the audit of accounts receivable, inventory, and property. Accounts 
receivable were overstated by $10.6 million or 162 percent; inventory was 
overstated by $10.2 million or 197 percent; property was overstated by $3.0 million 
or 40 percent. When restated, accounts receivable reduced net income by $9.7 
million, inventory reduced net income by $9.3 million and property and equipment 
reduced net income by $2.7 million. The SEC alleged that the auditors had failed to 
exercise appropriate professional skepticism, obtain competent evidential matter or 
properly supervise audit personnel. For example, the auditors did not examine the 
writeoff of one-third of the accounts receivable balance, an act that should have 
signaled to the auditors that a material misstatement was possible. The SEC 
eventually brought Rule 102(e) proceedings against the engagement partner and 
manager on Buffalo Chips’ 1994 audit.
Datatronix Inc. Case Study
Datatronix is a multinational database software company with shares traded over 
the counter. The company described itself in its press releases and advertising 
literature as the fastest growing company in the database software industry. In 
reality, the company was showing increased revenues and earnings by using a wide 
range of fraudulent accounting practices to produce the numbers on its own 
financial statements as well as those filed with the SEC. For the fiscal years 1994 to 
1996 and for the first quarter of fiscal 1997, Datatronix salespeople, managers, and 
others fraudulently inflated quarterly and annual revenues and earnings in violation 
of GAAP. The violations included:
1. Backdating license sale agreements
2. Entering into side agreements granting rights to refunds and other concessions to 
customers
3. Recognizing revenue on transactions with reseller customers that were not 
creditworthy
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4. Recognizing amounts due under software maintenance agreements as software 
license revenues
5. Recognizing revenue on disputed claims against customers
Managers later explained that the frauds occurred when the performance numbers 
failed to meet the internal revenue and earnings objectives which in turn had been 
established in order to meet analysts’ forecasts. As the quarterly cutoff dates 
approached, the sales department tried to close as many sales as possible to meet 
the quarterly objectives. If license agreements could not be signed before the end of 
the quarter, they were frequently signed later and backdated to the quarter in 
violation of both GAAP for revenue recognition and written internal policy. This 
practice was possible because of slack internal controls. Salespersons, the very 
people under pressure to produce good revenue figures, were responsible for 
overseeing the dating of signatures on agreements. In one known case, an 
agreement was accepted a month after the end of the quarter.
Written and oral side agreements were also common means of juggling revenues 
and earnings. The agreements had a wide variety of provisions:
1. Allowing resellers to return and to receive a refund or credit for unsold licenses
2. Committing the company to use its own sales force to find customers for resellers
3. Offering to assign future end-user orders to resellers
4. Extending payment dates beyond twelve months
5. Committing the company to purchase computer hardware or services from 
customers under terms that effectively refunded all or a substantial portion of the 
license fees paid by the customer
6. Diverting the company’s own future service revenues to customers as a means of 
refunding their license fees
7. Paying fictitious consulting or other fees to customers to be repaid to the 
company as license fees
These side letters allowed the sales staff to “park” software licenses with resellers 
and bring them into revenue without actually having sold anything to an end user, 
indeed, without having even found an end user. The most notorious reseller 
involved in this scheme was known as the “bank” and the “virtual warehouse.” This 
reseller was, however, not very effective at moving Datatronix products. 
Nevertheless, it entered into purchase agreements for $9.5 million in software 
licenses in fiscal 1995 but sold only $2.8 million in that year. In the first half of fiscal 
1996, it entered into purchase agreements for an additional $5.9 million. During the 
whole of 1996, it sold only $6.2 million of the remaining $6.7 million in licenses 
purchased in 1995 and none of the $5.9 million in licenses purchased in the first two 
quarters of 1996.
Datatronix created these sales through a series of side letters inducing this reseller to 
enter into quarter-end purchase agreements. The Datatronix sales staff offered the 
bait of allowing the reseller to book a sale they were negotiating with an end user. 
The same arrangement with the same end user was offered to two other resellers. 
The result allowed Datatronix to book the same end-user sale three times through 
the three resellers.
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Other side letters allowed resellers to cancel purchase agreements while Datatronix 
continued to recognize the original sales as revenue. One agreement allowed a 
reseller to cancel $6 million in licensing agreements in the third quarter of 1996. 
This figure represented 14 percent of pretax income for that quarter. Another side 
letter permitted a different reseller to cancel $6.4 million or 11 percent of pretax 
income in the fourth quarter.
Additional GAAP violations occurred when service agreements were recognized as 
license sales and taken fully into revenue in a single quarter instead of being taken 
in ratably over the life of the contract. In the 1996 fourth quarter, three service 
agreement renewals totaling $11.2 million or 25 percent of pretax income for the 
period were treated as license sales and taken into revenue.
In the last quarter of 1995, Datatronix invoiced a customer for $5.4 million claiming 
the customer had used more copies of Datatronix software than had been permitted 
under its license agreement. Finance staff thought the claim would be settled at a 
discount to the list price; the customer was told the $5.4 million could be applied 
against future purchases. The claim was settled in the first quarter of 1996 for $3.8 
million but Datatronix improperly recognized the claim as fourth-quarter 1995 
revenue and increased pretax income for the period by 13 percent. The remaining 
$1.8 million should have been written off in first-quarter 1996 but was instead 
improperly characterized as an unbilled maintenance fee receivable that was 
eventually written off over the last three quarters of fiscal 1996.
Revenue was recognized from end users with whom no contract had been signed 
and from whom no formal acceptance had been received. Policies for recognizing 
creditworthiness were disregarded and revenues were booked from 
undercapitalized and new customers. Both these actions are in clear violation of the 
GAAP that clearly states that “until persuasive evidence of the agreement exists and 
an assessment of the customer’s creditworthiness has been made,” no revenues can 
be recognized. Such improperly recognized revenues amounted to $3.3 million in 
the 1996 first quarter, $9.1 million in the second, and $8.2 million in the third.
At the end of the fourth quarter of fiscal 1996, Datatronix sold $9.2 million worth of 
software to a computer manufacturer for resale installed on its computers. 
Datatronix, however, failed to deliver the software code before the end of the fiscal 
year. Early in fiscal 1997, Datatronix delivered a so-called “beta” version that did 
not work on the purchaser’s hardware. Usable software was not, in fact, delivered 
until more than half way through 1997. Revenue from the sale was improperly 
recognized, however, in the fourth quarter of 1996 and increased pretax income for 
the period by 13 percent.
In 1996, Datatronix decided to open so-called Megastores where it would team up 
with hardware providers to sell hardware-software solutions. So-called 
“partnerships” were formed with hardware providers whereby Datatronix would 
buy computers for the stores while the hardware providers would buy licensing 
agreements of equal or greater value than the hardware purchases. The hardware 
purchasers were also asked to buy licenses for the software installed in the 
demonstration computers in the Megastores. The hardware purchases and license 
sales were in cash and structured so the hardware purchase would give the 
providers cash flow at about the time the license agreement payments were due. All 
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these transactions were premised on the expectation that Datatronix would absorb 
the costs of setting up new stores and that the Datatronix sales force would be 
involved in selling the solution as the hardware providers’ salespeople were not 
familiar with the Datatronix software. Because of the high cost of opening and 
operating the Megastores, the costs of reselling licensing agreements were going to 
be high for Datatronix. To cover these costs, Datatronix offered its sales force 
higher commissions if sales were closed through the hardware providers rather than 
by Datatronix. Objectives were established for end-user sales to be applied against 
the hardware providers’ outstanding commitments.
Datatronix recognized revenue when the hardware providers agreed to the 
purchase commitments even though Datatronix itself was paying the costs and 
expenses of setting up and operating the Megastores and its own sales force was 
going to do most of the reselling. This arrangement was in clear violation of the 
GAAP that if “other vendor obligations remaining after delivery are significant, 
revenue should not be recognized, because the earnings process is not substantially 
complete.”
Datatronix committed these violations of GAAP and included this false information 
in its interim and annual financial statements. Information was also omitted or 
misrepresented in these statements and those filed with the SEC. As a result, the 
company’s reports and filings were thus false and misleading.
At the end of March 1997, when the company announced a revenue shortfall, the 
stock price dropped 34.5 percent to $9 29/32 from $15 1/8 and reduced the 
Datatronix market capitalization to $1.5 billion from $2.3 billion. About two weeks 
after this collapse, auditors began to hear about accounting irregularities in 1995 
and 1996. Management realized that if the truth came out there would have to be a 
restatement and they resisted further investigation by indulging in additional 
fraudulent behavior for the purpose of limiting the scope of the audit. Over the next 
few months, nevertheless, more of the story began to emerge and by early 
September 1997, more than $100 million in various irregularities had been 
identified on the previously issued financial statements. On the basis of these 
revelations, amended 10-Ks and 10-Qs were filed with the SEC.
In the face of the SEC’s intention to institute administrative proceedings against 
Datatronix, the company submitted an Offer of Settlement which the SEC accepted.
Conclusion and Analysis
The root of the problem seems to have been a lack of internal controls strong 
enough to permit the preparation of financial statements within GAAP. The effect of 
this lack of controls was magnified by an organizational structure that had important 
financial people responsible for revenue recognition reporting directly to sales 
personnel rather than to senior financial management. Salespeople under pressure 
to produce revenues to support analysts’ forecasts were thus able to put pressure on 
their immediate financial inferiors to recognize revenues not generated in 
accordance with GAAP.
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10.3.5 Improper Disclosures and Material Omissions
Accounting principles require that financial statements and notes include all information 
necessary to ensure that the financial statements are not misleading. Although management 
is responsible for disclosure of all material information, the auditor has a responsibility to 
ensure that management meets its disclosure obligations.
Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 32, Adequacy of Disclosure in Financial Statements 
(AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 431), provides general information about 
informative disclosures. If an auditor believes management’s disclosures are inadequate, 
appropriate disclosures must be made in the auditor’s report, as provided by Statement of 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 58, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 508), as amended.





4. Changes in accounting principle
Liability Omissions
GAAP requires the disclosure of all material liabilities. Typical omissions include the failure 
to disclose loan covenants or contingent liabilities, such as pending lawsuits. Under FASB 
Statement No. 5, contingent liabilities must be disclosed if they are reasonably probable 
and capable of estimation.
Significant Events
Examples of significant events include the introduction of new products and technology, as 
well as the obsolescence of existing products in inventory. Under GAAP, any significant 
event that could have a material effect on the financial statements must be disclosed.
Related-Party Transactions
Related-party transactions are transactions made with entities that are controlled by the 
company or have control over the company and may include other businesses, vendors, 
customers, creditors, or shareholders. Although management is responsible for the 
disclosure of related-party transactions, the auditor has a specific responsibility to 
understand the client’s business including its relationships with related parties, to evaluate 
whether management’s disclosures are appropriate. FASB Statement No. 57, Related Party 
Transactions, sets forth the disclosure requirements for related-party transactions and 
provides guidance for the identification and evaluation of such transactions.41 In the 
41 Beyond the disclosure issues, related-party transactions may also trigger revenue recognition problems. For 
example, at Learnout & Hauspie, the Belgian maker of speech recognition software, an internal audit 
revealed that about a quarter of the company’s revenues was comprised of revenue recorded from about 
30 start-up customers funded with seed money from a venture capital firm linked to the company’s 
founders.
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aftermath of Enron, Tyco, and Adelphia, related-party disclosures will receive increased 
scrutiny.
Significant Accounting Changes
To ensure that financial statements are comparable from one period to the next, any 
changes to an issuer’s accounting policies or procedures must be disclosed. APB Opinion 
No. 20 describes three significant accounting changes that must be disclosed:
1. Estimates, such as useful lives used to calculate depreciation, bad debt expense, 
amortization estimates, warranty liability, and earned revenue estimates
2. Accounting principles, such as depreciation, capitalization, or tax methods
3. The accounting entity resulting from mergers, acquisitions, and spinoffs
10 .3.6 Special Purpose Entities: The Enron Case
The dramatic collapse of Enron Corp. in October 2001 has brought to light the potential for 
fraud in “off-balance-sheet” financing vehicles known as special purpose entities or SPEs. 
Enron investors were deceived because some SPEs were not consolidated even after they 
had ceased to qualify for off-balance-sheet treatment. Employees connected to the 
management of the SPEs improperly received nearly $50 million in total from partnerships 
designed not to meet some legitimate economic objective or to transfer risk but to create 
financial statements for Enron that would be viewed favorably by Wall Street analysts and 
the rating agencies and thus support the stock price and lower financing costs. Some 
transactions were even designed in such a way that GAAP rules that would have permitted 
keeping assets and debt off the balance sheet but were broken in order to create other 
illusions of financial health. In the end, the autopsy on the bankrupt showed it had died of 
poorly thought-out solutions, self-interested employees, inadequate controls, and poor 
oversight of a business model that tried to push the envelope.
The SPE is a financing method that has been around since the 1980s and is widely used 
especially in the energy and financial services industries, yet has received no official 
definition beyond the recognition that it is a class of asset whose members have a number 
of things in common. In fact, it really does not meet the definition of a business at all in that 
it is not self-sustaining with a revenue source of its own. An SPE has no independent 
management or employees; a trustee usually performs the administrative functions required 
by its creators and primary beneficiaries. It usually takes the legal form of a business trust 
but can be a limited partnership or even a corporation.
The company that creates the SPE can treat it as an independent external entity for 
accounting purposes only if an outside investor owns a minimum 3 percent of the equity 
(the FASB has now changed this to 10 percent) and exercises control. Control here is, 
obviously, not defined by majority equity ownership but by rights stated in the covenant 
somewhat on the model of control rights in partnerships. The rest of the capital comes from 
debt. The company records gains and losses in transactions with the SPE on its income 
statement but the SPE’s assets and liabilities are not entered on its balance sheet.
As its name indicates, an SPE is set up for some special purpose laid out in its trust 
agreement, charter or articles of formation. This purpose is usually to finance specific assets 
transferred to the SPE such as trade receivables, loans or securities against which the SPE
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issues debt. The creator of the SPE thus gains access to low-cost funds because the lenders’
risk is limited by the narrowly defined activities set forth in the trust agreement and the fact
that the SPE cannot take on any additional debt For example, an SPE could be the lessor
of a pulp mill through a so-called “synthetic lease” that provides the lessee with tax
advantages not available through a conventional mortgage loan.
The unconsolidated SPE is in a certain sense an accounting anomaly. It seems to stand 
against the long-standing and intuitive presumption that consolidated statements provide a 
more accurate picture of the company’s overall financial condition.
Subsequent to the revelations in the Enron case (following) the FASB issued FASB 
Interpretation No. 46 in January 2003 (and FASB Interpretation No. 46R in December 
2003) to address the accounting by variable interest entities (VIEs). Consolidation of such 
entities is required by the primary beneficiary of the entity if:
• Its at-risk equity position is insufficient to enable the VIE to finance its activities 
independently, or
• Its investors lack any one of the following control characteristics:
— Sufficient equity
— Residual equity
— Authority to make decisions
The net effect has been to require a significant analysis of the relationship between entities 
and force the consolidation of many previously unconsolidated entities.
The Incredible Collapse of Enron Case Study
How Enron abused these features of the SPE is laid out in the Report of Investigation 
by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. 
commissioned by the Enron board and headed by William Powers, Jr., dean of the 
University of Texas Law School. The committee’s mandate was not to investigate all 
the causes of Enron bankruptcy but simply to address “transactions between Enron 
and investment partnerships created and managed by Andrew S. Fastow, Enron’s 
former Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, and by other Enron 
employees who worked with Fastow.” In practice, this meant investigating the 
causes of the $544-million after-tax charge and a $1.2-billion reduction in 
shareholders’ equity in the third quarter of 2001 related to one of the partnerships. 
The inquiry then broadened to include the two dozen or so transactions between 
Enron and other partnerships. The result is an unprecedented look at SPEs, and 
their use and abuse.
Enron was a product not just of the merger of two gas pipeline companies in the 
late 1980s but also of the deregulation of gas and electricity prices carried out 
during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr. Enron grew by 
buying an energy asset such as a pipeline or power plant around which it built a 
wholesale or retail business. Deregulation allowed Enron to start packaging this 
energy into contracts and trading them like commodities contracts in the futures 
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market The promises to deliver in the future at prices fixed in the past were then 
hedged with derivatives. As Enron grew throughout the 1990s, the range of its 
commoditized products expanded to include bandwidth on optical fiber networks, 
newsprint, and many others. By 1998, some 60 percent of its earnings were from 
businesses in which Enron had not been engaged 10 years earlier and some 30 to 40 
percent from businesses entered into within the previous five years. The strategy 
seemed to be working since $10,000 invested in Enron stock at the end of 1995 was 
worth more than $47,000 by the end of 2000.
Since Enron saw itself as a long-term investor, it made large capital investments in 
the full realization that earnings and cash flow would not be significant in the short 
term. New borrowings to produce this growth would put pressure on Enron’s 
already debt-heavy balance sheet that would affect credit ratings and on the cash 
flow needed for debt servicing. Reduction of its ratings below investment grade 
would punish its expanding energy trading business. Common-share equity 
financing at a time when newly acquired businesses were showing only slow 
earnings growth would result in significant dilution and downward pressure on the 
P/E multiple.
To escape these constraints yet keep growing, Enron management turned to joint 
ventures and SPEs in the early 1990s to keep the negative elements off its balance 
sheet while taking on risks expected to provide significant rewards. With the 
passage of time, Enron also created partnerships designed to hedge against its so- 
called “merchant investments,” i.e., equity investments in public or private 
companies, debt, loans, or interests in limited partnerships.
Almost from the outset, Enron’s SPEs failed to comply with the 3-percent and 
control criteria for nonconsolidation. In 1993, Enron formed a joint venture 
partnership with the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) 
called Joint Energy Development Investment Limited Partnership (JEDI) in which 
Enron was the general partner contributing $250 million in Enron stock, and 
CalPERS was the limited partner contributing $250 million in cash. Because Enron 
owned a 50 percent interest, it did not have to consolidate JEDI. Gains and losses 
were recorded on the income statement and in the footnotes, but JEDI’s debt did 
not appear on Enron’s balance sheet.
When Enron wanted to form a $1-billion partnership with CalPERS in 1997 to be 
called JEDI II, Enron offered to buy out CalPERS interest in JEDI in the belief that 
CalPERS would not want to be invested in both JEDIs simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, Enron wanted to keep JEDI as an unconsolidated entity despite the 
fact it no longer had a joint partner. To accomplish this, a new limited partner had 
to be found. A limited liability company called Chewco Investments (another Star 
Wars name derived, this time, from Chewbacca) was formed to take over the now 
$383-million CalPERS interest. Michael Kopper, an Enron employee reporting to 
the CFO, controlled Chewco through intermediary companies. The $383 million 
was redeemed with bank loans guaranteed by Enron. Since no outside party had 
taken an equity interest or control, Chewco should have been consolidated at this 
time.
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Through a subsequent conversion to a limited partnership and labyrinthine 
financial arrangements, Enron tried to give Chewco the appearance of an 
unconsolidated SPE without actually finding any outside equity investors to put up 
the required 3 percent. Since Chewco failed both the third-party-equity and the 
control tests for nonconsolidation and JEDI’s unconsolidated status depended on 
Chewco’s independence, JEDI should also have been consolidated from the time of 
the breakup of the Enron-CalPERS joint venture.
Two other partnerships, IJM1 and IJM2, were set up for the purpose of 
transferring risk away from Enron through hedging transactions. The IJM 
partnerships were set up with Enron CFO Andrew Fastow as manager and investor 
along with other Enron employees. Enron entered into more than 20 different 
transactions with these two entities which resulted in the recognition of significant 
income for Enron and the displacement of significant losses onto the books of the 
partnership. Once again, questions arise concerning whether these entities met the 
criteria for nonconsolidation.
The purpose of LMJ1 (to restrict our discussion to just one of these entities) was to 
hedge Enron’s investment in Rhythms NetConnections, Inc., a privately held 
Internet service provider. Enron purchased 5.4 million shares at $1.85 per share for 
a total investment of $10 million in 1998. Rhythms went public in April 1999 at $21 
and closed at $69 at the end of the first trading day. By May, the stock had settled 
back to about $55 per share and Enron’s investment was worth approximately $300 
million but could not be sold until the end of 1999 because of a lock-up agreement. 
Since sale of the stock was forbidden and gains and losses in market value were 
reflected on Enron’s income statement, Enron wanted to protect its enormous 
profits with a hedge. A conventional hedge through a dealer was out of the 
question, however, since Enron’s holding was large and illiquid.
At the same time, the gain in market value of Enron stock had increased the value 
of forward contracts made through an investment bank to hedge future dilution 
from its own stock options obligations to its executives. LMJ1 was created to make 
use of the so-called “embedded” appreciated value of the Enron stock in the 
forward contracts transferred from Enron to “hedge” the Rhythms holding. The 
arrangement was flawed by the fact that Enron was attempting to hedge its Rhythm 
holdings with its own stock when both were at risk of decline. The essence of a 
hedge is that the price changes of the two assets must be inverse and that a 
counterparty assumes the opposite risk and will pay (or receive) the difference on 
closing out the position. Rhythms ultimately went bankrupt with enormous as-yet- 
uncalculated losses which Enron kept off its income statement at the time. There 
never was any true third party with a three percent equity position in control of 
LMJ1.
Conclusion and Analysis
The full story of Enron’s involvement in these and other SPEs has yet to be told. 
Nevertheless, the Powers report, Congressional hearings, and media investigations 
show patterns of noncompliance not only with GAAP but also with Enron’s own 
internal code of conduct. Once again, as we have seen in previous sections of this 
chapter, management took the definition of “performance” to mean meeting Wall 
Street expectations. Support the stock price at all costs! Impatience with slow cash­
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flow and earnings growth in the face of the profitable strategies possible for those 
willing to take the risks in the new world of deregulated energy prices necessitated 
continuous new financing. The SPE was an obvious alternative as a source of cheap 
capital for an aggressive company. Unfortunately, when no third-party equity 
investors were willing to put up the required 3 percent and take control, Enron 
chose to force the issue and assert its will in a murky area of GAAP interpretation. 
Fuzzy notions of what constitutes a third party, control, and even equity permitted 
audacious self-serving managers to exploit the SPE for themselves as well as for 
Enron.
The role of the auditor in preventing and detecting SPE fraud is difficult to define 
since the very purpose of the SPE is to keep certain information from being 
recorded in published financial statements. Given the lack of definition of many 
issues, the auditor must be prepared to interpret the purpose of accounting practices 
associated with SPEs and defend that interpretation. The Enron case has revealed 
the need for greater definition not only of the accounting issues involved but of the 
related corporate governance issues as well. The auditor should, however, be able 
to recognize that equity participation by employees of the beneficiary company is 
suspect on the grounds of both third-party definition and compliance with internal 
codes of conduct. The presence of hybrid concepts such as equity loans must also be 
suspect as possible fudges to give the appearance of compliance with GAAP. So- 
called management fees for no obvious work or out of all proportion to normal 
billing levels plus returns on investment beyond anything possible given the 
economic behavior of the entity should all draw the auditor’s attention to corporate 
accounting practices.
10.3.7 Methods to Conceal Financial Statement Fraud From Auditors
Financial statement fraud may be detected through the internal audit function or through 
substantive testing performed by independent auditors. But on occasion, the fraud may go 
undetected for years. This may result from audit failure or from intentional efforts by 
management to conceal the fraud from its independent accountants. (Audit failures are 
discussed in Section 10.6, entitled “Audit Deficiencies and Audit Failures,” below.) The 
following examples illustrate instances in which financial improprieties were not detected 
because of corporate misconduct, as opposed to audit failure.
In the case of Kurzweil Applied Intelligence, discussed above, senior executives directed 
subordinates to falsify books and records; to hide, shred, or destroy key documents; forge 
customers’ signatures on audit confirmation letters; and transfer goods improperly held at 
the off-site warehouse to even more remote locations to avoid detection.
In the matter of Structural Dynamics, the company stored more than $30 million in product 
in a warehouse at the Cincinnati airport in order to avoid suspicion by its independent 
auditors. Much of this product represented bogus revenues recorded for sales to distributors 
in the company’s Far East operations.
In the MiniScribe case, the company created fictitious inventory in transit, transferred 
nonexistent United States inventory from books in the United States to the books of its Far 
East subsidiaries, shipped boxes of bricks labeled as disk drives to distributors, repackaged 
accumulated scrap previously written off and counted it again as inventory. They also 
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received raw materials into inventory without recording the accounts payable liability. To 
conceal the inventory shortfall, employees broke into auditors’ trunks to obtain copies of 
inventory items test-counted by the auditors in order to inflate other high-value inventory 
items not sampled by the auditors.
In the Sensormatic matter, the company turned back the computer clock that dated and 
recorded shipments in order to prematurely recognize revenue on shipments made past the 
end of the quarter. When shipping documents were inspected by the auditors, the ship date 
appeared to be before the quarter-end, when in fact, shipment occurred after the quarter 
had closed.
In the matter of Sahlen & Associates, the company supplied its auditors with customer 
addresses that were, in reality, post office boxes opened by the Company’s employees. 
After the accounts receivable confirmations were sent out, the employees flew around the 
country to the customer destination, forged the customer signature on the audit 
confirmations, and locally mailed the forged confirmation back to the auditors without 
exception.
By being alert to the types of methods previously employed to conceal accounting 
irregularities, accountants and independent auditors may design appropriate procedures to 
avoid being duped by such chicanery.
10.4 Predictors of Financial Statement Fraud
Faced with the apparent pervasiveness of earnings and balance-sheet falsification, the 
problem for the auditor is to find any warning signs suggesting the risk of fraud may be 
present. A number of recent studies (to be discussed in more detail below) have suggested a 
group of indicators which, when taken together, give the generic profile of a company at 
risk of fraud.42
42 This portrait is drawn from Dechow and Skinner, and Levitt and COSO cited above, and important 
reports by the NYSE/NASD to be cited and discussed in Section 10.4.2, entitled “Qualitative Predictors, 
below.
The most typical fraud company is not listed on any of the major public stock exchanges. It 
has assets below $100 million and is experiencing losses, barely breaking even or reporting 
a small profit. The trend of net income is not an indicator since fraud can be committed to 
hide losses or preserve profits. Internal audit controls are weak or nonexistent. This can be 
attributed in part to the total absence of an audit committee or the presence of a weak one 
made up of financially unsophisticated directors meeting as infrequently as only once a 
year. More than 50 percent of the board of directors are insiders or “gray” directors, i.e., 
members with a large equity ownership or family, business, or other connections to the 
company or its board members. Few directors are on the boards of other companies and 
therefore the level of general business experience on the fraud company’s board is often 
quite low. Officers frequently hold incompatible positions such as CEO and CFO 
simultaneously. Finally, there usually is a change of auditor for the fraud period.
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10.4.1 Quantitative Predictors
Messod D. Beneish, an associate professor at the Kelley School of Business, Indiana 
University, has tried to develop quantitative fraud warning signs by analyzing a series of 
ratios which might be used as predictors when seen as a pattern of irregularity on the books 
of a given company.43 This model would distinguish manipulated from unmanipulated 
earnings within the definition of earnings manipulation as a violation of GAAP. Beneish 
studied 74 companies identified as earnings manipulators by the SEC or the media for the 
period 1982 through 1992.
43 Messod D. Beneish, “The Detection of Earnings Manipulation,” Financial Analysts Journal (24) September/ 
October 1999, pages 24-36.
Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies
The typical manipulator of Beneish’s study was a young, rapidly growing manufacturing 
company. As a group, they were smaller in terms of assets or sales, less profitable, more 
leveraged, and growing faster than Beneish’s control (presumably nonmanipulating) 
companies but with similar market capitalizations. Companies with poor prospects were 
more likely to commit financial statement fraud. Earnings manipulation typically occurred 
by recording fictitious revenues or inventory, unearned or uncertain revenues or 
capitalizing costs improperly.
Table 10.1 Characteristics of Sample and Control Companies Fiscal Year Prior 
to Public Disclosure (1982-1992)
Manipulators Nonmanipulators
Characteristics Mean Median Mean Median
Size (Millions)
Total Assets $467.33 $43.20 $1,140.37 $ 95.84
Sales 469.87 53.56 1,295.22 122.54
Market Value 323.72 74.90 813.35 64.59
Liquidity/Leverage
Working Capital to Total Assets 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.31
Current Ratio 2.54 1.83 2.54 2.11
Total Debt to Total Assets 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.52
Profitability/Growth
Return on Assets -1% 3% 3% 5%
Sales Growth 58 34 13 9
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Ratio and Index Analysis
Beneish identified a group of financial statement variables that capture actual earnings 
manipulation or indicate the potential for manipulation. Of that group, the following 
sections describe the characteristic measures that generate statistically meaningful results.
Days' Sales in Receivables Index
The days’ sales in receivables index (DSRI) shows the year-over-year comparison of the 
annual receivables/sales ratio taken as a ratio. This ratio, like all the other ratios in this 
study, should be 1:1. If receivables are beginning to become large in relation to sales, 
fraudulent sales practices may be in place. After allowing for external factors such as a more 
liberal credit policy that could have resulted in increased sales, an exceptionally large 
increase in receivables relative to sales might suggest revenue manipulation.
Gross Margin Index
The gross margin index (GMI) shows the year-over-year comparison of gross margins taken 
as a ratio. If the GMI is greater than 1, gross margins have weakened. Since the year-over- 
year deterioration of the gross margin is one of the most important signals of worsening 
prospects for the company, a GMI of greater than 1 is a red flag that financial statement 
manipulation may be about to occur.
Asset Quality Index
The asset quality index (AQI) shows the ratio of noncurrent assets exclusive of property, 
plant, and equipment to total assets in any given year. This ratio measures the proportion of 
assets whose power to produce future earnings is less certain. The higher the proportion of 
these intangibles to total assets, the greater the risk to future earnings growth. The AQI is 
the year-over-year comparison of these annual figures taken as a ratio. An AQI greater than 
1 indicates that more costs are being capitalized and thus deferred, and the door has been 
left open to earnings manipulation.
Sales Growth Index
The sales growth index (SGI) shows the year-over-year comparison of sales taken as a ratio. 
Mere sales growth does not necessarily imply manipulation. But when a young growth 
company is under pressure from analysts, underwriters, and banks to show continuing sales 
increases to support the stock price, the possibility of manipulation is definitely present. 
Any dramatic increase in the SGI should alert the auditor to possible problems.
Total Accruals to Total Assets
The total accruals to total assets (TATA) shows the year-over-year comparison of total 
accruals and total assets taken as a ratio with total accruals defined as the change in working 
capital accounts other than cash less depreciation. The presence of higher accruals, that is, 
less cash, is likely to be associated with earnings manipulation.
Look for the Pattern
Because of the interconnectedness of income and balance-sheet accounts, no single ratio 
should be taken in isolation as an indicator of manipulation. It is the pattern that counts, 
both among the accounts of one reporting period and over several periods. The broader the 
pattern, the greater the likelihood of earnings manipulation. But care should be taken that 
unusual ratios cannot be accounted for by acquisitions, shifts in strategy, or changes such as 
improving economic conditions and other normal business events.
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DSRI 1.465 1.031 0.434 42.1%
GMI 1.193 1.014 0.179 17.7%
AQI 1.254 1.039 0.215 20.7%
SGI 1.607 1.134 0.473 41.7%
TATA 0.031 0.018 0.013 72.2%
The findings indicate that manipulators exhibit certain financial-statement characteristics 
that are detectable and different from nonmanipulators. The year-over-year change in days’ 
sales in receivables, for example, was about 3 percent for nonmanipulators but over 46 
percent for manipulators. Manipulators showed an increase of about 42 percent in days’ 
sales in receivables in sales over the average change for the nonmanipulator peer group. 
The other indices demonstrate similar though smaller increases for manipulators over 
nonmanipulators. The total accruals-to-total-assets measure, however, was markedly 
different between the two groups. The TATA measure, which reflects noncash working 
capital to total assets, probably picked up the increases in receivables that typically 
accompany revenue manipulation.
These characteristic measures provide a quick and easy means of detecting the possibility 
of financial statement fraud. They are indicators and do not of themselves prove fraud. 
Auditors, however, desiring to implement SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit (AlCPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316),44 may want 
to include these characteristic measures in their financial statement analyses. Also, as an 
internal control, an internal auditor or controller could apply these measures when 
reviewing financial information from subsidiaries and divisions. An increase in any of the 
characteristic measures in the magnitude indicated in the above table should trigger 
additional inquiries. Such inquiries may very well head off an incipient fraudulent 
scheme.
44 Chapter 1, “Managing the Risk of Fraud,” of this Handbook discusses the auditor’s duty to detect fraud in 
detail.
10.4.2 Qualitative Predictors
Internal Work Environment and Corporate Governance
The board of directors is a group of persons elected by the shareholders to represent them 
at the highest level of corporate decision making and to monitor the work of management. 
A report published in 1999 for the NYSE and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (NASD) by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of 
Corporate Audit Committees (BRC) states explicitly that “the board must perform active 
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and independent oversight to be, as the law requires, a fiduciary for those who invest in the 
company.”40 The board must be committed to the principles of transparency and full 
disclosure and, one might add, to full compliance with GAAP and the regulations of the 
appropriate regulatory bodies. If the board understands its independent role, then it is 
likely the audit committee, a creature of the board, will also do its duty. Companies proven 
to be earnings manipulators tend to be those with no audit committee or a very weak and 
compromised one. About a quarter of all companies subject to SEC enforcement action did 
not have audit committees.
The report sees the role of the audit committee as follows:
The committee’s job is clearly one of oversight and monitoring, and in carrying out 
this job it acts in reliance on senior financial management and the outside auditors. 
A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups 
responsible for financial reporting—the full board including the audit committee, 
financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors— 
form a “three-legged stool” that supports responsible financial disclosure and active 
and participatory oversight.
Characteristics of a Good Audit Committee
The BRC made numerous recommendations for the effective working of a good audit 
committee. Despite the fact that the BRC’s mandate was to make recommendations for the 
conduct of audit committees of companies big enough to be listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ, many of the principles would apply equally well to smaller, private companies.
The foundation of a good audit committee is the independence of its members. Recent 
studies have shown a direct correlation between audit committee independence and better 
oversight resulting in a lower incidence of financial statement fraud. The BRC defines 
independence as follows:
Members of the audit committee shall be considered independent if they have no 
relationship to the corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their 
independence from management and the corporation. Examples of such 
relationships include:
• A director being employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates for the 
current year or any of the past five years;
• A director accepting any compensation from the corporation or any of its 
affiliates other than compensation for board service or benefits under a tax- 
qualified retirement plan;
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an individual who is, or 
has been in any of the past five years, employed by the corporation or any of its 
affiliates as an executive officer;
• A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder or to which the 
corporation made, or from which the corporation received, payments that are 
or have been significant to the corporation or business organization in any of 
the past five years;
• A director being employed as an executive of another company where any of 
the corporation’s executives serves on that company’s compensation committee. *
45 Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 1999. Available 
at http://www.nyse.com/ and http://www.nasdaqnews.com/.
60 Fraud Supp. 6—2006
Chapter Ten: Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
Building on this foundation of independence, the BRC recommends that for listed 
companies with capitalization in excess of $200 million, the audit committee should be 
composed of a minimum of three financially literate and entirely independent directors. 
The audit committee should have a charter approved by the full board describing its 
structure and responsibilities. The outside auditor should be accountable to the whole 
board of directors. The audit committee should be responsible for the selection of the 
outside auditors. The audit committee should have a formal written statement from the 
outside auditor describing all relationships between itself and the company. The audit 
committee should discuss with the outside auditor all aspects of the effectiveness or lack 
thereof of the company’s accounting practices. Where the board of directors is weak and 
the audit committee is weak or nonexistent, internal controls are likely to be deficient or 
lacking altogether.
COSO
The COSO Report Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997—An Analysis of U.S. Public 
Companies sought to identify and examine company and management characteristics in 
corporations involved in financial statement fraud.46 The Committee examined about 200 
cases (average assets of $533 million but median assets of only $16 million) from which it 
drew a number of generalized conclusions about the governance of fraud companies.
46 http://www.coso.org/main.htm
The presence and efficient functioning of internal controls are central to limiting the 
opportunities for fraud. Unfortunately, the small size of many companies makes them 
unable or unwilling to spend the money for proper controls or to pay for better trained and 
more experienced senior executives. These smaller companies are also unlikely to have 
strong audit committees capable of monitoring the nebulous but important matter of 
pressure on senior executives to report aggressively to meet investment community 
expectations or the numbers required to trigger bonuses. The CEO or CFO was involved in 
83 percent of the reported fraud cases.
A strong audit committee is an essential element in fraud prevention. Among the fraud 
companies surveyed, 25 percent had no audit committee and among those that did, 65 
percent of the directors were not certified in accounting or had held no accounting or 
financial positions. At the fraud companies, the committee usually met only once a year. (A 
pliable, inexperienced, and inattentive board is often the creation of a domineering CEO. 
Given the fact that in 83 percent of the reported fraud cases the CEO or CFO was involved, 
the combination of a weak board and aggressive leaders could be an indicator of financial 
statement fraud.)
The COSO Report confirmed the findings of the BRC mentioned above concerning the 
need for an independent board of directors. At the fraud companies, about 60 percent of 
the board members were insiders or “gray” directors, i.e., outsiders with some family, 
business, equity, or other tie to the company or its management. About 40 percent of the 
boards had no directors serving on the boards of other companies. Directors and officers 
owned about one-third of the companies’ stock while the CEO/president owned about 17 
percent. In about 40 percent of the companies, there were family relationships among the 
directors and/or officers. About 20 percent showed officers holding incompatible positions 
such as CEO and CFO.
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Since the average fraud period was 23.7 months and often started with the misstatement of 
interim statements, it is important to review the controls surrounding quarterly statement 
preparation. Because misstatements of accounts often occur near the period ends, internal 
controls governing the transaction cutoff and asset valuation should be tested.
The Boeing Company adopted recommendations from the 1992 COSO release entitled 
Internal Control-Integrated Framework and came up with a list of criteria for an unsatisfactory 
rating.47 These criteria are the following:
47 Dennis Applegate and Ted Wills, “Struggling to Incorporate the COSO Recommendations into Your 
Audit Process? Here’s One Audit Shop’s Winning Strategy,” Internal Auditor, The Institute of Internal 
Auditors: December 1999, http://www.coso.org/Articles/audit_shop.htm
1. Control environment criteria are:
• Hard controls are missing or inadequate.
• There are verified instances of breakdowns or soft controls.
2. Risk assessment criteria are the following:
• Management has not predefined relevant objectives.
• Such objectives are incompatible with broader objectives.
• Management has not identified risks relevant to achieving its objectives.
• Management does not have a basis for determining which risks are most critical.
• Management has not ensured the mitigation of critical operating risks.
• Audit tests detect key risks not previously contemplated by management.
3. Control activities criteria are the following:
• Key control activities are not functioning as intended.
• Management’s risk mitigation strategy is not adequately reflected within control 
activities.
4. Information and communication criteria are the following:
• Key metrics are not identified, collected, and communicated.
• Employees’ misunderstanding of their control responsibilities is pervasive.
• Customer or supplier complaints and disputes are not resolved or remedial action is 
not undertaken in a timely manner.
5. Monitoring criteria address whether or not management has established a means of 
determining the quality of the internal control system over time either through 
independent evaluations or ongoing, structured, and independent process checks.
6. Overall, the ratings of all components should be considered to determine whether 
controls provide reasonable assurance that management objectives will be achieved. 
Strength in the internal controls of one component may compensate for a control 
weakness in another.
10.4.3 A New Fraud Profile (1997-2002)?
The aftermath of the longest bull market in history has revealed that financial statement 
management at companies many times larger than the median $16-million company of the 
62 Fraud Supp. 6—2006
Chapter Ten: Reducing the Risk of Financial Statement Fraud
COSO Report. Whether these multibillion-dollar frauds point the way to a new era of 
larger and bolder financial statement scandals remains to be seen. The Great Crash of 1929, 
the end of the Go-Go market of the late 1960s, and the collapse of stock prices in October 
1987 also brought enormous scandals to light. These scandals proved to be the exception 
rather than the rule, however, and were not indicators of things to come.
Table 10.3 lists 13 of the major investigations and financial restatements of this period, 
together with the nature, period, and amount of the estimated or actual restatement.
Table 10.3 Major Investigations and Financial Restatements
Company Nature of Investigation or Restatement
Restatement 
Period




Questionable accounting practices and related- 
party transactions
1993-2001 $2.3 billion
America Online Improperly capitalized advertising costs instead 
of expensing in the period incurred; also may 
have recorded $45 million in improper 
payments from third parties in 2000-2002
1995-1996 $385 million
Cendant Inflated annual income through the misuse of 
reserves
1995-1997 $300 million
Dynegy “Project Alpha” was a complex transaction that 
artificially inflated cash flow from operations
2001 $79 million
Enron Corporate executives under investigation for 
creating and approving transactions designed to 
improperly keep billions of dollar in losses off 
the books
1997-2000 $500 million
Microsoft Used reserves, accruals, allowances, and 
liability accounts to manage earnings
1995-1998 $200 million to 
$900 million 
per year
MicroStrategy Restatement resulting from improper 
recognition of software revenue in 




Under investigation for improper recognition of 
revenue on sales of fiber-optic capacity
2000-2001 $2.2 billion
Rite Aid Overstated income through unsupported 
journal entries and fraudulent credits for 
damaged goods
1997-1999 $1.6 billion
Sunbeam Used cookie-jar reserves, big-bath restructuring 
charges, and channel stuffing to artificially 
inflate revenue
1996-1998 $97 billion
Xerox Improperly accelerated revenue from long-term 
leases of copiers and other office equipment.
1997-2001 $6.4 billion
Waste Management Improperly eliminated and deferred current 
period expenses to inflate earnings
1992-1997 $1.7 billion
WorldCom Restatement of $7.1 billion in improperly 
capitalized operating expenses in 2001-2002; 
possible overstatement of profits by $1 billion 
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Although not all of these revelations have resulted in fraud charges, some important 
differences from the COSO profile are evident. Deceptive financial statements occur today 
in a much wider range of industries than technology, health care, and financial services. 
Most interesting of all has been the discovery that many companies restating were actually 
profitable. The deception was not perpetrated to cover up losses or a deteriorating break­
even position; instead, management managed the financial statements to maintain the 
appearance of continued growth in order to support the stock price.
The vastness of the pool of disaster these frauds and misdeeds created appeared to be 
limited to the U.S. market, an assumption that was a source of smug commentary in 
overseas management circles. But, in late 2003, the smiles vanished when Parmalat, the 
Italian dairy and food conglomerate collapsed in the wake of the revelation of a deficiency 
of assets of between 8 and 12 billion Euros. Over a 15-year period the company had 
inflated sales (for example, by double billing for merchandise), and borrowed monies on 
falsely reported rapidly growing assets, becoming more audacious in its actions as time 
went on. Sending liabilities “off the balance sheet” to related entities in offshore tax havens 
like the Cayman Islands, the thread that started to unravel the fraud was a missed $185 
million payment. A big clue lay in what would later prove to be a bogus confirmation of a 4 
billion Euro cash account (the account did not exist). The company’s founder, Colisti Tanzi, 
a college drop-out with other failed family business ventures to his credit (to which he 
admitted some of the missing Parmalat assets were diverted) can lay claim to creating one 
of the most brazen and largest frauds ever, under the watchful eyes of two international 
accounting firms. Before the fraud was discovered, Parmalat operated in 30 countries and 
employed 36,000 workers. With elements of Enron (SPEs), Phar-Mor (asset manufacture 
and diversion of company assets), and Adelphia Communications (family businesses and 
related party transactions). Parmalat became the new world poster-child for fraud and 
greed.
10.5 Regulatory Responses to Financial Statement Fraud
10.5.1 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
One of the most sweeping responses to financial statement fraud and misstatements of 
financial statements in the early years of the new millennium was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, described in Chapter 1. Under this act the SEC was given increased authority and 
ability to prosecute corporate misdeeds. One of the most significant provisions of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the establishment of a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee the establishment of accounting standards and 
oversee audits of public companies. The PCAOB was charged to adopt quality control, 
ethics, independence and other audit standards, including rules governing the retention of 
working papers, concurring partner review of audit reports, and testing and reporting on 
reporting companies internal control systems. The SEC was charged with oversight of this 
new Board, which was to be funded by public companies and auditors registered with the 
Board to perform public company audits. In 2004 the PCAOB enacted Auditing Standard 
(AS No. 2) requiring auditors to opine on the effectiveness of public company internal 
controls and adopted an auditing standard on documentation, including guidance on what 
should be retained in audit documentation. Below are a number of other initiatives that 
have in recent years been directed to discourage financial statement fraud.
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10.5.2 SEC Initiatives and Staff Accounting Bulletins
Commission-Wide Initiatives
In the past four years, the SEC has adopted a number of initiatives to address the problem 
of financial fraud and earnings management. Commission-wide initiatives to address 
financial fraud include the formation of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (referred to above) set up in 1999 to develop 
standards to improve audit committee effectiveness, the promulgation of new rules on audit 
committee disclosure, the issuance of new rules governing auditor independence, CEO and 
CFO certification of financial statements, and the issuance of accounting guidance in the 
form of SABs.
The Rules on Audit Committee Disclosure
Following the BRC’s highly publicized report, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) 
implemented a number of its recommendations including new rules for audit committees. 
The rules on audit committee disclosure, effective January 1, 2000, require that:
• Independent auditors review interim financial statements before they are filed on Form 
10-Q with the SEC.
• Issuers must include in their proxy statements certain disclosures under Item 302(a) of 
Regulation S-K, which requires reconciliation and description of adjustments to 
quarterly financial information.
• Issuers must disclose in their proxy statements whether the audit committee reviewed 
and discussed with its auditors matters specified in the accounting literature, that is, SAS 
No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU 
sec. 380), as amended, and Independence Standards Board Standard (ISBS) No. 1, 
Independence Discussions with Audit Committees. These matters include proposed 
adjustments, independence issues, the quality of financial statements such as any unusual 
entries or adjustments, and the question of whether the numbers in the financial 
statements reflect economic reality. •
Interim auditor reviews began the first fiscal quarter ended after March 15, 2000. The other 
new requirements went into effect on December 15, 2000. These rules are incorporated into 
Section 10.5.2, “New Statements on Auditing Standards,” below.
Independence Rules
During 2001, the SEC adopted a series of rule amendments regarding auditor 
independence. The amendments, effective February 5, 2001, provide guidelines for:
1. Determining whether an auditor is independent in light of investments made by auditors 
or their family members in audit clients
2. Employment relationships among auditors, their family members, and audit clients
3. The scope of services provided by audit firms to their audit clients. (Notably, the scope 
of services provisions identify certain nonaudit services provided by an auditor to a 
public audit client that would impair the auditor’s independence.)
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CEO Certification of Financial Statements
On June 28, 2002, the Commission issued an order requiring the principal executive and 
financial officers of 947 public companies to certify personally, under oath and for 
publication, the completeness and accuracy of their most recent financial statements filed 
with the SEC. Specifically, corporate officers must certify that covered reports do not 
contain any untrue statements of material fact or omit to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements in the covered report, under the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading.
In a speech delivered to the National Press Club on July 22, 2002, Harvey Pitt, then the 
chairman of the SEC, noted that the Division of Enforcement has already filed a record 122 
actions for financial reporting and issuer disclosure violations in the first 10 months of fiscal 
2002, and further stated:
In just ten months, we’ve sought to throw unfit officers and directors out of 
corporate boardrooms for good in 71 cases, with more on the way—already almost 
twice the number we sought in 2000. As the President acknowledged in his Ten 
Point Plan, corporate officers and directors, and especially the CEOs and CFOs, 
must personally assume responsibility for compliance with our full disclosure laws. 
The ouster of unfit officers and directors is a critical tool to ensure that officers and 
directors “get it” that their mission is to safeguard the interests of shareholders. It is 
also important to prevent any corporate wrongdoers from getting a second chance 
to injure investors.
The chairman went on to say that “the heaviest hammer ... is criminal prosecution and 
serious jail time.”
On July 30, 2002, the President signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which 
imposes additional requirements on corporate officers. Section 906 of the Act, which is 
effective immediately, requires periodic reports filed with the Commission to be 
accompanied by a written certification by the CEO and CFO that the report fully complies 
with Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and that “the 
information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the 
financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.” The Act imposes criminal 
penalties of up to $1,000,000 or 10 years in jail for corporate officers who “willfully certify” 
while knowing that the periodic reports do not comply with these requirements.
Staff Accounting Bulletins
Other significant Commission-wide initiatives include the issuance by the Office of the 
Chief Accountant of Staff Accounting Bulletins (known as SABs) to provide guidance on 
materiality, restructuring and impairment charges, revenue recognition, and loan loss 
allowances. That guidance was issued in the form of SABs No. 99 Materiality, No. 100 
Restructuring and Impairment Charges, No. 101 Revenue Recognition , and No. 102 Loan 
Loss Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues.
Staff Accounting Bulletins
SAB No. 99, Materiality
SAB No. 99, published August 12, 1999, outlines the staff's concerns about the misuse of 
materiality. SAB No. 99 does not change existing legal or accounting requirements, but 
emphasizes that auditors should consider qualitative as well as quantitative benchmarks in 
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determining whether an item is material to the financial statements. By way of example, it 
notes that the following considerations “may well render material a quantitatively small 
misstatement of a financial statement item.” A material misstatement occurs if it:
• Arises not from an item capable of precise measurement, but rather from an estimate, 
taking into account the degree of imprecision of the estimate.
• Masks a change in earnings or earnings trends.
• Hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the enterprise.
• Changes a loss into income or vice versa.
• Concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that has been identified 
as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or profitability.
• Affects the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements.
• Affects the registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual 
arrangements.
• Has the effect of increasing management’s compensation, e.g., by meeting income 
targets necessary to trigger the award of bonuses or other incentive compensation.
• Involves the concealment of an unlawful transaction.
In these instances, a relatively small item (in quantitative terms) may be considered material 
to the financial statements as a whole.48
48 SAB No. 99 was quoted with approval by the Second Circuit in Gambino v. Citizens Utilities Company (228 
F.3d 154).
SAB No. 99 also reminds auditors of their obligations under Section 10A of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and existing auditing standards to inform management, in certain 
circumstances, the audit committee, and in exceptional circumstances, the SEC, of illegal 
acts detected in the course of an audit. Auditor obligations under Section 10A is discussed 
in greater detail in Section 10.5.3, “Enforcement of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,” below.
SAB No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges
SAB No. 100, published November 24, 1999, provides guidance on the accounting for and 
disclosure of expenses and liabilities currently reported in connection with restructuring 
activities and business combinations including detailed guidance on the reporting of exit 
costs. It also provides guidelines for the recognition and disclosure of asset impairment 
charges.
SAB No. 101, Revenue Recognition
SAB No. 101, published December 3, 1999, provides guidance on the recognition, 
presentation, and disclosure of revenue in financial statements including criteria for 
revenue recognition. It also includes guidance on recommended disclosures about revenue 
recognition policies and the impact of events and trends on revenue. It covers a number of 
specific situations where there is some room for judgment in interpreting GAAP. Although 
the SAB does not create new GAAP, it is intended to narrow practice to a single preferred 
approach.
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Because SAB No. 101 addressed specific situations not directly addressed in the accounting 
literature, the SEC gave issuers a grace period to comply with the SAB and permitted 
issuers to adopt a change in accounting principle to reflect the changes.
Initially, the grace period was scheduled to end the first fiscal period after December 15, 
1999 (first-quarter 2000 for most issuers), but many issuers requested additional time to 
comply. In response, the SEC issued two amendments (SAB No. 101A and No. 101B) that 
delayed implementation until the fourth quarter of the fiscal year beginning after December 
15, 1999 (fourth quarter 2000 for most companies).
Despite these delays, SAB No. 101 had an impact. A Bear Steams study released the first 
quarter after the reporting requirement went into effect, found that at least 32 issuers 
changed the way they booked revenue as a result of the SAB and the SEC’s heightened 
scrutiny of revenue recognition.
SAB No. 102, Loan Loss Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues
SAB No. 102, published on July 6, 2001, provides guidance on the development, 
documentation, and application of a systematic loan loss methodology. The Commission 
previously issued guidance on this topic in December 1986 through Financial Reporting 
Release No. 28, Accounting for Loan Losses by Registrants Engaged in Lending Activities. SAB No. 
102 applies to registrants who are creditors in loan transactions that, individually or in the 
aggregate, have a material effect on the registrant’s financial statements.
SAB No. 102 covers the following topics:
• A summary of current loan loss allowance guidance under GAAP and Commission rules 
and interpretations
• General factors or elements to consider in developing and documenting loan loss 
allowance methodologies including in written policies and procedures
• Staff expectations for documenting loan impairment under FASB Statements No. 5 and 
No. 114, Accounting by Creditors for the Impairment of a Loan
• Staff expectations related to summary documentation of the results of a systematic loan 
loss allowance methodology
• General guidance on validating and documenting the validation of a systematic loan loss 
allowance methodology.
Enforcement Initiatives
There have also been a number of important initiatives within the Division of Enforcement 
to address the problem of financial statement fraud:
1. The staff has heightened its scrutiny of investigations involving allegations of financial 
statement fraud. The staff has expanded its inquiries beyond the more typical revenue 
recognition and inventory management cases, to more difficult and controversial issues 
involving managed earnings, as in the W.R. Grace case; the application of technical 
accounting bulletins such as SOP 97-2, as in the MicroStrategy case; and the accounting 
for complex off-balance sheet financing transactions, as in the Enron investigation.
2. The Division changed the way it staffs accounting fraud investigations to investigate 
more quickly and charge those responsible for such transgressions. Traditionally, the 
Division staffed its accounting fraud cases with one staff attorney and one staff 
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accountant. The turnaround time from the commencement of the case to the 
recommendation of charges ranged from an average of two to four years, depending on 
the complexity of the case. In 1999, the Division realigned its resources and formed 
SWAT teams consisting of two or three staff attorneys and one or two accountants to 
enable the staff to ascertain liability and recommend enforcement action in three to six 
months. The Livent case is an excellent example of the Commission’s success with this 
approach.
3. The Division of Enforcement formed a special branch to focus exclusively on 
accounting fraud cases. This new group focuses on novel and complex financial fraud 
cases.
4. The Division of Enforcement has leveraged its resources through sweeps. Exactly one 
year after former chairman Arthur Levitt’s September 1998 “Numbers Game” speech, 
the division announced its first financial fraud sweep by charging 68 individuals and 
entities with fraud and/or abuses of the financial reporting process. Just about one year 
later, in September 2000, the SEC district office in San Francisco announced another 
financial fraud sweep against six companies.
5. The Division has made increasing numbers of criminal referrals in cases involving 
egregious misconduct. In August 2000, for example, the SEC and U.S :Attorney’s office 
brought civil and criminal charges against former officers of Cendant Corporation and 
CUC International. In a press release, Dick Walker, then Director of the Division of 
Enforcement, was quoted as stating that the action makes it “crystal clear that the SEC 
and U.S. Attorney have ZERO TOLERANCE for fraudulent financial reporting.” That 
sentiment was clear in the Commission’s subsequent actions against officers of Sirena 
Apparel, McKesson, and Informix. In Sirena Apparel, the SEC charged and the U.S. 
Attorney indicted the CEO and CFO for directing employees to reset computer clocks 
to backdate invoices. In McKesson, the SEC and U.S. Attorney charged the former 
president and CFO for their involvement in a scheme to overstate earnings. In Informix, 
the SEC and U.S. Attorney charged a former European sales executive who issued side 
letters allowing customers to delay payment for software. Most recently, swift SEC 
enforcement action and/or criminal indictments were brought against senior executive 
officers of WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia. These criminal referrals convey the message 
that financial fraud is a crime that carries both civil and criminal penalties.
6. The Division has also made a concerted effort to identify the individuals responsible for 
false financial statements. This effort signifies a rejection of the “innocent soldier” 
defense. To avoid delays, the Division may opt to settle with an issuer but continue its 
investigation of individuals. The effort to identify individuals responsible for an issuer’s 
false financials included increased scrutiny of gatekeepers, in particular, mid-level 
accounting personnel and independent auditors who reviewed the false financials.
7. The Division has used its powers under the Remedies Act more flexibly to encourage 
cooperation and appropriately credit issuers and individuals who cooperated in the 
staff’s investigations. That effort was formalized in October 2001 by Chairman Pitt in the 
highly publicized Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation 
to Agency Enforcement Decisions. In the Cendant case, despite civil charges against 
seven former officers and criminal charges against three, the SEC only charged the 
company with violations of the periodic reporting, corporate recordkeeping, and 
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internal control provisions of the federal securities laws. There were no fraud charge 
against Cendant, and in fashioning its order, the Commission specifically recognized 
remedial acts promptly undertaken by Cendant as well as its cooperation with the 
Commission and other authorities.
Likewise, the SEC filed a settled administrative action, with no fraud charge and no civil 
penalties, against Waste Management, because of the company’s remedial action and 
change in management. The outcome of Aurora Foods and Microsoft represent other 
examples of the staff's commitment to reward early cooperation. By contrast, the staff's 
imposition of a $10 million penalty against Xerox represents the consequences of a lack of 
cooperation.
10.5.3 New Statements on Auditing Standards
As previously mentioned, the PCAOB issued an auditing standard (AS 2) requiring auditors 
to provide an opinion on the effectiveness of internal controls. Management is also required 
to attest to its internal controls in its annual report. Since adoption part way into the 2004 
audit year, the Standard has fallen under criticism for its many required audit procedures 
and the burdens of implementation. Initially the Standard only was implemented for the 
largest public companies (“accelerated filers”), and, as of August 2006, the requirement for 
smaller companies to report on controls had been deferred again. Smaller companies with 
fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2006, will be required to self-report on their 
internal controls, with auditor involvement and opinions scheduled to be implemented the 
next year.
In response to the widening scandal on the dating of stock options, the PCAOB issued its 
first Staff Alert in July 2006 reminding auditors to include stock option policies and 
processes in their internal controls procedures and to direct audit procedures to this 
identified risk area.
In response to heightened concerns about earnings management, the Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) issued new Statements on Auditing Standards that affect the relationship 
among the auditor, corporate management, and the audit committee. They are SAS No. 89, 
Audit Adjustments (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 310, 333, and 380), which 
covers audit adjustments, and SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications (AICPA, 
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 380 and 722), which relates to audit committee 
communications.
SAS No, 89, Audit Adjustments
SAS No. 89, Audit Adjustments, governs engagement letters, management representation 
letters, and audit committee communications. SAS No. 89 amends existing guidance under 
SAS No. 85, Management Representations (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 333) 
and AU Section 310, Appointment of the Independent Auditor (AICPA, Professional Standards, 
vol. 1, AU sec. 310), to add to the list of items typically included in the engagement letter a 
new item relating to management responsibility for adjusting the financial statements to 
correct material misstatements. In addition, management is required to affirm to the auditor 
in the management representation letter that the effects of any uncorrected misstatements 
aggregated by the auditor during the current engagement are immaterial, both individually 
and in the aggregate, to the financial statements taken as a whole. In making the assessment 
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of materiality, the auditor is directed to consider not only quantitative, but also qualitative 
materiality, consistent with the requirements of SAB No. 99. SAS No. 89 also amends SAS 
No. 61, Communication With Audit Committees (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 
380), to require the auditor to inform the audit committee about uncorrected misstatements 
aggregated by the auditor during the current audit that management determines to be 
immaterial, both individually and in the aggregate.
SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications
Given the auditor’s increased responsibility to report unadjusted differences to the audit 
committee under SAS No. 89, the ASB issued SAS No. 90, Audit Committee Communications, 
to provide additional guidance on audit committee communications. SAS No. 90 further 
amends SAS No. 61 to require that the auditor discuss with the audit committee and 
corporate management the auditor’s judgments about the quality as well as the acceptability 
of the reporting entity’s accounting principles as applied in its financial reporting. The 
discussion should include items that have a significant impact on the representational 
faithfulness, verifiability, and neutrality of the information included in the financial 
statements. These should include but not limited to changes in accounting policies, 
estimates, judgment and uncertainties, unusual transactions, and accounting policies 
relating to significant financial statement items including the timing of transactions and the 
period in which they were recorded.
SAS No. 90 also amends SAS No. 71, Interim Financial Information (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 722), to implement the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon 
Committee. It requires auditors to discuss with audit committees:
1. The matters outlined in SAS No. 61 prior to filing quarterly financial information on 
Form 10-Q.
2. In performing SAS No. 71 limited review procedures, the issue of whether any of the 
matters discussed in SAS No. 61 may bear on the financial statements.
Any matters identified should be communicated to the audit committee.
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, was effective for audits for 
periods beginning on or after December 15, 2002. It enhanced the guidance and 
requirements in SAS No. 82 on that same subject and added more teeth to the previous 
requirements in the wake of the widespread scandals and frauds being discovered in 1999 
to 2002. A long standard with 82 paragraphs and an appendix and an exhibit, it had more 
“should” requirements than many previous standards in an effort to make fraud-directed 
procedures a standard part of the audit process. Among other requirements, it called for:
• a risk assessment process directed at the consideration of fraud risk
• a planning discussion among key audit engagement team members about the risks of 
fraud
• inquiries of personnel outside the financial accounting circle
• directing audit procedures against presumed fraud risk areas such as revenue 
recognition.
An appendix to the document enumerated fraud risk factors, classified by types and an 
exhibit was directed at companies to help them establish anti-fraud policies and procedures. 
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In 2006, a new suite of risk assessment and response standards was introduced by the ASB 
for private company audits (SAS No. 104 to SAS No 111). The specific provisions of some 
of these standards are discussed in earlier sections of this Handbook. Preceding their issuance 
was the implementation of a new documentation standard, SAS No. 103, Audit 
Documentation, to clarify auditor responsibilities to create and retain adequate audit 
documentation to support the opinion. It also clarified which documents need to be 
retained and those that can be discarded as the audit progresses and after the audit report is 
issued. The documentation standard is effective for most 2006 audits.
Although the risk assessment suite of standards is not required to be implemented until 
2007 for private company audits, many larger accounting firms have already integrated 
their provisions into their audit approaches because of the international nature of their audit 
approaches and the similarity of the U.S. SASs with IAASB Standards (principally ISAs 315 
and 330) that were implemented internationally in 2005. The ASB and IAASB worked 
together on the development of these standards beginning in the late 1990s, but factors in 
the U.S. environment including the disruptions caused by the aforementioned frauds and 
changes in the standard-setting process for companies delayed their finalization and 
implementation. Many of the provisions in these standards have implications for deterring 
or identifying fraud as well as misstatement, and include many specific performance 
requirements.
Although the compilation entitled Statements on Auditing Standards 104-111, published by 
the AICPA in 2006, is 206 pages long, some of the more important provisions are 
enumerated below and are detailed in a 2006 AICPA publication entitled Understanding the 
New Auditing Standards Related to Risk Assessment
• Clarification that “reasonable assurance” is a high level of assurance
• Requires a risk assessment, including the assessment of internal control
• Expands in more detail the business, environmental and company specific factors that 
should be considered when making the risk assessment
• Does not allow the auditor to “default” to high control risk and perform a substantive 
procedures audit without a basis for that assessment. Thus, auditors will need to assess 
the design of controls and that the controls have been implemented (placed in 
operation) on GAAS audits.
• Directs that audit risks, controls and further audit procedures should be linked 
throughout the workpapers through using audit assertions.
• Identifies a new type of risk—a “significant risk” that carries restrictions on how that risk 
can be addressed by audit procedures. One or more significant risks are presumed to be 
present in most audits
• Clarifies when evidence from prior audits can be used in current audits
• Directs that tolerable misstatement should be set to less than materiality amounts in 
order to allow for the risk of undetected misstatements in reaching a high assurance that 
the financials are free of material misstatement.
• Requires the communication of auditor identified known and likely misstatements
The AICPA is preparing an extensive audit guide, including a case study, to illustrate the 
key provisions of the standards and related standard SAS No. 112.
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On the heels of the new Risk Standards, SAS No. 112 Communicating Internal Control Related 
Matters Identified in an Audit (AICPA, 2006) was issued. However, this standard is effective 
for most 2006 audits and requires the annual written communication of identified significant 
deficiencies and material control weaknesses to management and “those charged with 
governance.” Additional guidance and examples are provided to help auditors identify 
these deficiencies and assess their severity. In combination with the required assessment of 
controls design (SAS No. 109), this standard is likely to push many companies to correct 
deficient controls and reduce the “opportunities” for fraud and misstatement in the private 
company sector, including non-profit and government entities.
An attestation standard on reporting on internal controls is also under revision for possible 
adoption in late 2006 (AT 501). Non-profit and government entities have expressed high 
interest in beginning to require auditor involvement in attestations concerning internal 
control effectiveness. To do that, the requirements of AS 2 seem too onerous and rigid, so 
AT 501 is designed to be more flexible, permitting the expression of assurance on just the 
“design of controls” rather than requiring the tests necessary to opine on operating 
effectiveness of the controls. This “toe in the water” strategy is expected to lead to future 
requirements to test and report on the effectiveness of controls, also an option under 
AT501.
10.5.4 The Paradigm: COSO’s “Internal Control—Integrated 
Framework”
The initially vague notion of “framework” above is clarified in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
in the SEC’s writings as meaning, for all practical purposes in the U.S., the COSO 
framework, Internal Control—Integrated Framework. This 1992 report grew out of the 
Treadway Commission, established as a result of a spate of frauds and misstatements 
observed in the 1970s and 1980s. The SEC notes that the COSO framework “satisfies our 
criteria and may be used as an evaluation framework for purposes of management’s annual 
internal control evaluation and disclosure requirements”. The SEC stops short of mandating 
the COSO framework, however, since other frameworks exist outside the U.S. (COCO in 
Canada and the Turnbull Report in the UK) and new ones might be developed in the 
future. For the purposes of compliance, it is expected registrants will use the COSO 
framework.
The COSO authors defined an internal control system as having three objectives:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
• Reliability of financial reporting
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
By restricting the final rules to internal control over financial reporting, the SEC therefore 
does not deal with operating controls or the self-monitoring process that ensures 
compliance with all laws and regulatory bodies. However, certain regulatory (e.g., 
compliance with environmental laws) and operating matters (e.g., operating reports are 
integral to management’s monitoring of reported financial results) may be included within 
the definition of internal control over financial reporting.
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Controls
There are two types of control over financial reporting:
1. Preventive
2. Detective
Preventive controls (e.g., sensors to detect merchandise theft) are designed to thwart the 
commission of errors or fraud that could cause a misstatement of financial results. Of 
course, determined fraudsters can override or avoid them by some stratagem. (It is the 
function of the code of ethics to deflate their desire to do so.) If the fraudsters manage to 
bypass the preventive controls, the detective controls (e.g., physical counts at year-end) 
should be able to catch the fraudsters or correct the statements before their crimes result in 
material financial misstatements.





4. Information and communications
5. Monitoring
Control Environment
The control environment is the most pervasive of all the controls because it sets the ethical 
tone in which all operations of the business take place. It influences the behavior of 
employees and their susceptibility to temptations to commit fraud or cut comers in dealing 
with suppliers, customers, and regulatory authorities. A written code of ethics should be 
drawn up, provided to all employees, reinforced through education and adhered to by 
example. Like any good army, a good company should be led from the front. The 
chairman, board and senior officers should all be of the highest integrity and be known 
throughout the company as ethical persons since the tone at the top will be felt all the way 
down to the lowest levels and out to suppliers and customers. Management’s operating style 
and general philosophy of business will be reflected in its view of risk, attitude toward 
compliance with the new SEC rules, and its way of developing operating goals and budgets. 
This philosophy will have a significant effect on the whole control process. The test of 
management’s ethical standards will come when forced to follow up on problems revealed 
by the internal or external auditors, whistleblowers, environmental accidents, and creditors 
and regulators.
Cases such as Phar-Mor and Adelphia Communications illustrate the pervasive effect of the 
chief executive’s ethics and the “tone at the top” on the entity. Without integrity at the top, 
the underlying detailed controls are a less relevant detail. PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2 
explicitly identifies senior management fraud of “any magnitude” to be a strong indicator of 
a controls weakness.
Management must also make sure the segregation of duties as well as performance goals 
and rewards are reasonable. Segregation of duties must recognize the possibility of conflicts 
that could lead to fraud. The perpetrator cannot simultaneously be in a position to both 
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commit the fraud and cover it up in the course of his or her assigned duties. The person 
responsible for booking receivables, for example, should not also be responsible for 
disbursements. The history of fraud is littered with cases of trusted employees giving way to 
temptation when performing conflicting duties. Short-term high-performance goals that are 
unrealistic simply open the door to fraud by high achievers. Unsegregated duties and 
unachievable performance goals could easily lead to improper financial reporting practices.
One of the most important parts of the control environment is the organizational structure 
including the allocation and delegation of authority and responsibility. The degree to which 
employees recognize their personal accountability is an important part of the overall 
effectiveness of all internal controls. The organizational structure must define jobs, assign 
but not duplicate or overlap decision-making powers, yet leave enough room for initiative 
and the unimpeded flow of information.
The competence of those with authority will be dependent on the hiring and training 
policies of the human resources department. HR is the gatekeeper checking the educational 
credentials and work histories of everyone who seeks employment at the enterprise. 
Unfortunately, the person who ultimately commits fraud usually has the profile of the ideal 
hire; everything checks out. Employee fraud is most frequently committed by someone 
responding to a personal financial crisis or seeing an opportunity to improve their lifestyle. 
To remove these incentives to fraud, HR must provide competitive compensation, 
opportunities for advancement through education and seniority, regular and fair 
performance reviews, plus bonuses to spur above-average efforts.
Risk Assessment
The COSO framework recognizes that specific risks derive from the objectives set by the 




• Compliance with laws and regulations
The one that concerns us here is the objective of internal control over financial reporting. 
The COSO framework considers the achievement of the financial reporting objectives as 
“[t]he preparation of reliable published financial statements, including interim and 
condensed financial statements and selected financial data derived from such statements, 
such as earnings releases, reported publicly”. The term “reliable” is taken as synonymous 
with “presents fairly” defined in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 The Meaning of 
“Presents Fairly in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” in the Independent 
Auditor’s Report. A fair presentation recognizes the following factors:
• The financial statements present the financial position, results of operations, and cash 
flows within limits reasonably attainable in financial statements
• The accounting principles used have general acceptance and are appropriate in the 
circumstances
• The amount of information is neither too sparse nor too detailed
• The financial statements are accompanied by explanatory notes
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The COSO study sets out that materiality is inherent in the concept of fair presentation. 
Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 defines a matter as material “if there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important.” In other words, would a 
financial statement user change his or her opinion if the matter were changed, included, or 
excluded?
Underlying the preparation of reliable published financial statements is another group of 
concepts:
• Existence or occurrence recognizes that assets, liabilities and ownership interests exist at a 
specific date; recorded transactions represent events actually occurring during the period
• Completeness means everything that occurred and should have been recognized during 
the period has, indeed, been recorded
• Rights and obligations refer to the rights inherent in assets and the obligations inherent in 
liabilities at a certain date
• Valuation or allocation refers to the accurate recording and summarization of assets, 
liabilities, revenues, and expenses according to relevant and appropriate accounting 
principles
• Presentation and disclosure means that items recorded in the statements are properly 
described, sorted and classified
The identification of a specific risk affecting financial reporting will be very difficult since 
the effects of all risks taken by the company will eventually feed into the financial 
statements. The creation of any account entry at any level of the company will be felt in the 
financial statements by virtue of being transmitted through the various levels of the 
reporting process. On this interpretation, the control governing the creation of any 
reportable number has to be considered part of the control system that must be assessed 
and audited to assure reliable financial statements and compliance with the SEC final rules.
Controls can lose their effectiveness and thus increase the risk of noncompliance as the 
company’s operating environment changes: personnel change; accounting rules change; 
competition increases; new regulations come into force; new technology is acquired; new 
product lines are introduced; mergers, acquisitions and restructurings occur. All these 
factors and many more require a review of the internal controls systems including that 
affecting control over financial reporting.
Control Activities
The function of controls, generally speaking, is to reduce the risks that would prevent the 
company from achieving its business objectives. Control activities can be divided into 
policy making and procedures. Policies will be determined by the overall risk assessment 
for the enterprise which will reflect its evaluation of operating, credit, and market risks. 
Because no two companies are the same, even in the same industry, control policies and 
procedures must be specific to the entity. Any control must counter the identified risk 
effectively and carry out the directives of management. Policies should be written but, in 
fact, are often communicated orally, especially in smaller companies. Problems identified 
during the enforcement of the procedures should be followed up and corrected.
Control activities to ensure internal control over financial reporting will be most important 
in the areas of:
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• Information processing
• Physical control of assets
• Segregation of duties.
Information and Communication
Information is the lifeblood of any organization. It must be accessible, accurate and flow 
freely to wherever it is required. It must flow upwards from the operating level to 
management and downward from the policymakers to those responsible for putting the 
policies into practice. The effectiveness of any control system depends on the quality and 
availability of information and the efficiency of the means of communicating it to those who 
need it to carry out their responsibilities. One of the key pieces of information that must be 
captured and communicated by the internal control system is any deficiency in the system 
itself. IT controls as a part of the information system will be treated separately below under 
IT Controls.
Information affects the functioning of control systems by making known to operators of the 
systems what is expected by way of ethical behavior, the level of competence required, how 
their work affects other departments, what to do in case of problems and so on. As changes 
occur in the enterprise risk assessment, changes may be needed in the control systems that 
must be communicated to the affected personnel.
Monitoring
Monitoring assesses the effectiveness of the design and performance of the control system 
over time. Monitoring should be an ongoing process built into the control system that 
detects problems as they occur and assures that the information on which the CEO and 
CFO are making their assessment complies with the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Reports by the internal and external auditors are an important part of the review process 
and can point out where the self-reporting controls are failing. Complaints by customers or 
suppliers should also be considered a form of monitoring report that requires investigation.
COSO Revisits the Framework in 2006 Report
At the prompting of the SEC, COSO began to study the application of the 1992 Integrated 
Framework document to smaller public companies in anticipation of their required public 
reporting on internal controls. Leading up to the report, a Roundtable discussion was held 
in 2005 with companies, auditors and the COSO project team to share ideas and 
experiences. A report was exposed for public comment in late 2005 and released as a final 
report Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller Public Companies in July 
2006. It can be ordered through any of the sponsoring organization Web sites including the 
AICPA Web site.
This study re-affirmed that controls effectiveness does not differ between small and large 
entities, but acknowledges the differences in the small versus large company environments 
and provides examples from business experience that illustrate how effective controls can 
be implemented at smaller companies. Many larger companies may also find the guidance 
helpful in aligning their controls to meet the control objectives in COSO.
The “tools” section of the 2006 report includes a simplified set of matrices for documenting 
and assessing controls effectiveness. In a new direction, the report uses 20 major principles 
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and numerous underlying attributes in lieu of the enumeration of the extensive number of 
control objectives that were in the 1992 report The simplification of the control objectives 
this way may also help the comprehension of the requirements for smaller companies, but 
at the proverbial “end of the day,” the standard for evaluating the effectiveness of the 
controls is the same.
10.5.5 Preventive and Detective Controls Under Sarbanes-Oxley
The SEC final rules governing internal control over financial reporting can be construed as 
rules to prevent financial statement fraud by controlling the accounting and IT subsystems 
that supply the information with which the financial statements are constructed. In practice, 
this means internal fraud, procurement fraud and computer fraud. The PCAOB recognizes 
the following list of five problem areas is not exhaustive:
1. Controls on the misappropriation of assets
2. Controls inherent in the company’s entire risk assessment processes
3. Code of ethics concerning conflicts of interest, related-party transactions, illegal acts and 
the monitoring of the code by management and the audit committee or board
4. Adequacy of the internal audit mandate and reporting process as well as the audit 
committee’s degree of involvement in the internal audit
5. Procedures for handling complaints and whistleblower reports
In the end, both the IT system and the accounting cycle feed into the financial statements 
every public company must prepare to comply with SEC disclosure requirements. It is the 
figures on these statements whose integrity must be guaranteed by the internal controls 
protecting the IT system and the accounting cycle. Given that the intent of Sarbanes-Oxley 
is to achieve reliability in financial reporting, any tampering with the means of producing 
financial statements will result in an unreliable and therefore noncompliant financial 
statement.
Unfortunately, even if the internal accounting and IT systems are reliable, senior 
management can still intervene to manipulate the results for fraudulent purposes. 
Management controls these systems and also has the power to override.
Financial statement fraud is often hard to distinguish from the exercise of discretion in the 
recognizing of income or expenses under GAAP. When there is a pattern of pushing the 
reading of GAAP rules, however, there is probably a fraud somewhere in the numbers. If 
exceptions to GAAP principles are not discussed in the footnotes to the financial statements 
they become misleading abuses; the unwary reader will erroneously assume the accounts 
have been accrued in the same way as other accounts. It is this kind of deception that 
Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to avoid.
Controls on the Misappropriation of Assets
The best way to achieve control over the misappropriation of assets is to relate the 
definition of internal control over financial reporting contained in the SEC final rules to 
areas of the accounting cycle where fraud is a risk. The risk of fraud in the accounting cycle 
is dealt with in detail in Chapter 5 of this Handbook, “Internal Fraud”.
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The sales and collection part of the accounting cycle creates the revenue accounts on the 
income statement and the cash and receivables accounts on the balance sheet. It is in this 
part of the accounting cycle that most cash thefts occur, kickback schemes are developed, 
and the falsification of sales records takes place. The foundation of reliability in this cycle is 
a well-designed IT system for recording and processing transactions. The system itself 
needs to be reviewed in light of the COBIT compliance standards.
The acquisition and payment portion of the accounting cycle is traditionally a very 
vulnerable area because funds are constantly flowing out of the company to pay for goods 
and services. This part of the cycle is touched on in Chapter 5 but receives a separate and 
more detailed discussion of its own in Chapter 13, “Detecting and Investigating 
Procurement Fraud”.
Most fraud at capital acquisition and repayment stages of the cycle are committed by senior 
management because they are most closely involved with the banks and underwriters and 
have the most override power. Because of the size of the funds involved, the impact on the 
balance sheet and income statement can be quite significant. The balance sheet accounts 
usually affected are cash, mortgages, accrued interest, capital stock and capital in excess of 
par value. On the income statement, interest expense, dividends and retained earnings 
usually feel the impact of this kind of fraud.
As for computer crime, most computer crime is not committed by hackers raiding the 
system from outside but from employees manipulating the system from inside.
A thorough review of Chapter 8, “Computer Crime, Computer Criminals, and Computer 
Evidence” as well as Chapter 4, “Computer Security and System Recovery” should be 
made in conjunction with the COBIT audit standards.
Controls Inherent in the Company’s Entire Risk Assessment Process
This topic is beyond the scope of this Handbook and belongs in the broad area of enterprise 
risk management. The most up-to-date discussion of this matter is contained in the new 
COSO book, Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework. COSO’s Internal Control- 
Integrated Framework, the internal control over financial reporting accepted by the SEC final 
rules, as noted frequently above, is, of course, essential reading. James Lam’s Enterprise Risk 
Management: From Incentives to Controls is also an excellent recent book.49




Because the topic of ethics is too broad to be dealt with fully here, the reader is referred 
elsewhere. Chapter 2 of this Handbook, “Promoting an Ethical Environment” is a good place 
to start. COSO’s Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting especially 
Chapter 2, “Recommendations for the Public Company” continues to be relevant to any 
discussion of ethical issues and governance. COSO’s Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
mentioned above also has an excellent discussion of the need for strong ethics, in particular 
Chapter 3, “Internal Environment”. As noted above, Brunswick Corporation has developed 
a good example of a written code of ethics.50
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Internal Audit, Reporting Process, Audit Committee
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act places great reliance on the audit committee as the body 
ultimately responsible for the production of transparent and reliable financial statements. 
The audit committee is responsible for hiring and firing the auditors, reviewing “all critical 
accounting policies and practices” to be used in the audit as well as “all alternative 
treatments of financial information” within GAAP after the auditor has discussed them with 
management. The auditor must also make the audit committee aware of any outstanding 
differences between itself and management. The audit committee is thus the final arbiter for 
conflicts between management and the auditor over accounting policies and practices.
Because it bears such great responsibility for resolving problems affecting compliance with 
Sarbanes-Oxley, the audit committee must display the greatest independence and 
professionalism. The audit committee and its oversight responsibilities including those for 
the internal audit function are discussed in detail in Report and Recommendations of the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, a joint study by 
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers published 
in 1999.51
51 http://www.nyse.com/content/publications/1043269645811 .html
In addition to ten recommendations, many of which have had their substance included in 
Sarbanes-Oxley, this Report provides what it calls in a chapter heading “Guiding Principles 
for Audit Committee Best Practices.” This chapter is a useful “how to” of the best way for 
the audit committee to conduct itself, what the Report calls “a catalog of common sense 
fundamentals that apply regardless of an individual company’s situation.” Recognition of 
the importance of these “fundamentals” will go a long way in assisting an audit committee 
to bring its company into compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley.
The Report emphasizes the oversight role of the audit committee over management, the 
internal auditor, and the external auditor and the need for open, objective relations with 
each. The committee should always be aware of the interrelationship among the three 
elements: management must implement the required controls, the internal auditor must 
“objectively assess” these controls, and the external auditor must review the effectiveness of 
both management and the internal auditor. By understanding each of these three roles, the 
audit committee should be able to ask incisive questions and thus improve the effectiveness 
of the whole control and reporting process.
Tension is inevitable between management and the internal auditor who is an employee of 
the company but has the role of objectively reviewing management’s effectiveness. There 
should therefore be a formal mechanism in place to allow the internal auditor to have 
regular meetings with the audit committee to discuss all aspects of the internal audit without 
any representative of management being present. Such dialogue should be open and 
uninhibited yet objective. Openness becomes especially important when management is 
unwilling to support requests by the internal auditor.
A similar relationship should be established with the external auditor in which meetings are 
held for a frank exchange of views without the presence of representatives from either 
management or the internal auditor. These meetings will be used to discuss the state of 
internal controls and the effectiveness of management and the internal auditor in 
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overseeing them. The focus of these discussions will be the effectiveness of all parties in 
producing reliable financial statements.
The committee must rely on management for its view of the enterprise risks and the 
establishment of controls to combat them. Management will be expected to supply reviews 
of the financial statements and documents prior to submission to the SEC. Management 
should also be prepared to present a report on any changes to accounting policies, 
treatment of significant transactions and any discrepancies between budgets and 
performance. The audit committee should expect that management will discuss any second 
opinions obtained from outside auditors that pertain to matters discussed by the internal 
auditor or the already retained external auditor. The committee should also invite 
management to speak openly about the assessments prepared by the internal and external 
auditors.
On the basis of these discussions with management, the audit committee should return to 
the internal and external auditors to see whether management is actually complying with all 
its own policies and procedures. None of this, however, should be a substitute for the audit 
committee’s own investigations to assure that there are no shenanigans among the other 
parties that might present a better picture of the company’s condition than is warranted.
Procedures for Handling Complaints and Whistleblower Reports
Under Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, audit committees are required to establish 
procedures for “the confidential, anonymous submission by employees of the issuer of 
concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.” The urgency of this can 
be measured by statistics in the 2004 Report to the Nation of the Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners (ACFE) which shows that 39.6% of cases were detected by tips from all 
sources and of these 59.6% were from employees. Although the Act only requires channels 
be opened for employees, the ACFE study shows that customers and vendors are also 
important sources of leads that ultimately uncover fraud.52 This report and its predecessors 
are extremely important because they give a picture of the extent of occupational fraud.
10.5.6 Enforcement of Section 10A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires auditors to take certain actions 
upon the discovery of a possible “illegal act.” This requirement is an affirmative obligation 
that arises when, in the course of an audit, an auditor detects an illegal act—whether or not 
the effect of that act is material to the financial statements as a whole. In other words, 
materiality may not be avoided by offsetting improper revenue with other financial 
statement items.
These requirements are spelled out in the accounting literature, specifically, in the SASs. 
SAS No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 317), and 
SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional 
Standards, vol. 1, AU secs. 110, 230, 312, and 316), require auditors to report evidence of 
fraud to management, and if senior management is involved in the fraud, the auditor must 
report to the audit committee.
52 http://www.cfenet.com/resources/RttN.asp
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Section 10A goes one step further. It provides that, after the auditor notifies the audit 
committee, the auditor must make three determinations. First, the auditor must determine 
whether the illegal act has a material effect on the issuer’s financial statements (quantitative 
or qualitative). Second, the auditor must determine whether management has failed to take 
appropriate remedial action. Third, the auditor must determine whether the failure to take 
remedial action will require a departure from the auditor’s standard audit report.
Once all three determinations have been made, the auditor must notify the board of 
directors “as soon as practicable.” That time period is not clearly defined, but it is clear that 
once the auditor notified the board of directors, the board has one business day to notify 
the SEC Office of the Chief Accountant.
The board may provide a copy of the auditor’s report or a summary. If the auditor does not 
receive a copy of that notice by the end of the next business day, the auditor must resign 
from the engagement or provide the SEC a copy of its report. Resignation does not relieve 
the auditor of its obligation to report to the SEC; it just buys one additional day since, upon 
resignation, the auditor must submit its report to the Office of the Chief Accountant the 
following business day.
This obligation of auditors to report to the SEC was included in Title III of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which is best known for heightening the 
pleading standards for plaintiffs in securities class action litigation and added Section 10A to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The original intent of Section 10A was to provide an 
incentive for management to take remedial action. But the number of financial fraud cases 
in recent years, and the number of enforcement actions against auditors suggests that the 
hammer of Section 10A was not enough.
Solucorp and Rosetti & Yonkers Section 10A Case Studies
On October 31, 1999, the SEC brought its first two cases against auditors for failing 
to file Section 10A reports. Those cases were In the Matter of Solucorp and In the 
Matter of Pat A. Rosetti and Jeffrey M. Yonkers. In the Solucorp matter, the SEC 
charged a chartered accountant with the Canadian accounting firm McKay & 
Partners for failing to take appropriate action upon the discovery of possible illegal 
conduct during an audit of Solucorp’s financial statements, in violation of Section 
10A. Specifically, the auditor failed to follow the procedures outlined in Section 
10A, and required by GAAS, upon his review of a backdated license agreement 
used to cover up improper revenue recognition. In the Matter of Rosetti and Yonkers, 
the SEC determined that two CPA’s employed by the firm Marcum & Kliegman, 
LLC, failed to take appropriate action as required by Section 10A upon learning 
that the firm’s client was preparing its financial statements using fractions of 
numbers from existing financial statements, rather than actual results of operations, 
and failed to properly record or require management to record an expense related 
to options issued to consultants. In both cases, the auditors were sanctioned under 
rule 102(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice.
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10.6 Audit Deficiencies and Audit Failures
10.6.1 The Top 10 Audit Deficiencies (1987-1997)
A complementary report by the authors of the COSO Report, entitled Fraud Related SEC 
Enforcement Actions Against Auditors: 1987-1997 (the Audit Failure Report), documented the 
ten most common audit failures in 45 SEC enforcement actions where sanctions were 
imposed against auditors for their association with fraudulent financial statements during 
the period 1987 to 1997.53
The most common problem, in 80 percent of the cases reviewed, was the auditor’s failure to 
gather sufficient audit evidence, most commonly in the areas of asset valuation, asset 
ownership, and corroboration of management representations. In about half of the 
enforcement actions reviewed, the auditors incorrectly applied or failed to apply GAAP 
pronouncements. In 44 percent of the cases, audit program design was cited as a problem. 
Specifically, the auditor failed to address inherent risk properly and adjust the audit 
program accordingly, recognize the additional risk associated with nonroutine transactions 
or prepare a new audit program for each engagement. Other common audit problems 
included the failure to exercise due professional care and appropriate professional 
skepticism, overreliance on inquiry as a form of audit evidence, deficiencies in the 
confirmation of accounts receivable, failure to recognize related-party transactions, and the 
failure to expand testing to compensate for identified weaknesses in internal controls.
Table 10.4 classifies the audit deficiency cited, together with the number and percentage of 
cases in which the deficiency occurred.
Table 10.4 Audit Deficiencies
Audit Deficiency
Number of Cases 
(45 Total) Percentage
Gathering sufficient audit evidence 36 80%
Exercising due professional care 32 71%
Demonstrating appropriate professional 
skepticism
27 60%
Interpreting or applying GAAP 22 49%
Audit program design and planning 20 44%
Using inquiry as a form of evidence 18 40%
Obtaining adequate evidence to evaluate 
significant management estimates
16 36%
Confirming accounts receivable 13 29%
Recognizing related parties 12 27%
Reliance on internal controls 11 24%
53 Also see the article “Top 10 Audit Deficiencies” by Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson in the Journal of 
Accountancy, April 2001.
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10.6.2 Audit Failures (1997-2002)
Several of the audit deficiencies noted above were also present in SEC enforcement cases 
against auditors during the period 1997 to present. Some of the most notable cases during 
this period are discussed in the following sections.
Sunbeam Corporation
On May 15, 2001, the SEC brought fraud charges against five former officers of Sunbeam 
Corporation, as well as the former engagement partner from Arthur Andersen who 
authorized unqualified audit opinions on Sunbeam’s 1996 and 1997 financial statements, 
which were determined by the SEC to have been materially misstated. Among the 
accounting gimmicks used to artificially inflate reported revenues and earnings were the use 
of big-bath restructuring charges to create cookie-jar reserves, the recognition of revenue on 
contingent sales, the acceleration of potential sales into the current quarter, and the 
improper use of bill-and-hold transactions. Despite these deviations from GAAP, Andersen 
issued unqualified audit opinions in contravention of GAAS.
Waste Management, Inc,
On June 19, 2001, the SEC filed settled administrative proceedings against Arthur 
Andersen for the firm’s issuance of materially false and misleading audit reports on Waste 
Management’s financial statements for the period 1993 through 1996. Specifically, the SEC 
alleged that at the time Andersen issued unqualified audit reports certain of its partners 
knew or were reckless in not knowing that the company’s financial statements were not 
presented fairly, in all material respects, in conformity with GAAP. The SEC claimed the 
Andersen audit engagement team had identified and documented numerous accounting 
issues that ultimately led to the company’s restatement of financial results for the period 
1992 to 1996 and the first three quarters of 1997. As a result of Andersen’s failure to ensure 
that all known misstatements were quantified and all likely misstatements estimated, the 
SEC further alleged that Andersen’s audits were not conducted in accordance with GAAS.
Notably, from the time of Waste Management’s IPO in 1971 until 1997, every chief 
financial officer and chief accounting officer in Andersen’s history had previously worked 
as an auditor at the company. During the 1990s, when the fraud occurred, 14 former 
Andersen employees worked for Waste Management, mostly in key financial and 
accounting positions.
According to the SEC, Andersen recognized as early as 1988 that Waste Management 
employed aggressive accounting tactics including improper adjustments to decrease 
depreciation expense, the capitalization of interest on current-period development costs, the 
failure to accrue properly for tax and insurance expenses, improper charges of operating 
expenses to reserve accounts, and the refusal to write off costs associated with impaired 
assets. During each audit performed in the restatement period, the engagement team 
proposed adjusting journal entries to account for material current- and prior-period 
misstatements. However, management refused to make the entries and Andersen’s audit 
partners declined to take appropriate action or modify the firm’s unqualified audit opinions. 
The adjustments were not made until a new management team took over in late 1997 and 
determined to restate the company’s prior-period financial statements.
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Enron Corporation
On June 15, 2002, Arthur Andersen was convicted of obstructing justice by impeding an 
investigation by securities regulators into the events leading to Enron’s financial demise. 
The conviction represents the first against a major accounting firm, and ultimately led to the 
firm ceasing operations in 2002.
In addition to the fraud charges, federal investigators are continuing to examine Andersen’s 
audit failures during the firm’s long relationship with Enron management. Although charges 
have not yet been brought, the numerous audit deficiencies noted to date include the failure 
to identify and require disclosure of significant related-party transactions, the failure to 
review off-balance-sheet financing transactions, the failure to exercise appropriate 
professional skepticism, the failure to challenge management’s estimates, and the approval 
of complex, nonroutine accounting transactions that were not permissible under GAAP, 
without the approval of the firm’s technical experts.
California Micro Devices
Following the indictment of Cal Micro’s senior executive officers on fraud charges for 
artificially inflating reported revenues and earnings, the SEC in August 1998 brought Rule 
102(e) proceedings against the engagement partner and senior manager on Cal Micro’s 
1994 audit. These individuals were both members of a then Big Five accounting firm. The 
SEC alleged that the auditors were reckless in failing to comply with GAAS during the Cal 
Micro audit, and more specifically, that the auditors conducted themselves unprofessionally 
in the three critical audit areas of accounts receivable, inventory and property. In each of 
these areas, the SEC alleged that the auditors failed to exercise appropriate professional 
skepticism, obtain competent evidential matter or properly supervise audit personnel.
Moreover, although Cal Micro had been singled out for “special attention,” the SEC 
alleged that the auditors ignored red flags that indicated potential accounting irregularities.
For example, the SEC alleged that in the revenue recognition category, the auditors did not 
examine the writeoff of one-third of the Company’s accounts receivable balance—a red flag 
that, in the eyes of the SEC, should have alerted the auditors to the possibility of a material 
misstatement. The three areas where the auditors were alleged to be lax—accounts 
receivable, inventory, and property—directly correspond to the areas where most of the 
accounting adjustments occurred when Cal Micro restated its financial results for fiscal 
1994.
However, in a surprising turn of events, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) on 
September 21, 2001, dismissed all 102(e) charges against Cal Micro’s auditors, including 
charges that the CPAs had acted recklessly. Key to the ALJ’s opinion was the finding that 
despite the alleged violations of technical standards there was no evidence to prove a direct 
link between the audit deficiencies and the misstated financial results. Specifically, the AIJ 
found that:
1. The auditors were negligent but not reckless in auditing accounts receivable, sales, and 
returns.
2. No GASS violations were proven in auditing the values of Cal Micro’s property, 
equipment, and obsolete inventory.
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3. The evidence did not support the conclusion that Cal Micro materially misstated its 
property, equipment, obsolete inventory, revenues, or accounts receivable in violation of 
GAAP.
10.6.3 Lessons Learned
The audit failures noted above provide important lessons in audit planning, execution, and 
management. For example, as noted in the Audit Failure Report, die three most common 
audit deficiencies, failure to gather sufficient competent evidence, lack of due care, and lack 
of professional skepticism, all reflect engagement management problems. The 
recommended solution to this problem is the development of a properly designed and 
executed quality control system. The emphasis would be on sound audit planning, 
supervision, and review as well as adherence to guidelines for the collection of sufficient 
audit evidence to perform substantive testing and corroborate management representations.
In the planning phase, the Audit Failure Report recommended more extensive 
participation by engagement partners and concurring partners as well as managers. This 
would increase the likelihood that the auditor would correctly assess audit risk; make 
appropriate modifications to the nature, extent, and timing of planned tests; and identify 
nonroutine transactions that might require additional investigation.
To reduce the incidence of GAAP violations, the Audit Failure Report recommended 
consultation with technical partners or industry specialists when certain accounting issues 
arise, expanded coverage of technical accounting topics and industry specific requirements 
in firm-sponsored training courses, and training on the provisions of SAS No. 69, The 
Meaning of Present Fairly in Conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the 
Independent Auditor's Report (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 411).
To confirm accounts receivable effectively, CPA firms must ensure that their audit teams 
confirm accounts receivable balances, confirm an adequate selection of the receivables, 
maintain control of the confirmation process, and employ alternative procedures when 
confirmations are not returned or exceptions are received.
To increase the likelihood of detecting related-party transactions, the auditor should, for 
each engagement, prepare a list of related parties, continually update the list throughout the 
engagement, and provide the list to all audit team members. The audit team should also 
make inquiries of management regarding the existence of related-party transactions. In 
addition, it is advisable to confirm with the counterparty the existence and nature of 
unusual client transactions.
10.7 Guidance for Auditors
In this regulatory environment, auditors should be mindful of the lessons learned from past 
audit failures. It is also prudent to review existing guidance in each of the key phases of the 
audit process, namely, initial risk assessment, analytical procedures, substantive testing, and 
the issuance of audit opinions.
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10.7.1 Risk Assessment
During the risk assessment phase, auditors should obtain an understanding of the 
prospective client’s industry and identify contractual, market, regulatory, and company­
specific incentives to manage earnings. Risk assessment is particularly important in 
determining whether to accept a new audit client, when interviewing former auditors, and 
when drafting the initial audit plan. To minimize risk, auditors should consider each of the 
risk factors identified in SAS No. 53, The Auditor’s Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities, superseded by SAS No. 81, and SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316), with an eye to 
any red flags that might signal a need for further review. Some of the most important risk 
factors to consider include the existence of a weak internal control environment, evidence 
that management provided untruthful or evasive answers to prior audit inquiries, 
indications that management is unduly aggressive or places undue emphasis on meeting 
earnings projections, and the existence of nonroutine transactions that may be difficult to 
audit.
10.7.2 Analytical Procedures
Analytical procedures are important tools used by auditors to identify problem areas and to 
inform substantive testing. Analytical procedures include vertical, horizontal, and ratio 
analysis. Vertical analysis is a technique for analyzing the relationships between items on an 
income statement, balance sheet, or statement of cash flows by expressing components 
as percentages of net sales, total assets, or liabilities and owners’ equity. These relationships 
may be used with historical averages to identify anomalies. Horizontal analysis is a 
technique for analyzing the percentage change in financial statement items each year. The 
first period in the analysis is the base year and changes in subsequent periods are computed 
as a percentage of the base. This method may be effective in identifying material 
inconsistencies. Ratio analysis is a technique used to identify relationships between two 
different financial statement amounts and to compare those relationships to industry 
averages. Of the three techniques, ratio analysis is the most useful for detecting red flags.
The most common ratios used to analyze financial statement amounts are the current ratio, 
the quick ratio, receivables turnover, inventory turnover, profit margin and asset turnover 
ratio.
The current ratio, which compares current assets to current liabilities, measures a company’s 
ability to meet its present obligations from its liquid assets. A significant increase in the 
current ratio may indicate an understatement of liabilities.
The quick ratio is similar to the current ratio but focuses on assets that may be liquidated 
immediately: cash, securities and accounts receivable. These assets are then compared to 
current liabilities to measure a company’s ability to meet its immediate cash requirements. 
A significant decrease in the quick ratio may indicate an increase in accounts receivable, 
which may suggest the improper recognition of revenue to artificially inflate sales.
The receivables turnover ratio compares net sales to average net receivables. As with the quick 
ratio, a decrease in receivables turnover resulting from an increase in receivables may 
signal the existence of improper revenue recognition.
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The inventory turnover ratio compares cost of goods sold to average inventory and measures 
the number of times inventory is sold during a period. Although a high inventory turnover 
is generally favorable, an abnormally high inventory rate may indicate inventory theft; an 
abnormally low inventory rate may reflect false debits to cost of goods sold to conceal 
fictitious sales.
The profit margin ratio compares net income to net sales and measures the amount of profit 
in each dollar of sales. An abnormally high profit margin may indicate the overstatement of 
net income resulting from inflated revenues or understated expenses.
The asset turnover ratio compares net sales to average operating assets. A decrease in the 
ratio may indicate overstatement of assets while an increase in the ratio may indicate 
overstatement of revenues or understatement of expenses.
10.7.3 Targeted Substantive Testing
The auditor should carefully design substantive tests based upon the initial audit plan as 
modified by the results of analytical procedures. Emphasis should be placed on specific 
potential problem areas.
For example, if the initial assessment indicates that management is overly aggressive about 
meeting earnings projections, it may be appropriate to increase and vary sample size in the 
accounts receivable confirmation process. It may also be advisable to evaluate the nature 
and adequacy of reserves through the application of analytical procedures to total accruals 
and individual accrual accounts. This analysis should include comparisons of year-to-year 
totals in the company and within the industry. This is especially important in companies 
with historically consistent earnings trends.
In addition, rather than simply accepting management’s best estimates, auditors should 
prepare a schedule of management estimates and estimates suggested by the audit evidence. 
If individual estimates suggest a directional effect on earnings and the aggregate difference 
is material, the auditor should evaluate the reasonableness of management estimates.
Heightened scrutiny should be applied to unusually large accounting estimates or accruals 
that decrease earnings, since the overstatement of expense in one year will create upward 
pressure on earnings in subsequent years.
10.7.4 Scope Limitations and Qualified Audit Opinions
Finally, scope limitations and qualified audit opinions should be used where information 
cannot be tested or verified. The tendency to waive immaterial discrepancies should be 
avoided. As regulators scrutinize the conduct of auditors in financial restatement cases, 
conservatism should be applied in all areas where the auditor’s discretion may be 
questioned.
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10.7.5 Typical Frauds Related to Misappropriation of Assets, 
Example Audit Procedures, and Internal Control Questions54
54 Adapted from Fraud Detection In A GAAS Audit, by Michael J. Ramos, CPA, Copyright © 2004 published 
by AICPA and available at www.cpa2biz.com.
The purpose of this section is to help auditors design extended audit procedures whenever 
it is believed planned audit procedures are insufficient to respond to the assessed risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud. This section is organized according to audit area and 
within each area, the following considerations are included:
• A description of the typical fraud schemes that might be discovered in that area. As 
described in Chapter 3, of “Fraud Detection In A GAAS Audit” it is relatively unusual 
for auditors to encounter a fraud and thus, they can become lulled into believing that the 
risks of material misstatement due to fraud may be negligible at their client. One of the 
keys for overcoming this assumption and developing a more skeptical attitude is for 
auditors to become familiar with the types of fraud that might occur. The descriptions 
included here are designed to do just that. The auditor should consider discussing these 
common frauds as part of their brainstorming session.
• A listing of what may be discovered during the information-gathering and risk 
assessment phase of the audit that may indicate the existence of the specified frauds.
• A description of audit procedures that may help detect material misstatements resulting 
from those frauds. As indicated in Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, 
AU sec. 316), response to address specifically identified risks of material misstatement 
due to fraud may include changing the nature, timing, and extent of auditing 
procedures. The example procedures in this section go beyond the example procedures 
included in SAS No. 99 (AU sec. 316.53).
For fraud schemes relating to the misappropriation of assets, a listing of supplemental 
internal control questions are included to help identify control deficiencies that leave them 
susceptible to fraud. (Note: Fraudulent financial reporting usually is perpetrated by 
management, who has the ability to override most internal controls. For this reason, the 
sections dealing with fraudulent financial reporting do not include a discussion of controls.)
This section, is written for auditors performing an audit in accordance with generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS). When audit procedures are extended, audit 
procedures should continuously be evaluated whether the procedures performed are part of 
a GAAS audit or part of a fraud examination consulting engagement. Again, it is important 
to note that the example audit procedures are not required by SAS No. 99 but rather consist 
of the author of “Fraud Detection In A GAAS Audit.”
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Most frauds relating to the misappropriation of collections on accounts receivable 
involve the diversion of payments received from customers. The scheme is fairly 
simple to perform, for example, an employee opens a bank account with a name 
similar to that of the company (Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer 
payments can then be taken by the employee and deposited into this bogus bank 
account.
What varies in accounts receivable frauds is how the frauds are concealed. 
Common techniques include the following:
• Lapping. The payment from customer A is diverted by the employee. To keep 
customer A from complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to 
customer A’s account. Customer C’s payment is applied to customer B’s account, 
and so on.
• Posting bogus credits to the account. To conceal the fraud, the employee posts credit 
memos or other noncash reductions (for example, representing a sales return or 
the write-off) to the customer account from whom the funds were diverted.
• Altering internal copies of invoices. The company’s copy of the sales invoice is 
altered to report an amount lower than that actually billed to the customer. 
When payment is received, the “excess” amount is diverted by the employee.
Another accounts receivable fraud involves the diversion of payments from written- 
off accounts. Most companies do not monitor the activity on accounts that have 
been written off, which provides the employee with the opportunity to divert 
payments from these customers and not be detected. For example, an employee will 
work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. As the customer is about to 
pay, the employee writes off the account, removing it from the books.
Finally, the author is aware of one fraud committed by an employee who made an 
arrangement with customers to “manage” their past-due accounts. The employee 
took steps to make sure these customers’ accounts were always shown as current in 
the company’s books and records. This effectively gave the customers an unlimited 
amount of time to pay their bills and avoid late fees and interest charges. In 
exchange for this service, the employee received a kickback from the customers.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are 
occurring or have occurred.
• Unexplained differences noted by customers on their accounts receivable 
confirmations.
• Significant delays between the time when the customer states a payment was 
made and the payment was recorded as received by the company.
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• A significant number of credit entries and other adjustments made to the 
accounts receivable records.
• Unexplained or inadequately explained differences between the accounts 
receivable subsidiary ledger and the general ledger.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, 
these procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance 
with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS 
audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Confirm account activity (not just the balance) with the customers directly. Be 
sure to confirm credit memo and sales return activity, as well as the date 
payments on account were made.
• Perform analytical reviews of credit memo and write-off activity, for example, by 
comparing to prior periods. Look for unusual trends or patterns, such as large 
numbers of credit memos pertaining to one customer or sales person, or those 
processed shortly after the close of an accounting period.
• Vouch credit memos and other write-offs to receiving records for returned 
goods, correspondence with customers, and other documentation supporting the 
transaction.
• Investigate all differences between the payment date reported by the customer 
and the payment date recorded by the company. Do not rely on company­
generated activity summaries—review both sides of the original checks or check 
copies.
• Analyze recoveries of written-off accounts.
• Obtain an understanding of how the accounts receivable aging is prepared and 
who has access to the data used to prepare the aging.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying the 
client’s vulnerability to the misappropriation of accounts receivable. Make sure the 
person completing the questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. 
“No” responses may not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, 
you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the 
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
In addition, you may wish to review the control objectives enumerated for this area 
in the 1992 Internal Control—Integrated Framework or the principles and attributes 
enumerated in the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller 
Public Companies. Deficiencies in control design or operating effectiveness are an 
invitation for fraud to occur.
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Table 10.5 Internal Control Questions Related to Fraud
Accounts Receivable Yes No
1. Are different employees responsible for preparing invoices, receiving 
payment, and maintaining accounts receivable records?
2. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized accounts 
receivable records and processes?
3. Are employees with accounts receivable responsibilities required to 
take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to perform 
those functions when an employee is absent?
4. Are credit memos approved and reviewed by management?
5. Does the entity have a method for tracking and monitoring customer 
complaints related to billing? Are these complaints periodically 
reviewed by management?
6. Is the accounts receivable subsidiary ledger reconciled to the general 
ledger account balance on a regular basis?
—




One of the more common inventory frauds is the theft of inventory for personal use. 
This is more likely to happen when inventory items are small and easy to steal, and 
the items have value to an employee as a consumer. For example, computer chips 
are small and easy to steal, but they have no value to the employee as a consumer. 
A laptop computer has the physical characteristics that make it susceptible to theft, 
plus the employee can use it immediately. The computer is more likely than the 
computer chip to be stolen for personal use.
A more lucrative inventory fraud is the theft of inventory for sale. For these frauds, 
it’s not necessary for the inventory to have value to the employee as a consumer, 
since the goods won’t be used for personal use. A common scheme is for the 
receiving personnel to steal the goods right from the receiving dock, before physical 
custody is established by the warehouse. For example, the employee signs a 
receiving report stating that 100 units were received, but only 90 are stocked in the 
warehouse and 10 are placed in the trunk of the employee’s car. The missing units 
will not be discovered until the year-end physical inventory count.
For larger inventory items that are more difficult to transport, the receiving 
personnel may collude with the vendor’s delivery personnel. The delivery 
personnel diverts 10 units of inventory to another location and delivers the 
remaining 90 units. The receiving personnel prepares a receiving report indicating 
that all 100 units were received. The stolen merchandise is then sold and the 
proceeds split between the two.
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Theft of scrap is another common fraud. For example, a hospital employee was 
convicted of stealing used x-rays, then recovering and selling the silver. In most 
companies, inventory scrap is not recorded or well-controlled, which makes it easy 
to steal. These thefts can be significant, especially in situations where the embezzler 
has the ability to inappropriately designate good inventory as scrap.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are 
occurring or have occurred.
• Large differences between the physical inventory counts and perpetual inventory 
records.
• Unexpected or unexplained increases in inventory turnover accompanied by 
decreases in gross profit percentages.
• Unexplained entries in the perpetual inventory records.
• Key inventory ratios (for example, shrinkage, turnover, or gross profit) that vary 
significandy from industry norms or between company locations or inventory 
types.
• Shipping documents (that is, showing goods were shipped from the company) 
without corresponding sales documentation.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described here. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, 
these procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance 
with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS 
audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example, by selecting more items.
• Analyze inventory shortages by location or product type. Compare key 
inventory ratios to industry norms. Look for unusual concentrations, patterns, or 
trends as a way to direct further inquiries and investigations.
• Review receiving reports and look for indication of alternative shipping sites.
• Review supporting documentation for reductions to the perpetual inventory 
records.
• Compare shipping documents to corresponding documentation.
Because of the nature of inventory theft, it may be difficult to detect using traditional 
audit techniques. If your client has reason to believe inventory is being stolen, a 
fraud examination may be required. For example, a fraud examiner might perform 
surveillance of receiving personnel or make surprise counts of items received into 
inventory.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your 
client’s vulnerability to the misappropriation of inventory. Make sure that the 
person completing the questionnaire understands the implication of these questions.
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“No” responses may not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of 
the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, 
you should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the 
lack of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
In addition, you may wish to review the control objectives enumerated for this area 
in the 1992 Internal Control—Integrated Framework or the principles and attributes 
enumerated in the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller 
Public Companies. Deficiencies in control design or operating effectiveness are an 
invitation for fraud to occur.
Table 10.6 Internal Control Questions Related to Fraud
Inventory Yes No
1. Does the client maintain adequate safeguard controls (for example, 
locked warehouses) over inventory susceptible to misappropriation?
2. Is there proper segregation of duties between persons responsible for 
inventory recordkeeping and those responsible for its physical 
custody?
3. Are employees with inventory, shipping, and receiving responsibilities 
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to 
perform those functions when an employee is absent?
4. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized inventory 
records?
5. Are physical inventory counts performed regularly? Are the count 
procedures adequate to ensure an accurate count?
6. Is scrap inventoried and controlled?
7. Is there a proper segregation of duties between those with the 
authority to sell scrap and those with the responsibility for doing so?
—
—




The purchasing function is particularly vulnerable to fraud. For many small 
businesses it represents the largest area of the risk of embezzlement.
The most common fraud scheme is the payment of invoices to a fictitious company. 
To perpetrate this scheme, the embezzler establishes a fake entity (often with a P.O. 
box for an address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate company) and gets the 
fake entered into company records as a legitimate vendor. The embezzler then 
produces invoices for the fake vendor, which get processed by the accounts payable 
system. Sometimes the embezzler is responsible for authorizing payment; other 
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times not. The scheme may also require collusion between various people, such as 
receiving (doctoring a receiving report to indicate something was received) and 
accounts payable (approving the invoice for payment).
Another common fraud is a kickback paid by vendors to the company’s purchasing 
agent. In collusion with suppliers, a purchasing agent may get paid a kickback for 
any number of activities, including:
• Allowing the vendor to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment. 
Examples of fraudulent billing practices include billing for goods or services 
never performed or received, billing more than once for the same item, 
substituting lower quality items than the ones billed, or overbilling for the items 
delivered.
• Excess purchasing of property or services.
• Bid-rigging.
Kickbacks are “off-the-book” frauds, that is, their concealment is not recorded on 
the books of the company. For that reason, it is often difficult for auditors to detect 
the presence of kickbacks.
The most common payroll fraud is the use of ghost employees, where the embezzler 
enters fictitious employees into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll 
checks. A variation on this scheme is to keep terminated employees on the payroll 
several pay periods after they leave their job. The embezzler then receives the 
paycheck for the terminated employee.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are 
occurring or have occurred.
• Fictitious vendors
— Photocopied invoices or invoices have obviously been tampered with (for 
example, sections have been “whited out” and typed over).
— Invoice numbers from the same vendor occur in an unbroken consecutive 
sequence.
— Invoices from companies have a P.O. box address or no phone number.
— Invoices from companies have the same address or phone number as an 
employee.
— The amount of each invoice from a particular vendor falls just below a 
threshold for review.
— Multiple companies have the same address and phone number.
— Vendor names appear to be a “knock-off” of well-established businesses.
• Kickbacks
— Purchasing agent handles all matters related to a vendor even though it might 
be outside or below his or her normal duties.
— Vendors who receive an inordinate amount of business from the company for 
no apparent business reason.
— Vendor salesmen make frequent, unexplained visits to purchasing personnel.
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— Prices from a particular vendor are unreasonably high when compared to 
others.
— Quality of goods or services received is low.
— Tips or complaints are received from other employees or honest vendors.
— Key contracts are awarded with no formal bid process.
• Ghost employees
— Employees with duplicate addresses, checking accounts, or Social Security 
numbers.
— Employees with no withholding taxes, insurance, or other normal deductions.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described in the previous 
list. Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to 
fraud, these procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in 
accordance with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of 
a GAAS audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider 
expanding their extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Review selected invoices and look for evidence that the invoice has been 
doctored.
• Perform a computerized search of the vendor list and look for P.O. box 
addresses, duplicate addresses, and vendors with no phone number.
• Perform a computerized match of the vendor list with a list of employees and 
look for matches of addresses or phone numbers.
• Perform a computerized sort of invoices by vendor and look for unusual 
sequencing or amount (indication of possible fictitious company). Look for 
unusual pricing and volume trends (indication of possible kickback).
• Review selected invoices and examine supporting documentation indicating 
goods or services were received.
• Perform a computerized search of payroll records to identify duplicate addresses, 
Social Security numbers, or bank accounts.
• Review personnel files and look for those that contain little or no evidence of 
activity, for example, a lack of performance evaluations, requests for changes to 
withholdings, or retirement plan options.
Because kickbacks are conducted off the books, they may be difficult to detect using 
traditional audit techniques. If your client has reason to believe a purchasing agent 
is accepting kickbacks, a fraud examination may be required.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your 
client’s vulnerability to the misappropriation of assets in the purchasing and payroll 
functions. Make sure that the person completing the questionnaire understands the 
implication of these questions. “No” responses may not change your control risk 
assessment or your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As 
a client service matter, however, you should consider discussing these items with 
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your client and explaining how the lack of certain controls leaves the company 
exposed to fraud.
In addition, you may wish to review the control objectives enumerated for this area 
in the 1992 Internal Control—Integrated Framework or the principles and attributes 
enumerated in the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller 
Public Companies. Deficiencies in control design or operating effectiveness are an 
invitation for fraud to occur.
Table 10.7 Internal Control Questions Related to Fraud
Purchasing and Payroll Yes No
1. Is there adequate segregation of duties between purchasing, 
receiving, and the accounts payable function? ____ ____
2. Are employees with purchasing and accounts payable responsibilities 
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to 
perform those functions when an employee is absent?
3. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized vendor, 
accounts payable, and payroll records? ____ ____
4. If the company chooses suppliers based on competitive bids, are all 
bids date stamped when received, and opened at the same time 
under dual control?
5. Does the accounts payable system include controls to avoid duplicate 
payments? ____ ____
6. Are new vendors reviewed by management before being added to 
the list of qualified vendors? ____ ____
7. Does the company have a written policy on the amount and type of 
gifts an employee can accept from suppliers and customers? Is that 
policy communicated to employees, customers, and suppliers?
8. Does the company include a “right to audit” clause in its contracts 
with major suppliers?55 ____ ____
9. Are new employees approved by management before being added to 
the payroll records? ____ ____
10. Are there controls in place to ensure that terminated employees are 
removed from payroll records in a timely fashion? ____ ____
11. If the size of the entity permits it, does the owner-manager 
periodically review the payroll records to determine if every 
employee listed is personally known to him or her?
55 “Right to audit” clauses can be included in contracts or printed on the back of all purchase orders. Under a 
right-to-audit clause, the company reserves the right to audit the vendor’s books at any time. Vendors who 
know their records are subject to examination generally are reluctant to make bribery payments.
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The most common way in which a company (particularly a small business) is 
defrauded of cash is through fraudulent disbursements. Under these schemes, the 
employee uses company checks to either (1) withdraw cash directly for their own 
benefit or (2) pay personal expenses. For example:
• An employee wrote checks payable to cash and posted the debit to various 
expense accounts. When the bank statement came back with the canceled 
checks, she simply discarded the ones she had cashed then proceeded to 
perform the bank reconciliation.
• An employee used company checks to pay personal credit card bills. Each 
month, he had a credit card bill approximately equal to the company’s required 
payroll tax withholding. Instead of making the payroll tax deposit, he wrote a 
check to the credit card company. He discarded these checks when they were 
returned with the bank statements. He also discarded the notices received from 
the IRS stating that the company’s payroll withholding deposits had not been 
made.
There are infinite variations on these types of frauds.
People who commit these kinds of frauds are faced with two tasks. First, they must 
post a debit somewhere in the general ledger to disguise the disbursement. The 
clever embezzler will post this debit to an expense account (which is closed out at 
the end of the year, thus eliminating the audit trail), or to inventory (where 
differences between the books and the physical count flow through cost of sales, 
thus eliminating the audit trail). Second, the embezzler must have a way for 
avoiding detection during the bank reconciliation process. In a small business, this 
usually is possible because of a lack of segregation of duties. It might also involve 
collusion.
Companies that handle large amounts of cash are also susceptible to theft of cash on 
hand. Industries such as retail sales or restaurants are particularly susceptible to 
these kinds of frauds. It would be rare that the theft of cash on hand would be 
material to an entity’s financial statements, but as a client service matter, you should 
be alert to the possibility. Common schemes include:
• Skimming. Cash is “skimmed” before it enters the accounting system. For 
example, the employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt, or prepares a 
receipt for less than the amount taken.
• Substituting personal checks for cash. The employee takes money from the cash 
register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always 
“in balance,” but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to 
the company’s bank account. In that way, the employee receives free use of the 
cash.
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• Fictitious refunds and discount. The employee records a refund and removes cash 
as if a refund had occurred, but no merchandise was returned or discount given.
• Altered credit card receipts. This is a problem in the restaurant business where the 
waitperson will increase the tip on a credit card receipt.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above 
are occurring or have occurred:
• Large, unexplained reconciling items in the bank reconciliations.
• Bank statements that do not include canceled checks.
• Some canceled checks are missing.
• Disbursements are unsupported by invoices or other documentation.
• Customer complaints.
• Altered or missing cash register tapes.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, 
these procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance 
with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS 
audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Examination of bank reconciliations. A thorough review of bank reconciliations is one of 
the best ways to detect fraud relating to cash.
• Review bank statements and canceled checks. Look for checks made out to cash or to 
employees. Compare endorsement to payee. Make sure all canceled checks are 
accounted for.
• Obtain a bank cut-off statement. Cut-off statements are ordered from the bank and 
delivered directly to the auditor who reconciles them.
• Search for and examine unusual expense account activity close to the end of an 
accounting period. The theft of cash usually is concealed with a debit to an expense 
account because expenses are closed to retained earnings at the end of the accounting 
cycle. The clever embezzler will concentrate his or her theft at the end of the cycle to 
limit the amount of time the theft remains on the books.
• Surprise cash counts. These will sometimes turn up embezzlement of petty cash.
• Analyze sales discounts and returns. Compare current period to prior periods or 
breakdown activity by employee. Look for unusual patterns or trends.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your 
client’s vulnerability to the misappropriation of cash. Make sure that the person 
completing the questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. “No” 
responses may not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of the 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, you 
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should consider discussing these items with your client and explaining how the lack 
of certain controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
In addition, you may wish to review the control objectives enumerated for this area 
in the 1992 Internal Control—Integrated Framework or the principles and attributes 
enumerated in the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller 
Public Companies. Deficiencies in control design or operating effectiveness are an 
invitation for fraud to occur.
Table 10.8 Internal Control Questions Related to Fraud
Cash Yes No
1. Are all bank accounts reconciled on a timely basis?
2. Is the person who reconciles the bank accounts different from the 
person responsible for cash disbursements?
3. Does the company receive canceled checks along with its bank 
statements?
4. Do the bank reconciliation procedures include accounting for all 
canceled checks?
5. Are employees with cash disbursement and bank reconciliation duties 
required to take vacations, and are other employees cross-trained to 
perform those functions when an employee is absent?
6. Has the company limited the logical access to computerized cash 
disbursement records?
7. Does the company limit the physical access to negotiable assets, such 
as blank checks?
8. Does the owner review and sign all checks? If not, do disbursements 
over a certain dollar amount require dual signature or other control 
procedure?
9. If company employees process a significant amount of cash 
transactions, does the company adequately control and monitor these 
transactions?




The most common types of computer schemes involve input tampering. This can be 
accomplished by altering, forging, or fabricating computer input documents. In an 
entity without adequate logical access control (which is not uncommon for small 
businesses), input tampering is quite easy to accomplish. The more common 
computer input schemes include:
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• Entering false transactions. For example, entering invoices for fake vendors into the 
accounts payable system or recording false credit memos to accounts receivable.
• Entering bogus file maintenance transactions. File maintenance activities include 
such transactions as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to 
the payroll. Bogus file maintenance transactions can lay the groundwork for any 
number of frauds, for example, the use of ghost employees to embezzle funds.
• Failure to enter legitimate transactions or file maintenance instructions. For example, 
when an employee is terminated, that information should be entered into the 
computer system to remove that employee from the payroll records. A failure to 
do this creates a ghost employee.
• Altering input data. For example, changing the amounts, dates, or other 
information contained on the input data.
Other computer frauds involve program modification schemes, sometimes referred to 
as “throughput frauds.” To accomplish these schemes requires an understanding of 
and the ability to modify computer application programs. Typical schemes include:
• Bogus instructions. A computer programmer may place bogus instructions into a 
computer program so the computer will perform unauthorized functions, for 
example, making payments to a vendor not listed on an approved list.
• Siphoning funds. Funds can be siphoned in small amounts from a large number of 
accounts, for example, pennies and portions of pennies (due to rounding) can be 
shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a 
single account that is accessed by the embezzler.
• Direct manipulation of accounts. Computer programs may be altered to obtain 
direct access to manipulate files without authorization. For example, file 
maintenance changes may be accomplished without the input of the normal 
documentation.
What to Look For
Computers often are used to accomplish the frauds listed elsewhere in this section of 
the publication. Observing signs of other frauds may lead you to one of the 
computer fraud schemes listed here. In addition to the items listed elsewhere, be 
alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described here are 
occurring or have occurred.
• Inability to process computer applications in a timely manner.
• Unexplained differences in batch or hash totals, or other means to control 
computer input.
• Undocumented or unauthorized account postings, file changes, or modifications 
to application programs.
• Unexplained differences between the general ledger and computerized 
accounting records (for example, a computer spreadsheet) maintained on a 
separate computer.
Most small businesses use microcomputers, either to process accounting 
information or to prepare or summarize information for input (for example, through 
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use of a spreadsheet). The use of microcomputers and a highly decentralized 
computer processing environment can leave a company vulnerable to various fraud 
schemes because of:
• A lack of segregation of duties. The same person can prepare a source document (for 
example, an invoice), process the information (prepare a spreadsheet summary 
for the day or month), and review the output (review the output and input the 
totals to the general ledger).
• Lack of logical access. Many off-the-shelf computer programs contain logical access 
controls, such as password protection. Unfortunately, entities often fail to install 
these controls or do so ineffectively.
• Lack of adequate computer processing controls. Most microcomputer accounting 
packages contain controls to ensure the accuracy of processing or to identify 
conditions that require user follow-up (for example, exception reports). Again, 
many entities fail to properly implement these controls.
When gaining an understanding of the entity’s internal controls, be alert for 
weaknesses relating to the entity’s use of microcomputers. An excellent source of 
additional information is Auditing in Common Computer Environments, an Auditing 
Procedures Study published by the AICPA.
Example Audit Procedures
The following audit procedures will help detect the frauds described above. 
Depending on your assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, 
these procedures may be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance 
with GAAS. Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS 
audit. If these procedures are already being performed, consider expanding their 
extent, for example by selecting more items.
• Review documentation supporting a selection of financial transactions or file 
maintenance procedures.
• Review error reports, batch processing totals, and other user controls over the 
input and processing of financial transactions or file maintenance procedures.
• Reconstruct accounts or files from original source documents.
Expanding Your Internal Control Questionnaire
Your internal control questionnaire may have questions aimed at identifying your 
client’s vulnerability to computer fraud. Make sure that the person completing the 
questionnaire understands the implication of these questions. “No” responses may 
not change your control risk assessment or your assessment of the risk of material 
misstatement due to fraud. As a client service matter, however, you should consider 
discussing these items with your client and explaining how the lack of certain 
controls leaves the company exposed to fraud.
In addition, you may wish to review the control objectives enumerated for this area 
in the 1992 Internal Control—Integrated Framework or the principles and attributes 
enumerated in the 2006 Internal Control over Financial Reporting—Guidance for Smaller 
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Public Companies. Deficiencies in control design or operating effectiveness are an 
invitation for fraud to occur.
Table 10.9 Internal Control Questions Related to Fraud
Computer Schemes Yes No
1. Is there a proper segregation of duties between the authorization of 
input, the preparation of input, and the reconciliation of output? ____ —
2. Are employees with computer input duties required to take vacations, 
and are other employees cross-trained to perform those functions 
when an employee is absent?
3. Is there a proper segregation of duties between computer 
programmers and computer operators? ____ —
4. Has the company implemented effective logical access controls, 
including access to application programs, master files, and databases? ____ —
5. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure the adequacy 
and legitimacy of input data? ____ ___
6. Does the company have adequate controls to ensure that changes to 
computer applications are authorized and they function as planned? ____ ___
7. Are exception reports, error listings, and other computer-generated 
items that require user follow-up investigated and resolved in a timely 
manner?
8. Are spreadsheets and other microcomputer applications used to 
process significant accounting information checked for accuracy by 
someone other than the person who prepared it? _____ __




Inventory frauds are perpetrated to manipulate earnings—inflated ending inventory 
balances reduce the amount of reported cost of goods sold, which results in 
improper increases to gross profit and net income. The usual method for inflating 
ending inventory is to report fictitious inventory amounts. This can be done in 
numerous ways, including:
• Altering quantities reported on inventory count tags that were not checked by 
the auditors.
• Entering inventory count tags for nonexistent inventory.
• Shifting the same inventory between several different locations.
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• Altering or disguising the physical characteristics of inventory items to make it 
appear as if larger quantities are on hand. For example, hollow stacks of 
inventory that are made to appear solid, or inventory boxes filled with weights.
In other instances, management may be predisposed to understate beginning 
inventory balances, which has the same desired effect of increasing current period 
earnings. For example, this scheme may be perpetrated when there has been a 
change in management, and current management wishes to report improved 
profitability. The most common method for understating beginning inventory is to 
overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above 
are occurring or have occurred.
• Inability to produce all inventory count tags.
• Lack of control over the population of used count tags.
• Slow inventory turnover; increases in certain types of inventory or in branches 
or other locations not examined by auditors.
• Inability to produce vendor invoices supporting purchases (for example, invoices 
unavailable while performing price test work).
• Significant changes in gross profit percentages.
• Large unexplained reconciling differences between the inventory amounts 
recorded on the books and the physical inventory count.
• Large increases in inventory balances without corresponding increases in 
purchases.
• Journal entries made directly to the inventory account and not through the 
purchases journal.
Example Audit Procedures
Your primary audit procedure relating to the existence of inventory is the physical 
inventory count. The following audit procedures, performed during the physical 
inventory count, will help detect the frauds described here. Depending on your 
assessment of the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, these procedures may 
be performed as part of an audit conducted in accordance with GAAS. 
Alternatively, they may be performed outside the scope of a GAAS audit
• Account for all inventory tags used during the physical count.
• Expand the number of test counts.
• Rigorously examine all items counted, for example by opening sealed boxes to 
observe the contents.
• Perform physical inventory counts at all locations simultaneously.
• Use the work of a specialist to help determine the quality (for example, the 
purity, grade, or concentration) of the inventory items.
• Perform analytical review procedures of gross profit; analyze according to 
location or inventory type.
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• Perform analytical review procedures of inventory balances and purchases; 
analyze according to location or inventory type.
Extended Audit Procedures 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
Overvalued Assets
Typical Frauds
Overvaluing assets is a relatively simple way to directly manipulate reported 
earnings because overstated assets usually result in understated expenses. Common 
schemes for reporting overvalued assets include:
• Improper capitalization of costs that should have been expensed.
• Failure to recognize impairment losses on long-lived assets.
• Recognition of fictitious assets, for example, through the use of related-party 
transactions, the manipulation of intercompany accounts, or the failure to write 
off expired assets.
• Recognition of assets that the company does not have title to.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable asset valuation allowances.
• Unreasonable or unsupportable estimates of fair value, for assets required to be 
reported at fair value.
• Improper classification of marketable securities such as trading, available-for- 
sale, or held-to-maturity.
• Manipulation of depreciation expense, for example through unreasonable 
assumptions about the useful lives of assets or their residual values.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may be present when the frauds described above 
are occurring or have occurred.
• Unusually high fixed-asset balances, when compared to total assets or to 
comparable entities.
• Unrealistically large changes in asset balances.
• Unusual or unexplained relationship between depreciation expense and fixed 
asset balances.
• Events or changes in circumstances that indicate assets may have been impaired.
• Missing documents related to asset transactions.
• Journal entries affecting the reported amount of assets, particularly entries made 
near the end of the reporting period or those that are unsupported or 
unauthorized.
• Unusual discrepancies between the entity’s asset-related records and the general 
ledger.
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Example Audit Procedures
Auditors have an advantage when auditing for overvalued assets because they 
direct their audit procedures toward an amount the entity has already recorded. This is 
much easier than trying to detect transactions or amounts that the entity has not 
recorded, such as unrecorded liabilities. In addition to your normal procedures to 
address the assertions related to assets, you also might consider performing the 
following:
• Extending the scope of detailed audit procedures related to the acquisition of 
fixed assets, such as the examination of supporting documents.
• Physical observation of fixed assets.
• Confirm the terms of significant fixed asset additions with the counterparty to 
the transaction.
• Confirm that the entity has title to reported assets through a review of relevant 





The fraudulent underreporting liabilities can have a direct positive effect on an 
entity’s financial position and its reported earnings. Common schemes to 
underreport liabilities include the following:
• Understating accounts payable, for example, by recording purchases in 
subsequent accounting periods, overstating purchase returns, or falsifying 
documents that make it appear liabilities have been paid off.
• Recognizing unearned revenue as earned revenue.
• Failure to record all debt or other liabilities.
• Failure to recognize contingent liabilities.
• Underreporting future obligations, such as warranty costs.
What to Look For
Be alert for the following, which may indicate that one of the frauds mentioned 
above is occurring or has occurred.
• Unusual or unexplained trends in accounts payable balances or differences 
between the entity’s payables balances and those of comparable entities.
• Evidence of contingent liabilities in attorney’s letter responses, correspondence 
from regulatory agencies or others, or other information gathered during the 
engagement.
• Significant purchases of assets with no recorded debt.
• Unusual or unexplained relationships between interest expense and recorded 
liabilities.
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• Unexplained significant decreases in liabilities.
• Unusual relationship between the trend in the accrual for estimated warranty 
expense and sales.
• Receiving reports received near the end of the reporting period without a 
corresponding invoice.
• Amounts listed on vendor’s statements that were not reported as purchases.
• Discrepancies in debt confirmations.
• Obligations reported as being discussed by management in the entity’s minutes, 
but not reported in the accounting records.
Example Audit Procedures
In addition to the audit procedures typically performed related to liabilities, you 
might also consider the following:
• Perform lien searches on entity properties to search for unrecorded debt.
• Confirm the existence and terms of liabilities, including payables, with third 
parties.
• Read internal correspondence and correspondence between the entity and third 
parties to identify the existence or possible underreporting of liabilities.
10.8 Checklist: Detection of Financial Statement Fraud
This checklist addresses internal controls issues, taken from the discussion in this chapter, 
specific to suspected financial statement fraud. The checklist is an addition to Section 1.5, 
“Risk Management Checklist,” and Section 2.2, “Ethical Environment Checklist,” of this 
Handbook.
This checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute 
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who 
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
Table 10.10 Financial Statement Fraud Checklist
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
1. Motives
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a 
greater likelihood of potential financial statement fraud.
a. Is there a perception among management of the company or 
of individual operating units that there is extraordinary 
pressure (over and above the pressures typically associated 
with this industry) to achieve a higher level of reported 
earnings?
(continued)
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Table 10.10 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
b. Do management compensation agreements tie compensation 
or bonuses to higher levels of reported earnings?
c. Is there extraordinary pressure from outside shareholders or 
other outsiders to improve the value of company stock?
d. With regard to shares held by management or major 
shareholders, could the existence of any of the following 
provide an incentive to maintain or increase reported 
earnings, especially in the near term?
• Vesting provisions in employee stock ownership plans 
that postpone ownership.
• Stock option exercise restrictions that prevent managers
from acquiring shares until specified dates or the 
occurrence of specific events.
• Rule 144A restrictions that limit the number of shares that
can be sold on United States securities exchanges on a 
given trading day.
• Income tax provisions that afford more favorable
treatment to capital gains in shares held for a sufficient 
period of time to qualify as long-term capital gains (the 
restriction being that the government would receive more
of the sale proceeds if the share sales were classified as 
short-term capital gains).
• Corporate control requirements that necessitate holding
significant blocks of stock past some event such as an 
annual shareholders meeting before they can be sold.
e. Is the company in danger of losing its listing on a major stock 
exchange, or is it attempting to obtain a new listing?
f. If the company is publicly traded, is there extraordinary 
pressure to meet analysts’ or market expectations, whether 
explicitly stated in published reports, public filings or public 
statements by company officials or implicitly perceived by 
management?
g. Is there extraordinary pressure, whether explicit or implicit, 
to continue to report a rising trend in earnings and/or 
revenues?
h. Is the company operating close to or in violation of the limits 
of financial covenants, such as minimum shareholders’ equity, 
maximum debt-to-equity ratios or minimum current ratios, 
contained in bank credit facility agreements or other debt 
instruments?
i. For firms doing business in regulated industries, is the 
company operating close to or in violation of the financial 
restrictions set by regulators or by statute?
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Table 10.10 (continued)
(continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
2. Quantitative Characteristics
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a greater 
likelihood of potential financial statement fraud.
a. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and 
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-over-year 
increase greater than 10 percent (i.e., an index greater than 
1.1)?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Index
• Sales Growth Index
b. When calculating the following indexes for the previous and 
the current year, do any of the indexes show a year-over-year 
increase greater than 10 percent more than increases for 
similar indexes of peer (same industry) companies?
• Days’ Sales in Receivables Index
• Gross Margin Index
• Asset Quality Index
• Sales Growth Index
c. Is the change in working capital over the past year (excluding 
cash changes) relative to total assets at the end of the period 
more than 20 percent greater than similar calculations for 
peer companies?
3. Qualitative Predictors: The Audit Committee
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a need to 
take action to improve the integrity and effectiveness of the Audit 
Committee.
a. Has the board of directors failed to designate an audit 
committee or failed to approve a charter for an audit 
committee?
b. If there is an audit committee, do any of the following 
conditions exist with regard to members of that committee?
• A director being employed by the corporation or any of 
its affiliates for the current year or any of the past five 
years.
• A director accepting any compensation from the 
corporation or any of its affiliates other than compensation 
for board service or benefits under a tax-qualified 
retirement plan.
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Table 10.10 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
• A director being a member of the immediate family of an 
individual who is, or has been in any of the past five years, 
employed by the corporation or any of its affiliates as an 
executive officer.
• A director being a partner in, or a controlling shareholder 
or to which the corporation made, or from which the 
corporation received, payments that are or have been 
significant to the corporation or business organization in 
any of the past five years.
• A director being employed as an executive of another 
company where any of the corporation’s executives serves 
on that company’s compensation committee.
c. Are there less than three audit committee members with at 
least some financial accounting experience?
d. Is it not clear or not the case that:
• The audit committee should be responsible for selecting 
the outside auditors.
• The audit committee has a formal written statement from 
the outside auditors describing all relationships between 
the auditors and the company.
• The audit committee regularly discusses with the outside 
auditors all aspects of the propriety or lack thereof of the 
company’s accounting practices.
• The audit committee receives all reports of internal 






A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section indicate a greater 
likelihood of potential financial statement fraud.
Has the company had a history of internal control problems, 
whether those problems resulted in detection of financial 
statement or any other type of fraud?
Does the company CEO engage in micro-management or 
other practices that could unduly influence accounting 
decision-makers with regard to financial statement reporting?
c. Are financial statements presented to the board of directors or 
to outsiders (banks, minority investors, etc.) prepared on a 
basis other than GAAP?
d. Are outside auditors unaware of any interim or quarterly 
financial statements, or financial statements prepared for 
selected outside parties such as banks or investors?
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Table 10.10 (continued)
(continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
e. In establishing and reviewing internal controls, has 
management failed to establish adequately the key metrics or 
guidelines to determine the extent and frequency of internal 
auditor review?
f. Is there a lack of evidence that management has properly 
communicated the internal control guidelines and procedures 
to appropriate personnel?
g. If there is no audit committee, does the firm lack procedure 
for reporting accounting irregularities to the entire board, 
either directly or through senior management?
h. Does it appear that management does not assess the quality of 
its internal controls over time?
i. If the firm is not audited annually, has more than one year 
elapsed since either outside accountants or internal auditors 
have reviewed all internal controls?
j. Have any audit tests detected significant risks not previously 
known to management?
k. Is there a history of using a quantitative standard for 
materiality, such as a percentage of earnings or assets, to fail 
to correct known accounting errors or irregularities?
5. Special Areas
A Yes answer to any of the questions in this section should generate 
further inquiry to determine if specific internal controls need to be 
improved.
1. Failure to Record Loss Contingencies
a. Given the nature of the company’s business, is it likely that 
any of the following issues could be relevant?
• Collectibility of receivables
• Obligations related to product warranties and product 
defects
• Risk of loss or damage of enterprise property
• Threat of expropriation of assets
• Pending or threatened litigation
• Actual or possible claims and assessments
• Guarantees of indebtedness of others
• Agreements to repurchase receivables (or repurchase 
related property) that have been sold
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b. With regard to possible contingencies, does there exist:
• The incidence of claims prior to the date of financial 
statements
• Correspondence with (and bills from) outside legal 
counsel
• Internal correspondence within production and research 
staffs as to the need to address a critical problem with a 
product already on the market
• Internal correspondence among department heads of 
production, R&D, general counsel, and senior 
management about postproduction problems and product 
claims
• External correspondence between the manufacturer and 
its customers about a given product concerning special 
price concessions or special return privileges
• The incidence of special or over-budget freight charges to 
accommodate returns and/or the shipment of replacement 
product
• Shifting of production schedules to manufacture 
replacement product
• Halting manufacture of the product in question
• Shifting of R&D staff away from planned research projects 
to applications engineering relating to redesign of existing 
products
• Payments in sometimes seemingly immaterial amounts to 
customers on a regular basis over a period of weeks or 
months that indicate some arrangement to compensate for 
product defects
c. If there is a suspected contingency, does correspondence 
between departments or within departments indicate a 
problem?
d. If a contingency is likely to exist, has management used an 
inadequate or inappropriate standard for quantifying the 
potential claim?
2. Failure to Record Asset Writeoffs
a. Has the company’s industry experienced rapid changes in 
engineering or materials applications that may lead to asset 
write-offs?
b. Is the industry in which the company operates very cost- 
competitive?
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c. Has the company experienced:
• Significant changes in customer demand
• Significant loss of business to a competitor
• A need to obtain or retain a customer relationship by 
bidding below cost
d. When reviewing fixed asset schedules with production or 
divisional personnel, have any of the following occurred?
• A significant decrease in the market value of an asset
• A significant change in the extent or manner in which an 
asset is used or a significant physical change in an asset
• A significant adverse change in legal factors or in the 
business climate that could affect the value of an asset or 
an adverse action or assessment by a regulator
• An accumulation of costs significantly in excess of the 
amount originally expected to acquire or construct an asset
• A current-period operating or cash-flow loss combined 
with a history of operating or cash-flow losses or a 
projection or forecast that demonstrates continuing losses 
associated with an asset used for the purpose of producing 
revenue
e. Is there evidence of significant changes in production or 
product demand?
f. From the review of moving expenses and discussion with 
production personnel, does it appear that any equipment has 
been moved off the shop floor into storage?
g. Does the company not maintain profitability analyses by 
product line or by customer?
h. Upon reviewing profitability analyses, does it appear that 
certain products have not been historically profitable?
i. For historically unprofitable product lines, to justify not 
writing down assets for impairment, has management used:
• Overly optimistic forecasts of future profitability
• Out-of-date forecasts
• Forecasts not prepared or reviewed by personnel with line 
responsibility for production
j. If written narratives accompany the forecasts, do they discuss 
downside possibilities that management has not adequately 
taken into account?
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k. Are there any facts now known that would invalidate 
assumptions contained in the forecast?
1. For investments in nonpublicly traded securities:
• Does the company have financial data adequate to 
determine historical profitability of the investee?
• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has 
management failed to write down the investment based 
upon an overly optimistic forecast?
• If the investee has not been historically profitable, has 
management failed to write down the investment based 
upon a forecast prepared by management with business or 
family ties to the investor company?
3. Acquisition and Cookie Jar Reserves
a. Were reserves established without a clear purpose or 
justification?
b. If reserves were established by a current period charge to 
income, were earnings prior to the charge in excess of 
management or outside expectations?
c. Were reserves established at or near the close of a reporting 
period?
d. Were reserves established without adequate review by senior 
management?
e. Upon review of charges to a given reserve, are there charges 
for expenses that are not appropriate to the stated purpose of 
the reserve?
f. Was the timing of the take-down of reserves coincident with 
achieving certain financial targets set by management or 
outsiders?
g. Was the amount of the take-down of reserves for a given 
period necessary to achieve certain financial targets set by 
management or outsiders?
h. For acquisition reserves:
• Were reserves established after twelve months from the 
date of the acquisition?
• Were reserves set up for items not related to the 
acquisition?
• Does the quantity of costs allocated to the reserve in a 
given period cause earnings to reach certain financial 
targets set by management or outsiders?
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4. Cost Shifting
a. Has management made a recent change in policy with regard 
to capitalizing previously expensed costs?
b. Has a change in policy with regard to capitalizing previously 
expensed costs not been disclosed in company financial 
statements?
c. Has management proposed to capitalize a new category of 
expenditure that customarily is expensed on peer-group firm 
financial statements?
d. Does the timing of changes in policy with regard to 
capitalizing expenses coincide with:
• Implementation of a management bonus plan or 
calculation of bonuses under that plan
• Commencement of the sale of stock or the search for an 
equity partner
• Implementation of a new credit facility or recent problems 
in maintaining financial covenants under an existing 
facility
e. But for the capitalization of certain expenses:
• Would management not receive certain bonuses or other 
benefits under a management compensation plan?
• In the opinion of securities analysts, appraisers, or 
underwriters, would the company’s share price be 
significantly lower?
• Would the company be in violation of loan or debt 
covenants?
f. Does the capitalization of expenses cause the firm’s Asset 
Quality Index to increase significantly in excess of increases 
(if any) for its industry peers?
g. If company management provides segment or subsidiary 
financial data, especially if management or outsiders tend to 
point to performance of that segment or subsidiary in their 
discussions of company performance:
• Have expenses been incurred by the parent that relates to 
the segment or subsidiary?
• Have other segments or subsidiaries incurred expenses 
that should be allocated to the segment or subsidiary in 
question?
Fraud Supp. 6—2006 115
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
Table 10.10 (continued)
Financial Statement Fraud Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
h. Has senior management failed to establish proper procedures 
for allocating or apportioning costs among affiliates or, if 
there is a policy, is there evidence that adherence is lax or 
that there have been documented lapses?
i. Is there correspondence among heads of affiliates concerning 
disputes over expense allocations or apportionment that has 
not come to the attention of the audit committee?
j. Were reserves established at the parent company for 
expenses anticipated for subsidiaries?
k. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability 
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to the parent or 
another subsidiary?
1. Are there debit entries in subsidiary expense or liability 
accounts that could reflect cost transfers to reserves 
established at the parent level or in another subsidiary?
m. Is there any correspondence between accounting personnel at 
the parent and subsidiary levels that describe special 
procedures for certain costs that are incurred by the 
subsidiary but not charged to earnings of that subsidiary?
5. Recording Fictitious Revenues
a. If the company requires signed agreements from customers 
before revenue is recognized:
• Have sales personnel indicated that their managers have 
approved as income sales contracts that were not signed as 
of the period end?
• Have sales personnel stated that unsigned contracts were 
recorded as revenue under the premise that key buyer 
personnel had given verbal approvals?
• Have sales personnel stated that unsigned contracts were 
recorded as revenue under the premise that key buyer 
personnel had signed the contract but the contract was 
held up for other reasons?
b. Have there been prior internal control failures with sales 
cutoff?
c. If fabricated contracts are suspected, have the sales cutoff tests 
performed by internal or outside auditors failed to look for 
the fabrication and substitution of contracts?
d. Have sales cutoff tests failed to examine the history of sales 
returns and reversals over time?
e. With regard to the requirement for timely delivery:
• Are there lapses in documentation of delivery?
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• Have customers complained about receiving deliveries 
too early?
• Have returns from a certain customer or reseller been 
abnormally high?
f. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are 
receiving unusually generous sales terms for returns or 
refunds?
g. Is there evidence that certain customers or resellers are 
receiving unusually low prices or above-average discounts?
h. Is the price for component products sold by the company 
dependent, at least in part, upon the price of the final product 
sold by another company?
i. Have royalties been accrued to income prior to receipt of 
confirmation from the payer that royalties are owed?
j. Do department heads have the authority to both approve 
sales and the recognition of related revenue in the financial 
statements?
k. Is there a lack of review of sales revenue recognition at the 
senior management level?
1. Is there a history of revenue being recognized improperly?
m. Have department heads approved significant refunds or 
returns that are out of the ordinary or appear to violate 
company policies?
n. Have refunds or returns been historically high for a certain 
department?
o. Have the reasons for refunds and returns not been 
documented or, if documented, have the reasons given been 
insufficient?
p. Has senior management failed to review or been lax in 
reviewing significant sales refunds and returns?
q. If side letters are suspected:
• Have engineers, technicians, or others involved with the 
installation of the products indicated that certain customers 
made additional demands before agreeing to buy?
• Are there notes or letters in sales files indicating customer 
demands had been made to allow for returns or refunds?
r. Are sales approved before obtaining credit checks for new 
customers or for existing customers that are experiencing 
financial difficulties?
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s. Is there an unusual concentration of orders from small or 
distressed customers occurring near the end of a reporting 
period or sales contest?
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10.9 Checklist: Sarbanes-Oxley
This checklist addresses control issues affecting the internal control over financial reporting 
required by the SEC final rule for compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
This checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the 
checklist does not guarantee compliance or the prevention or detection of fraud 
and is not intended as a substitute for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital 
concerns about compliance and fraud prevention or who suspect fraud should seek 
the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
A No answer to any of the questions in this checklist indicates a greater likelihood of 
potential noncompliance and fraud.
Table 10.11 Internal Control over Financial Reporting Checklist
Sarbanes-Oxley Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
1. Ethics
a. Does the company have a written code of ethics?
b. Is the code of ethics distributed to all employees?
c. Is there ongoing ethical education for all employees?
2. Audit Committee
a. Has an audit committee been established?
b. Does the committee understand its duties?
c. Does at least one member meet the definition of “financial 
expert” as defined by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
d. Are all members independent as defined by the Act?
e. Has the committee set up a process by which it may receive 
and review complaints including those from whistleblowers?
f. Has each member of the committee received and read the 
new Auditing Standards Numbers 1 and 2 and the proposed 
Number 3 from the PCAOB?
g. Has each member of the committee received and read the 
SEC final rules?
h. Has each member of the committee received a copy of and 
read Internal Control—Integrated Framework, published by 
COSO?
3. Control Over Financial Reporting
a. Has a committee been established or a senior person 
designated to implement the SEC final rules to make the 
enterprise compliant with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
b. Has each member of senior management received and read 
Internal Control—Integrated Framework published by COSO?
(continued)
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c. Is the COSO or equivalent framework being used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the internal control over financial 
reporting?
d. Do the CEO and CFO understand the elements of the 
company’s internal control system, including the control 
environment, that must be reviewed in order to attest to the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting?
e. Do the other members of the management team understand 
the elements of the company’s internal control system that 
must be reviewed in order to attest to the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting?
f. Is the internal control system evolving as the company grows 
and changes?
g. Does the internal control over financial reporting record a 
description of authorized transactions?
h. Does the internal control over financial reporting classify 
transactions according to their description?
i. Does the internal control over financial reporting place the 
transaction in its proper accounting period?
j. Does the internal control over financial reporting enable 
transactions to be included in periodic financial reports?
k. Are there any design or operating deficiencies in the internal 
control system as defined by the PCAOB?
1. Are there any significant design or operating deficiencies in 
the internal control system as defined by the PCAOB?
m. Are there any design or operating material weaknesses in the 
internal control system as defined by the PCAOB?
n. Would any resultant material misstatement meet the test of 
materiality as defined by SAB No. 99?
0. Do those persons responsible for the financial reporting 
process understand the distinction between “internal control 
over financial reporting” and “disclosure controls and 
procedures”?
p. Has a committee been established to oversee the 
implementation of disclosure controls and procedures?
q. Is there a system of disclosure controls and procedures in 
place that will ensure compliance with SEC reporting 
requirements?
r. Can the control system distinguish between error and fraud?
s. Does the documentation describe the results of any 
management tests of the effectiveness of the internal control 
over financial reporting?
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Table 10.11 (continued)
Sarbanes-Oxley Checklist Yes No N/A Ref
t.
u.
Have the internal controls reporting project team 
management members received and read PCAOB Auditing 
Standard No. 2, (as suggested by the SEC) to identify the 
details of company compliance (e.g., communications with 
auditors, scope of controls examinations, etc.) not enumerated 
in SEC documents?
Does the documentation describe accounting policies used 
and how they conform to GAAP?
V.
w.
Has all system testing been done in a timely manner to meet 
the “as of’ requirement for Sarbanes-Oxley compliance?
Have all material weaknesses been disclosed to the CEO and 
CFO?
X. Are the CEO and CFO aware they must sign an attestation to 
the establishment and effectiveness of internal control over 
financial reporting?
y. Are the CEO and CFO aware the external auditor must 
review the basis of their attestation and sign off on it?
z. Has management reviewed the PCAOB documents 
describing the suggested phraseology of its report?
aa. Is the external auditor being given all the help needed to 
review the internal control over financial reporting and 
provide “reasonable assurance” as to its effectiveness?
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Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis 
Management
11.1 Overview
In a world as unpredictable as ours, events are often beyond our control. There are natural 
disasters; there are accidents; and there are intentional catastrophes. The September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon are a chilling reminder 
of the last category. Although certain threats may be totally unforeseen, appropriate 
security measures can sometimes prevent losses, and appropriate crisis management 
planning can help to minimize the impact when disaster strikes. Whether the threat relates 
to fraud committed by an insider or an extremist who has threatened the lives of some of 
your employees, there are a variety of security measures that can be undertaken to 
minimize your company’s vulnerability.
When the events of September 11 unfolded, certain companies were prepared to handle 
the ensuing crisis after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center had caused them to 
consider and address their weaknesses. Many companies, however, were not prepared.
A survey conducted by Kroll Associates in October 2001 (included at the end of this 
chapter) of business executives in New York, Boston, and Toronto revealed that the 
awareness and concern of the business community for security risk management had 
increased dramatically since September 11, and many executives now believed their 
security risk management systems needed upgrading. Previously, the main security-driven 
priorities had been employee integrity and information security, but this list has expanded 
to include the physical security of both a company’s assets and its people. Awareness of the 
importance of appropriate security measures has also increased. But what is appropriate? 
Each company’s circumstances, needs, and risk profiles are different, so the security 
measures that are appropriate for one company may not be sufficient for another.
This chapter has been written to assist in defining this what. It identifies the types of threats 
that a business faces, and then goes through the primary considerations for an effective 
security plan to prevent or detect such threats so that you, as a CPA, can be better 
informed of the need for security, and the types of security measures that should be 
undertaken. There are certain threats, however, that no plan can prevent but their effects 
may be mitigated by a good recovery plan.
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11.2 The Threat
11.2.1 Identifiable Threats
There are a wide variety of threats to a business, ranging from natural threats to those that 
are either intentionally or unintentionally caused by people. There are conventional threats 
that have existed for hundreds of years, and there are more contemporary threats that arise 
from technological advances. Threats associated with civil unrest, war, and terrorism have 
become a way of life in some parts of the world, whereas North America and other parts of 
the world have enjoyed relative stability in recent years, and these threats are only now 
being considered seriously.
In order to set up appropriate security measures, it is necessary to identify all imaginable 
threats. The next step in the security process is to assess the likelihood of such threats 
becoming reality. What follows is an extensive but not all-inclusive list of the potential 
threats:
• Theft and other intrusions include the following:
— Theft
— Armed attacks, for example, bank robbery, and so on
— Vandalism and other malicious acts
— Systems intrusion
• Water damage may result from the following:
— Flood
— Tidal waves or storm surge
— Drought
— Water pollution
• Fire includes the damage from either of the following:
— Fire
— Smoke
• Accidents and mechanical breakdowns can arise from the following:
— Vehicular accidents
— Equipment malfunctioning
• Utility interruption may involve the following:
— Water, power, utility, and communication outages
— Fuel shortages
• Earth movements include the following:
— Earthquakes
— Avalanches and landslides
— Volcanic eruptions
• Weather conditions can be any of the following:
— Extreme cold and extreme heat
— Snow, ice, and hail
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— Typhoons, tornadoes, and hurricanes
— Dust and sandstorms
— Lightning storms
— Infestations
• Threats to the safety of a company’s personnel can include the following:
— Kidnap and ransom
— Hostage-taking
— Workplace violence, such as physical assault or assault with lethal weapons
• Bomb threats and explosions can be caused by the following:
— Suicide bombings
— Conventional bombs
• Civil disorder can arise from the following:
— Riots, strikes, and demonstrations
— Warfare, including attacks that could be conventional, biological, chemical, or 
nuclear
• Hazardous materials present the following dangers:
— Intentional contamination that could be chemical, biological, or radioactive
— Accidental contamination that could be chemical, biological, or radioactive
• Cyber attacks can include any of the following:
— Theft of information
— Misinformation about your company on the Internet
— Denial of service
• Corruption of the system can involve disruption of any of the following:
— 911 emergency response system
— Electric power grids
— Water supply
— Telecommunications
— Air traffic control
• Terrorist acts, conducted by individuals or groups with an ideological agenda, and can 
include any of the above threats, but often include the following:
— Kidnap and ransom or hostage-taking, or both
— Workplace violence
— Bomb threats and explosions
— Hazardous materials contamination
11.2.2 Vulnerabilities
There are four primary aspects of a company that are vulnerable to security threats: 
physical assets, including premises and equipment; people; information; and reputation.
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A company’s physical assets include all of its premises, for example, manufacturing locations,
showrooms, head office and warehouse facilities, as well as equipment such as computers
and all the equipment used in the operational processes of the company. Such assets are
vulnerable to access violations, malfunctions, theft or conversion, and destruction.
People are the lifeblood of an organization. Without adequate security measures and 
training, the people employed by a company can become victims of a kidnapping, be 
injured, or, in certain cases, become a fatality. If an employee is abducted, injured, or dies 
because of inadequate security measures, the employer also suffers not only because of the 
downtime caused by the loss of that employee, but also because of the impact on the other 
employees, and the effect on the company’s reputation. The people in a company who are 
the most vulnerable include expatriates in foreign jurisdictions, traveling executives, 
employees who deal directly with the public, employees who are operators of sophisticated 
equipment or who have critical skill sets and knowledge of company processes and 
procedures, and security personnel.
Information that needs to be protected includes information that is stored electronically on 
computers, networks, tapes, drives, and disks as well as in paper files and books. Several 
companies destroyed in the World Trade Center attacks cited the loss of the company’s 
history, often in the form of a commissioned book, as irreplaceable. Electronic information, 
however, is only one source of information that is vital to an organization. Other 
information that needs to be protected includes intellectual property such as trade secrets, 
product development ideas, competitive intelligence, customer lists, processes and 
procedures, training manuals, legal contracts, and accounting and tax records.
The reputation of a company represents its credibility and image as seen by its employees, 
customers and suppliers, shareholders, the general public, the media and regulatory 
authorities. A company’s reputation is created by its actions and communications as well as 
the communications of other parties, all of which must be consistent, credible, and positive 
in order for that reputation to remain intact. If the security of a company has been 
breached, a company’s reputation is vulnerable, particularly if the communications are not 
all positive. Effective communication, therefore, is vital to maintaining a company’s 
reputation.
11.2.3 Some Risks of Greater Concern
The above-mentioned Kroll survey taken in October 2001 shows that there is a heightened 
awareness of the need for appropriate measures to protect against a wide range of threats to 
a company’s security of which manmade threats now represent more of a concern than 
natural disasters.
The Kroll survey revealed that before September 11, the most important security issues 
related to threats from the following:
• Systems intrusion
• Computer and telecommunications failures, or both
• Fire and explosion
After September 11, these three issues continued to represent the greatest area of concern 
to executives. However, since the attacks, the degree to which these risks were considered 
important increased by at least 25 percentage points. For instance, 86 percent now viewed
6 Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
Chapter Eleven: Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis Management
systems intrusion as an important security issue compared to 61 percent who viewed 
systems intrusion to be important before. This represents an increase of 25 percentage 
points. Computer and telecommunications failures were considered to be important issues 
to address by 83 percent of respondents subsequent to the attacks, compared to 57 percent 
before; and the threat of fire and explosion was considered to be an important issue to be 
addressed by 77 percent of the respondents now, compared to 48 percent who considered 
it to be important before.
The Kroll survey also revealed that certain other security issues, previously considered to 
be less of a threat, have become much more of a concern than they were. Bomb and 
hazardous materials threats showed the biggest gain in importance (up 42 and 47 
percentage points respectively to 71 percent each). More than half of the respondents 
considered the following threats to be important issues to address now, whereas less than a 
third of the respondents considered these to be important issues to address before 
September 11:
Threat Important Before 
September 11 (Percentage 
of Respondents)
Important After 
September 11 (Percentage 
of Respondents)
Bomb Threats 29 71
Hazardous Materials 24 71
Civil Disorder 16 53
Armed Attack 22 52
Hostage-Taking 21 51
Water and Power Outages 44 66
The Kroll survey also shows that bomb threats and hazardous materials were considered to 
be more of a concern after the attacks than threats related to water and power outages, 
whereas before, water and power outages had been considered to be more of a concern.
11.2.4 Relative Vulnerability
All companies face security risks, some more so than others. The vulnerability of one 
company compared to another is a function of several factors, including the extent to 
which appropriate security measures have been implemented, the degree of security 
preparedness, and the geographic location and the nature of the company’s operations.
Certain regulated industries, such as oil and gas, have mandated security procedures to 
mitigate known risks. They can, however, be vulnerable because they have limited security 
procedures related to other aspects of their operations. Companies in other industries can 
be vulnerable because they have few or no security measures in place.
The companies that face the biggest threat from a terrorist perspective are those whose 
activities could impact large numbers of people such as those that:
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02 7
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
• Have large groups of employees at one location.
• Handle precious commodities.
• Handle toxic substances.
• Handle food and other items consumed by the general public.
11.3 Planning and Prevention
11.3.1 Post-September 11 Crisis Management
The Kroll Survey revealed that in the aftermath of September 11, companies are more 
aware of the need to identify and assess risks and reduce vulnerability through planning.
For example, 89 percent now view physical security as important, compared to 40 percent 
before. Approximately 86 percent identified emergency planning as important, compared 
to 34 percent before. About 80 percent cited business resumption planning as important, 
compared to 38 percent before.
As a result, more companies are paying attention to their security needs than ever before, 
and many are hiring risk consultants to conduct corporate security reviews and make 
recommendations to improve their security and emergency preparedness.
This response is not only wise from the perspective of protecting a company’s assets and its 
people, but it is also becoming more of a necessity for insurance reasons as more 
companies face rising insurance costs. Some companies are finding they cannot get 
insurance coverage unless they have adequate security and crisis management plans in 
place. Many insurers are looking for evidence that companies are taking all reasonable 
steps to mitigate their risks by conducting corporate security reviews and by the 
preparation of threat and crisis management plans. Companies that have conducted 
security reviews and that have threat and crisis management plans are better able to reduce 
their losses through improved security and are, therefore, more likely to get or retain their 
insurance coverage.
Certain risks, however, such as terrorist acts and acts of war, are no longer covered by most 
insurance companies. In the absence of insurance coverage, the ability of a company to 
cope with such acts quickly and effectively is the only way to minimize the losses that 
would otherwise be suffered.
11.3.2 Elements of a Corporate Security Review
A comprehensive corporate security review involves the following five steps:
1. Identify all the threats that a business faces (for instance, all the threats identified in the 
previous section of this chapter).
2. Conduct a threat assessment to consider the probability of each threat.
3. Conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of each sector of the business and each 
location.
4. Identify appropriate security measures to eliminate, avert, or minimize the risk of the 
most significant threats; or, if that is not possible, to provide an early detection system 
that warns of the existence of such threats.
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5. Develop an effective threat and crisis management plan that covers all aspects of the 
business to help facilitate management’s response to the threat or crisis, and, more than 
likely, to minimize the effects of business interruption.
11.3.3 The Threat Assessment Process
The threat assessment process involves assessing for each location and threat:
• The likelihood of each threat becoming a reality
• The severity of the impact of such a threat
More specifically, the issues to assess relative to each threat must include:
• Identifying whether the threat could affect the particular location under review.
• Identifying the frequency with which this threat is likely to recur (several times per 
annum, once every three years, once every ten years, once in a lifetime, once every 
hundred years, or highly improbable).
• Identifying whether the threat represents a significant threat to a company’s operations, 
facilities, people, information, or reputation. Part of this assessment involves considering 
the number of people likely to be affected by the threat, recovery time, insurance 
coverage both to repair and replace damaged equipment or premises and to cover 
business interruption losses, and the financial impact.
• Identifying whether appropriate security measures are in place to prevent such a threat 
from materializing or to mitigate its impact.
• Determining the ease with which security measures could be introduced.
Such an assessment is subjective by nature. It is useful to make the assessment, however, as 
the process provides valuable information that can be used to prioritize the areas for 
review. This information can then be used to establish the priorities for implementing 
appropriate security measures to minimize the risks associated with these threats. This is 
particularly important when resources allocated to the implementation of appropriate 
security measures are limited.
Threats that would have a negligible impact but which are frequent threats should have a 
lower priority than threats that could cause catastrophic damage, even if they are only 
remote possibilities. The following table can be used to assist in assigning the relative 
priorities for addressing the threats faced by a business. Frequent threats with catastrophic 
consequences would be assigned an A priority, whereas improbable threats with negligible 
consequences would be assigned a D priority.
Table 11.1 Assessing the Relative Priority for Dealing with Each Threat
Frequency of 
Occurrence
Severity of the Risk 
Catastrophic Major Minor Negligible
Frequent A A A C
Occasional A B B D
Remote A B C D
Improbable B C C D
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11.3.4 The Comprehensive Risk Assessment Process
A comprehensive risk assessment is often done with the assistance of external experts and 
involves assessing the security-related controls and procedures that need to be in place to 
protect four basic areas of the business for each operating site:
• Premises and equipment. Assess the company’s physical controls that prevent and detect 
unauthorized access.
• People. Assess the degree to which a company’s personnel are aware of ways to avoid 
crises and what to do if they should occur. Risky travel destinations, for example, should 
be identified and travel advisories prepared for relevant personnel.
• Information. Assess the company’s hardware and software controls to prevent and detect 
unauthorized access to information. The speed of recovery through the use of backup 
data should also be part of this assessment.
• Reputation. Assess the communication system that advises employees, customers, 
suppliers, shareholders, and the media.
The results of this overall assessment should be documented so that future assessments can 
consider whether there have been any changes to the company’s vulnerability.
Premises and Equipment
The assessment of a company’s premises and equipment must concern itself primarily with 
access and exit controls. The following is a list of the type of information that should be 
assessed for each facility:
1. Type of facility (corporate offices, retail outlets, and factories)
2. Location
3. Number of floors including a basement
4. Number of persons in each building and on each floor
5. Type of department on each floor
6. Type of equipment on each floor
7. Tenant and visitor access control
8. Alarms and monitoring in general
9. Access to loading docks
10. Access and surveillance of elevators and stairwells
11. Type of access technology (cards)
12. Closed circuit TV surveillance
13. Nature of businesses of other building tenants
14. History of security breaches and their correction
People
Putting in place an adequate plan to secure a company’s premises and equipment is an 
important step in safeguarding a company’s people but it is just a first step. Other aspects to 
assess affecting personnel include the following:
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1. Educational material should be provided to executives, security personnel, and 
employees regarding the following security-related policies and procedures:
• Mail and package handling processes
• Evacuation procedures
• Crisis management procedures
2. Company hiring practices should include screening and background checks. What is the 
awareness level of personnel with respect to political risks in the countries to which they 
are traveling?
3. Personnel awareness of corporate practices to address a crisis such as a bomb or 
biohazard threat and contingency plans in case of an emergency
Information
This section of the plan should concern itself primarily with unauthorized access to 
confidential information and the ability to restore or recover such information in the event 
that it is destroyed or otherwise corrupted. The following is a list of issues to be addressed 
in securing confidential corporate information:
1. Access the controls that exist to protect the company’s computer(s) and the information 
stored in them.
2. Protect the company Web site from hackers.
3. Establish the frequency of data and software backups.
4. Provide for the offsite storage and security of backups.
5. Access controls to protect company accounting information, customer lists, manuals and 
procedures, patents, and processes.
Other computer security issues such as physical security, logical security and system 
recovery are addressed in Chapter 4, “Computer Security and System Recovery,” of this 
manual. Also refer to Chapter 8, “Computer Crime and Computer Criminals.”
Reputation
The security of a company’s reputation depends on the effectiveness of control over all 
forms of communications affecting the company. The following is a list of how the types of 
information should be assessed to protect a company’s reputation:
1. Clearly designate the persons authorized to speak for the company to the media, 
analysts, and shareholders.
2. Issue authorized press releases.
3. Train those persons who deal with the media.
4. Monitor the media for reports on the company.
5. Monitor chat rooms.
6. Develop a strategy for countering false information about company products or services 
in media or chat rooms.
7. Develop policies that clearly state the consequences of committing an act that is adverse 
to the interests of the company, such as fraud or the destruction of property.
8. Require that all personnel sign a statement acknowledging they have read and agreed to 
the policies.
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11.3.5 Preventing and Detecting Security Breaches
The overall security plan of a company should be the responsibility of one independent 
security department and not fragmented among the functional areas of the business on the 
model of the internal audit and designed to protect premises and equipment, people, 
information, and reputation.
The following case illustrates what can happen when corporate security is not performed in 
this way.
Mining Security in a Global Setting Study
When the events of September 11, 2001, were over, members of the board of 
directors of a large multinational mining company started to ask themselves some 
hard questions about the security of their own operations. Would their company be 
able to handle a crisis that threatened to disrupt production at one of their mine 
sites? What security measures were in place to prevent access to the company’s 
processing plants? The directors were surprised to find that the answers to these and 
other questions were unclear. It had quickly become apparent that the company 
needed to strengthen its security overall and to establish a crisis management plan 
to address a wide variety of threats to the company’s operations, including threats 
associated with terrorist acts.
Management retained the services of an international risk consulting firm to help 
them address these questions, to conduct a comprehensive corporate security 
review of its worldwide operations, and to develop recommendations to improve 
security at each location.
The mining company had rapidly grown from a single-site mining operation in the 
United States to a multinational leader in the mining and processing of precious 
metals. This growth had been achieved through the acquisition of various 
complementary businesses and mine sites.
Security was quite comprehensive at some sites but lax or virtually nonexistent at 
others. At certain locations, there were sophisticated plans to protect the health and 
safety of the employees while, elsewhere, conditions invited breaches of security 
that could result in loss of property and/or harm to employees. This unevenness 
occurred because security was considered to be the responsibility of the plant 
manager at each location rather than that of a single company-wide security 
department. For instance, plant managers sometimes opted to use security 
personnel to do maintenance or clerical duties. While such duties were being 
performed, the security personnel were unable to perform their security duties. At 
these times, employees and others had free access to the site to steal inventory and 
supplies without being challenged.
12 Fraud Supp. 2—3/02
Chapter Eleven: Corporate Security: Threat and Crisis Management
Although individual plant managers did have an awareness of the need for security 
at their respective facilities, security was not their main priority. Costs related to the 
security function at their location were considered to be an overhead expense, and 
the plant managers’ priority was to reduce overhead and improve earnings. As a 
result, recommendations for improved security measures in the past had been 
dismissed or shelved.
One of the primary recommendations from the risk consultant was, therefore, to 
integrate the security function at a corporate level by hiring an experienced security 
manager and having the security personnel at each site report to him. The risk 
consultant also recommended that the costs related to security personnel at each 
site should be accounted for as a head office cost and should be budgeted in a 
separate corporate security budget. This would prevent the plant managers from 
making decisions regarding security issues based on the impact on the profitability 
of each site.
Other recommendations by the risk consultant included the establishment of 
common access controls, the training of security personnel, and the instruction of 
all management personnel in the importance of security. Failure to comply with 
these policies and procedures would be punished.
The Mining Security case above illustrates several important points:
1. Security should be an integrated function with on-site personnel reporting all security 
matters to head office representatives at each location who report to head office. 
Administrative matters would be handled locally.
2 Security costs would be a head-office cost rather than local overhead.
Set out below are a number of security measures that are typically recommended for the 
protection of a company’s premises and equipment, people, information and reputation.
Premises and Equipment
The effective use of guards is essential.
• Use the services of competent uniformed guards who are actively involved in protecting 
the facility rather than doing other jobs such as driving buses and groundskeeping.
• Change the corporate mentality to make each employee consider himself or herself a 
guard. Everyone has a responsibility to be on the lookout for possible breaches of 
security.
Controls to authenticate and authorize access should include the following:
• Establish access controls through the use of cards and card readers to prevent 
unauthorized entry to the facilities. Establish additional access controls to network hubs 
and other critical areas within the facilities.
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• Insist that employees wear photo identification badges with security features to be
produced together with their access cards. This not only inexpensively improves
security but by its very nature increases the level of security awareness across all
departments.
• Install an alarm button for the reception area to be monitored continuously whenever 
reception is open.
• Use biometric technology such as facial and iris recognition.
• Install entry cameras at all access points.
Exit controls to prevent unauthorized departures should restrict use of:
• Stairwells for emergency exit only. This can be accomplished by installing audible 
alarms on each access door and tying these into the building alarm system.
• Freight elevators.
Procedures relating to bomb threats, weapons, and hazardous materials:
• Install magnetometers and implementing bag checks for all personnel entering the site.
• Prevent unattended curbside parking around the building without a permit.
• Conduct vehicle inspections of all vehicles entering the loading bay where applicable.
• Inspect all storage areas and vehicles carrying hazardous materials for leaks.
People
Screening in the form of employee background checks (also important for preventing 
internal fraud as is discussed more fully in Chapter 5) is essential in any security plan. Such 
screening should include the following:
• Pre-employment screening of educational, employment, and other information in 
resumes
• Reference checking
• Employee integrity and honesty testing
Provide staff training, awareness programs, and general information to ensure the safety of 
all personnel regarding the following:
• How to avoid a crisis that could threaten their personal safety
• How to handle suspicious letters and packages
• The dissemination of travel advisory information to executives that provides up-to-date 
information on political risks and other local threats to security
Establish policies explaining the consequences of involvement in any activities detrimental 
to the interests of the company. For instance, the company should make clear that any 
employee involved in fraud will be terminated and subject to criminal prosecution.
Information
Access controls through the use of passwords by all personnel and the requirement that 
such passwords be changed regularly.
Use computer logs to monitor unauthorized attempts to obtain access to data or software.
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Electronic countermeasures include the following:
• Sophisticated firewalls and virus alerts to prevent unauthorized access by hackers
• Regular sweeps for any tools installed to obtain unauthorized access to information or 
passwords
Reputation
Monitoring the information reported in the press should include the following:
• Monitoring information appearing in chat rooms about the company.
• Take legal action against any parties committing slander or libel against the company 
and the company’s reputation.
Security in an Emerging Nation Case Study
A global corporation needed to evaluate conditions for a potential manufacturing 
site in an emerging nation. If the project was to proceed, it needed to identify and 
deal with the day-to-day risks.
The region was rich in raw materials, and transportation to world markets was 
efficient and cost effective. In addition, labor costs were low and the local 
government provided strong incentives for the location of manufacturing businesses 
in its jurisdiction. In purely economic terms, the decision to build the plant was 
straightforward.
Management was concerned, however, about the day-to-day risks created by civil 
disorder arising from the country’s economic difficulties. There was also growing 
anti-American sentiment because of the alignment of the local government with 
international issues and factions critical of United States policies. In addition, there 
had been incidents over the years in which company personnel had been exposed 
to violence and threats of kidnapping
A risk consulting firm was brought in to assess the situation and devise strategies to 
protect the company’s people and facilities in the event that the project was to 
proceed. Based on the strength of these strategies, a decision was made to proceed 
with developing the site as a new manufacturing facility.
The risk consulting firm devised security strategies for the company’s executives 
and management personnel traveling to and from the manufacturing site that took 
into consideration safety and security issues as well as political conditions.
These strategies included the provision of a local guard force for both the housing 
and office quarters for designated corporate employees. Site access was controlled 
and electronic monitoring for key areas was installed. Company officials were 
briefed on personal security issues and trained in the security measures taken at the 
site. A threat and crisis management plan was devised that specifically addressed 
the threat of a kidnapping or hostage-taking incident. The company’s top 
executives were then trained on what to do in the event of such an incident.
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Simulation exercises were conducted so that management would be very familiar 
with every aspect of the plan and could refine it over time.
For personnel traveling to the site from head office, comprehensive travel advisory 
information and personalized instructions and training were provided to make 
them aware of the dangers involved and to train them to avoid kidnapping or 
hostage taking.
To date, there have been no incidents that have threatened the safety of either the 
expatriate personnel or traveling executives.
The Emerging Nation case above illustrates several important points regarding the risk 
assessment process:
1. The risks of operating in an emerging nation can be mitigated by the implementation of 
appropriate security procedures.
2. The biggest concern in an emerging nation should be for the security of a company’s 
personnel.
3. Adequate security for personnel involves more than just guards and locks.
11.4 Crisis Management
11.4.1 Essentials of a Threat and Crisis Management Plan
In overview, an effective threat and crisis management plan should cover at least the 
following two topics:
1. Initial response to the emergency should include evacuation procedures, assembly 
points before and after the incident, and processes for communicating with employees 
and their families, clients, and the media.
2. Business resumption planning after an emergency is also needed.
Ideally, the plan should be written in a way that considers every type of threat that an 
organization can face as discussed earlier in this chapter, namely, theft and other intrusions, 
water damage, fire, accidents and mechanical breakdowns, utility interruption, earth 
movements, weather conditions, threats to the safety of a company’s personnel, bomb 
threats and explosions, civil disorder, hazardous materials, and cyber and terrorist attacks.
The plan should be documented in a manual or other form readily accessible to all 
employees involved in implementing the plan.
The plan should address each of the four primary areas of the business that need 
protection, namely, the company’s premises and equipment, people, information, and 
reputation.
It should specifically cover how and where to relocate or maintain the security of each of 
these aspects of a company’s business in times of crisis so that critical operations can be 
restored as quickly as possible and additional losses prevented or minimized.
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In order for a plan to remain effective, however, it must be reviewed on an annual basis, 
and tested and enhanced. This way, the plan will be known by more personnel than just its 
authors and can remain current as the company’s circumstances evolve and new personnel 
come on board.
Included in the last section of this chapter is a “Threat and Crisis Management Plan” 
checklist that identifies many of the issues that need to be addressed in such a plan. This 
checklist is not a substitute for obtaining professional advice as part of the threat and crisis 
management planning process but is instead provided so CPAs can be aware of the types 
of issues to be considered.
The following case study provides an example of an effective threat and crisis management 
plan that was put to the test on September 11, 2001, and in the days shortly thereafter.
Fiduciary Trust’s Recovery from Total Destruction Case Study
When the South Tower of the World Trade Center crashed to the ground on 
September 11, 2001, the five-floor office of Fiduciary Trust Company International 
and the lives of 87 of its 647 employees were destroyed with it. Thanks to a 
comprehensive threat and crisis management plan, however, the company was able 
to provide its main services the next day and was in full operation in less than a 
week.
The plan had been developed in 1987 to address management’s concerns about 
business interruption from a power outage and expanded following the bombing of 
the WTC in 1993. Since then, it had been reviewed and practiced annually. In the 
event, when a disaster beyond the imagination of even the most forward-looking 
planner struck the company on September 11, this well-thought-out plan met 
almost all expectations. It covered everything from making sure that each employee 
had a flashlight with fresh batteries to how and where to relocate the computer 
systems to minimize any disruptions in the company’s ability to manage $44 billion 
of securities for pension plans, endowments, and wealthy individuals.
The plan included the following:
• Identification of at least two escape routes for each employee
• Assembly points for exiting the building and regrouping outside
• Arrangements for post-trauma counseling services
• Authorization of three key executives to declare a disaster independently
• Arrangements for temporary office space, telecommunications and computer systems at 
a site in New Jersey provided by Comdisco, a disaster recovery company
• Daily offsite backups of the company’s transactions and balances
• Arrangements for delivery of the previous day’s backup computer tapes
• Guidelines for booting up the systems
• Establishment of Internet access and an additional backup system
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• Offsite storage for Fiduciary Trust’s client list
• Guidelines for dealing with clients during the crisis
• Briefing manuals with the home and cellphone numbers of crucial staff
Two dozen key people knew how to recover all the electronic records of client 
accounts, trades and money transfers, and how to get servers and PCs up and 
running. These people were able to work effectively following September 11 
because company policy required the plan be tested annually; the most recent 
annual test had been completed in late August 2001.
Bear in mind that Fiduciary Trust was in the South Tower. Within minutes of the 
North Tower being hit, the company’s crisis management plan was being put in 
motion by employees offsite as well as onsite. Within an hour, president Bill Yun 
and chief technology officer Stephen Tall were at Comdisco’s disaster recovery site 
in New Jersey. (Yun had been at a client meeting in New Jersey at the time of the 
attacks and Tall had been driving to work from his home in New Jersey.) As soon 
as the two executives reached their new temporary headquarters, they began work 
to reestablish their computer systems and contact their key clients. During these 
calls, management received overwhelming support as the first thought of each 
client was for the safety of Fiduciary Trust’s employees.
Comdisco, one of the three biggest companies in the disaster recovery industry, has 
thirteen large facilities across the United States providing logistical support in the 
form of temporary office space, telecommunications, and computer systems to 
companies forced out of their premises by disasters ranging from earthquakes, fire, 
and flood to, in this case, an unprecedented terrorist attack. Comdisco’s new facility 
in Carlstadt, New Jersey, for instance, is a 302,000-square-foot site capable of 
supporting 1,000 workers and up to sixteen different computer systems. Within 
days of September 11, this site was filled to overflowing. Numerous companies 
from the World Trade Center as well as others from the surrounding downtown 
area called on Comdisco and other similar firms to help them reestablish 
operations. By September 13, Fiduciary Trust had issued an announcement to the 
media “that operations are up and running at our disaster recovery center in New 
Jersey supported by Franklin Templeton Investments’ offices in Short Hills, NJ.”
Although Fiduciary Trust’s threat and crisis management plan was comprehensive 
and well thought out, the unprecedented events of September 11 caused more 
destruction than anyone could have imagined. Many people had died and 
enormous buildings had been completely destroyed. The following were some of 
the operational issues that had not been considered as part of Fiduciary Trust’s 
crisis management planning process. Instead, as the enormity of the disaster 
unfolded, they were addressed by Fiduciary Trust’s management, as follows:
1. Comdisco and other disaster recovery firms found that even their hundreds of 
thousands of square feet of available office space proved insufficient for a crisis requiring 
the relocation of the entire operations of so many clients simultaneously. Fiduciary Trust 
had to act quickly to secure additional premises not just for the long term but for the 
short term as well.
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2. Most comprehensive threat and crisis management plans address the need for 
temporary office space for its critical personnel but do not consider the need for 
permanent office space to house a company’s entire operations. Fiduciary Trust’s plan 
was no exception. Its executives immediately realized, however, the need to secure 
suitable permanent office space. Finding new offices quickly would be critical to the 
whole recovery process not only for company operations but also for the emotional 
well-being of its personnel. By September 15, only four days after the disaster, 
management of Fiduciary Trust had secured new premises for its New York operations; 
within weeks, its personnel started moving into their new location.
3. Established counseling services were insufficient to meet Fiduciary Trust’s needs since 
the threat and crisis management plan had not contemplated the loss of so many lives. 
Nor had the plan contemplated the gravity of the situation and the extent to which 
people felt threatened not only by the terrorist acts themselves but also by the new risks 
associated with war. Fiduciary Trust’s parent helped to fill this need by seconding 
personnel from its own human resources staff.
4. Communications were disrupted to a greater extent than had been anticipated in the 
plan. Additional support was required from the parent.
5. Fiduciary Trust’s Web site had not been backed up to an offsite location. Its parent had 
a new Web site up and running the following day.
6. Fiduciary Trust’s management had not anticipated the degree of media interest in the 
company and its employees, especially the hounding of employees for personal stories. 
The company countered this media pressure by installing a security system on its Web 
site that prevented any outsider from obtaining information about its employees.
The events of September 11 showed that even the unimaginable can sometimes happen 
and that it is important for companies to have a well-practiced threat and crisis 
management plan in place long before disaster strikes. In hindsight, this tragedy proved the 
effectiveness of the plan that Fiduciary Trust had developed over the preceding fourteen 
years. Despite the tragic loss of life and the complete destruction of its offices, the company 
was operational the day following the disaster even though the plan had not covered every 
contingency as, indeed, no plan could have. Total chaos was, however, averted and both 
Fiduciary Trust and its employees were soon well on their way to a speedy recovery.
The Fiduciary Trust case illustrates several important points regarding threat and crisis 
management plans:
1. A comprehensive threat and crisis management plan is critical to the quick restoration 
of a company’s business after a crisis strikes. It is an excellent tool to assist in restoring 
order to chaos. This is not only because many key operational decisions have already 
been made but also because it enables employees to understand their role in the 
restoration process.
2. A plan that sits on a shelf is of little value to an organization. It is only of value if it has 
been tested and a company’s employees know how to implement it.
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3. An effective threat and crisis management plan addresses how and where to relocate
and restore a company’s premises and equipment in times of crisis; how a company’s
personnel will escape from a crisis and where they are to report; how information will
be protected before a crisis and then restored afterwards; and how to communicate with
its personnel, clients, and the public at large.
4. When a crisis affects many companies simultaneously, companies that provide disaster 
support services such as counseling and temporary relocation services may not be able 
to fulfill all the needs of their clients. An effective crisis management plan should 
identify a contingency plan to provide backup support as needed.
5. Even the most comprehensive plans cannot cover every contingency.
Other aspects of a comprehensive threat and crisis management plan that are not 
addressed in the Fiduciary Trust case study described above, but which should be part of 
an effective plan, are described below:
Premises
The threat and crisis management plan should cover incidents at all facilities—including 
the head office location, storage facilities, data processing facilities, call centers, 
manufacturing plants, and sales centers.
People
The threat and crisis management plan should identify who will be in command during the 
crisis and who will continue to be involved in running the day-to-day operations of the 
business. The plan should identify clear lines of authority for those in central command; 
the roles and responsibilities of each person should be defined and understood. Typically, 
the crisis team would include at least one representative from each of the critical functional 
areas of the business as well as someone from human resources, legal, security, 
occupational health, public affairs, the CFO’s office, and a union representative.
The threat and crisis management plan should identify a designated threat assessment team 
to assess and respond to the following:
• Bomb threats. The plan should identify the tasks and responsibilities associated with 
determining whether the threat is real or not and who should be contacted to defuse 
and remove the bomb.
• Hazardous materials contamination. The plan should identify the tasks and responsibilities 
necessary to contain the hazardous materials and prevent further contamination.
• Medical emergencies. The plan should identify the paramedics and medical specialists to 
treat or decontaminate victims and provide antibiotics/antidotes to hazardous materials 
contaminants.
• Fire emergencies. The plan should identify the firemen and medical specialists to contain 
the fire and treat victims for bums and smoke inhalation.
The threat and crisis management plan should identify who should be called in to help 
from outside the company, including crisis management consultants, insurance companies, 
insurance brokers, call center services companies, and other service and professional 
resources such as engineers and restoration specialists.
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The threat and crisis management plan should identify who should be responsible for 
communicating with employees and their families, clients, suppliers, insurers, and the 
media and should also identify the types of communications to be provided.
Information
Whether implemented as part of the threat and crisis management planning process or as a 
standard business practice of the information technology (IT) department, it is advisable to 
have more than one backup location for a company’s transactional data, client, and staff 
lists, and the software used to process such information. Companies using courier services 
between offices can include backup disks along with the mail going to outlying offices.
The threat and crisis management plan should include the creation of a manual for 
recovering the company’s computer systems. Such a manual should identify all key 
software and hardware required by the business and should identify how to recover or 
restore each system. This manual should be the basis for regular testing and should be 
upgraded as required to keep current with any new technology.
Reputation
A company’s reputation must be considered as part of any comprehensive threat and crisis 
management plan. This involves developing appropriate strategies for communicating with 
all the people who could be affected by a crisis. It would also involve developing strategies 
for communication with those who could have an interest in the handling of the crisis, 
including the company’s employees, customers, suppliers, shareholders, the general public, 
the media, and regulatory authorities.
The actions of a company in a crisis—how it handles the actual crisis and how quickly it 
responds—are critical to maintaining its reputation. The nature and timing of the 
communications issued by the company are also important but these are secondary to its 
actions. Such communications could take the form of damage control or could be positive 
messages regarding how the company is averting or minimizing the impact of the crisis.
11.4.2 Denial of Insurance Coverage for Terrorist Acts
September 11, 2001 convinced many managements that disaster could be just around the 
corner for their business and that it was important to have an effective and up-to-date threat 
and crisis management plan to minimize the disruption and losses that would otherwise be 
suffered from such a disaster.
The actions of insurance companies after September 11 further convinced management of 
this need as many insurance companies rewrote their policies to exclude coverage for 
terrorist acts.
This prompted many executives to realize how vulnerable they were and prompted them 
to establish or upgrade their threat and crisis management plans to minimize the 
disruptions and losses to their ongoing operations.
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Campbell Electronics Case Study
Subsequent to September 11, 2001, Campbell Electronics, an electronics 
manufacturing company with head offices in California and manufacturing facilities 
in several foreign jurisdictions including the Pacific Rim, retained a risk consulting 
firm to assess its risks and vulnerabilities. This assessment included examining the 
company’s existing response and business continuation plans to determine their 
efficacy.
This risk assessment revealed that Campbell Electronics had well-developed 
security procedures related to computer security, fire, and theft but was ill-prepared 
for catastrophic events such as those of September 11. For example, there were no 
plans for dealing with bomb threats or chemical contaminants. The company also 
had no contingency or business continuation plans for incidents that might deny 
them access to their facilities because of the destruction of their headquarters.
This weakness represented a significant risk to the company since it was critical for 
head office staff to be able to coordinate the activities of each of its manufacturing 
facilities. This was accomplished through sophisticated communications systems 
using their computer and telecommunication systems. These systems were 
networked and integrated and allowed for the secure exchange of financial and 
strategic information on a real-time basis. Their operations relied heavily on this 
communications network to control inventory levels and manufacturing schedules 
as well as accounting and human resource functions.
Based on the results of the risk assessment, Campbell Electronics modified its crisis 
management plans to address this critical risk by incorporating contingency plans 
to provide for business continuation in the event of a denial of access to its 
corporate head office facilities near San Francisco. The contingency plan identified 
the departments and personnel that were critical to the operations of the business in 
the US and internationally and also identified all the computer, telephone and 
office equipment necessary for these departments and personnel to function 
effectively at the backup site. This evaluation was based on input from several 
employees within the company.
The company then made arrangements with a reputable disaster recovery facility to 
provide sufficient temporary office space, computer equipment, telephones, and 
office equipment to enable the critical operations team to function effectively. The 
contingency plan also identified how to mobilize such resources. For personnel who 
were not part of the critical operations team, the plan provided guidelines for 
supporting the continued operations.
Training programs were integrated into a comprehensive program to prepare the 
company’s management team and staff to respond to any crisis. Such training 
included the introduction of crisis simulation exercises to ensure that the 
contingency plans were understood by the key decision makers involved in 
implementing the plan and to provide a forum for the plan to be discussed and 
improved upon.
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The Campbell Electronics case illustrates several important points regarding threat and 
crisis management plans:
1. Threat and crisis management plans need to include more than just an evacuation plan 
and whom to call in the event of fire. They need to consider what to do when an entire 
facility is destroyed or otherwise becomes unavailable for use.
2. As part of the threat and crisis management planning process, it is important to consider 
what aspects of a business are critical and to tailor the threat and crisis management 
plan to enable the critical components of the business to be restored immediately after 
the crisis.
3. Employees who are not part of the critical operations team still have an important role 
to fill in the event of an emergency. They need to be available for deployment in 
whatever roles are considered important by the crisis management team.
4. Crisis simulation exercises are an important part of the preparation of management to 
handle a threat or crisis and are also an important part of the process of improving and 
refining the threat and crisis management plan.
Sanvista’s Kidnapping Crisis Case Study
Sanvista Consumables, a multinational consumer products company operating in 
the Middle East, engaged a risk consulting company to expand its crisis 
management plan. It wanted the plan especially to cover the threat to senior 
management personnel of kidnapping or hostage taking. Sanvista’s head offices 
were in the United States, and it was widely known to be a United States-led 
operation. The company had operated in the Middle East for years without any 
major incident; the Gulf War in 1991 created uneasiness, however, and raised the 
level of apprehension among the company’s executives as to Sanvista’s ability to 
deal with a kidnapping or hostage-taking crisis.
The risk consulting company provided training for Sanvista’s senior executives at 
home and abroad in crisis management and incident control. Response procedures 
were established to make critical decisions and retain organizational control. Such 
procedures were documented in the crisis management plan and were the subject 
of simulation exercises to prepare management for a kidnapping or hostage-taking 
incident.
Several months later, one of Sanvista’s top executives in Dubai left his home for an 
early morning walk to a convenience store around the corner. He didn’t return.
Two days after he disappeared, a phone call was received at the company’s head 
office in the United States demanding a ransom for the return of the executive. A 
call was placed to a risk consulting firm for assistance.
Within twenty-four hours, a risk consultant was on location providing expertise and 
support to the Sanvista’s crisis management team. The team followed the crisis 
management plan, which enabled them to address the situation effectively:
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1. They established an emergency operations center that operated twenty-four hours a
day.
2. From this location, they worked with local government officials and enforcement 
officials to negotiate the executive’s release.
3. They also assigned a liaison to provide information and support for the kidnapped 
executive’s family and to deal with the media effectively.
Three days later the executive was returned tired and shaken but otherwise 
unharmed.
The Sanvista case illustrates several important points regarding kidnapping and hostage­
taking incidents:
1. It is important for all senior personnel to try to avoid becoming the victims of a 
kidnapping or hostage taking. If prevention fails, it is important for the safety of the 
kidnap victim as well as for the reputation of the company to have a crisis management 
plan to effect the safe return of the victim.
2. Training in crisis management and incident control are critical for maintaining calm in 
the face of danger.
3. A command center with round-the-clock communications capabilities is essential for 
comprehensive management of the crisis.
4. Competent professionals with significant experience with kidnapping and hostage­
taking incidents should be brought in to assist with strategy and communications at the 
command center.
11.5 Corporate Security Checklists
CPAs can use the checklists in this section to assist them in understanding the security 
needs of their organization or their clients. No answers require follow-up, the results of 
which should be documented. Use the “Ref" column to cross-reference the checklist to the 
appropriate supporting working papers. Some sections in these checklists may not be 
applicable and should be identified as such in the “N/A” column. The “Ref’ column can 
be used to cross-reference any notes made regarding why such sections are not applicable.
The checklists in this section are intended for general guidance and information only. Use 
of these checklists does not guarantee the prevention or detection of security breaches. 
Those with vital concerns about security or who have a security-related crisis should seek 
the advice of a competent risk advisory services practitioner.
11.5.1 Comprehensive Risk Assessment
Comprehensive risk assessments are best performed by a competent risk advisory services 
professional with many years’ experience in not only identifying but in dealing with the 
types of risks described earlier in this chapter. Table 11.2, Comprehensive Risk Assessment 
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Checklist, is provided to assist CPAs in understanding the types of issues that need to be 
considered as part of this process. This checklist collates several of the concepts presented 
in this chapter but does purport to present all issues that need to be considered as part of a 
comprehensive risk assessment process. Further, this checklist is not intended as a substitute 
for engaging a competent risk advisory services professional.
Table 11.2 Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow­
up:
1. Security Department
a. Does your company have a security department?
b. Does the security department report to head office? And are 
the costs related to security part of the head office budget?
c. Does the head of security have at least ten years’ experience?
d. Does the security department have security personnel at each 
location?
2. Nature and Location of Operations
a. Do appropriate security procedures exist to protect the 
personal safety of employees who handle hazardous materials? 
To prevent a contamination?
b. If your organization has facilities that are visited by the public, 
or has transportation equipment that the public uses, do 
appropriate security procedures exist to protect the public from 
danger, and to evacuate the public in the event of danger?
c. If any of your facilities are located in the third world, have any 
additional security procedures been implemented there 
beyond those that are implemented elsewhere?
3. Emergency Preparedness
a. Has a threat and crisis management plan been developed for 
your organization? If so, has it been reviewed and tested in the 
last year?
b. Does the threat and crisis management plan cover evacuation 
procedures?
c. Does the threat and crisis management plan cover business 
resumption planning?
4. Premises and Equipment (Consider the following questions 
for each location.)
a. Does this location have locks and alarms to prevent 
unauthorized entry? Are they monitored?
(continued)
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Table 11.2 (continued)
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Is card access technology used?
c. If card access technology is used, are these cards also used for 
photo identification purposes?
d. Is closed circuit television (CCTV) used at all access points to 
the facility?
e. Does reception have an alarm button that is continuously 
monitored whenever reception is open?
f. Do controls exist to prevent unauthorized access from the 
loading dock?
g. Do controls exist to prevent unauthorized access via the freight 
elevator and stairwells?
h. Have improvements been made to the security system related 
to any past security breaches?
i. Have you looked into where to obtain temporary equipment to 
keep your business going?
j. Do you know how you would quickly replace your inventories, 
if lost?
k. Do you know where you would maintain your inventory if 
your storage facility was damaged?
1. Do you know where you would manufacture your product or 
operate your business if your primary location was irreparably 
damaged or destroyed?
5. People (Consider the following questions for personnel at 
each location.)
a. Have evacuation procedures been documented and distributed 
to all personnel?
b. Have crisis management procedures been developed and 
distributed to all key personnel?
c. Are all new employees screened through a background 
checking process?
d. Is travel advisory information provided to traveling executives 
that advises on political and other risks in the countries they 
are traveling to?
e. Have all key personnel been trained in how to avoid becoming 
a victim of a kidnapping?
f. Have procedures been documented and distributed related to 
how to handle bomb threats or biohazards?
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Table 11.2 (continued)
Comprehensive Risk Assessment Checklist Yes No NA Ref
6. Critical Operations and Personnel
a. Do you know which employees perform functions that are 
critical to the survival of your business?
b. If certain employees were unable to work, have you identified 
replacements, either within the organization or through the use 
of temporary employment agencies?
c. Do at least two other employees know how to perform the 
critical functions performed by these people?
d. Do you maintain up-to-date procedure manuals regarding the 
performance of the business’s critical functions?
7. Information (Consider the following questions for information 
stored electronically and in hard-copy format at each location.)
a. Do access controls exist to protect each computer at this 
location and the information stored in them?
b. Are laptops secured at night?
c. Are daily backups taken of all data on servers and mainframes? 
And are these backups stored offsite? Is more than one backup 
taken?
d. Do you regularly back-up all computer programs?
e. Are current copies of customer lists, employee lists and 
procedures manuals maintained offsite?
8. Insurance Coverage
a. Do you periodically review your insurance coverage, know 
exactly what your insurance policy covers and keep a copy of 
the policy offsite?
b. Have your insurance policies been reviewed within the last 
year?
9. Reputation
a. Are press releases controlled?
b. Are newspapers monitored for information about your 
company?
c. Are chat rooms monitored, and are there procedures in place 
to handle any reputational slurs?
d. Do policies exist related to the consequences of committing an 
act that is adverse to the interests of the company such as 
committing a fraud, or destroying property? Are all personnel 
required to sign a statement acknowledging they have read and 
agree to the policies?
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11.5.2 Threat and Crisis Management Planning
The threat and crisis management planning process is best performed by a competent risk 
and crisis management professional, with many years’ experience in not only planning for, 
but also addressing the types of threats and crises described in this chapter. Table 11.3, 
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist, is provided to assist CPAs in understanding the 
types of issues that need to be considered as part of this process. This checklist is not 
intended as a substitute for engaging a competent risk crisis management professional.
Table 11.3 Threat and Crisis Management Checklist
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow­
up:
1. Existence of a Crisis Management Plan
a. Is there a Crisis Management Plan?
b. Has it been reviewed within the last year?
c. Has it been tested within the last year?
d. Have all the recommendations for improvement been 
implemented since the plan was last tested?
e. Is a copy of the Crisis Management Plan maintained in both 
hard copy and electronically?
f. Is the Crisis Management Plan accessible to at least ten key 
personnel per location, in both electronic and hard-copy form? 
And have two copies of the plan been provided to each 
person—one for the office, and a backup copy for their homes?
g. Does the plan accommodate local, regional, and international 
incidents?
h. Does the plan accommodate incidents at all types of facilities of 
the company (for instance, storage facilities, production plants, 
head office, sales offices)?
2. Roles and Responsibilities
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify who will perform 
the following roles in the event of a crisis along with alternates 
for each position (if yes, identify names)?
• Crisis Management Chairman
• Incident and Intelligence Coordinators
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Computer Recovery
• Human Resources
• Public Relations and Media Coordinator




b. Does the Crisis Management Plan provide a description of the 
responsibilities for each of the following personnel?
• Crisis Management Chairman (person with authority to 
make decisions on evacuation and related to the allocation 
of funds, etc.)
• Incident and Intelligence Coordinators






• Public Relations and Media Coordinator
• Crisis Management Coordinator (coordinates all activities 
of support personnel during the recovery efforts)
• Recorder (records critical information during the recovery 




c. Does the Crisis Management Plan make it clear who will speak 
to employees, the media, victims and families after a crisis?
3. Personnel Evacuation, Identification, and Recall
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan designate evacuation points 
that have protection from weather? Are there restroom 
facilities?
(continued)
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Do the evacuation points have access to appropriate 
communication methods?
c. Does the Crisis Management Plan include accountability lists 
per department, or identify where the current version of such 
lists are located?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where employees 
are to “call in” to report their whereabouts in the event of a 
catastrophe?
e. Does the Crisis Management Plan include emergency contact 
numbers for the next of kin of employees in each department, 
or identify where the current version of such information is 
located?
f. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify a recall method 
regarding when it is safe to return to work?
4. Operational Facilities and Personnel
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify which operations 
are critical for the ongoing operations of the business?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify which employees 
perform functions that are critical for the ongoing operations of 
the business?
c. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify at least two 
replacement personnel for each critical employee—either 
within the organization or through the use of temporary 
employment agencies—in the event that certain of the critical 
employees are unable to work?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the 
primary Replacement Operational Facility?
e. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the 
alternate Replacement Operational Facility?
f. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore 
operations?
g. Are the primary and alternate Replacement Operational 
Facilities located off-site?
h. Are the primary and alternate Replacement Operational 
Facilities located within two miles of the existing operational 
facility?
i. Is the space sufficient in the primary and alternate 
Replacement Operational Facilities?
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
5. Crisis Command Center
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the 
primary Crisis Command Center?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the location of the 
alternate Crisis Command Center?
c. Are the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers 
located offsite?
d. Are the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers 
located within two miles of the existing facility?
e. Is the space sufficient in the primary and alternate Crisis 
Command Centers?
f. Do the primary and alternate Crisis Command Centers have 
the following:
• Copies of the Crisis Management Plan Manual















• Television Sets (at least three)
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
• Tape Recorder
• Basic Office Equipment and Supplies (pens, pencils,
erasers, staplers, markers, tape, masking tape, duct tape)
• Flashlights
• Safe or other secure storage facility, which can be secured
when the center is unoccupied for storing sensitive files and 
materials
6. Crisis Support Numbers
Does the Crisis Management Plan include phone numbers for the 
following services?
• Local Hospitals
• Local Ambulance Services
• Burn Center
• Centers for Disease Control
• Counseling Services
• Local Bomb Squad




• FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)
• US Embassy or Consulate
• Passport and Visa Office
7. Data Recovery and Replacement Computer Equipment
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where a 
replacement computer system is located?
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify where back-up data
is located?
c. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore the 
computer system with the back-up data?
d. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify how to restore the
company’s Web site in the event that it is no longer available?
8. Equipment Requirements
a. Does the Crisis Management Plan identify the equipment that
is essential for the operation of the business?
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Table 11.3 (continued)
Threat and Crisis Management Checklist Yes No NA Ref
b. Does the Crisis Management Plan provide authority for the 
procurement of essential equipment?
9. Incident-Specific Crisis Management Plans





• Computer and Telecommunications Failures
• Fire and Explosion





• Kidnap and Extortion
• Employee Disappearance
• Hostage Taking





11.5.3 Financial Issues to Deal With When Disaster Strikes
There are a number of financial issues that arise when disaster strikes. The quicker these 
issues are dealt with, the quicker a business will be able to return to normal operations and 
prevent further losses from occurring. Table 11.4, Financial Issues to Address When 
Disaster Strikes, is provided for general guidance to CPAs to address the financial aspects 
of the disaster-recovery effort. This table is not intended as a substitute for engaging a 
competent crisis management professional to assist in the event of an actual disaster.
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Table 11.4 Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes
Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes Yes No NA Ref
A no answer to any of the following questions warrants further follow­
up:
1. Cash Flow and Financing
a. Are alternate means of payroll processing and delivery 
available? Are all health and disability insurance issues 
addressed?
b. Are you still able to obtain payments from your customers? (If 
not, make arrangements for alternate postal delivery 
services/banking arrangements with customers.)
c. Is your cash position adequate? Can you access the cash? Can 
you meet your immediate cash needs? Can you keep up with 
your anticipated cash-burn rate?
d. Have you informed your creditors, bankers, suppliers, joint 
venture partners, and strategic partners of the recent events?
e. Are you aware of all available financial assistance such as 
credit lines, disaster loans and grants? (Make arrangements as 
required.)
2. Insurance
a. Have you informed your insurer and insurance broker 
regarding the recent events?
b. Do you have a copy of your insurance policies covering, for 
example, key individuals, other life, property, business 
interruption, and disability?
c. Do you know the deadlines for submissions of an insurance 
claim? Have you gathered and submitted the required 
information?
3. Business Operations
a. Are you able to operate right now? Determine, for example, 
immediate or impending deadlines, due dates, customer and 
supplier needs.
b. Are you aware of your company’s current operational risks, 
such as work-in-progress, cancellations, no-shows, refunds, lost 
revenues, and undeliverable materials?
c. Are you able to meet all the needs of your customers? If not, 
consider contacting competitors to outsource production to 
them until you are able to meet your customers’ needs.
4. Information Backup
a. Do you know when the last backup of your computer 
information took place?
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Table 11.4 (continued)
Financial Issues to Address When Disaster Strikes Yes No NA Ref
b. Do you know where your backup data is stored? Has it been 
retrieved yet?
c. Do you have a copy of the last available financial statements? 
(If not, check with auditors and attorneys.)
d. Have you inquired of your attorneys and auditors to determine 
whether they have any other information that could be useful 
for ongoing operational purposes (copies of contracts and 
agreements)?
5. Business Plan Assessment
a. Is your most recent business plan still valid? Have you 
considered what can/cannot be executed?
b. Has your business plan been updated to reflect the current 
situation?
c. Have you provided a copy of your updated business plan to 
your financiers, creditors or bankers (if required)?
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11.6 The Kroll October 2001 Survey on 
Security Risk Management
Kroll
The Risk Consulting Company October 2001
Survey on Security Risk Management
Post September 11, 2001
September 11, 2001 has prompted businesses to abruptly 
re-assess their ability to deal with security threats, accord­
ing to a recent survey of executives, conducted by Kroll, 
a leading risk consulting company.
In New York, Boston and Toronto, businesspeople 
expressed a heightened sense of vulnerability to possible 
emergencies, both man-made and natural. Before 
September 11, information protection and employee 
integrity were the top security priorities. Since then, 
concern with emergency planning, business resumption 
planning and physical security has increased dramatically.
Although most have formal plans for fire and systems 
disasters, many organizations would be forced to impro­
vise if confronted by a bomb threat, hazardous material 
scare or utility outage. Despite widespread doubt about 
the adequacy of controls to manage security risks, almost 
everyone has indicated that their organizations will 
upgrade security over the next six months. This apparent 
commitment to improve security should be welcome 
news to employees, customers and shareholders alike.
Objectives
This survey was designed to:
□ Assess whether the security priorities of business have 
changed since September 11, 2001 - and if so, how;
□ Measure the extent to which business is ready with 
emergency plans and security measures; and
□ Gauge the adequacy of security risk management by 
business.
Methodology
Kroll invited executives and professionals from a broad 
range of sectors - including financial services, consumer 
goods and services, utilities, energy, and real estate - to 
complete a confidential “Security Preparedness” ques­
tionnaire at Threat and Crisis Management seminars held 
in October 2001 in New York, Boston and Toronto. 
Approximately 100 of the participants gave details on 
their organizations’ readiness to deter, detect and respond 
to security threats. There appears to be a strong consen­
sus on most security issues.
Key Findings
The key findings are summarized below under five 
headings:
1. Adequacy of security risk management today - and in 
six months
2. Security priorities
3. Importance of preparedness
4. Incidence of formal emergency plans
5. Incidence of specific security measures
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  Adequacy of Security Risk Management 
Today - And In Six Months
While many businesspeople question the adequacy of 
their organizations’ management of security risks - most 
believe this security will improve over the next six 
months.
□ When asked about their organizations’ “ability to 
manage security risks,” only 43% gave positive ratings 
(4 or 5, on a 5-point scale). Another 37% were uncer­
tain or neutral on the question, while 19% indicated 
outright criticism.
□ Most (89%) expect security risks to be better managed 
in six months time, suggesting that many businesses 
are committed to upgrading their risk management 
systems by addressing perceived shortcomings.
Perception of the adequacy 
of company's security risk
Expectation that company's 
security risk management will 
change in 6 months
Security Priorities 
 ... .........................................................
Priorities have shifted. Before 9/11, information 
security and employee integrity led the list of 
concerns. Since then, preoccupation with all aspects 
of security has intensified dramatically, particularly 
with emergency planning, business resumption plan­
ning and physical security.
  Most businesspeople (86%) now view emergency 
planning as “important” (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale), 
whereas only 34% said this was a priority before 
September 11.
□ Similarly, 80% say business resumption planning is 
“important,” while only 38% held this opinion 
before 9/11.
□ Likewise, 89% think physical security is an “impor­
tant” priority, up from 40%.
Security Priorities:
% Rating "Important" (4 or 5, on 5-point scale)
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October 2001
Importance of Preparedness
The survey confirms a heightened sense of vulnerability to 
a wide range of emergencies, both man-made and natural.
□ The importance of “preparedness” has risen since 
September 11 for all ten types of emergencies covered 
by the survey. In addition to increased concern with 
terrorist bomb threats, hostage-taking and armed 
attacks, businesses are also more worried about coping 
with fire, utility outages, computer intrusions - and 
even civil disorder and natural disasters.
□ Not surprisingly, preparedness to deal with bomb 
threats and hazardous materials saw the greatest jump 
in importance (i.e., up 43 and 47 percentage points, 
respectively) since September 11. Only 24% of respon­
dents said readiness to deal with hazardous material 
was important before the US terrorist attacks, 
compared with 71% afterward.
□ System intrusion was rated the most important issue 













% Rating "Important" (4 or 5, on 5-point scale)
[+xx%] indicates percentage point difference between ratings before and after Sept 11, 2001.
Incidence of Formal Emergency Plans
Most organizations have formal plans for fire and 
computer disasters, but many would be forced to impro­
vise if struck by other types of catastrophe:
□ A majority of (though not all) organizations have docu­
mented emergency procedures for fire (73%), 
telecom/computer outages (75%) and systems intrusions 
(71%).
□ Readiness to address other emergencies is less 
common, such as the ability to cope with bomb threats 
(60%), utility outages (57%) or hazardous materials 
(50%).
□ Only 48% currently have formal plans to deal with 
any form of natural disaster, although another 18% 
say such plans are now being developed.
Incidence of Formal Emergency Plans
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Incidence of Specific Security Measures
Certain standard security measures are quite prevalent; for 
example, most organizations have evacuation procedures 
and many hold regular drills. Computer monitoring and off­
site storage of vital business records are also widespread, as 
is electronic surveillance. On the other hand, there are some 
notable shortcomings:
□ Just 59% of organizations have procedures to shut 
down utilities in an emergency.
□ Only half (47%) have designated threat assessment 
teams.
□ Security policies for traveling company executives are 
comparatively rare (31%), despite being relatively 
straightforward to implement.
Incidence of Security Measures
Kroll Inc. is a global leader in providing risk consulting services to corporations, 
financial institutions and governments. Drawing on a broad range of profes­
sional disciplines and experience - including security, law enforcement, forensic 
accounting, information technology and competitive intelligence - Kroll’s 
services include:
□ Physical security assessment
□ Emergency procedure consulting
□ Security staff training
□ Surveillance technology consulting
□ Business intelligence and investigations
□ Country risk assessments
□ Traveler security advisories
□ Kidnap response
□ Executive protection
□ Systems intrusion detection
□ Employee integrity checks □ Computer network assessment
For more information regarding Kroll’s services, please visit 
www.krollworldwide.com or contact one of Kroll’s offices.
Kroll
The Risk Consulting Company
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Some people believe that any attempt to discharge legitimate debts through the bankruptcy 
process is, at best, a questionable moral act and, at worst, a crime. The right to remove 
one’s debts through a bankruptcy filing has, however, been long established in American 
law. Unfortunately, among the huge number of bankruptcies filed annually, some are 
based on fudged accounting that may create an outright criminal fraud. Criminal 
bankruptcy fraud is often complex and not readily understood by the public or even by 
CPAs who are skilled in financial accounting. CPAs who act as auditors of a company that 
later goes bankrupt often find themselves embroiled in an audit or negligence action 
concerning whether they should have known about the fraudulent transactions that led to 
the collapse.
To the CPA untutored in the arcane lore of bankruptcy, the entire process may seem 
intended primarily to move the bankruptcy through the system quickly and not necessarily 
to uncover and prosecute fraudulent filings. Nevertheless, those associated with the 
administration of the bankruptcy system are keenly aware of the possibilities of fraud and 
are willing to act promptly on learning of its existence.
12.2 The Bankruptcy Process
To understand bankruptcy fraud, it is necessary to understand the basic elements of the 
bankruptcy process. That process is supported by various concepts, most of which seem 
relatively simple on the surface, but become increasingly complex for a number of reasons.
12.2.1 Insolvency
Although insolvency is not an absolute requirement, bankruptcy starts with the 
presumption that liabilities exceed assets or that existing cash flow is insufficient to service 
debts. This simple concept can be agonizingly complex in larger bankruptcies because of 
the wide variety of valuation methods. Nevertheless, by and large, most insolvency is 
determined by this test. Insolvency does not need to be reached before filing a bankruptcy 
petition.
12.2.2 Filing for Bankruptcy
The actual bankruptcy commences with the filing of a bankruptcy petition. Concurrent 
with the filing of the petition or shortly thereafter, the debtor, that is, any person or entity 
that is the subject of the bankruptcy, is required to file a Schedule of Assets and Liabilities 
and a Statement of Financial Affairs. These documents, which are often referred to as 
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bankruptcy schedules, are a somewhat tailored set of financial statements containing a list
of the debtor’s assets and liabilities plus specific written intentions regarding the disposition
of assets and the payment of liabilities.
For instance, if a debtor owns a TV or automobile in which a creditor holds a security 
interest, the debtor must state his or her intention to surrender that asset or make 
arrangements to pay for the asset in accordance with the terms of the contract.
Examples of bankruptcy schedules are included as Exhibit A, Bankruptcy Schedules, on 
the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. These particular forms (in PDF-format, viewable 
with Adobe Acrobat) are used by the Central District of California, but may be considered 
typical since bankruptcy forms are relatively uniform throughout the United States.
12.2.3 The Bankruptcy Petition
A bankruptcy petition requesting one of two prescribed courses of action must be included 
with the filing. Under the first option, the debtor may reorganize his or her financial affairs 
under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 (or Chapter 12 for a family farmer) and remain in some 
form of control, albeit under strict court supervision.
The second choice is to file a simple liquidation under Chapter 7 and allow a trustee to 
liquidate his or her assets and pay the remaining sums to creditors in accordance with the 
priorities established under the bankruptcy code. Although some classes of creditors may 
receive a higher priority due to a statutory right, that is, taxes versus general unsecured 
creditors, creditors cannot be subject to any arbitrary discrimination on the part of the 
debtor.
The bankruptcy schedules are filed under a penalty of perjury. Consequently, any 
intentional misstatement included in the bankruptcy schedules may subject the debtor to 
criminal penalties.
Within a short time following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a time, date, and place 
will be arranged for the debtor to be placed under oath and answer the questions of any 
creditors wishing to ask questions. This examination is called a 341a meeting, that is, a First 
Meeting of Creditors, as mandated by the bankruptcy code.
If an individual debtor (primarily a person) files his or her schedules and statements in 
good faith and complies with all other requirements, he or she will be allowed a discharge of 
their debts in accordance with bankruptcy law. A corporation is not allowed a discharge 
under the same provisions afforded an individual debtor.
12.3 Fraud in Bankruptcy Filings
Tens of thousands of persons seeking to be relieved of their debts follow the above­
referenced procedure every year. There are, however, many who seek to avail themselves 
of the protection afforded under the bankruptcy code without complying with all the 
applicable bankruptcy code requirements.
Many CPAs can recognize fraud when they encounter it. CPAs who have not had direct 
experience with the criminal justice system, however, may find themselves on uncertain 
ground as they try to understand the distinction between civil and criminal fraud.
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The following sections will provide some limited assistance in this area, but the exact
demarcation between civil and criminal matters in any particular case is best left to legal
counsel or law enforcement. The CPA should develop the facts and underlying supporting
documentation of any alleged fraud and allow the lawyers to make that distinction. CPAs
should keep in mind the following concepts that relate to bankruptcy fraud.
12.3.1 Materiality
Materiality is a concept that CPAs must deal with routinely. CPAs believe that financial 
statements must be materially correct and materiality is often defined as an omission or 
misstatement within five percent of the correct amount. However, the five-percent 
materiality rule does not apply in bankruptcy fraud.
Failure to Disclose Assests
If, for example, a debtor files bankruptcy schedules and knowingly fails to include a one- 
third interest in a small boat valued at $30,000, with ownership shared by other members 
of the family, that oversight may be deemed material in the accounting sense, especially if 
the debtor’s total net worth is small. The knowing exclusion of such an amount may 
technically qualify as a bankruptcy crime but the act may not rise to the level of 
prosecutorial merit in the opinion of the United States Attorney. However, if a debtor 
somehow conveniently forgets $ 1 million in a Swiss bank account, that oversight will not 
be similarly forgiven, even if such a large sum constitutes only two percent of the debtor’s 
total assets.
Geographical Differences
The meaning of materiality may also vary according to location. What may deeply offend 
the moral and legal sensibilities in Topeka, Kansas, may be dismissed with a wave of the 
hand in Los Angeles or New York.
Providing a Complete Report
The best course of action when faced with the dilemma of whether or not an action will be 
deemed material is simply to provide a complete report of the findings and allow others to 
make that decision. Of course, that full reporting concept should be tempered with 
financial and cost considerations such as the cost required to uncover such omissions fully.
12.3.2 Knowledge and Fraudulent Intent
Knowledge and intent are legal concepts probably best left to be discussed by lawyers. 
There are, however, some common-sense elements that may offer assistance to the CPA 
when analyzing various elements of bankruptcy fraud.
Debtor Knowledge
The government is not required to demonstrate that the debtor knew his or her acts or 
omissions were unlawful, but the government is required to demonstrate that the defendant 
acted knowingly and fraudulently. In fact, a debtor should be very careful about the 
contents of any documents he or she signs. If those schedules are later found to be 
fraudulent, the debtor will probably be unable to assert complete ignorance as a defense.
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The courts have routinely characterized such action as willful blindness and have deemed
them nonexculpatory, although an inadvertent mistake will not support a violation.
Circumstantial Evidence
It is also possible to demonstrate fraudulent intent through circumstantial evidence and 
inferences can be drawn through observing a course of conduct. In fact, circumstantial 
evidence and inferences from behavior often constitute the bulk of the evidence in 
bankruptcy fraud. If a bankruptcy is filed for a retail business and there is a later 
determination that the schedules omitted substantial levels of inventory previously listed on 
the books and records of the debtor, it would be natural to question such an omission, 
especially if there was no visible cash from the sale of the inventory.
In one instance, the president and former owner of the company volunteered that he had 
sold the inventory in the ordinary course of business just before the bankruptcy and had 
deposited the funds in the bank account of a creditor, pursuant to a prior agreement. Such 
action may be unwise but is not in and of itself a criminal act. It would be difficult to assert 
that such action was a premeditated attempt to deprive the creditors of funds to enrich the 
former owner of the company at their expense since the cash was still available but simply 
deposited erroneously into a creditor’s account according to a procedure in place before 
the bankruptcy.
If, on the other hand, the former owner of the business had filed a police report alleging 
theft of the entire inventory just before the bankruptcy, and it was later determined that the 
former owner had secretly removed the inventory with the help of accomplices and 
pocketed the proceeds from its sale, such action would clearly have been knowing and 
fraudulent. It would be difficult to believe otherwise.
12.3.3 Criminal Prosecution
Judicial Discretion
It is important for any CPA to understand that what may seem a very clear bankruptcy 
fraud worthy of incarceration may not necessarily draw a federal prosecutor to the same 
conclusion. The decision of a federal prosecutor as to whether or not to prosecute a 
bankruptcy fraud may hinge on a number of factors such as those listed below.
Law Enforcement Staffing Limitations
The United States Attorney’s Office and the FBI or other investigative agencies have 
staffing limitations similar to those of any organization. For instance, the day after the 
World Trade Center attack, it would have been difficult to generate a lot of enthusiasm for 
removing FBI agents from the terrorism investigation to pursue a bankruptcy allegation. 
Granting that most priorities are not as clearly defined as this, normal personnel-allocation 
matters are a daily problem. Prosecution priorities are often established on a national basis 
but local offices can decide to pursue any number of violations they deem to be of great 
importance to that locale. The issue of materiality or the amount of money involved in the 
fraud is clearly a determining factor—the larger the loss, the greater the likelihood of an 
investigation. Some offices may choose to emphasize violent crimes they consider more 
dangerous to the citizens of their communities than nonviolent bankruptcy crimes. 
Bankruptcy cases often require a significant investment of hours before a successful
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indictment can be brought, whereas other cases may require fewer hours and still produce 
the desired indictment.
Self-Incrimination Issues
A person subject to a bankruptcy fraud investigation may choose to invoke their rights 
under the Fifth Amendment, which gives them the right not to answer any questions on the 
premise that they do not want to incriminate themselves.
Even though CPAs usually do not face this issue, should it arise, the following are among 
the points that should be remembered:
1. Should you wish to obtain information from the debtor and he or she chooses not to 
speak with you, be careful not to compel or threaten him or her. Respect his or her Fifth 
Amendment rights. In any accounting investigations of this nature, it is far better to 
focus your efforts on the accounting records, at least in the early stages.
2. The issue of self-incrimination may arise during your attempts to obtain the accounting 
records. Debtors may assert that privilege to prohibit the CPA from reviewing their 
records. The CPA should seek competent legal counsel in such cases. As a general rule, 
however, access to debtor records is not necessarily protected under the Fifth 
Amendment if the existence of the records is undisputed. The CPA should provide a 
reasonable basis for requesting the records and make certain that such a request is both 
sensible and within the appropriate realm of inquiry.
3. The Fifth Amendment is a personal right, not a blanket right to be extended to all 
associates of the debtor. For instance, a CPA or bookkeeper employed by the debtor 
will generally be far more helpful in providing information than even the debtor. Also, 
even though the bookkeeper can assert his or her own individual privilege under the 
Fifth Amendment, he or she has no power to extend that privilege to his or her 
employer, the debtor.
4. The right to seek records in a bankruptcy is rather broad. If the debtor, a bank, or other 
party, refuses to provide records voluntarily, an order to compel production of 
documents, a Rule 2004 examination request, is filed in the bankruptcy court. The Rule 
2004 examination is found in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. It is 
somewhat similar to a subpoena but can be broader. The bankruptcy judge will usually 
issue a Rule 2004 examination order without a hearing upon application from any party 
in interest. If the party to whom the 2004 examination is directed objects, a hearing will 
be scheduled. The assertion that the records of the debtor may be incriminating is not 
likely to draw a sympathetic response from the court if the existence of those records is 
undisputed.
5. Be patient and methodical in your attempts to collect and review documents. The 
process is never quite as neat or fast as depicted on television. It is possible to pursue 
both a civil and a criminal bankruptcy fraud investigation at the same time. The 
existence of a criminal investigation may make the normal review of records somewhat 
more difficult. Keep focused on the task and do not be dissuaded from your right to 
review them.
6. Finally, in appropriate civil cases, the debtor’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege may support an adverse inference by the bankruptcy court. The court is 
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allowed to take note of such an adverse inference if they so choose, and independent
evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.
12.4 Elements of Bankruptcy Fraud
There are a number of possible ways for an individual to engage in bankruptcy fraud. The 
list below, while not exhaustive, is an example of the main types of fraud used to 
circumvent the bankruptcy code.
12.4.1 Nondisclosure or Concealment of Assets
Asset concealment consists of knowingly concealing the existence of an asset by not 
disclosing the asset in the schedules and statements filed in the bankruptcy. The FBI 
estimates that approximately 70 percent of all bankruptcy crimes are committed through 
asset concealment.
Title 18, Section 152 of the United States Code defines as criminal
a person who—(1) knowingly and fraudulently conceals from a custodian, 
trustee, marshal, or other officer of the court charged with the control or 
custody of property, or, in connection with a case under title 11, from 
creditors or the United States Trustee, any property belonging to the estate of 
the debtor [emphasis added].
Kinds of Concealed Assets
The following are examples of commonly concealed assets:
1. Potential gain or loss from a personal injury lawsuit
2. Interest held by a debtor in real property
3. Bank and investment accounts not disclosed on the schedules
4. Investments in nondebtor entities
5. Art or other valuable collectibles
6. Investments in any assets that include both a beneficial or recorded interest in behalf of 
the debtor
7. Intentional undervaluation of assets to convince creditors or the Chapter 7 Trustee to 
abandon any interest in the property and allow the debtor to retain the asset for use 
after the bankruptcy (An example of undervaluation may be to list an asset, such as a 
piece of real estate, but to knowingly attach a minimal value to the property by excluding 
some element of value such as a valuable right of way or possible mineral rights.)
Uncovering Concealed Assets
The most important fact to remember when trying to uncover concealed assets is that they 
were not always concealed. There were probably times during the period preceding the 
bankruptcy when those assets were listed in the financial statements and general ledgers of 
the debtor, or both. You must backtrack until you reach the period when the asset was 
either fully or partially disclosed.
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The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover concealed assets:
1. As a debtor’s financial difficulties begin, it is usual for him or her to seek financing from 
traditional financial institutions to ease the problems. When seeking a loan at such a 
time, most individuals make extensive disclosure of their assets. In other words, they put 
everything possible into their balance sheet to convince the financial institution of their 
creditworthiness. Therefore, a good step is to find all banks that may have received such 
a financial statement within the last five years and obtain a copy of those loan 
applications. Credit reports often identify requests or applications for credit and list the 
bank from which the credit was sought. A number of financial institutions may have had 
a long history with the debtor and may even be creditors in the bankruptcy. Prior 
applications for credit should be sought from those banks. Also, banks often have prior 
tax returns of the debtor. Such returns are not privileged in the hands of third parties. 
However, always consult legal counsel before attempting to obtain bank, credit, or other 
records to avoid violating laws, regulations, and the debtors’ rights.
2. Obtain tax returns for as far back as possible, preferably for at least five years. Review 
those tax returns for any hidden income that might be reflected in K-1 forms from 
partnership accounts or 1099 forms from either financial institutions or other income 
sources.
3. Engage a licensed investigative firm to conduct a background search of property and 
business records for the debtor over the last few years. Because so many records are 
contained on computerized databases, a significant amount of information can be 
obtained from this source, and at a reasonable cost. Such analysis may include credit­
report services that generally provide significant information that can be used to 
supplement information from other sources.
4. Review various listing agencies such as Network Solution for URLs to determine 
whether the debtor is holding any valuable URLs that have not been recorded on the 
debtor’s books and records.
5. Ultimately, the most complete analysis for the discovery of concealed assets is a review 
of all cash flowing in and out of the debtor’s accounts over the last four years, or longer 
if necessary. The decision to undertake such an analysis is not made routinely. In fact, it 
is seldom done unless there exists some unexplained loss or another compelling reason 
from an accounting viewpoint. The expense of performing a complete cash analysis of a 
debtor will need to be justified on a cost basis and will certainly not be feasible except in 
larger bankruptcies wherein the financial benefits outweigh the expense. The process to 
complete such an analysis is outlined below.
If a cash-flow analysis is contemplated, it is necessary to obtain the debtor’s bank 
statements and all related entities for the period being analyzed in order to create a 
database of all receipts and disbursements. A materiality level reflecting the number of 
bank accounts, the activity in each account, and overall cost-benefit issues should be 
established prior to preparing such a database. While analyzing the bank statements, the 
CPA should keep the following issues in mind:
• Look for large or unusual receipts and disbursements, or both, and trace those 
transactions to supporting documentation within the records of the debtor. It is 
entirely possible that these payments may represent the purchase of assets or the 
payment of liabilities not recorded by the debtor.
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02 9
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
• Review monthly or periodic payments of equal amounts that could represent regular
loan payments. Make certain that the assets represented by such payments are
included in the records of the debtor.
• Ascertain whether any monthly or periodic payments are being made to related 
parties. Such payments may either represent a transfer of assets for little or no 
consideration or create a situation in which a related party is able to acquire assets 
belonging to the estate for return to the debtor at a later date.
• Review payments made for real and personal property taxes. The information from 
invoices and check details may provide supporting documentation regarding assets 
not listed in the records of the debtor.
• Analyze payments to insurance companies. The record of these transactions can 
reveal information concerning insured assets. The invoices and check details may 
provide additional insight into what may be unlisted assets rightfully belonging to the 
estate.
• Analyze unusual expense items that might point to assets not included in the debtor’s 
records. For example, monthly payments for hangar rental might indicate the 
existence of an airplane.
12.4.2 False Information in Filing
The filing of a bankruptcy petition calls for a declaration under penalty of perjury that all 
information included therein is true and correct. United States Code (USC) Section 152 
and Section 157 prohibit making a “false oath or account” or a “false declaration, 
certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury.” Such false information can 
include any number of items such as false social security numbers, fictitious addresses, and 
even fake names.
The “knowingly and fraudulently” portion of Section 152 is not intended to encompass an 
inadvertent transposition of the existing social security numbers or minor misspelling of 
names, but contemplates the willful intent usually evident in identity thefts.
It should be noted that the debtor cannot simply assert that he or she failed to pay attention 
to the bankruptcy documents when signing, since the debtor is also required to declare 
orally and under penalty of perjury at the 341a meeting that all information included in the 
schedules and statements is true and correct in every way.
All information included in a bankruptcy filing must be accurate. Any knowing exclusion or 
misstatement could be considered a false declaration or statement. Such information includes 
understating the level of postpetition income as required in the bankruptcy schedules. 
Should income be sufficiently large and debts sufficiently small, a motion may be filed to 
set aside the bankruptcy as a bad-faith filing.
One example of false information in filing would be identity theft, a violation of Section 
157, wherein a person essentially steals the identity of another, incurs substantial credit card 
or other debt, and then files a bankruptcy under the stolen person’s name and social 
security number to forestall the actions of creditors. This kind of theft is increasing as the 
volume of Internet shopping grows.
The deliberate and intentional misstatement of income is another example of false 
information. A well-compensated salesman who knowingly convinces some clients to defer 
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commissions on sales to be completed before the bankruptcy will necessarily understate 
projected income as reported on Schedule J. This understatement would allow the debtor 
to receive the deferred income after his discharge from bankruptcy.
Uncovering Concealed False Information
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover concealed false information:
1. Engage a licensed investigative firm to provide a background check on past addresses 
and social security numbers.
2. Review information gleaned from investment accounts and credit card accounts to 
ascertain spending practices.
3. Review tax returns for inconsistencies including a large variation in income between 
present and prior years.
12.4.3 False Claims Filed in a Bankruptcy
Following the filing of a bankruptcy petition, in cases where assets are available, creditors 
are generally required to file a proof of claim specifying the nature and amount of their 
claim. Exhibit B, Proof Claim Form, used in the Central District of California, is included 
on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
Knowingly filing a false claim in bankruptcy is a serious matter that can result in criminal 
action. The filing of such a claim must generally be exceptional to warrant the imposition 
of criminal action. However, the filing of a false proof of claim could be as simple as trying 
to hide a small proof of claim among a large number of nondescript claims.
On the other hand, it could be as complex as a creditor and debtor conspiring to cure a 
defect in a security interest to allow the creditor a secured priority to which he or she would 
not be entitled under normal conditions. Often, this is done because a debtor may have a 
personal guarantee and wishes to avoid a call on that guarantee by granting the creditor a 
superior access to assets in the bankruptcy.
An example may be an agreement between the debtor and a creditor during the 
bankruptcy for the creditor to provide a false invoice for services or assets not delivered. 
Under normal conditions, most postpetition bankruptcy invoices would be paid, thereby 
granting the creditor payment to which he or she would not be entitled were it not for the 
filing of a false invoice. One of the most common false claim methods is to file an inflated 
claim. For instance, a $100 valid claim could be filed for $1,000.
Uncovering False Claims
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover false claims:
1. Conduct a review of the accounts payable subsidiary ledgers for intermittent periods 
prior to the bankruptcy and compare those ledgers to existing claims to determine 
inconsistencies. Many debtors will have open invoice files. It is likely that the accounts 
payable subsidiary ledgers have not been updated for all open invoices. Many creditors 
will continue to send invoices that can be used for comparative purposes long after the 
bankruptcy has been filed.
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2. Analyze the payments made to creditors for the three to six months before the
bankruptcy to determine whether any of the claims filed in the bankruptcy had been
paid previously.
3. Review the payments made during the year before the filing to ensure that the creditors 
have applied the payments correctly. For example, a creditor could have both secured 
and unsecured claims with a debtor. Payments could be inappropriately applied to the 
unsecured claim so that the secured claim could retain its priority status after the filing.
4. Request supporting documentation from any creditor filing a questionable claim and 
conduct a detailed review of such documentation.
5. If the information available leads you to believe that a creditor has engaged in the filing 
of a false claim, it may be advisable to schedule a Rule 2004 examination, in which the 
creditor provides documents relating to the claim and is placed under oath, and 
subjected to questioning. When asked to answer questions under oath, especially any 
questions concerning the validity of those claims, the creditor will often withdraw the 
claim to avoid close scrutiny.
12.4.4 Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy Filing
One of the more common methods of concealing assets in violation of bankruptcy laws is 
to transfer assets without consideration before the actual bankruptcy filing. Should this 
scheme go undetected, the debtor could retrieve the assets from the conspiring party 
following the bankruptcy.
For example, the debtor in contemplation of bankruptcy agrees to sell an interest in a 
fledgling company to a friend for an insignificant sum on the basis of an unwritten 
agreement whereby the debtor can reacquire the interest in the company for a similarly 
insignificant sum.
Uncovering Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy Filing
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover transfer of assets before a 
bankruptcy filing:
1. Many of the steps covered in this section are similar to those discussed in the section on 
the nondisclosure or concealment of assets. As in that section, it is important to 
understand that there was probably a period preceding the bankruptcy during which 
those assets were listed in the records of the debtor. Therefore, you should examine the 
debtor’s balance sheets at different dates prior to the bankruptcy and make certain you 
can account for assets that have been transferred or otherwise disposed of.
2. Locate all banks that may have received a financial statement from the debtor within 
the last five years and obtain a copy of the loan applications they supported. Review 
those assets listed in the earlier financial statements and make certain they have been 
properly accounted for or adequate consideration has been received for them. It may 
be appropriate to trace the receipt of cash from the sale of those assets into the bank 
statements of the debtor.
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3. Obtain tax returns for as far back as possible, preferably for at least five years. Review
them for any hidden income that might be reflected in the K-1 forms from partnership
accounts or 1099 forms from either financial institutions or other income sources.
Determine whether those assets have been sold in the period just prior to the
bankruptcy and whether adequate consideration was provided.
4. Engage a licensed investigative firm to conduct a background search of property and 
business listings for the debtor over the last few years.
5. Review various listing agencies for URLs to determine whether the debtor is holding 
any valuable URLs that have not been recorded on the debtor’s books and records.
6. Look for large or unusual receipts and disbursements, or both, and trace those 
transactions to supporting documentation within the debtor’s records. It is entirely 
possible that these payments may represent the purchase of assets or payment of 
liabilities not recorded by the debtor.
7. Review monthly or periodic payments of equal amounts that could represent regular 
loan payments. Make certain that the assets represented by such payments are included 
in the debtor’s records.
8. Ascertain whether any monthly or periodic payments are being made to related parties. 
Such payments may represent a transfer of assets to the related party for little or no 
consideration or create a situation in which a related party is able to acquire assets 
belonging to the estate that will be made available to the debtor at a later date.
9. Review payments made for real and personal property taxes. The information from 
invoices and check detail may provide supporting documentation regarding assets not 
listed in the debtor’s records.
10. Analyze payments made to insurance companies to find information concerning any 
insured assets. The invoices and check detail might provide additional insight into what 
could be unlisted assets rightfully belonging to the estate.
11. Analyze unusual expense items that might indicate assets not included in the debtor’s 
records. For example, monthly payments for hangar rental might indicate the existence 
of an airplane.
Skimming the Cream Case Study
Cable & Wireless Broadcasters, Inc. (CWB), was a cable and satellite program 
distributor whose lenders had reason to question its financial soundness. CWB was 
materially late in making payments against its $35-million debt. In fact, it was late 
in paying just about everybody. Additional financing from the principals was not 
forthcoming. Other creditors were threatening to cease providing essential services 
to CWB, including the means of transmitting the programming. The lenders were 
expecting CWB to collapse. Under the terms of the loan agreement, CPAs were 
called in to stanch the liquidity hemorrhage and discover what had happened to the 
$35 million.
CWB’s accounting records, correspondence, contracts, and computers were 
effectively controlled and inventoried, and copies immediately made of some of the 
Fraud Supp. 2—3/02 13
The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud
most critical records. These records revealed many instances of suspicious cash
disbursements prior to the collapse:
• Payments to the principals’ families for personal matters. Although the amounts 
were small, the fact that they were paid at all suggested that there might be 
improprieties in the accounts.
• Loans with no repayment record.
• Transfers without any obvious business purpose to offshore and overseas 
accounts.
Further investigation revealed collusion among the principals and the chief 
accounting officers. Business records, including cash disbursements and journals, 
were incomplete. The chief financial officer and controller were adept at concealing 
improper expenditures and describing them as legitimate business expenses. 
However, an expert search of the electronic documents contained on the hard 
drives of their computers discovered a secret bank account into which commissions 
had been deposited.
These commissions were applied against the loans received from the lenders, which 
benefited the principals who had established an offshore account in the name of an 
apparent charity. Nearly $4 million was deposited into this charity from the CWB’s 
main bank account. These findings were presented to the lender’s counsel who then 
began negotiations with the principals’ counsel.
To placate the lenders, avoid bad publicity and attacks against reputation, as well as 
criminal charges, CWB’s principals quickly and quietly settled by being suddenly 
able to find the funds to repay the debts. The lenders were made whole without 
protracted and expensive litigation.
The Skimming the Cream case illustrates several important points regarding asset transfers 
before a bankruptcy filing:
1. The perpetrators of such a crime are usually desperate and, while they may cover their 
recent tracks, they often leave a trail behind that can easily be unraveled if the CPA 
starts his or her investigation early enough.
2. Fraudulent transfers or fraudulent conveyances, wherein an asset is converted to another 
form, often cash, are often connected to a fraudulent concealment of assets.
3. It is important for CPAs to be alert to the possibility that, in times of financial crisis, the 
principals of a company could be tempted to transfer assets in an attempt to protect 
themselves, notwithstanding the fact that the company may be doomed to failure.
12.4.5 Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy Filing
A debtor in functional control of his or her estate while in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy must 
obtain court approval, following notice to interested parties, to dispose or sell any assets 
owned by the estate. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy is not applicable in this instance as the 
debtor relinquishes control of the estate assets, if any, to an appointed Chapter 7 Trustee.
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Although not as common as the surreptitious concealing of assets before filing a 
bankruptcy, certain debtors transfer assets for inadequate or, in some cases, no 
consideration, without notice to any parties or bankruptcy court approval. This insidious 
practice has the same ultimate goal of depriving creditors of a fair and equitable allocation 
of assets.
For example, a debtor conspires to transfer significant amounts of retail inventory to a 
noncreditor third party for little or no consideration. The intention is to allow the debtor to 
benefit from the third party after the bankruptcy.
Uncovering Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy Filing
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover transfers of assets after a 
bankruptcy:
1. The best way to discover transfers of inventory for no consideration is to conduct a 
physical inventory following the bankruptcy and reconstruct the inventory numbers that 
would be expected under historic operating margins.
2. The manner of maintaining control of assets after bankruptcy is not much different from 
the way of control prior to bankruptcy. One should employ audit-like controls and 
procedures and test their validity.
12.4.6 Bribery or Threats
A creditor might use bribery, threats, or intimidation to secure the promise of the debtor to 
pay his or her debts to the exclusion of all others. Such agreement is a violation by both 
parties.
There is also the possibility that both the debtor and a creditor could engage in a separate 
side-bar agreement wherein the creditor agrees not to take certain action in return for 
property, money, or some other improper advantage.
For example, upon hearing of a bankruptcy filing, a creditor threatens the debtor with 
physical harm unless arrangements can be made to assure payment of his prepetition 
claim. The debtor, fearing for his or her safety, agrees to pay the creditor from postpetition 
proceeds and ultimately does so.
In another case, a creditor discovers that the debtor has secreted funds in violation of the 
bankruptcy code. Rather than informing the appropriate authorities of that knowledge, the 
creditor threatens to expose the action unless the debtor agrees to pay him or her from the 
ill-gotten funds. The debtor, sensing the criminal and civil penalties consequent on such a 
deviation from ethical behavior, agrees to pay the creditor to the exclusion of all other 
creditors.
Uncovering the Existence of Bribery or Threats
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover the existence of bribery or threats:
1. It is difficult to ascertain the existence of bribery or threats solely from the accounting 
records. Most of the transactions that occur as a direct result of such behavior tend to be 
off-book transactions. In other words, such payments are often completed through cash 
or checks from other sources not readily identifiable from the records of the debtor.
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2. It may be advantageous to review the liabilities of the debtor before the bankruptcy and
determine whether any of the creditors failed to file claims or were somehow
disregarded following the bankruptcy. Upon ascertaining the existence of any such
creditors, interviews with both the debtor and creditor should be conducted to
determine whether any threats or bribery were involved.
3. Since the bribery or threat might include an attempt to discourage open bidding on the 
sale of assets, special efforts should be made to be certain that the open bidding process 
is maintained during the bankruptcy and that all interested parties are allowed to 
participate fully. The CPA may wish to review the process to establish procedures for 
bidding and conduct a limited inquiry to make certain that fair value was obtained in all 
asset sales.
12.4.7 Concealment, Destruction, or Withholding of Documents
The records of the debtor should be available for review by the creditors of the estate as 
well as a trustee or any party that can establish a right of review. The retention of such 
documents is vitally important to the efficient administration of the estate. It is also a 
violation to withhold documents even though the documents have not been destroyed.
Section 152 Para. 8, specifically states, whoever, “after the filing of a case under title 11 or 
in contemplation thereof, knowingly and fraudulently conceals, destroys, mutilates, falsifies, 
or makes a false entry in any recorded information (including books, documents, records, 
and papers) relating to the property or financial affairs of a debtor,” shall be fined under 
[18 U.S.C. Section 5371], imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
It would also be a violation to interfere with electronic records by destroying, deleting, or 
altering computer files of the debtor.
Even if documents are destroyed in violation of the law, many of the original records, such 
as bank statements and canceled checks, can be obtained by subpoena from third parties. 
The cost of so doing can, however, be prohibitive, especially in small cases.
Uncovering or Preventing the Destruction or Withholding of Documents
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover or prevent the destruction or 
withholding of documents:
1. The retention of adequate accounting records is vital. Therefore, as soon as practicable 
after filing the bankruptcy or determining that a review must be made of the records, it 
is imperative that an inventory be made of all existing records. Should there be any 
possibility of the debtor destroying the records, it may be wise to engage a copy service 
to obtain a separate copy of all relevant records.
2. While the inventory of documents is being taken, all electronic evidence, that is, all data 
on computer hard drives, should be preserved by a computer forensics expert. This is 
an extremely important step. Electronic files might be difficult or impossible to recover 
afterwards.
3. It is possible to obtain copies of federal and state tax returns by first obtaining power of 
attorney and then submitting the appropriate forms to both the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) and the state taxing authorities. A bankruptcy trustee can obtain copies of 
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federal and state tax returns by simply making a written request supported by a notice
of the trustee appointment.
4. Upon completion of the inventory analysis, a secure location must be obtained for the 
safekeeping of program diskettes and CDs as well as data diskettes, CDs and backup 
tapes, or any other storage devices. In more complex cases, it may be important to 
create a separate and secure location to store all of the records and control access.
5. An immediate contact should be made with the debtor’s banks, outside CPA firm, and 
legal counsel as they often have important records and documents in their possession.
6. If the records have been seized by a government agency pursuant to a subpoena, it is 
often very difficult to obtain access because of secrecy provisions inherent in the grand 
jury process. However, it still may be possible to obtain copies of certain records, 
especially, if the government chooses to rely upon the nongovernment accountant’s 
analysis as supporting documentation for their own criminal case.
12.5 Kinds of Bankruptcy Fraud
12.5.1 Bust Out and Bleed Out
The systematic pillaging of assets while increasing the liabilities of a successful company is 
often referred to as a bust out. This procedure is used by the more seasoned element of our 
criminal population and is usually brazen and easily identified.
The destruction of a company can be accomplished relatively quickly or can drag on for 
years as the owners methodically bleed the company of assets while steadily increasing 
liabilities. This slower process is generally referred to as a bleed out. Such a blatant and 
criminal abuse of the bankruptcy protections can often provoke the draconian penalties 
found in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute.
Conducting the necessary accounting analysis to prove that a company was the victim of a 
bust out or bleed out scheme to defraud creditors is a very time-consuming and laborious 
proposition.
For example, a formerly successful retail clothing business with an excellent credit rating is 
in arrears with its clothing suppliers. The usual liquidity ratios suffer drastic reversals as 
inventory and other liquid assets inexplicably disappear and bills remain unpaid.
Meanwhile, the operating capital normally retained for paying day-to-day expenses and 
purchasing inventory are transferred to a separate account for the personal benefit of the 
owner. The company ultimately files bankruptcy and provides a minimal level of assets 
while listing an extremely large number of unsecured creditors. The hope of the debtor is 
that the bankruptcy will pass quietly through the system with a minimum of scrutiny.
Uncovering a Bust Out or Bleed Out Before a Bankruptcy
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover a bust out or bleed out before a 
bankruptcy:
1. Perform a detailed ratio analysis to discover asset or liability accounts for which further 
analysis is warranted. These ratios may point the CPA to an inventory or accounts 
receivable problem.
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2. Review the salaries and consulting fees paid to owners, family members, and other 
related parties. Look closely at bonuses or other types of compensation.
3. Analyze the travel and entertainment expense records to determine whether the 
company is paying for significant personal items. An analysis of such expenses may 
reveal that large personal expenses are being paid for the benefit of the owners, their 
family, or related parties.
4. Analyze the company’s debt to discover whether the proceeds of any issue were actually 
received and used in internal operations.
5. Review transfers of assets or liabilities. The determination should be made as to whether 
such transfers were made “knowingly and fraudulently.”
6. Analyze rents and lease payments. In circumstances such as these, it is common for 
parties to lease physical facilities, equipment, or vehicles to the debtor at inflated rates in 
not arms-length transactions.
12.5.2 Embezzlement by a Trustee or Officer
If a trustee or other officer appropriates assets of the estate to a person’s own use, he or she is 
violating his or her fiduciary duty. It is important to note that it is also a violation for a 
trustee, officer, or similarly situated person to secrete or destroy any document belonging to 
the estate.
It is a violation of the law to purchase any property directly or indirectly from the estate of 
which he or she is an officer even if adequate consideration is provided
It is improper for the trustee to allow no reasonable opportunity for inspection of 
documents and accounts relating to the affairs of estates in his or her charge by parties in 
interest when directed to do so by the court.
A CPA should follow the same steps and procedures in uncovering and validating 
embezzlement during bankruptcy as he or she would in an embezzlement investigation at 
an ongoing business. The principles and methods are similar.
12.5.3 Serial Filings
One of the most pernicious acts in bankruptcy is a procedure intended primarily to take 
advantage of the automatic stay to prevent foreclosure on certain assets and collection of 
other debts.
For example, an individual in significant financial distress has not made payments on a 
house for an extended period of time. After a notice of default and just prior to the actual 
foreclosure, the following occur:
• The debtor files a bankruptcy.
• The lienholder files a motion for relief from the automatic stay citing lack of equity and 
lack of payments.
• The court grants relief.
• The foreclosure process begins again.
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• Just before completion of the second foreclosure attempt, the debtor’s wife, who is listed
as a co-owner on the property, files a bankruptcy thereby stopping the foreclosure
action once again.
This procedure can continue indefinitely as other parties holding an arguable interest in the 
property file a succession of bankruptcies until the judge imposes various restrictions 
including sanctions on those parties filing bankruptcies in bad faith.
The same procedure can be used in differing degrees, but under the same concept by those 
facing eviction in rental units or management companies operating commercial real 
property.
12,5.4 Service Petition Mills
Lawyers represent a significant number of those filing bankruptcy. As such, they are 
governed by standards and procedures established by the regulatory bodies of their 
profession. Lawyers, by definition, are not included in service petition mills.
Another group assisting in the filing of bankruptcies is the qualified personnel working for 
legal aid services who, although not attorneys, are nevertheless competent and provide a 
lower cost alternative.
There are, however, a number of unscrupulous services that set themselves up primarily in 
low-income areas and engage in heavy advertising offering their services as a solution to 
financial problems. They often charge an excessive amount for a very limited service, 
namely, typing the petition with minimal assistance. These services often prepare but do 
not file the bankruptcy. Since their names are not mentioned as having prepared the 
petition, they disappear quickly should problems with the filing ensue. Occasionally, they 
step over the line into complicity by filing fraudulent and inaccurate petitions.
The proper response upon uncovering a practice of this nature is to report the findings 
promptly to both the United States Attorney and the local Office of the United States 
Trustee. The U.S. Trustee usually takes action promptly even making legal filings if 
necessary to drive unethical practitioners from the market.
12.5.5 Ponzi Schemes
A Ponzi scheme is conceived as a pyramid (and often referred to as a pyramid scheme). As 
the early investors recruit new investors and these investors, in turn, recruit yet others, the 
large number of investors forming the base support the small number of scheme organizers 
and early investors at the top. Investors are induced to join by the promise of returns 
exceeding market rates. These promised returns are actually paid out at the beginning of 
the fraud to lure new prospects to invest their money. Payments to previous investors are 
made from the funds paid in by later investors. As the number of investors grows 
exponentially, soon there is not enough money available to pay all investors the promised 
returns. In the end, the majority of investors are left with millions of dollars in claims 
against a paltry amount of assets.
As the number of investors grows, the amount of assets declines, and lawsuits commence, 
the debtor files for bankruptcy claiming that an economic setback and not the pitiless 
mathematics of the pyramid scam itself was the cause of the financial collapse.
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The creation of a Ponzi scheme does not constitute a violation of the bankruptcy law in and 
of itself. The filing of a bankruptcy to conceal the existence of a Ponzi scheme does, 
however, violate the bankruptcy law.
A review of accounting records to establish the existence of a Ponzi scheme can prove to 
be extremely difficult. It is not, however, impossible and in fact has been done many times.
Uncovering a Ponzi Scheme
The following is a list of steps CPAs can take to uncover a Ponzi scheme:
1. Ponzi schemes are usually of short duration. The CPA should be aware of the 
possibility, however, that a Ponzi scheme could keep operating for many years. It is also 
possible that a legitimate business could become a Ponzi scheme as specific financials 
deteriorate, government regulations change, or the general economy declines.
2. Because a Ponzi scheme by its very nature is fraudulent, the CPA cannot always use the 
financial statements as a guide because of the likelihood they may contain significant 
misstatements. The best source of information may actually be the cash receipt and 
disbursement activity.
3. An analysis of the balance sheet at various dates in the past can provide meaningful 
information regarding the existence of a Ponzi scheme if the difficult problem of 
eliminating material misstatements can be overcome. The net equity section of the 
balance sheet can reflect a change over time from a positive balance to negative equity. 
This is usually the result of growing losses, diminishing assets, and increasing liabilities. 
It is even possible that the entity was in a negative equity position for the entire period 
of analysis with the result that the insolvency continued to deepen.
4. An historical analysis of the income statement often reflects little or no legitimate 
business activity. Once again, material misstatements must be identified and adjusted to 
provide meaningful results. Revenues may actually decline while expenses increase 
exponentially. A detailed analysis of the cash receipts may demonstrate that the 
majority of cash flow is provided by new debt and new investors with very little 
emanating from operations.
5. In the typical Ponzi operation, an analysis of cash receipts and disbursements should 
reveal a constantly growing need for cash. Cash from new investors or new debt is 
never enough to stop the endless need for more and more cash to meet ever-increasing 
obligations.
6. A month-by-month analysis of the general and subsidiary ledgers may demonstrate the 
replacement of old debt and old investors with new debt and new investors.
7. It is common for the cash receipt and disbursement analysis to show significant amounts 
paid to the owners and/or insiders. Because the perpetrators of Ponzi schemes recognize 
their entity is doomed to self-destruct, they often engage in an orgy of cash 
disbursements in the period just prior to its inevitable collapse. A review of cash receipts 
and disbursements during this critical time can lay bare such an illegitimate outflow.
12.6 Punishment Provisions
As discussed in greater detail below, the harshness of punishment for bankruptcy fraud 
may vary to a considerable degree for any number of reasons.
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Usually, for each single criminal violation of the bankruptcy code as detailed in most of the
matters and examples listed above, the penalty prescribed shall include a fine and
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.
12.7 Referral of Bankruptcy Fraud
If you are a trustee, judge, or receiver, the code requires that you shall report to the United 
States Attorney whenever you have reasonable grounds to believe that a criminal violation 
has occurred and that an investigation is warranted. That duty is mandatory. If you are not 
serving in any of the capacities referred to above, you should seek legal counsel as to your 
obligation to report criminal activity.
Once you have determined that a referral is necessary, the fraud should be reported to 
both the United States Attorney and the United States Trustee in your jurisdiction. The 
referral should be in the form of a written report. An oral report will be insufficient. Exhibit 
C, Bankruptcy Referral Letter, is included on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
The referral report should contain the following:
1. A short summary of the alleged crime. For example, this referral concerns concealment of 
assets in violation of Section 152 or concealment or destruction of records in violation of 
Section 152.
2. The name or names of the subjects involved. If there was a corporation or partnership 
involved, all owners or partners should be included in the report. If available, you 
should include the dates of birth and social security numbers of those involved.
3. A complete and factual presentation of the evidence supporting the assertion of the violation. Keep 
in mind that a general statement that a person or entity has filed multiple bankruptcies 
may be relevant in establishing intent. The underlying evidence, however, must be 
compelling and specific. Generalized allegations will not be sufficient.
4. The estimated total loss or amount of harm caused by the alleged bankruptcy violation.
5. The names of the witnesses or potential witnesses. If available, provide addresses and 
telephone numbers.
6. A list of the documentary evidence that is available supporting the allegation and the location of 
such evidence.
The referral report need not include every scintilla of information constituting the facts and 
the evidence. You can provide additional information to the investigative agency should an 
affirmative decision be made to conduct an investigation based on the referral.
It is important to note that a fully prepared referral and subsequent analysis will greatly 
increase chances for a successful criminal investigation and indictment. Simply put—the 
more complete the report, the better.
As already discussed, investigative agencies are always mindful of the personnel 
requirements necessary to complete an investigation. There are never enough people to get 
all the jobs done immediately.
Finally, the CPA should not engage in judgmental categorizations that imply that the 
United States Attorney is compelled to take action based on the referral.
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Table 12.1, Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist, is designed to assist CPAs in addressing
bankruptcy fraud. Generally, all No answers require investigation and follow-up. The results
should be documented. Use the Ref column to cross-reference the checklist to any
additional working papers. The checklist is intended for general guidance and information
only.
12.8 Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
Table 12.1 Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
1. Non-Disclosure or Concealment of Assets
A no answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater 
likelihood of potential nondisclosure or concealment of assets.
a. Have the known assets been fairly valued?
b. Have the debtor’s bank statements for the last five years been 
obtained?
c. Has a cash-flow analysis of the debtor’s accounts been made 
for the last four years at least on the basis of these bank 
statements?
d. Are there any unusual receipts or disbursements?
e. Are there any regular periodic payments of equal amounts 
that cannot be accounted for by an automobile or other asset?
f. Have income tax returns from previous years been reviewed 
for undeclared income sources?
g. Have property tax returns from previous years been reviewed 
for undeclared property ownership?
h. Are there any unsettled personal injury lawsuits outstanding?
i. Does the debtor hold any real interest in any real properties 
other than his or her residence?
j. Are there any bank or investment accounts not disclosed on 
the schedules?
k. Are there any works of art or other collectibles?
1. Are there any investments that include either a beneficial or 
recorded interest on the debtor’s behalf?
m. Have insurance premium payments been examined for any 
insured but undeclared assets?
n. Have the debtor’s financial statements filed with former 
lenders been reviewed?
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Table 12.1 (continued)
(continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
o. there any assets revealed on the balance sheets of previous 
fiscal periods that have not been accounted for?  
p. Has a licensed private investigative firm been engaged to 
search property and business listings for assets of the debtor 
owned over the last few years?
q. Does the debtor hold any valuable unrecorded URLs?
2. False Information in Filing
a. Has there been a background check on the debtor’s past 
addresses and social security numbers?
b. Have investment and credit card accounts been reviewed to 
find spending patterns?
3. False claims filed in bankruptcy
a. Have the accounts payable subsidiary ledgers for intermittent 
periods in the past been examined and compared for 
inconsistencies?
b. Have any payments to creditors already made within the last 
six months reappeared in the bankruptcy schedules?
c. Have payments made within the last year been correctly 
applied to secured and unsecured claims so that the priority 
of the creditors’ claims has been properly maintained?
d. Have claims from dubious creditors been thoroughly 
examined?
e. If suspicious claims are being pressed vigorously, has a Rule 
2004 examination been scheduled to examine the creditor 
under oath?
4. Transfer of Assets Before a Bankruptcy
a. Have financial statements for past years been examined for 
the ownership or disposition of assets not present in the 
current statements?
b. Have the loan applications supported by these financial 
statements been examined?
c. Have previous tax returns been examined for income in the 
K-l forms from partnerships or the 1099 forms from financial 
institutions or elsewhere?
d. Have any assets revealed on these earlier statements been 
sold just prior to the bankruptcy filing?
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Table 12.1 (continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
e. Have property and business listings of the debtor been 
searched?  
f. Is the debtor holding any valuable URLs?
g. Have there been any recent large receipts or disbursements 
recorded by the debtor?
h. Are there any periodic equal payments unaccounted for by 
the recorded assets?
i. Are there any regular payments to related parties?
j. Can all invoices and check detail be explained by the 
recorded assets?
k. Are insurance premiums being paid for unrecorded assets?
1. Are there any unusual expense items unaccounted for?
5. Transfer of Assets After a Bankruptcy
a. Was a physical inventory conducted immediately after the 
bankruptcy?
b. Have any assets been transferred for no consideration?
c. Have effective audit-like accounting controls been applied to 
monitor the disposition of financial assets after the 
bankruptcy?
6. Bribery or Threats
a. Have any creditors failed to file claims against the debtor?
b. Have any creditors been disregarded following the 
bankruptcy?
c. Has the open bidding process been impaired in any way or 
by any person?
d. Has the open bidding process been reviewed for fairness?
e. Was fair value received for all goods sold?
7. Concealment, Destruction, or Withholding of Documents
a. Has an inventory been made of all records?
b. Have copies been made of all relevant records?
c. Have the debtors’ electronic records been preserved by a 
qualified computer forensics expert?
d. Have copies of federal and state tax returns been applied for?
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Table 12.1 (continued)
Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist Yes No NA Ref
e. Are program and data diskettes and CDs safely and securely 
stored?
f. Have records at the offices of the debtor’s banks, outside 
CPAs, and lawyers been located and identified?
g. Has application been made to acquire copies of documents 
under subpoena in cases of criminal bankruptcy?
8. Bust Out and Bleed Out
a. Have detailed ratio analyses been performed on accounts 
receivable and inventory?
b. Have salaries, bonuses, and consulting fees been analyzed for 
payments to owners, family members, or other related 
parties?
c. Are travel and entertainment expenses within historic norms?
d. How have the proceeds from any loans or financings been 
used?
e. Are all asset and liability transfers readily explicable?
f. Are all rent and lease payments for facilities, equipment, and 
vehicles needed directly in the operations of the debtor?
9. Ponzi Schemes
a. Have cash receipts and disbursements been analyzed for 
unusual trends?
b. Are there material misstatements in the financials?
c. Is net equity growing or shrinking?
d. Does an analysis of the income statement show an 
unexpectedly low level of business activity?
e. Is most cash flow generated from debt and new investment 
rather than from operations?
f. Is there an unusually high rate of turnover among lenders 
and investors?
g. Is an unusually high level of cash disbursements being made to 
the owners and insiders?
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13.1 Overview of Procurement Fraud
Procurement is the process of contracting to acquire goods and services. Procurement fraud is 
the unlawful manipulation of this process to obtain an advantage. This form of fraud is 
especially common in government and industries, such as construction, where lucrative 
contracts are awarded, and management is reliant on a process that may be corrupt.
The first fact about procurement fraud that must be recognized is that it is one of the most 
difficult white-collar crimes to detect because much of it is “off-book,” that is, the fraud 
happens and there’s no specific entries to cover it up. Hence, understanding the nature of 
the procurement process is the first step in being able to detect, investigate, and ultimately 
prevent, procurement fraud.
The second fact is that all too many companies refuse to entertain the thought that their 
team of loyal employees could harbor fraudsters. When fraud occurs, management is taken 
by surprise; then, only after the event and after the insurance company has refused to pay 
the employee fidelity claim, decides to implement tighter controls. The sad truth is that 
much procurement fraud could be prevented by simple measures such as the separation 
and/or rotation of duties and surprise audits.
Unfortunately, as corporations downsize in a difficult economy or reconfigure 
responsibilities through technological changes, layers of managerial control are often 
removed and new opportunities open up for the imaginative fraudster. The remaining staff 
is usually overburdened with work and no longer attentive to the subtle indicators of 
irregularity in the company’s business practices or the behavior of their fellow workers that 
can be the first signs of fraud.
There are two key aspects to effective fraud prevention. The first is addressing the human 
side of fraud by taking steps to minimize the likelihood of hiring fraudsters, and 
establishing and maintaining an ethical workplace where honesty is respected. Employees 
must understand that fraud will not be tolerated; it can cost jobs, lower profits, eliminate 
bonuses, and even close businesses. Fair treatment and competitive compensation also play 
a role in prevention.
The second key aspect to effective fraud prevention involves addressing the environmental 
factors related to procurement fraud. This includes the development of an internal control 
system that can either prevent or detect anomalies. Regular review of such controls would 
include ensuring that the different kinds of signing authorities are not abused. Each 
override should be investigated to make sure it was justified by the circumstances and not 
part of a scam. Surprise audits are an essential element of internal control and should be 
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conducted by persons unconnected to the department under review. Everyone, including 
senior management, must be subject to surprise audits.
But human and environmental control systems cannot be established in a vacuum. To be 
effective in preventing and detecting procurement fraud, management must be 
knowledgeable about:
• The characteristics of the procurement process;
• The stages in the procurement process at risk for fraud; and
• The fraud risk indicators related to each stage in the procurement process.
With knowledge about each of these areas, then and only then, can management be 
effective in designing a suitable procurement fraud strategy to prevent, detect and/or 
investigate procurement fraud.
13.2 Characteristics of the Procurement Process
To be effective in dealing with procurement fraud, both in designing tests to detect it and in 
designing controls to prevent it, one needs to first consider the types of goods or services 
that can be purchased and the types of contracts related to such purchases, the stages of the 
procurement process and the types of activities that are meant to occur at each stage, the 
records related to each stage in the procurement process, and who is involved in the 
procurement process.
13.2.1 Procurement Contracts Defined
The purchasing process within an organization takes many forms—ranging from formal 
procurement contracts, to informal arrangements based on oral agreements to supply 
goods or services. For the purpose of this Handbook, although much of the discussion is 
directly applicable to the formal procurement contract process, the concepts discussed are 
equally applicable to informal arrangements.
To gain a better understanding of the vulnerabilities in the procurement process and the 
type of information that should be available relative to any particular procurement 
transaction, it is useful to study different types of procurement contracts, which can be 
classified in three broad ways:
1. Types of goods or services
2. Pricing method
3. Method of award, that is, competitive or non-competitive (sole-sourced)
The variations in each of these procurement processes impact not only the nature of the 
records that should exist for each procurement transaction, but also the motivations and 
weaknesses that should be tested when conducting the screening phase of a procurement 
fraud investigation.
Types of Goods or Services
1. Construction Contract. A construction contract is a contract entered into for construction, 
repair, renovation, or the restoration of any work.
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2. Goods Contract. A goods contract is an agreement for the purchase of assets, inventory, 
commodities, equipment, goods, materials, or supplies.
3. Service Contract. A service contract is a contract for the provision of services by persons 
other than employees. There are several different types of service contracts:
a. Professional Services Contract. A contract for services provided by individuals with 
significant training, qualifications and expertise in a professional, scientific, technical, 
or managerial field (for example, legal services, engineering services, accounting 
services).
b. Consulting Services Contract. A contract for the provision of advice (e.g. management 
consulting, computer consulting).
c. Nonconsulting Services Contract. A contract for the provision of services other than the 
provision of advice or consulting, (for example, travel, entertainment, advertising 
placement, cleaning services, waste removal).
4. Lease Contract. An agreement whereby a company acquires a leasehold interest in real 
property, including a tenancy agreement or a license in respect of real property.
Method of Pricing
1. Fixed Fee, Firm Fee or Lump Sum Contract. A fixed fee, firm fee or lump sum contract 
specifies the total payable based on a fixed lump sum. Both parties agree on the price 
before the contract is awarded. Deviations are not allowed regardless of the volume of 
materials/labor used in the contracting process.
2. Cost Per Unit. A cost per unit contract specifies the total payable by multiplying identical 
units of work or items delivered by a fixed unit price.
3. Cost Plus. A cost-plus contract has a payment arrangement whereby the contractor pays 
actual costs incurred plus either an agreed fee or a percentage of cost. A variation on 
this type of contract would be a cost-plus contract with a guaranteed maximum.
4. Time & Material. A time and material contract varies based on the extent of materials 
and labor used to complete the contract.
Method of Award: Competitive Versus Sole-Sourced Contracts
Competitive Contract. Competitive contracts are generally awarded after at least two 
valid bids have been received based on the following criteria:
• Construction. Bids at firm prices, lowest accepted
• Goods. Lowest accepted
• Consulting services. Lowest or offering the best value accepted
• Professional services. Lowest or offering the best value accepted
• Nonconsulting services. Lowest accepted
• Lease. Lowest or offering the best value accepted
Sole-Sourced Contract. Sole-sourced contracts are a type of non-competitive contract for 
which bids have not been solicited or, if they have been solicited, the conditions of a 
competitive contract were not met. Such contracts are generally awarded for reasons other 
than price.
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13.2.2 Stages in the Procurement Process at Risk for Fraud
The procurement process has a few key stages. The words used to describe the various 
stages in the process may differ, but the activities performed do not.
Each stage of the procurement process has different types of risks. In order to understand 
and minimize such risks, it is useful to consider the different stages separately.
For the purpose of this Handbook, the procurement contracting process is divided into the 
following five stages (see Table 13.1) for both competitive and non-competitive contracts:
1. Requirements definition
2. Bidding and selection
3. Contract performance and evaluation
4. Billing
5. Payment




1 Requirements Definition Requirements Definition
2 Bidding and Selection Selection




The requirements definition stage is the first stage in the procurement process; it is also the 
first step in the decision-making process related to whether to purchase the goods or 
services. This is when the job to be done is defined and decisions are made regarding 
whether to procure the goods or services required.
If a competitive contract is selected as the method of procurement, the specifications must 
be formulated in a way that will attract multiple bidders. The requirements definition stage 
therefore involves planning, budgeting, and decision making to avoid jeopardizing the 
integrity of the bidding process. Otherwise, the company may enter into an unnecessary 
contract or competition may be compromised by setting specifications that can be met by 
only one potential vendor.
The following are the components of the requirements definition stage:
• Identify the need.
• Specify the requirements as to time, cost and/or performance criteria.
• Assess alternatives to meet the need (including contracting).
• Prepare bid information if a competitive contract is the selected means to meet the 
requirement.
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• Plan the procurement process.
• Establish the award criteria.
Key Control Features
• The need should be defined within the mandated objectives of the department.
• The standards or other measurement criteria should be articulated so that it can be used 
during or after the completion of the contract to establish that the contract has been 
performed to an acceptable standard.
• An alternatives assessment should be completed regarding availability, time and cost 
estimates.
• Research should be conducted regarding the most appropriate procurement method 
(for example, identifying whether the contract should be awarded based on a 
competitive process or a non-competitive/sole-sourced process).
• A procurement schedule and management, production, and logistical plans should be 
developed for later comparison purposes.
Bidding & Selection Stage
During the bidding and selection stage of the procurement process, purchasing or materials 
management staff identify sources of supply, develop and issue a request for proposals or 
quotations (known as an RFP or RFQ); analyze responding proposals, quotations or bids; 
communicate with likely candidates as necessary; select the final contractor;, define the 
terms of the contract; and otherwise ensure the proper authorization for acquisition of the 
contractor’s services. This stage of the procurement process is the second major decision of 
the procurement process.
Once again, if this stage is not executed properly, the integrity of the entire procurement 
process is in jeopardy.
The following are the components of the bidding and selection stage:
• Bid solicitation and evaluation
• Contract approval and award
• Contract documentation
For non-competitive or sole-sourced contracts, the bidding and selection stage doesn’t 
involve a bidding process, but there is still a selection process, where justifications are 
generally provided in support of a particular contractor.
Key Control Features
• Where it is cost effective to do so, all qualified firms should have an opportunity to 
compete for procurement contracts. Firms will be considered to be qualified that: 
— Have the technical, financial, and managerial competence to perform the contract. 
— Meet criteria established by company policies and objectives. Contracts should be 
approved according to pre-approved levels of authority.
• The draft procurement contract should be compared to the original requirements 
definition.
• Legal counsel should be involved in the drafting process.
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Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage
During this stage of the procurement process, the contracted services/goods are 
provided/supplied, and evaluations are performed to compare the actual completion of the 
contract to the time and performance criteria specified in the contract as defined in the 
requirements definition stage.
This is the third major step in the procurement process, that is, the operational step in the 
process.
Management and support staff with primary responsibility for contract evaluation would 
perform the technical evaluations to ensure that the contracted goods/services were 
delivered as agreed in the contract. Such staff would also provide input into the billing and 
payment stage of the contract—to ensure that the progress reports on the financial status of 
the contract match the technical reports. They may also resolve contract disputes and 
ensure that any contract amendments receive as much scrutiny as the original contract.
Each contract should be evaluated to ensure the supplier met the terms of the contract and 
the product fulfilled the program requirements as specified. Line managers play a key role 
in monitoring service contracts. They are responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
contract and certification that services have been received.
The following are the components of the contract performance and evaluation stage:
• Contract monitoring
• Contractor and technical evaluation
• Progress reports review
• Amendments and change orders review
Key Control Features
• The contractor should provide technical progress reports.
• Contractor performance should be evaluated regularly to ensure that the contract 
addressed the identified requirements.
• Bid protests/contract disputes should be addressed and resolved with minimal delay.
• Contracts should not be amended unless in the best interests of the company.
Billing Stage
During the billing stage of the procurement process, the contractor submits invoices or 
progress payments that are then evaluated to ensure that contract costs are appropriate—as 
agreed in the original contract or contract amendments, and the cost is established as a 
liability of the company to the contractor.
This is the fourth stage in the procurement process, which occurs after the project is 
completed, or it could occur after a portion of the project is completed. During this stage, 
the liability for the goods or services would typically be established based on the invoice 
submitted.
The following are the components of the billing stage:
• Invoices received from contractor
• Financial controls related to the amounts billed
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• Costs established as a liability
• Dispute resolution
• Amendments and change orders review
Key Control Features
• Contracts should be administered in accordance with company financial policies, 
procedures, and accepted financial control practices.
• The contractor should provide financial/technical progress reports.
• Bid protests/contract disputes should be addressed and resolved with minimal delay.
Payment Stage
During the payment stage of the procurement process, the company makes payment(s) to 
the contractor based on the invoices/progress payment requests submitted.
This is the fifth and final stage of the procurement process. During this stage, the liability 
for the goods or services is discharged as the invoice submitted in the preceding stage is 
paid.
The following are the components of the billing stage:
• Payments issued to the contractor
• Financial controls
Key Control Features
• Payments should be made in accordance with company financial policies, procedures, 
and accepted financial control practices.
13.2.3 Records Related to Each Stage in the Procurement Process
One of the most important aspects to realize when considering how to prevent, detect or 
investigate procurement fraud, is that only the last two stages of the procurement process, 
namely the billing stage and the payment stage, involve accounting records.
The requirements definition stage, bidding and selection stage, and contract performance 
and evaluation stage each have certain types of records that would typically be produced, 
but such records are ordinarily maintained by a company’s purchasing department, not the 
accounting department, and are therefore not the types of records that most accountants 
examine when assessing the costs incurred by a company.
Accordingly, success when dealing with procurement fraud involves examining more than 
just accounting records, as the other business records are more likely the records that will 
be useful in proving procurement fraud.
The following are the types of records that are typically produced at each stage in the 
procurement process:
Requirements Definition Stage
• Needs assessment documentation (or needs justification documentation)
• Requirements “specs”—including performance criteria, quantities required, due dates, 
type of goods/services to be provided
• Internal communications approving the need for the purchase/service
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Bidding & Selection Stage
• Potential contactor research
• List of contractors invited to submit a proposal
• Request for proposal, quotation, or any other bid solicitation records (these are 
essentially similar documents; certain organizations have different names for them)
• Tender packages including proposals/quotes/bids submitted by potential contractors
• Written communications issued to the potential contractors, either before or after the 
deadline for bid submission
• Notes from oral communications with potential contractors, either before or after the 
deadline for bid submission
• Analysis of tender package records
• Contract acceptance records
• Price list(s) from prior contracts, competitors in order to evaluate the pricing of the 
contract
• Contract documentation, including drafts of the contract, as well as the final approved 
contract
• Notes from communications with counsel regarding the legal issues arising in the 
proposed contract
Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage
• Progress reports from the contractor
• Internal progress reports evaluating the stage of completion of the contract
• Written correspondence, or notes from oral communications, with the contractor
• Deficiencies list(s)
• Evaluation reports on the supplier’s performance under the contract
• Technical documentation required to evaluate the goods/services provided
• Change orders and communications related to the need for the change order
• Amendments to the contract
Billing Stage
• Invoices or progress payments submitted by the contractor
• Documentation submitted by the contractor in support of the invoices submitted 
(related to proof of performance, or to establish the quantity delivered, etc.)
• Written correspondence, or notes from oral communications, related to approval of the 
invoices/progress payments
• Entries in the purchases journal and/or general ledger related to establishing the liability 
and expense for the costs incurred
Payment Stage
• Check(s) or transfer(s) used to pay the invoice(s) of the contractor
• Entries to record the payment and relieve the general ledger of the liability for the costs 
incurred
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In addition to operational and accounting records, procurement processes are often well 
documented by the internal audit department of an organization. The internal audit 
process would typically generate:
• Overview fact sheets
• Internal control evaluation questionnaires for the purchases, payables, and payments 
system
• An audit program
• Audit data
• An audit report
• A responding management report
13.2.4 Who Is Involved in the Procurement Process?
The procurement process of an organization typically involves a team of people both 
within an organization and external to an organization.
The people involved in the procurement process that are inside an organization include 
purchasing agents or buyers, the users of the goods or services, management, and accounts 
payable or other accounting personnel.
The people involved in the procurement process that are external to an organization 
include suppliers and their sales personnel, and accounts receivable or other accounting 
personnel at the supplier organization.
Each of these people have an important role to fulfill relative to the procurement process of 
an organization, and are therefore each in a position to be able to commit procurement 
fraud.
Procurement fraud can be committed by:
1. Internal employees or management acting alone or in collusion with other employees
2. Employees acting in collusion with vendors/contractors
3. Vendors acting against the company
4. Vendors acting in collusion as a group
Internal Employee/Management Fraud
Procurement fraud involving employees or management, either acting alone or in collusion 
with other employees/management, often involves undisclosed conflicts of interest, false or 
inflated expense reports, or schemes involving diverted payments.
Many employee/management frauds are “on-book” frauds, where the fraud itself, and the 
coverup thereof, can typically be traced through the accounting records of the company.
Collusion Between Employees and Vendors
Procurement fraud involving collusion between employees and vendors often involves off- 
book bribes, secret commissions or kickbacks of cash, gifts, free trips, dinners at fine 
restaurants, and other inducements to give favorable treatment on an upcoming bid, to 
approve transactions with vendors that should not otherwise be approved, or simply to 
retain existing business. Such- activity is generally off-book, and is much harder to detect 
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because of the hidden nature of the transactions involved. It is also much harder to detect 
because of the enhanced ability of the perpetrators to cover-up the situation.
Essentially this form of collusion involves “cozy business relationships” where decision­
makers are enticed to “look the other way”. A pair of courtside NBA tickets now and again 
or a bottle of single-malt Scotch at Christmas might not be a problem, but a two-week trip 
to the Bahamas for the director of purchasing and his wife is inappropriate.
Vendor Fraud Against the Company
Vendor fraud often involves false billing or substitution of goods or services inferior to the 
contract specifications, and can be either on-book or off-book frauds. In other words, it 
may or may not be possible to prove the fraud using the books of the company that hired 
the vendor/contractor.
These types of fraud often occur in organizations where the procurement-related internal 
controls are weak, and an external party sees a weakness and then exploits it.
Collusion Among the Vendors Within an Industry or Bidding Group
Procurement fraud involving collusion among vendors often occurs when vendors 
communicate/scheme to engineer bids higher than market rates. This type of procurement 
fraud is typically known as an off-book fraud, and is very difficult to prove, because it is 
difficult to establish what the market rate actually is.
13.3 Types of Procurement Fraud
There are numerous different types of procurement fraud schemes that can be perpetrated; 
the variations relate to who is involved in perpetrating the fraud, and the stage in the 
procurement process that is being compromised.
13.3.1 Procurement Fraud Schemes—by Perpetrator
Internal Employee/Management Fraud:
Conflict of Interest. A conflict of interest involving internal employees/management 
occurs when a procurement contract is awarded to a firm in which such employees or their 
families have an undisclosed financial interest. Such conflicts become fraudulent when they 
are detrimental to the interests of the company that awarded the contract. For example, 
there would be a conflict of interest in contracts awarded to a company that is owned by 
the employee. This conflict of interest would be fraudulent if the invoices submitted were 
inflated, and the employee was involved in the invoice approval process.
Payment Diversion. Payment diversions involve employees or management who:
• Cash the check or redirect where the payment that was intended for submission to the 
contractor will be made, and
• Adjust the accounting records to either engage in a lapping scheme, or to make the 
accounting records appear as if the payment had, in fact, been made.
For example, a payment diversion fraud could occur if the employee changes the payee on 
a check, and then changes the accounting records to make it appear as if this particular 
payee was paid.
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Phantom Contractor. Phantom contractors are fictional companies created by 
employees/management that were set up to enable internal personnel to submit an 
invoice(s) for payment For example, corrupt employees create invoices similar to the 
actual invoices submitted by legitimate contractors.
Purchases for Personal Use. An employee may purchase items for personal use or make 
excess purchases for personal use. For example, an employee has a family business whose 
stationery is printed as part of his employer’s contract for printing stationery.
Collusion Between Employees and Vendors:
Bribery. Bribes are typically offered or paid to unduly influence a particular decision or 
outcome that would be favorable to the payer of the bribe. Bribes are similar to secret 
commissions and kickbacks, and bribes are an “off-book” transaction; the primary 
distinction is that a bribe is typically offered before influence has been improperly 
exercised, whereas secret commissions and kickbacks are generally paid after. For example, 
a building inspector receives plain envelopes filled with cash as a bribe to entice him to 
approve substandard construction work.
Conflict of Interest A conflict of interest involving collusion between employees and 
vendors occurs when a contract is awarded to a firm employing company employees or 
their families, or to a firm in which such the family members of such employees have an 
undisclosed financial interest. Such conflicts become fraudulent when they are detrimental 
to the interests of the company that awarded the contract. For example, there would be a 
conflict of interest in contracts awarded to the brother-in-law of a company employee. This 
conflict of interest would be fraudulent if the invoices submitted were inflated, but were 
approved by the company employee nonetheless.
Information Theft or Bid Fixing. Information theft or bid fixing occurs when a company 
employee releases unauthorized information to third parties that would provide them with 
an unfair advantage in a competitive procurement process. For example, a contractor 
receives information concerning the amounts bid by competing contractors before 
submitting his or her bid. The favored contractor then submits a lower bid.
Small Purchase Order Fraud or Split Purchases. Small purchase order fraud, or split 
purchases fraud usually occurs in order to circumvent the requirement for a formal 
competitive procurement process. In such circumstances, purchases are split into two or 
more segments so that the cost of each segment is lower than the authorized procurement 
limit. For example, five purchase orders are issued, each below the limit instead of one 
large order assessed as a single contract.
Secret Commissions and Kickbacks. Secret commissions and kickbacks are typically 
paid by vendors to company employees in the form of money or gifts to reward the 
employee for providing business or favorable treatment. Secret commissions are typically 
paid as a percentage of the transaction the secret commission related to, whereas the 
amount of a kickback is typically not directly linked to the amount of the underlying 
transaction or fraud. Secret commissions and kickbacks are primarily “off-book” frauds in 
which the amount of the secret commission or kickback is disguised or otherwise hidden in 
the books as part of the transaction to which they are related. For example, a building 
inspector receives plain envelopes filled with cash after the approval of substandard 
construction work. The funds for this payment are accounted for as a materials cost.
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Unnecessary Purchases. Procurement fraud involving unnecessary purchases occurs 
when bids are solicited for unnecessary goods or services or for the duplication of other 
contracts. For example, a contract is awarded for a consulting group to study the impact of 
a fire on the water supply after such a study had already been included as part of a larger 
review prepared by other consultants.
Collusion Between Employees and Vendors Case Study
An anonymous letter and supporting documents arrived on the desk of the president of a 
small gas producer alleging that the plant manager was colluding with a local contractor in 
contracts for pipeline repair and maintenance. The letter claimed the local contractor had 
been awarded a disproportionate number of contracts and that more work and supplies 
were being billed for than were ever performed or delivered. Police assisted by forensic 
investigators discovered that the contractor owned five additional companies and that two 
regularly submitted competitive bids for work at the gas producer. Records showed that the 
plant manager and other senior staff had circumvented the internal controls governing the 
procurement process and had contracted for more materials from the local contractor than 
had been needed to repair retaining walls on a river bank and rebury pipeline exposed 
after severe flooding. The plant manager also accepted a time card two weeks late that 
billed $50,000 for 2,500 hundred hours at $20 per hour. By using the right-to-audit clause 
in the contract, the forensic investigators found that the contractor had only paid its 
employees $24,000 for 1,200 hours work. A portion of the difference had been kicked back 
to the plant manager for influencing the selection of the contractor. A review of the 
contracts showed them to be poorly worded, imprecise and open to abuse; other records 
were found to be inaccurate. A lifestyle review of the plant manager showed him and his 
wife to be living far beyond the means provided by his salary.
Vendor Fraud:
Change Order Abuse. Change orders or changes requiring additional funds are typical in 
the procurement process, but are abusive if they are issued in order to compensate for the 
initial low bid. For example, many subsequent stages of work may be required to fulfill the 
original contract specifications.
Co-mingling of Contracts. Co-mingling occurs if a contractor bills for the same work in 
more than one component of the contract. For example, the same demolition costs are 
billed four times in relation to separate contracts for the construction of foundations, walls, 
ceilings, and floors.
Duplicate Payments. Duplicate payment fraud occurs when a contractor intentionally 
submits more than one original invoice for the same goods or services, and the company 
pays both invoices without realizing that such invoices were duplicated. For example, a 
second invoice is sent by a contractor without identifying it as a second copy.
False Invoices. False invoice fraud occurs when a contractor submits an invoice for goods 
or services that were not provided. For example, an invoice is issued for goods delivered to 
a different fixed-price contract job and charged on a cost-plus contract.
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False Representations. The contractor misrepresents the quality of the products to be 
supplied or his ability to perform contracted services. For example, a contractor claims he 
has equipment to dig a hole with a 90-degree turn, but charges for the labor required to dig 
the turn manually.
Front-End Loading. Front-end loading (or advance payment fraud) typically occurs in a 
percentage of completion contract when the contractor inflates the costs of the initial stage 
of work in order to receive inflated cash flows when the percentage of completion billing 
method is applied. The costs of later work are understated in the expectation that change 
orders will be approved to make up for the shortfall. For example, details relating to labor 
usage are embellished.
Inflated Pricing. Inflated pricing fraud occurs if the contractor submits invoices at prices 
higher than agreed in the contract. For example, an invoice issued for 1,000 units at $105 
each instead of $102 each. Cost mischarging occurs when the contractor charges for costs 
that are not allowable, unreasonable, or cannot be allocated to the contract. For example, 
labor charges are allocated from a fixed price contract with no remaining budget to another 
contract on a cost-plus basis.
Product Substitution. Product substitution refers to supplying goods or services that do 
not conform to the procurement contract specifications. For example, a lower grade of 
lumber and cement is used in the construction of a building than was specified in the 
contract.
Progress Payment Fraud. Progress payment fraud occurs if the contractor requests 
progress payments based on falsified information regarding the progress of the project. For 
example, the invoice details supporting the progress payment include charges for payroll 
costs not incurred because of layoffs or the reassignment of personnel.
Vendor Fraud Case Study
A large manufacturing company decided to build a new factory. Contracts were let through 
the usual bidding process and construction began. After substantial cost overruns, a 
forensic investigation was initiated. Investigators found that about four months into the 
project, requests began to appear for changes to the original contracts, usually involving 
supplemental charges. Questions began to arise about the quality of some materials, 
especially about the volume of washroom tiles purchased and the amount of breakage. The 
expense accounts of the procurement manager were examined and numerous curious 
entries were found. For example, expenses were submitted for meals and rooms at 
restaurants and hotels in New York and New Orleans for conventions that had not taken 
place and without any accompanying expenses for airline tickets or other transportation. 
The names that appeared on the receipts were known to be associated with the successful 
bidders on the factory construction contract.
The investigation revealed that the vendors had flown the procurement manager and his 
wife as well as other people in the procurement department and their spouses to vacation 
destinations. Relatives of the manager had been employed by the vendors and the vendors 
had done renovations on the manager’s home free of charge. For this, the manager 
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approved changes in the contracts, approved the use of materials such as the tiles that were
inferior to the specifications and accepted invoices sometimes as much as 40 percent above
the actual cost of the materials and labor. At the end of the investigation, the manager and
others in the procurement department were dismissed and charged with fraud.
Collusion Among the Vendors:
Bid Rigging, Collusive Bidding, or Price Fixing. Bid rigging, collusive bidding, or 
price fixing are similar forms of fraud. In each, a group of two or more prospective 
contractors have a private arrangement to coordinate their bidding to eliminate or limit 
competition. In bid rigging, the “winning bidder” is predetermined based on an agreement 
between the vendors. In collusive bidding, the bidders share information with each other 
prior to issuing their final bid and collaborate on the amount of each bid. In price fixing, 
the ultimate price is agreed among a group of vendors.
The purpose of each of these types of arrangements is to raise the ultimate price above 
what it would otherwise be, thereby effectively destroying the competitive process. For 
example, contractors agree in private that one of them will be the low bidder. Each then 
submits an inflated bid that includes a higher level of profit than would otherwise be 
achieved if the contractors were legitimately competing against one another.
In some circles, this type of “collusion” or “cooperation” among a group of vendors is 
considered to be market practice. Hence, it is important to note the factors that would 
cause such market cooperation to be considered fraudulent:
• Collusion among vendors
• Dishonest elimination of competition
• Deprivation to company purchasing goods/services—i.e. higher prices
The last element is difficult to prove, however, because it is difficult to establish what the 
market would have been if the vendor group had not collaborated on the price.
Collusion Among the Vendors Case Study
During the European construction boom of the late 1980s, two wealthy businessmen saw 
an opportunity to make money in the market for cement powder. The key to beating the 
price of local manufacturers was to purchase powder from low-cost producers in Greece, 
Turkey and Romania and import it into European ports on leased self-unloading ships. 
When the ships began arriving at French ports, the dockworkers refused to unload them. 
Unable to discharge their cargo, they anchored offshore for months while the owners 
argued with the local harbor authorities and the unions. After the two men realized they 
were not going to get permission to dock and unload, they decided to sell the cement 
powder in Africa at a loss rather than have the wet sea air harden it in the holds of the 
anchored ships. The whole venture cost them about US$300 million by the time the ships’ 
leases had expired.
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A few years later the two businessmen discovered it was not the French unions that had 
caused their project to fail. An extensive investigation by governments and law 
enforcement agencies across Europe revealed that some of Europe’s largest cement makers 
had been engaged for more than a decade in a conspiracy to fix the market for cement and 
ready-mix concrete. Construction companies all across Europe had been paying 
substantially more than they should have because of the collusion among the cement 
producers. The Competition Directorate of the European Union fined the members of the 
conspiracy US$300 million as punishment.
13.3.2 Procurement Fraud Schemes—by Stage in the Procurement 
Process
Table 13.2 summarizes the stages of the procurement process that are being compromised 
for each of the different types of procurement fraud described in the previous section of 
this chapter.
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13.4 Procurement Fraud Detection & Investigation
Procurement fraud investigations can be difficult and costly. Accordingly, procurement 
fraud investigations should be done in a disciplined manner, where the extent of work 
performed is commensurate with the risks involved, and where the cost of further 
investigation is justified by the results of the investigation to date.
This is best accomplished using a phased approach where the first phase involves 
performing limited testing to find the areas of concern or indicators/red flags of fraud; the 
second phase involves performing additional analyses to confirm/refute the red flags or 
indicators identified in the first phase; and the third phase involves determining the full 
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extent of the fraud and proving the allegations so that the suspect can be confronted— 
either informally or formally via criminal or civil court proceedings.
13.4.1 Detection & Investigation—A Disciplined Phased Approach
For the purposes of this text, we have divided the fraud detection and investigation process 
into the following three phases:
1. Screening: The first phase is the detection phase, which involves limited testing and/or 
interviews to identify fraud risk indicators or “red flags” indicative of possible areas of 
concern, and to identify issues that should be further scrutinized for possible fraud.
2. Scrutinizing: The second phase is the allegation testing phase, which involves performing 
certain analyses, comparisons, interviews or other investigative procedures to confirm or 
refute the allegations identified as red flags in the screening phase, and identify issues 
that should be subjected to a rigorous in-depth examination of all the available 
evidence.
3. In-Depth Examination: The third phase is the investigation phase, which involves an in- 
depth investigation including detailed document analysis, analytical techniques and 
interviews to determine the full extent of the fraud as alleged in the screening and 
scrutinizing phases, and to do so in a way that can withstand cross-examination via a 
formal process (beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal proceedings, and at a high 
enough level to be convincing for other civil proceedings or an insurance claim).
What is the primary difference between the procedures performed in the screening phase, 
the scrutinizing phase, and the in-depth and examination phase? Each of these phases 
involves investigative procedures and interviews, and the distinction between each phase 
can sometimes get a little blurred. This occurs because the process of conducting a 
procurement fraud investigation is an art, not a science. In addition, investigations are 
conducted by human beings who can easily “get caught up in the chase” of pursuing a 
fraud investigation, thereby losing the discipline of a cost-effective phased approach. To 
simplify the distinction between the three phases, the differences between the three phases 
are outlined in Table 13.3:
Table 13.3 Phased Investigations
Phase Primary Objective Nature of Testing Nature of Interviews
Screening Establish/collect
evidence
Determine areas of possible Systems/procedural 
concern interviews
Scrutinizing Test the allegations Establish whether fraud has Fact-finding interviews 
occurred/who involved/how re: who & how 
done
In-Depth Obtain final proof for
Examination court purposes
Detailed testing/beyond a Accusatory interviews
reasonable doubt
13.4.2 Procurement Fraud Investigations—A Team Approach
The process of detecting and investigating procurement fraud is enhanced by using people 
with several different skills—including people with investigative skills, legal skills, 
accounting skills, and business skills, and the investigation would be further enhanced by 
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using client staff—possibly from internal audit—who can help smooth the way in terms of 
gaining access to information. People with a purchasing background would also be useful 
for the team, as such people typically have good insight into how the purchasing process is 
meant to work, and are therefore alert to how the procurement system could be 
compromised.
13.4.3 Identifying the Indicators of Procurement Fraud
No indicator alone confirms the existence of procurement fraud. Rather, the presence of 
several indicators should raise the suspicion of improper activity. The issue then, is how 
first to detect such indicators, and what is an indicator of fraud? What does an indicator of 
fraud look like?
The process of looking for red flags involves looking for oddities that “don’t smell right.”
Red flags are found by applying intuition and judgment that come from experience and 
knowledge of inappropriate activity. Red flags are generally something different than 
expected in time, place, personality or amount.
In order to find the red flags of fraud, the following questions are typically asked:
1. Are there any oddities relating to:
• Time (of day, week, month, year, or season)
• Frequency (too many, too few)
• Places (too near, too far, or too far out)
• Amount (too high, too low, too inconsistent, too alike, too different)
• Parties or personalities (related parties, oddball characters, strange relationships, 
estranged relationships, unusual functions performed)
2. Where are the weakest links in the chain? Or how could the systems of internal control 
be compromised?
3. What deviations are possible, how are they handled, and who can authorize such 
transactions?
4. What control features can be bypassed/overridden by higher authorities, and how?
These questions, combined with knowledge of the stages of the procurement process, 
enable a comprehensive examination of the red flags of procurement fraud. This is the 
process that has been followed in the remaining sections of this chapter and the red flags 
identified are presented in tabular form throughout the remainder of this chapter.
13.4.4 Facilitating the Detection & Investigation of Procurement 
Fraud
Checklists are often helpful in the process of identifying and investigating red flags, because 
they typically provide a broader range than might otherwise be considered, and therefore 
heighten awareness as to:
• Whether there are any red flags.
• The type of fraud that might have occurred.
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• Other red flags that may have occurred, which could further substantiate that fraud has 
occurred.
But checklists should be used with caution as they could stifle creativity and could 
ultimately limit the awareness of the user of such checklists.
The material in the remainder of this chapter has been organized in a sequence that could 
be followed during an actual investigation, but the steps to be undertaken would depend on 
the nature of the allegations identified. Red flag indicators are provided in tabular form and 
are further explained after each table. The types of fraud likely indicated by the red flags 
are also identified—so that further scrutinizing can be performed to further confirm/refute 
whether the red flags are, in fact, indicative of fraud.






Nature of Testing Nature of Interviews
Determine areas of possible Systems/procedural 
concern interviews
As discussed earlier in this chapter, screening is the “detection phase” of the procurement 
fraud detection and investigation process. This phase involves performing limited testing 
and/or interviews to identify “red flags” indicative of possible areas of concern, and to 
identify issues that should be further scrutinized for possible fraud. In this phase, evidence 
is collected to determine areas of possible concern, and information is gathered to identify 
systems/procedural weaknesses that would enable such concerns to exist.
Documentation Required
In screening procurement contracts for potential fraud and applying the red flag approach, 
the following documents would be useful to gather and review.
Contract Files. Gather and review contract files including:
• Plans and reports defining the requirement
• Request for proposal or any other bid solicitation records
• Tender packages
• Assessment of tender package records
• Contract acceptance records
• Final approved contract
• Progress reports
• Invoices charged against the contract
• Amendments to the contract
• Evaluation reports on the supplier’s performance under the contract
Internal Audit Working Papers. Gather and review internal audit working papers 
including:
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• Overview fact sheets






13.5.1 Screening the Requirements Definition Stage
The acquisition of goods and services usually begins only after the completion of a proper 
needs assessment Although the lack of or an inadequate needs assessment does not in itself 
constitute fraud, it often provides an opportunity for fraudulent activity.
Fraudulent schemes predicated on a poor needs analysis usually involve the misuse of 
employee discretionary power to define requirements. The type of misuse varies according 
to the nature of the scheme. The contracted goods and services may deliberately exceed 
those required or, in extreme circumstances, may not be needed at all. An employee may 
even decide to dispose of goods that need not be replaced. The level of documentation in 
the files for any of these schemes could range from deliberately falsified figures or facts in 
an elaborate analysis to a very sketchy outline that leaves the employee with significant 
opportunity for fraudulent maneuvering.
For fraud to be established, dishonest intent must be demonstrated. Therefore, an 
employee could not be prosecuted for fraud for conducting an inadequate needs analysis 
since incompetence is not a criminal offence. If, on the other hand, the employee or a 
related party were to receive a benefit as a result of this “incompetence,” dishonest 
intention may be provable and fraud may be established.
Red Flags in the Requirements Definition Stage
The following red flags could be indicative of fraud involving the requirements definition 
stage of the procurement process:
1. Excess Stock Acquired. Unneeded stock is acquired from certain contractors or in excess of 
inventory requirements.
2. Marketing Information in Files. Department files include marketing information provided 
by the successful contractor prior to the issuance of the contract. The presence of such 
material may indicate the department is purchasing goods or services in response to 
aggressive marketing efforts by contractors and possible favors, secret commissions, or 
benefits, rather than to meet valid requirements. The file should show how the two 
parties first made contact.
3. Narrow Requirements Definition. The requirements definition is so narrow it eliminates 
certain suppliers or there is an unjustified or unreasonable eligibility constraint.
4. Official Involvement. A senior official exceeds his/her responsibilities by going beyond 
their job descriptions—for instance, by assisting in the preparation of the needs 
definition.
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5. Replacement Period Unreasonable. The replacement cycle for goods is shorter than 
indicated by manufacturers’ recommendations, departmental standards, or the level of 
utilization.
6. Rushed Timing. The time allocated to the requirements definition stage is unreasonably 
short in comparison to the size of the project. Rushed timing can indicate someone 
trying to circumvent the usual controls in the contracting process.
7. “Surplus” Goods Replaced. Goods originally sold as surplus are subsequently replaced.
8. Thin File Syndrome. Needs assessments are not adequately or accurately documented. 
The needs assessment may be nonexistent, or may describe the desired product without 
justifying its acquisition or is vague about its performance standards.
The following table (Table 13.4) shows the types of fraud most commonly committed in 
the requirements definition stage of the procurement process, and the types of red flags that 
are indicative of such fraud.
Table 13.4 Red Flags: Screening the Requirements Definition Stage










1. Excessive Stock Acquired
2. Marketing Information in Files
3. Narrow Requirements Definition
4. Official Involvement
5. Replacement Period Unreasonable
6. Rushed Timing
7. Surplus Goods Replaced
8. Thin File Syndrome
13.5.2 Screening the Bidding & Selection Stage
The request for a proposal (RFP) provides contractors with an opportunity to submit bids 
for the provision of goods or services that meet the terms of the requirements definition 
and bid specifications. This process is intended to maximize the use of competition to 
ensure the company obtains the right goods and services at the best possible price.
The documents in a RFP provide prospective bidders with details on the eligibility of 
contractors, the specific work to be performed, and the type of goods to be delivered. They 
provide bidders with a complete guide to the preparation and submission of bids. Every 
interested bidder should be provided with identical tender documents.
After the proposals have been received and the deadline has passed, the award of the 
contract is based on many factors including price, responsiveness, and responsibility.
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Carelessly written bid specifications and contracts make it easier for a contractor to claim 
more money if the company later defines what it really wants. Vague specifications can 
suggest collusion between a company employee and the contractor. Similarly, an increase 
in price immediately after the award of the contract could suggest a possible problem.
For the sake of clarity and completeness, the red flags of fraud for competitive contracts are 
discussed separately from the red flags of fraud for sole-sourced or non-competitive 
contracts.
Red Flags in the Bidding & Selection Stage of Competitive Contracts
The following are the types of fraud that typically relate to the bidding and selection stage 
of competitive contracts:
• Bid rigging, collusive bidding or price fixing
• Bribery
• Conflict of interest
• False representations
• Information theft or bid fixing
• Phantom contractor
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
The following red flags could be indicative of such fraud:
1. Award Patterns. Certain contractors are consistently successful in one particular 
territory, or the same bidder is usually successful when contracting with one particular 
department but not with others.
2. Bidding Patterns.
• Certain contractors always bid against each other or, conversely, certain 
contractors never bid against one another.
• Bid prices drop when a new or infrequent bidder submits a bid.
• A certain contractor appears to be bidding substantially higher on some bids than 
on others with no logical cost difference to account for the increase.
• Certain companies within a group of contractors appear to submit the lowest bid. 
(This might indicate a market division by class of customer.)
3. Bid Fixing Correspondence.
• The file contains letters, notes, or memos by employees, former employees, or 
competitors that refers to the existence of agreements to fix bids and prices or 
otherwise restrain trade.
• A contractor states that he “does not sell in a particular area” or that “only a 
particular firm sells in that area.”
• A bidder or contractor states that it is not their turn to receive a contract.
4. Bid Specifications Unclear or Vague. Bid specifications are unclear or vague with respect 
to the standards of performance, timing, quantity or quality. Unclear bid specifications 
create potential fraud opportunities because they:
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• Open the door to the exercise of discretion by company employees in selecting a 
suitable contractor.
• Provide an opportunity for the contractor to recoup otherwise unrecompensable 
losses by falsely attributing them to the unclear bid specifications.
5. Bid Specifications Unrelated to Requirements Definition. Bid specifications are not 
consistent with the needs determination or requirements definition.
6. Changes to Specifications After Award but Prior to Contract Signing. New contract 
specifications that create the opportunity for overcharging are developed in 
consultation with the successful bidder and incorporated into the final contract.
7. Company/Alumni Involvement with Contractor. The involvement of former employees 
who own the company awarded the contract, or who commence working for the 
successful bidder subsequent to the contract award date.
8. Company Personnel Related to Contractor. Relationships involving a company manager or 
employee who has close professional or personal ties with a particular 
bidder/contractor or its officials, or is related, either by birth or by marriage, to a 
particular bidder/contractor or its officials.
9. Comparison of Bid Package Details.
• Bidders that ship their product a short distance bid more than those who must 
spend more to ship their product long distances.
• Identical bid amounts are specified for certain contract line items by two or more 
contractors.
• Identical calculations or spelling errors appear in two or more competing bids.
10. Competition Restricted. Proposal requests are made orally to only a few contractors, 
rather than published in a newspaper, or they appear in obscure publications, during a 
holiday period or on a weekend.
11. Consultant Involvement with Contractor. A consultant or the employee of a consultant 
who has close professional or personal ties with a particular bidder/contractor or its 
officials, is related, either by birth or by marriage, to a particular bidder/contractor or 
its officials, or is engaged to help develop the requirements, and then accepts a job 
with a potential bidder or acts as consultant to a potential bidder on the same 
requirements definition they helped develop for the company.
12. Contractor Meetings. Competing contractors regularly socialize or appear to hold 
meetings more frequently than regular trade and association meetings.
13. Contractor Selection Unjustified. The lowest bidder is not accepted even though the 
lowest bidder meets all the requirements for the contract, or the contract is awarded to 
a contractor with a history of poor performance.
14. Contractor/Subcontractor Relationships.
• A low bidder who withdraws from the contracting process later becomes a 
subcontractor of a higher bidder.
• The successful bidder repeatedly subcontracts to companies that submit higher 
bids or are qualified to act as prime contractors but do not submit bids.
• One contractor’s tender package includes the bids of subcontractors who are 
actually competing for the main contract.
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• The successful contractor subsequently uses unsuccessful bidders as subcontractors 
on the same project.
15. Dummy Bids.
• A bid is accepted from a contractor unqualified to meet the bid specifications.
• Bids were submitted that do not comply with obvious provisions of the bid 
specifications or contract requirements.
• Only one bidder has put forward a complete bid that meets the specifications and 
requirements in the tender documents while the others have simply thrown 
together corporate material only tangential to the contract.
16. Industry Price Lists. Competitors exchange price information among themselves from 
an “industry price list” or “price agreement” to which contractors refer in formulating 
their bids. Bidders refer to “association price schedules,” “industry price schedules,” 
“industry suggested prices,” “industry-wide prices,” or “market-wide prices.”
17. Narrow Bid Specifications. Specifications that create unnecessary restrictions in soliciting 
bids for competitive contracts—that typically fit the products or capabilities of only 
certain contractors or exclude contractors or products that would otherwise qualify for 
the contract. Examples include an unusual format for the submission of the proposal, 
a requirement that the bidder use only certain types of equipment, or limitations or 
restrictions related to the specific goods or services to be supplied.
18. No Audit Terms. The contract does not provide for an inspection or audit of all the 
contractor’s records relevant to the performance of the contract (including records of 
subsidiaries or related companies performing work in connection with the contract).
19. Official Involvement. Certain senior management or employees take an active interest in 
whether or not a certain bidder is awarded a contract, request information with 
respect to the details of a proposed contract, get closely involved in a contracting 
process outside their job responsibilities, or are unusually demonstrative in their 
support for the successful bidder.
20. Preferred/Unpreferred Contractor Documentation. An unusual amount of affirmative data 
on preferred contractors or an unusual amount of derogatory data on nonpreferred 
contractors is maintained in the file.
21. Rebid Patterns. New or supplementary bids are requested as a result of changes in the 
specifications after the initial bids have been opened, or certain contractors do not 
rebid when asked to do so.
22. Release of Confidential Information.
• Confidential contract information is released in advance or selectively to certain 
contractors.
• One or more contractors ask to receive the bid package prior to release of the 
invitation to tender.
• The successful bid contains specific information from company files that was not 
supplied in the tender call documents.
• Information is released to competing contractors by consultants or firms engaged 
prior to the tendering process.
• A nondisclosure agreement relating to sensitive information is not included in the 
files provided to consultants hired prior to the tendering process.
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23. Request for Proposal Mistakes. The tender call or request for proposal has a mistake 
(intentional) that would allow for a tender recall if the “preferred” contractor does not 
submit the lowest bid.
24. Rushed Timing. The tender call has an unusually short closing date, so that only bidders 
with inside knowledge would have the opportunity to prepare an adequate response. 
The time allotted to prepare the contract specification document or for the contractors 
to prepare and submit a proposal is short considering the total estimated dollar value 
of the contract or the complexity of the bid specifications. Rushed timing is often 
indicative of someone trying to circumvent the usual controls by creating a situation in 
which only those with advance information have enough time to prepare their bid.
25. Split Contract. Contracts have been split into two or more smaller amounts to avoid 
approval or authorization that would otherwise be required for larger sums.
26. Tender Changes. Bid documents appear to have been altered after submission.
27. Tender Deadline Exceptions. Tenders are opened prior to the deadline, or are received 
after the closing date but are not disqualified.
28. Withdrawals.
• The lowest bidder withdraws after submission of their tender.
• A bidder is allowed to withdraw from the contracting process without justification.
• A contractor withdraws from the contracting process without justification and is 
not required to forfeit the bid bond.
How Round Can a Number Be Case Study
A manufacturer of heavy equipment for the mining industry knew how to manage its 
production schedule so that it was nearly always profitable despite the cyclical nature of 
metal prices and its effect on demand for new equipment at the mines and smelters. It was 
noticed, however, that one plant seemed to be suffering gross margin pressure despite a 
continuing high level of equipment sales. It was also noticed that the onset of lower 
profitability coincided with the hiring of a new plant manager. An investigation by the 
internal security department discovered nothing out of the ordinary except that the new 
manager seemed to want to control everything at the plant, down to the smallest details of 
day-to-day operations.
As profits continued at inexplicably low levels, head office called in a team of forensic 
accountants to investigate the manager and the plant accounts. Rumors of the manager’s 
intrusive operating style caused the investigators to look at all transactions he had initiated 
or approved. Nothing turned up despite an extensive review of the relevant documents 
until one of the investigators noticed some peculiar numbers on a copy of the winning 
contract for a large supply of materials. Of the 52 items on the contract, 45 had unit prices 
that ended in 5 or 0. Of these 45 items, the price $1.75 appeared seven times and $4.30 
appeared five times. The three losing bidders had slightly higher prices such as $1.83 and 
$4.37 for the same items but lower prices on the other seven items.
A review of other contracts won by the same contractor and their comparison with those of 
the losers showed a similar pattern: slightly lower rounded numbers for all but a few items 
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for which the winning bidder’s unit price was higher. Further investigation showed that the 
few higher-priced items were always bought more frequently and in greater volumes than 
the many lower-priced items. Because of the higher unit prices and huge number of units 
purchased of the few items, the winning bidder’s contract was much more expensive than 
any of the losing bids.
Taking advantage of the manager’s signed waiver allowing the company to audit his use of 
company communications equipment, the investigators hired a computer forensics expert 
to recover deleted voice-mail and e-mail messages. The recovered messages revealed not 
only that the manager was colluding with the winning bidder but was also developing 
schemes with several other suppliers. When the manager and winner of the rigged bids 
were confronted with this evidence, the manager denied everything but the contractor 
spilled the whole story. The manager left the company voluntarily and agreed to repay the 
benefits he had received from the supplier. The plant returned to former levels of 
profitability.
Red Flags in the Selection Stage of Sole-Sourced or Other Non-Competitive 
Contracts
No bids are solicited for the awarding of sole-sourced or other non-competitive contracts; 
there is a selection process only. A requirements definition must be developed, and the 
contractor must meet the performance and evaluation criteria. This section addresses only 
those red flags involving the selection stage of sole-sourced and other non-competitive 
contracts.
The following are the types of fraud that typically relate to the selection stage of sole- 
sourced and other non-competitive contracts:
• Conflict of interest
• Purchases for personal use
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
• Small purchase order fraud or split purchases
• Unnecessary purchases
The following red flags could be indicative of these types of fraud:
1. Contracts Repeatedly Awarded to One Contractor.
• Goods and services are continually purchased from a single source without 
development of secondary suppliers.
• Goods or services are purchased from the same source or contractor over a long 
period of time, without documented verification of market price changes or 
documentation showing the existence of other providers
• No time limit set for mandatory review of the single source.
2. Conversion of Competitive Contract. A contract initiated in the competitive process is 
converted into a negotiated sole-source contract.
3. Documentation Supporting Sole-Source Contractor.
• Documentation in the file in support of sole-source or non-competitive contractor 
does not make sense or is overly descriptive or aggressive.
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• Employees working outside their job descriptions sign statements in support of sole­
source contractors.
4. Repeated Small Purchase Orders.
• Contracts have been split for the purpose of bypassing financial authority, or 
avoiding other levels of review.
• Purchases are split that in total would be above authorized spending limits.
These red flags may indicate the presence of fraud as shown in Table 13.5.
Table 13.5 Red Flags: Screening the Selection Stage of Sole-Source Contracts
















1. Contracts Repeatedly Awarded to 
the Contractor
2. Conversion of Competitive 
Contract
3. Documentation Supporting Sole- 
Source Contractor
4. Repeated Small Purchase Orders
Detecting Fraud in Sole-Sourced or Non-Competitive Contracts
In these types of fraud, there is usually some form of collusion between a company 
employee and a contractor. It is difficult, however, to obtain evidence of fraud from 
company sources during either the scrutinizing or in-depth examination phases. Secret 
commissions or kickbacks are even more difficult to detect and investigate as they are often 
considered to be a marketing cost by the contractor, which is one of the costs of doing 
business.
Contractors in the habit of offering secret commissions, kickbacks or other types of 
“benefits” will rarely make a direct and blatant offer. Contractors usually begin with subtle 
overtures as they look for the vulnerabilities of agents or employees, those areas in which 
they might be most easily exploited. They might begin by discussing the employee’s 
lifestyle, family, salary, or job satisfaction. They will probe into the hobbies or special 
interests of the employee. They may learn that the employee is a new homeowner, and 
then steer the discussion to the high cost of mortgages. They may suggest that a mortgage 
at a very favorable rate can be arranged perhaps from a related corporation. The employee 
may not even suspect a connection at the outset. As time goes on, additional benefits will 
be subtly arranged. Christmas and birthday gifts may arrive from the contractor, or 
expensive luncheons or dinners may be arranged. Once it becomes a habit for the 
employee to receive gifts and other minor benefits, the contractor will likely increase the 
amount. Cash, cars, and travel expenses will likely follow. Job offers and even corporate 
shares will usually put the employee under full control of the contractor.
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Conflict of Interest Case Study
A contractor met a senior manager of a company for the first time at a luncheon, and 
quickly learned that the manager had a great interest in quarter horses. He had a small 
farm and the contractor had a 500-acre ranch. As they were parting from the lunch, the 
contractor invited the manager to fly down to his ranch the next weekend to see a matched 
pair of quarter horses. The manager accepted without either party mentioning who would 
pay for the flight.
The following day a first-class return airline ticket arrived at the manager’s office. The 
contractor personally met the manager at the airport and joined him on the flight to the 
ranch. The manager offered to pay for the tickets, but the contractor said they could deal 
with money later.
Contrary to what he told the manager at the lunch, the contractor did not have the 
matched pair of quarter horses on his ranch. Before the manager arrived for the weekend, 
the contractor ordered two matched horses from a horse dealer and had them delivered to 
his ranch. The manager returned to the ranch with the contractor on four other occasions. 
Subsequently, the contractor offered the manager the job as president of his refining and 
smelting company, along with 60,000 shares of his company, which were valued at more 
than US$1.50 per share on the market.
Shortly thereafter, the manager approved a major contract for the contractor’s company. In 
this case, the pattern of conversation and dealings between the contractor and the official 
demonstrate that a conflict of interest had developed. At the outset, the manager had 
expected to pay for the airline tickets and other expenses. After the second trip to the 
ranch, there was no further mention of payment. The contractor had told the manager that 
he had set up an account receivable in the manager’s name and that the manager could 
pay the amount owed whenever he wished. The manager, of course, never paid any 
expenses. The process of discovering and proving that this conflict of interest existed was 
quite involved because little hard evidence was available.
13.5.3 Screening the Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage
During the contract performance and evaluation stage, the contract work is completed and 
approved, and progress reports and change orders are issued and approved. During this 
stage, the work specified in the contract is meant to be performed in accordance with the 
specific terms of the contract, which could include particulars as to the timing and due 
dates, sizes and quantities, volumes anticipated, and the skills of the people who are meant 
to fulfill the terms of the contract.
The following are the types of fraud that typically relate to the contract performance and 
evaluation stage:
• Change order abuse
• Conflicts of interest
• False representations
• Product substitution
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
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Red Flags in the Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage
The following red flags could be indicative of fraud involving the contract performance and 
evaluation stage:
1. Change Order Issued. A change order is issued on the contract without a valid justification 
for doing so.
2. Changes to Contract After Award. Changes are made in the definition of services required 
after the awarding of the contract. This provides the contractor with an opportunity to 
submit claims for losses based on these changes.
3. Complaints About Quality. Documentation in the file expressing concerns over possibly 
inferior goods or services.
4. Contract Extension. An emergency extension allows the contractor to complete the 
project after the completion date specified in the contract.
5. No Inspector on Site. There is no inspector on site to confirm that the contracted work is 
complete at the appropriate stage of the contract.
6. Performance Variations. Foreign-made products are provided where domestic products 
were required; contractor used untrained employees when skilled personnel were 
required.
7. Testing Certificates. No original test results or reports appear in the contract file 
(especially if required by the contract specifications), or tests performed by the 
contractor are not certified by an independent testing agency.
8. Verification of Contractor Performance. No formal procedures are in place to ensure the 
contracted work has actually been performed to specification; there is no formal 
program for inspection and quality assurance; goods and materials have not been tested 
as required by the contract specifications; the contracting department relies entirely on 
the contractor to ensure goods and services meet specifications; and employees rely 
completely on the contractor to carry out testing and assure the tests will adequately test 
the requirements of the contract.
The following table (Table 13.6) shows the types of fraud most commonly committed in 
the contract performance and evaluation stage, and the types of red flags that are indicative 
of such fraud.
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Table 13.6 Red Flags: Screening the Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage



















1. Change Order Issued
2. Changes to Contract After
It Has Been Awarded
3. Complaints About Quality
4. Contract Extension
5. No Inspector on Site
6. Performance Variations
7. Testing Certificates
8. Verification of Contractor
Performance
13.5.4 Screening the Billing & Payment Stages
Fraud in the billing stage usually involves the submission of false, inflated or unsupported 
invoices by the contractor. Fraud in the payment stage usually involves payment 
diversions, duplicate payments, or payments being made ahead of schedule.
Red Flags in the Billing & Payment Stages
The following red flags could be indicative of fraud involving the billing or payment stages:
1. Charges Higher Than Contracted. The rates actually charged by the contractor are higher 
than the rates quoted in the contract, or the contractor submits charges for services not 
included in the contract or in the bid specifications.
2. Contractor Complaints re: Non-Payment. The contractor complains that payment has not 
been made, or that the accounts are not being paid on a regular basis, or that certain 
invoices have been paid, while others are outstanding.
3. Cost Overruns. There are significant cost overruns on the contract.
4. Invoice Details. Whiteout is used on a document or contains seemingly irrelevant 
handwritten details, or products listed on the invoice are referenced by a product 
number only and provide no description of the nature of the goods provided.
5. Invoice Identification. Certain contractor or subcontractor invoices lack telephone 
numbers and/or have only a post office box as an address, or the contractor submits 
photocopies of invoices as support for charges on a cost-plus contract.
6. Invoices Not Certified as Paid. The contractor does not certify that the subcontractors’ 
invoices submitted on a cost-plus contract were paid.
7. Materials Not Yet Purchased. A progress payment claim made for materials is not 
supported by a paid subcontractor invoice.
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8. No System for Review of Contractor Invoices. Invoices are not cross-checked to previously 
submitted invoices for possible duplication.
9. “Payments”from Contractor to Company Personnel. The successful contractor provides 
gifts, parties, meals, or any other benefits to a company employee(s).
10. Timing of Progress Payment Charges. Progress payments do not appear to coincide with 
the contractor’s plan and ability to perform the contract.
11. Uncleared Checks Submitted as Proof of Payment. The contractor submits photocopies of 
only the front side of the check to show that the subcontractors’ invoices on a cost-plus 
contract were paid.
The following table (Table 13.7) shows the types of fraud most commonly committed in 
the billing and payment stages, and the types of red flags that are indicative of such fraud.
TYPE OF FRAUD THAT MAY BE INDICATED
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13.5.5 Screening for Off-Book Frauds
For ease of reference, the list of red flags previously outlined that may indicate the presence 
of off-book frauds such as bribery, secret commissions, kickbacks, and/or conflicts of 
interest, are listed below.
Requirements Definition
• Excessive stock acquired
• Marketing information in files
• Narrow requirements definition
• Official involvement
• Replacement period unreasonable
• Rushed timing
• “Surplus” goods replaced
• Thin file syndrome
Bidding and Selection
Red flags associated with competitive contracts:
• Award patterns
• Bid specifications unclear or vague
• Bid specifications unrelated to requirements definition
• Changes to specifications after award but prior to contract signing
• Company alumni involvement with contractor
• Company personnel related to contractor
• Competition restricted
• Consultant involvement with contractor
• Contractor selection unjustified
• Contractor/subcontractor relationships
• Narrow bid specifications
• No audit terms
• Official involvement
• Preferred/unpreferred contractor documentation
• Rebid patterns
• Release of confidential information
• Request for proposal mistakes
• Rushed timing
• Tender deadline exceptions
• Withdrawals
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Additional red flags associated with sole-sourced or other non-competitive contracts:
• Contracts repeatedly awarded to one contractor
• Conversion of competitive contract
• Documentation supporting sole-source contractor
Contract Performance & Evaluation
• Change order issued
• Changes to contract after it has been awarded
• Complaints about quality
• Contract extension
• No inspector on site
• Performance variations
• Testing certificates
• Verification of contractor performance
Billing & Payment
• Charges higher than contracted
• Cost overruns
• Invoice identification
• No system for review of invoices
• Payments from contractor to employees





Nature of Testing Nature of Interviews
Establish whether fraud has Fact-finding interviews 
occurred/who involved/how re: who & how 
done
As discussed earlier in this chapter, scrutinizing is the second phase in which the allegations 
identified as red flags in the screening phase are tested to determine whether or not fraud 
has occurred. This phase involves performing analyses, comparisons, interviews and/or 
other investigative procedures of a sample of transactions in order to understand the 
actions of the parties involved, and to identify whether there are any issues that should be 
subjected to a rigorous in-depth examination of all the available evidence. As one would 
expect, there are numerous different types of analyses, comparisons and other investigative 
procedures that could be performed in the scrutinizing phase; the specific approach to be 
taken would depend on the circumstances of the case. Rather than describing each of them, 
this section introduces the procedures that could be undertaken when scrutinizing suspect 
procurement contracts by providing steps or procedures that might be considered for at 
least one type of procurement fraud per stage in the procurement process as follows:
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Requirements Definition Stage: — Unnecessary Purchases
Bidding & Selection Stage: — Bid Rigging
Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage: — Product Substitution
Billing & Payment Stages: — Inflated Pricing
— Progress Payment Fraud 
or Front-End Loading
In addition, this section includes procedures that might be considered when investigating 
off-book frauds such as bribery, secret commissions and kickbacks, and conflicts of interest.
13.6.1 Scrutinizing the Requirements Definition Stage
Table 13.4, Red Flags: Screening the Requirements Definition Stage, in Section 13.5.1, (found in 
13.5, Screening Procurement Contracts) lists the red flags that may indicate the occurrence 
of the following types of fraud:
• Conflict of interest
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
• Unnecessary purchases
The steps involved in scrutinizing for conflicts of interest or secret commissions and 
kickbacks are addressed later in this chapter.
Scrutinizing for Unnecessary Purchases
The steps involved in scrutinizing for unnecessary purchases include performing additional 
research to confirm or refute the red flags found in the screening phase of the investigative 
process. The following are the types of procedures that could be performed/questions that 
could be asked:
1. Research Relative to the Goods or Services Acquired.
• Do the goods or services contracted for fit the profile of the department or division?
• How long has the company been using these particular goods or services?
• Were the goods or services actually delivered/provided?
• Are the goods or services being used by the department/division that originally 
ordered the goods or services? To what extent?
2. Internal Department or Agency Research.
• What level of employee or management approved or recommended the contract? Is 
the level too high or too low?
• How long has this “approving person” been in the department? In the company?
• How long has the “approving person” been dealing with this particular contractor?
• Did the company deal with this particular contractor prior to the approving person’s 
employment with the company?
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3. Contractor Research.
• Perform a background check to determine when the contracting company was 
incorporated. A recent incorporation could indicate a lack of stability, and could also 
indicate the company is a sham.
• Perform a background check on the officials or directors of the contractor’s 
company. This may reveal an association between the contractor and a company 
employee.
• Examine contractor documentation. Is the address a post office box, for example?
• Call the contractor using the telephone number listed in the files or on invoices.
• Consider the numerous potential sources of documents and information that can be 
obtained about a contractor from outside the company.
13.6.2 Scrutinizing the Bidding & Selection Stage
Section 13.5.2, Screening the Bidding and Selection Stage, lists the red flags that may indicate 
the occurrence of the following types of fraud:
• Bid rigging, collusive bidding or price fixing
• Bribery
• Conflict of interest
• False representations
• Information theft or bid fixing
• Phantom contractor
• Purchases for personal use
• Small purchase order fraud or split purchases
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
• Unnecessary purchases
Set out below are a number of investigative procedures that could be performed in the 
scrutinizing phase of the investigative process for bid rigging.
Scrutinizing for Bid Rigging
Bid rigging includes many forms of anti-competitive activity. The common thread running 
through such activities, however, is arrangements among contractors limiting competition. 
The variations on this theme are only limited by the imaginations of the contractors 
involved. Common schemes include the following:
1. Bid Suppression. Contractors agree among themselves that at least one will refrain from 
bidding or agree to withdraw a previously submitted bid to allow another bid to be 
accepted.
2. Complementary Bidding. Contractors submit unacceptably high token bids or bids with 
special but unacceptable terms. Such bids are not intended to win but to create the 
appearance of competition.
3. Bid Rotation. The colluding contractors submit bids but take turns submitting the lowest 
bid. Bid rotation schemes often follow a cyclical pattern or a pattern related to the size 
of the contract.
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4. Market Division. Contractors refrain from competing in a designated portion of a market 
divided by government department, customer, or geographic area. Contractors will not 
bid or will submit only complementary bids to a solicitation from a customer not 
assigned to them or in a different geographic area.
Bid rigging has been found to be prevalent in a number of industries, including: asphalt 
paving, bread-making, building construction, cigarettes, coal, dredging, electrical 
equipment, lumber, milk, retail gasoline, roofing, shipment of household goods, waste 
disposal, and wholesale produce.
To demonstrate that bid rigging has occurred, it is necessary to establish with a reasonable 
degree of certainty that an agreement has been made to restrain trade. It is necessary to 
establish that the contractors had a common arrangement to fix prices or discounts, and/or 
allocate customers, territories, or markets. The process of scrutinizing bid rigging, therefore, 
involves refuting or confirming the red flags of such an agreement. The following are some 
of the investigative procedures that could be performed:
1. Bidder Information. Perform corporate searches to find the date of incorporation plus 
names of directors and officers of each bidder.
2. Compare Bidder Histories.
• Compare specifications with previous similar contracts, perhaps from another 
department For example, a contract undertaken in one territory should be 
compared with a similar contract in another.
• Review previous contract files to determine timing, amount, and nature of each 
contractor’s involvement in other bids.
• Prepare a schedule comparing the details of each bid and each winning contractor. 
Identify whether there are any patterns.
• Examine each bidder’s previous contracts. Look for relationships with other 
contractors and subcontractors and any patterns of bidding on other jobs. Determine 
whether contractors switch places as contractor and subcontractor on different jobs.
• Look for large consortiums among competing contractors. Check each contractor’s 
involvement in a consortium or partnership arrangement on any other contract at 
the time the competitive bids were submitted.
• Follow up on any withdrawals to obtain their reasons for withdrawing from the 
bidding process.
3. Complaint Review. Examine all files and correspondence for any unauthorized release of 
information. Follow up on any complaints by employees or others about this particular 
contract or group of contractors.
4. Industry Review. Inquire of other departments, law enforcement or government agencies 
about collusive bidding in the contractor’s industry. Consider obtaining media searches 
on the industry/specific contractors. Consider obtaining price lists from other 
competitors.
5. Request for Proposal Review. Compare the requests for proposals with the requirements 
definition information/bid specifications information. Determine whether the 
documents are so specific that only certain contractor(s) can fill the requirements.
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13.6.3 Scrutinizing the Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage
Table 13.5, Red Flags: Screening the Contract Performance & Evaluation Stage, in Section 13.5.3, 
(found in 13.5, Screening Procurement Contracts), lists the red flags that may indicate the 
occurrence of the following types of fraud:
• Change order abuse
• Conflicts of interest
• False representations
• Product substitution
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
Set out below are a number of investigative procedures that could be performed in the 
scrutinizing phase of the investigative process for product substitution.
Scrutinizing for Product Substitution
Product-substitution is a vendor fraud that involves the delivery of goods or services below 
contract specifications without giving notice of the change but seeking reimbursement 
based on the higher standard in the contract. Typical instances of product substitution are 
as follows:
• Providing goods of a lesser quality than specified in the contract.
• Furnishing items produced by a manufacturer other than the original equipment 
manufacturer as specified in the contract.
• Furnishing items produced in a country other than that specified in the contract.
• Failing to conduct suitability and reliability tests specified in the contract.
• Using staff with lesser skills/qualifications to perform the services required in the 
contract.
This type of fraud typically occurs in the contract performance and evaluation stage.
The following are some of the investigative procedures that could be performed to 
determine whether product substitution has occurred:
1. Research Industry Complaints. Call competitors to determine the contractor’s reputation, 
and canvas other departments and public sources for complaints of inferior products or 
service.
2. Consult Employees and Contract Files. Ask employees who requested the goods or services 
whether the goods/services met their requirements; and determine whether the services 
contracted for were actually performed.
3. Examine the Inspection/Quality Review Process. Determine whether an inspection process 
has been used for other unrelated contracts performed for the company. Determine 
whether the inspection process was marginalized for this particular contract, or whether 
the inspection process is simply ineffective for the company as a whole.
4. Establish Quality of Prior Projects. Identify any previous contracts performed by this 
contractor, and establish whether any further contracts/expenditures have been 
required to remedy any quality deficiencies in previous contracts.
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13 .6.4 Scrutinizing the Billing & Payment Stages
Table 13.6, Red Flags: Screening the Billing & Payment Stages, in Section 13.5, Screening 
Procurement Contracts, lists the red flags that may indicate the occurrence of the following 
types of fraud:
• Duplicate invoices
• False invoices/inflated pricing
• Front-end loading
• Payment diversion
• Progress payment fraud and front-end loading
• Secret commissions and kickbacks
Set out below are a number of investigative procedures that could be performed in the 
scrutinizing phase of the investigative process for inflated pricing/cost mischarging, and in 
connection with progress payment fraud and front-end loading.
Scrutinizing for Inflated Pricing or Cost Mischarging
Most cost-plus and cost-per-unit contracts require the contractor to submit detailed certified 
documentation supporting cost or pricing data. The biggest risk relates to charges for 
unallowable costs that are concealed or misrepresented as allowable costs or are otherwise 
hidden in certain accounts not usually examined closely.
Labor costs are one of the easiest to mischarge because employees’ labor can be readily 
shifted from contract to contract with the stroke of a pen on their timecards. The only way 
to be absolutely certain that labor costs are charged to the correct contract is to observe the 
actual work of each employee, then check the accounting records to ensure the cost is 
charged to the right contract.
To prove that inflated pricing or cost mischarging has occurred, it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the suspect entry was not a mistake. Therefore, the process of scrutinizing 
for inflated pricing or cost mischarging must confirm or deny the contractor’s intent.
A few of the investigative procedures that could be performed in scrutinizing for inflated 
pricing and cost mischarging are identified below.
1. Competitor Pricing/Rate Reasonableness Testing. Call competitors that provide similar goods 
and services and compare prices. Note any large discrepancies.
2. Scrutinize Subcontractor Invoices. Look for discrepancies between physical addresses and 
post office box addresses. Verify the physical addresses. Check the telephone numbers. 
Look up the subcontractor in a telephone book or business directory and compare 
spelling, address, and other details to the invoice.
3. Historical Pricing Analysis. Compare prices charged on this contract with prices charged 
on prior contracts. Followup on any unexplained discrepancies.
Scrutinizing for Progress Payment Fraud and Front-End Loading
Progress payments are made as work moves through the stages of a contract. They are 
based on costs incurred, the percentage of work completed, or the completion of a 
particular stage of the contract. The purpose of progress payments is to provide contractors 
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with a continuing source of revenue to meet their contractual obligations. In some cases, 
the contractor’s work may be the subject of an inspection but, for the most part, companies 
rely solely on the contractor’s integrity that the contracted obligations have been carried 
out. If a contractor requests payment for costs not actually incurred, a fraud or other crime 
has been committed.
Progress payment fraud or front-end loading therefore occurs when a contractor submits a 
progress payment request based on false information, usually including a falsified certificate 
that the required stage of the contract has been completed.
The procedures that could be performed in scrutinizing for progress payment fraud and 
front-end loading include the following:
1. Scrutinize Files. Review monthly contract status management reports and obtain a 
detailed explanation of any differences between the scheduled completion dates and 
actual completion dates. Also obtain explanations for any time periods in the contract 
when the contracted work was performed much quicker than originally anticipated.
2. Scrutinize Invoices. Examine invoices to determine whether goods appear to have been 
shipped on odd dates such as weekends or holidays.
3. Contractor Review. Perform corporate searches to determine whether the contractor has 
declared bankruptcy or otherwise has cash flow difficulties.
4. Inspection of the Job Site. Visit personally or send a qualified person such as an engineer to 
check that work is actually progressing as reported in the contractor’s invoices.
13.6.5 Scrutinizing for Off-Book Frauds
In an earlier section of this chapter, we provided basic definitions of the following types of 
procurement fraud: bribery, secret commissions and kickbacks, and conflicts of interest. 
Each of these forms of procurement fraud are typically off-book frauds, but what is the 
difference between them? And if you suspect they’re occurring, how do you prove them? 
What are the elements of proving this type of procurement fraud?
Bribes, Secret Commissions, Kickbacks & Conflicts of Interest: The 
Differences
A secret commission is something that is paid after the fact—usually based on a percentage 
of the contract or the amount of the fraud; a bribe is something that is paid in advance— 
usually on a flat fee basis, or could be in the form of a perk; a kickback is something that is 
paid after the fact—again on a flat fee basis, or in the form of a perk; and a conflict of 
interest usually involves ownership of a contractor by an employee.
So essentially, the difference between each of these types of procurement fraud relates 
primarily to the timing and manner of the payment (see Table 13.8):
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Timing of Payment Amount
Table 13.8 Comparison of Bribes, Secret Commissions & Kickbacks
Bribes Paid before the contract is awarded, or Flat fee or a perk
before the fraud has been consummated
Kickbacks Paid after the contract has been awarded, 
or after the fraud has been consummated
Flat fee or a perk
Secret Commissions Paid after the contract has been awarded, °/o of contract or 
or after the fraud has been consummated fraud
Conflict of Interest Paid after the contract has been awarded, 
or after the fraud has been consummated
Paid indirectly via 
the employee’s 
ownership interest
Bribes, Secret Commissions, Kickbacks & Conflicts of Interest:
Proving Them
Off-book frauds can be quite difficult to prove... as the records relating to the specific 
payments involved are all off-book, where the fraudulent payment from the contractor to 
the employee occurs outside of the books of the business. Proving such off-book frauds 
therefore involves establishing inappropriate relationships that are to the benefit of two or 
more parties, and are to the detriment of a third.
But how does one establish that an inappropriate relationship is occurring? What are the 
symptoms of this? What does an inappropriate relationship look like? What makes a 
relationship “inappropriate”?
The answers to these questions can be found by studying the following “triangle of 
dishonesty”:
“TRIANGLE OF DISHONESTY”
If an employee exercises “influence” in a way that would benefit a particular contractor in 
exchange for an “inappropriate perk”, they are involved in a triangle of dishonesty.
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Influence (A) could be exercised by an employee in a variety of ways at various stages in the 
procurement process:
• In the requirements definition stage, the employee could provide “justification” for the 
purchase of goods or services that are not needed.
• In the bidding and selection stage, the employee could engage in influence-peddling 
regarding the decision to award a contract to one particular supplier over another— 
through false testimonials, or other internal communications to sway the ultimate 
decision-maker, or the employee could provide confidential information to the supplier 
that would enable them to prepare a bid that would appear to be more attractive to the 
employer from a cost or quality perspective.
• In the contract performance and evaluation stage, the employee could provide false 
evaluation reports on the supplier’s performance under the contract.
• In the billing and payment stage, the employee could approve invoices for amounts that 
are higher than appropriate.
The benefit (B) to a supplier is generally in the form of a lucrative contract where:
• The supplier can earn a relatively high level of (legitimate) profit; or
• The supplier can earn “extra profits” (with the assistance of the employee) through 
another form of procurement fraud such as false or inflated invoices, or product 
substitution.
The inappropriate perk (C) could be paid from the supplier to the employee in the form of 
gifts, cash, travel, entertainment, consulting fees, home renovations, or other types of 
personal benefits.
Section 13.5.5, Screening for Off-Book Frauds, lists the red flags that may indicate the 
occurrence of these types of fraud.
Such red flags are identified and initially confirmed in the screening process, and must then 
be scrutinized before establishing that a full-scale investigation is warranted. Falsified 
records may complicate this process. The investigative procedures that would typically be 
performed in the scrutinizing include establishing evidence related to each of the three 
sides of the triangle of dishonesty: the influence, benefit and perk. This often involves 
examining the relationships of the parties involved, and obtaining circumstantial evidence 
to confirm or refute the concerns raised in the screening stage of the procurement 
investigation process. The scrutinizing steps that could be performed include the following:
1. Review of Supplier Background. Check out the ownership of the supplier’s company. 
Identify all the supplier’s related companies or businesses. The supplier may not 
necessarily be the party who paid the benefit.
2. Examine the Nature of the Relationship Between Supplier and Employees. Determine the 
nature of any relationship between the supplier and the employee suspected of having 
received a benefit. Discovery of a relationship could establish the motive for the 
payment of the alleged secret commission.
3. Review of Employee Lifestyle. Gather information about employees in an unobtrusive 
manner to find out if any employees:
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• are living beyond their means, that is, have cash, assets such as expensive cars or 
jewelry, or lifestyles that include expensive vacations or gambling that cannot be 
accounted for by known sources of income. Salary information may be required.
• have personal or social commitments involving one or more suppliers.
4. Review of Employee Roles and Responsibilities. Establish whether the suspected employee 
has any authority to sign checks, authorize purchases, or grant credit up to a certain 
limit. Has that limit been strictly observed?
5. the Relationship Between Employee Decision Making and Benefits Gained. Determine 
whether the suspected employee has acted beyond the scope of his or her normal 
responsibilities to approve or influence the approval of transactions. Compare the 
timing of the benefit with decisions made by the suspected employee. Determine 
whether the contractor benefited. For instance, did a contractor win a contract around 
the time of an alleged secret commission payment?
13.7 In-Depth Examination of Suspect Procurement Contracts
Phase Primary Objective Nature of Testing Nature of Interviews
In-Depth Obtain final proof for Detailed testing/beyond a Accusatory interviews
Examination court purposes reasonable doubt
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the in-depth examination phase is the third phase, and 
is the “formal investigation phase.” It involves detailed document analysis, analytical 
techniques and interviews, to prove the fraud.
In the in-depth examination phase, the investigative procedures performed would include 
interviewing persons involved in or with knowledge of any apparent fraudulent scheme. 
The investigative process would include identifying, and then interviewing individuals in 
possible conflict with the contractor or any of the suppliers or subcontractors. Employees 
terminated by the contractor, the supplier, or the subcontractor are usually willing to 
provide details of any wrongdoing.
The in-depth examination phase also requires analyses of a wide range of documentary 
evidence. Typical evidence examined at this stage includes evidence related to the 
activities of any suspect including debt levels and servicing, gambling, alcohol or drug use, 
and any other unusual behavior.
For instance, expense accounts or assets under the control of an employee should be 
reviewed. Contractors and employees may frequent the same restaurants or belong to the 
same social or sports clubs. A comparison of the employee expense accounts with those of 
the contractor may indicate an undisclosed relationship.
The types of investigative procedures that are performed during the in-depth examination 
phase can be quite intrusive; accordingly, there are numerous legal and ethical 
considerations that must be addressed in order to ensure that any evidence gathered is, in 
fact, admissible, to maximize the level of co-operation of those being investigated, and to 
minimize the likelihood of a legal claim by the parties being investigated:
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• How to conduct interviews
• How to gather and preserve evidence
• What is considered relevant evidence
• Legal evidentiary issues
• Employee/employer legal issues
Typical steps undertaken to address these concerns include the following:
1. Establish the care, custody, and control of all available documents relating to the 
contract.
2. Inform the corporate authorities of the current situation and its direction.
3. Consider the interview process:
• Should other people within the department or contractor’s organization be 
interviewed?
• Should other contractors be interviewed?
• Does the investigator have a right to meet with these people and examine their 
documents?
4. How far back in time should one go?
5. Is additional documentation necessary and available? If so, where?
6. Does the available evidence form a pattern?
7. Evaluate the evidence and present the results to general counsel for his or her 
consideration and reaction strategy.
8. Decide whether to consult experts.
Evidence may consist of statements from witnesses, confessions of perpetrators, documents, 
and perhaps the report of an expert.
13.7.1 In-Depth Examination of the Requirements Definition Stage
There are numerous different types of investigative steps that could be performed in the in- 
depth examination phase of a procurement fraud investigation. The types of steps chosen, 
and the degree to which they are successful, will be dependent upon the type of 
procurement fraud suspected, the extent of evidence available, and the degree to which the 
investigator is entitled to, and is successful in obtaining, the evidence required.
Set out below are some investigative procedures that could be performed when 
investigating allegations involving concerns arising at the requirements definition stage 
specifically related to the possibility of unnecessary purchases.
In-Depth Examination for Unnecessary Purchases
1. Analysis of Contractor Records. Obtain the contractor’s financial statements and calculate 
the total dollar value of all contracts awarded to this contractor as a percentage of the 
contractor’s total revenue to measure the contractor’s dependence on the company. 
Calculate the total dollar value of the contracts awarded to one particular contractor as a 
percentage of all the contracts awarded by the company or department to measure the 
degree to which the company is dependent on the contractor.
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2. Interviews of Company Employees. Interview company employees who ordered the goods 
or services to find out why the goods or services were ordered but not used.
3. Interviews of Other Suppliers. Contact other suppliers of the same goods or services to 
determine their use. Look for excessive support or total rejection of what these goods or 
services can do.
4. Interview of Consultants. Interview consultants who may have carried out pre-contract 
studies or analyses. Determine the nature of any relationships between such consultants 
and the successful bidders.
5. Conflict Analysis. Examine the involvement of any employee from other divisions or a 
related department. If these individuals have been involved in obtaining information or 
preparing the needs or requirements documents, their relationship with the successful 
bidder must be determined, even if they are senior management.
13.7.2 In-Depth Examination of the Bidding & Selection Stage
Set out below are some investigative procedures that could be performed when 
investigating allegations involving concerns arising at the bidding and selection stage of the 
procurement process, specifically related to the possibility of bid rigging.
In-Depth Examination for Bid Rigging
1. Interview of Employees and Consultants. The topics addressed during such interviews could 
include:
• Checking for any irregularities in the tendering and awarding of the contract. 
Interviewees may not come out and say there were irregularities, but their demeanor 
could indicate their feelings.
• Determine whether any former employee is now employed by the contractor or if 
there are any other unreported relationships. Excessive support by one employee or 
senior manager could indicate a relationship with the successful bidder or a 
relationship with the real beneficiary of a fix in the bid process.
• Determine whether there is any preference for one contractor over another.
2. Interview of Unsuccessful Bidders Concerning the Bidding Process. The topics addressed during 
such interviews could include:
• Excessive complaints or no complaint at all, which may indicate further evidence of 
a problem.
• Praise of the successful bidder, which could indicate the bidders fixed the process 
themselves.
13.7.3 In-Depth Examination of the Contract Performance & 
Evaluation Stage
Set out below are some investigative procedures that could be performed when 
investigating allegations involving concerns arising at the contract performance and 
evaluation stage of the procurement process, specifically related to the possibility of 
product substitution.
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In-Depth Examination for Product Substitution
1. Interview Testing Organization’s Employees. Determine whether testing was actually 
performed and obtain test results.
2. Engage Technical Experts. Have independent experts carry out an examination of the 
technical aspects of the products or services in question.
3. Customs Follow-Up. For contracts specifying only foreign goods, use a qualified 
investigator to verify the types, quality, and quantity of items imported; compare these 
to the contracted products. Do a search by type of product and address of importer to 
determine whether the contractor is importing the contracted goods under another 
name.
4. Interview of Company Employees and Management. Interview users to find out whether the 
service or goods were satisfactory. Poor performance but continued use identifies a 
problem.
13.7.4 In-Depth Examination of the Billing & Payment Stages
Set out below are some investigative procedures that could be performed when 
investigating allegations involving concerns arising at the billing and payment stages of the 
procurement process, specifically related to the possibility of inflated pricing or cost 
mischarging, and progress payment fraud and front-end loading.
In-Depth Examination for Inflated Pricing or Cost Mischarging
1. Interview Subcontractors. Contact subcontractors and discuss the nature of their work. 
Obtain evidence of completed work.
2. Pricing Review. Compare catalog prices and service rates to the contract prices.
3. Timecard Review. Obtain a complete employee list and all timecards for the contracted 
work. Examine signatures on timecards for forgery or tracing through carbon. Examine 
timecards for changes to the contract number charged.
4. Review of Cost Allocations. Obtain all journal entries and allocation worksheets showing 
all cost allocations between contracts, particularly between cost-plus and fixed-cost 
contracts. Investigate any adjustments. Be aware that the contractor may claim the 
adjustments were necessary because of accounting errors. Examine the alleged 
accounting errors.
In-Depth Examination for Progress Payment Fraud and Front-End Loading
1. Contractor Review. Examine the contractor’s subcontractor files for evidence of 
nonpayment for goods or services charged to the company by the contractor. Obtain 
financial statements and cash flow projections to determine whether the contractor is 
able to meet its liabilities.
2. Company File Review. Do a complete audit of all cost-plus submissions.
3. Subcontractor Review. Telephone or write suppliers to verify their existence and that they 
supplied the goods and work specified. Verify the prices, quantity, and quality of the 
goods or services supplied.
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13.7.5 In-Depth Examination for Off-Book Frauds
The investigative procedures to be followed in an in-depth examination for secret 
commissions, bribery, kickbacks or conflicts of interest could include:
1. Review of Financial Statements of Contractor. Examine the contractor’s financial records to 
establish the nature of any relationship and the extent of any dealings. Bear in mind that 
dishonest contractors regard secret commissions as a cost of doing business and will 
include them in their records suitably disguised as expenses.
2. Review of Accounting and Banking Records of Contractor. Determine the form and purpose of 
the alleged secret commission by reviewing the accounting and banking records of the 
contractor. Does the alleged secret commission take the form of cash or payments to the 
benefit of the recipient, e.g., travel or a car? The books of account of the payor or of the 
appropriate related company will have to be reviewed for supporting documentation 
such as checks and supplier invoices. This review should also disclose how such 
payments were recorded by the payor.
In general, these payments are recorded as either an expense or a loan.
• If the payment is recorded as a loan to the recipient:
— What was the purpose of the loan?
— Does a promissory note exist?
— Has any interest been charged on the loan or has any interest been collected?
— What are the terms of repayment, if any, and have any repayments been made?
— If the loan has been repaid, was a check presented for payment and did it clear 
the banking system?
• If the payment was recorded as an expense:
— Establish the nature of the expense, for example, promotion travel, and whether such 
payments are in the normal course of business or reflect an unusual transaction.
— Obtain documents such as invoices, purchase orders, contract or shipping documents 
that describe the goods or services being paid for.
3. Review of Personal Financial Affairs of the Employee. Review the suspected employee’s 
known assets by performing a search to determine how and when such assets were 
acquired; obtain any documentation in support of these purchases. Examine the 
personal financial affairs of the employee; this may help establish a lifestyle inconsistent 
with income.
4. Interview Contractor. Interview the contractor to discover what he or she knows about the 
company’s need for goods or services or whether the contractor got the contract 
through a possible link to a particular employee.
13.8 Analytical Techniques
There is no one correct method or process for analyzing evidence. The type of analysis 
required will depend on the nature of the allegations. This section will review some typical 
types of analysis that should be familiar to the investigator. Some of the types of analysis 
that can be conducted are:
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4. Net worth analysis
5. Statement of cash-flows analysis
6. Source and use of funds analysis
Vertical Analysis
Vertical analysis, which is sometimes referred to as common-size analysis, examines the 
relationships between line items on an income statement, balance sheet, or statement of 
cash flows by expressing components as percentages.
In the vertical analysis of an income statement, for example, net revenues is assigned 100 
percent. For a balance sheet, total assets is 100 percent. All other line items are expressed 
as a percentage of these two numbers. When completing the analyses, the changes must be 
material.
Horizontal Analysis
Horizontal analysis examines the year-over-year change in individual financial statement 
line items as a percentage. Each line of the base year is assigned 100 percent. The changes 
in subsequent years are computed as a percentage of the base year’s balances.
Ratio Analysis
Ratio analysis can be helpful in detecting potential errors and other irregularities with 
respect to various balance-sheet and income items.
Net Worth Analysis
Net worth analysis is used to prove the suspect’s assets or expenditures for a given period 
exceed that which can be accounted for from known sources of income. This tool is most 
useful when the recipient is taking cash or other payments which cannot be traced directly 
and when the amount greatly exceeds legitimate income. It is often used by the Internal 
Revenue Service. Net worth analysis is also useful in bribery and corruption cases (off- 
books). The two methods for completing net worth analysis are the assets method and the 
expenditures method, and are described in the following:
Assets Method
The assets method should be used when the suspect has invested supposedly illegal funds to 
increase net worth. The steps to complete this analysis are to:
1. Establish a base period such as the year before the one in question.
2. Compute the suspect’s net worth at the end of the base year. Identify all assets at cost 
and all known liabilities. The difference is the net worth.
3. Repeat the computation for the year in question using the same method.
4. Determine the suspect’s known income during year two, and subtract known expenses 
for year two. The difference between the suspect’s income and expenses equals the 
increase or decrease in net worth from year one to year two attributed to known 
sources.
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5. Subtract the increase in net worth from known sources from the total increases in net 
worth to determine the amount from unknown sources.
6. Repeat the computations as necessary for subsequent years.
Expenditures Method
This expenditures method is best used when the suspect spends allegedly ill-gotten gains on 
lavish living, travel, and entertainment. Expenditures in excess of known revenues are 
unexplained income. The steps to complete this analysis are:
1. Establish the suspect’s known expenditures for the relevant year. Expenditures include 
the use or application of funds for any purpose. These expenditures include deposits to 
bank accounts, purchase of major assets, travel and expenses, payment of loans, and 
payment of credit cards.
2. Identify all sources of funds available to the suspect. These funds include cash on hand 
from previous years’ loans and gifts.
3. Conclude that the amount in excess of known income shows the expenditures 
attributable to unknown sources.
Key Points in Determining Net Worth
The auditor should consider the following in determining net worth:
1. All assets should be valued at cost, not fair-market value.
2. Ignore depreciation or appreciation.
3. Give the suspect the benefit of the doubt when estimating income or assets.
4. Factor in expenses for living, such as food and entertainment.
5. Consider interviewing the suspect to identify all alleged sources and to rebut later 
defenses.
Statement of Cash-Flows Analysis
Cash is the asset most often pilfered. Analysis of the statement of cash flows can be useful 
in detecting fraud in small businesses. For example, suppose the bookkeeper 
misappropriated cash instead of paying the company’s bills. The statement of cash flows 
highlights the significant increase in payables. Cash receipts were stolen over a period of 
years and the statement of cash flows shows one of the following:
— A significant increase in receivables
— Cash, as a percentage of sales, decreasing over time
Source and Use of Funds Analysis
The purpose of a source and use schedule is to provide an overview of the flow of funds. A 
source and use schedule can show the individuals involved in the transactions and the 
benefits obtained from the use of the funds. The level of examinable detail will be 
determined by the availability of documents. There may be a number of disbursements for 
which the canceled check is missing, or a number of deposits whose origin is unknown. 
The investigator should ensure the information in the source and use schedule is complete 
and accurate. The integrity of the investigator’s work will be undermined if the schedule 
contains errors.
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Methods of Displaying the Results of Analysis
Chronologies. Chronologies tell the story of events by organizing information along a 
time line. This narrative can be developed through interviews. A sequencing of all relevant 
documents can also be prepared. Comparisons of chronologies can expose inconsistencies 
between witness statements and documentary evidence. Such conflicts may be important to 
investigations such as bid rigging where the sequence of events is critical.
Chronologies keep the investigation team focused on the relevant events. They can also 
highlight gaps requiring further investigation. Comparing chronologies may also lead the 
investigators to a better understanding of the issues. The behavior of a certain person may 
be explained by a change in their personal situation.
Charts and Graphs. The fundamental purpose of charts is to present complex issues 
organized into a simple, easy-to-understand format. They can be used in a variety of ways, 
such as illustrating relationships between individuals and/or companies or visualizing the 
flow of information within an organization.
Graphs are similar to charts in that they, too, are used to simplify the presentation of 
information, especially quantifiable information. For example, monthly sales figures may 
be more easily understood as a line or bar chart than as a column of numbers. Graphs tend 
to have a greater impact than a column of numbers because the use of pictures puts the 
numbers in context. A graph of an individual’s monthly expenses, for example, may 
highlight a shift in the spending pattern that corresponds to a known event such as the 
awarding of a contract. Graphs can be used to play up the strengths of one own position, or 
point out the deficiencies of one’s adversary. They can also be used to great effect in 
reports and later in court.
13.9 Reporting Fraud in Procurement Contracts
At the conclusion of the in-depth examination stage of the fraud detection process, the 
auditor should be in a position to recommend various options:
• A full formal investigation
• A loss recovery action be instituted on behalf of the company
• A disciplinary action be taken against an employee and the case referred to general or 
corporate counsel
• No further action is necessary since the suspicions were unfounded
Such recommendations should be made in a written report to management. If management 
decides to take the case further, other reports are likely to be required for legal counsel or 
government agencies. Once a case is referred to such agencies, a process of loss recovery, 
criminal investigation, or other action may be contemplated.
If the auditor recommends the case go forward, the reports to management and legal 
counsel should request a decision on how to proceed. Both reports should thus be written 
simultaneously and have similar content.
As the case progresses, it becomes more organized and the evidence becomes easier to 
manage. The reporting process would also be greatly simplified by an organized approach 
to handling the evidence.
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13.9.1 Organization of Evidence
Some cases may produce up to 100 binders of documents and working papers. It is 
therefore vital to prepare indices for notes on findings. The casebook or working paper files 
can then list the various documents and issues of the case that forms the basis of the written 
report.
The preparation of a complete index requires a command of the facts of the case. Such 
knowledge, however, is usually not gained until near the end of the case. Accordingly, any 
useful interim index must be capable of expansion and reorganization as the case 
progresses. As the index expands, it may be necessary to create subindices to group-related 
documents and issues. Such organization keeps the auditor from becoming lost in the 
paperwork. The lack of good housekeeping practices is probably the chief cause of 
misplaced documents or forgotten information.
The documents filed in the working papers would typically include copies of documents 
used as evidence for the case, file notes, and memoranda prepared by the auditor. The 
copies used in the working paper files would be one of the two sets of copies taken of the 
original documents (the other set being retained to prepare the document brief). At the 
time of copying, post-it notes placed on the original documents would facilitate gathering 
the original evidence required for submission in court. If one document relates to more 
than one section of the working paper file, it would be advisable to copy that document for 
inclusion wherever needed elsewhere in the file.
13.9.2 Working Paper File Sections
Most working paper files would contain similar types of documents. Standardization of the 
filing method for these documents makes it possible for any auditor to find his way around 
a given case. Included in this section is a list of documents typically included in a fraud 
detection file prepared by auditors or designated employees. Since the order of these 
documents has not been finalized, it is up to auditors or designated employees to determine 
a suitable organizational standard for their working paper files.
Case Indices
Case indices should be prepared for each file. If a case requires more than one file, master 
indices should be filed in the front of each file. It may even be necessary to prepare indices 
of the indices, if the case is unusually complex. The indices should cover not only the issues 
of the case but also the overview and background records.
Reports
All reports presenting findings in summary form to either management or external 
agencies, should be filed in the working paper files. Among these reports should be drafts 
of all reports seen by others.
Outstanding Matters
This section contains all material pertaining to methodology and any incidental materials. 
Monitoring such loose ends may be crucial to a large investigation especially since there is 
no standard methodology of fraud detection.
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As the case develops, this section will likely be subdivided into a small number of broad 
subject areas. As procedures are completed, such documents should be annotated and 
retained to record the methodology when preparing the report.
Case Overview
The case overview should be represented by a chart of the relevant issues or red flags and 
any conclusions. If the case cannot be represented on one sheet of paper, either the person 
preparing the overview chart does not understand the case, or the case is too complicated. 
Such a chart should be prepared right at the beginning of the fraud detection process to 
show what is known. This overview should change as new information changes the focus of 
the auditor’s attention. This case overview will form the basis for organizing the evidence 
and the findings section of the working papers file.
Chronology of Events
A case chronology permits new documentation and information to be put into perspective. 
The chronology may include timing details for all the issues of the case, or, if the case is 
complex, there may be an overall chronology of significant events and then 
subchronologies of events relating to particular issues.
Key Player Profiles
The particulars of all witnesses and suspects should be listed together with the details of 
their involvement. This information is useful in detecting inconsistencies or gaps in later 
interviews or other evidence.
Contact Lists
All investigators should also be listed along with a description of their role in the fraud 
detection process and their telephone number(s). This list should be available to all 
individuals working on the case.
Correspondence
All correspondence and attachments should be filed by date. Correspondence received 
should be date-stamped. If these documents contain information required elsewhere in the 
file, copies should be made and filed in the appropriate place.
Diary Entries
This section includes all records of meetings, telephone calls, and interviews. If the case is 
large enough, such documentation might be split into several files. Meeting records should 
include the date, time, and place of the meeting; the names of those attending; the topics 
discussed; and a summary of all points resolved. Telephone logs should record the name of 
the caller, date, and time of the call; and the topics discussed. Preparatory notes should be 
filed together with interview transcripts. As new issues come up in the course of the 
interview, a new working paper should be opened. This practice keeps topics distinct and 
allows the auditor to build files in the relevant case sections.
Time Estimates
Although time estimates are difficult to prepare, a “best-guess” must be made near the 
beginning as to the total estimated time for completion. This time estimate can be used in 
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staffing decisions and in estimating when the case will be ready for the report preparation 
stage.
Legal Documentation
Copies of all relevant legal documentation should be obtained and filed in the working 
paper files for future reference. For example, a civil case file would usually include a 
statement of claim, a statement of defense, and a statement of counterclaim. The attorney 
on the case should be able to provide such documentation.
Findings and Supporting Documentation
All issues addressed in the case overview should be supported by working papers and their 
related documents. Flexibility in working paper file organization should permit change as 
the case overview changes.
Once the working paper file has been completed, the process of preparing a report should 
be fairly simple, since the working paper file should already include all the findings. During 
the writing of the report, there should be few, if any, calculations required.
13.9.3 The Formal Report
Most reports issued to either the company or external legal counsel will have similar 
contents. Below is a list (in no particular order) of the types of things most often included in 
reports:
1. Summary of Findings. All points addressed in the case overview and the auditor’s 
procedural recommendation should be included.
2. Scope. The scope of the auditor’s examination should be described in any report. This 
would normally include a list based on the indices of the records and other evidence 
examined.
3. Approach. The methodology used should be patterned after the case overview and may 
include the completed procedures as documented in the outstanding matters section.
4. Findings. The text of the case findings should be written simply and chart summaries 
and graphs used to support the findings.
5. Summary Charts and Graphs. These documents should be filed as appendices to the 
report and cross-referenced to the supporting documentation.
6. Document Brief. A document brief is a collection of documents to be entered as exhibits 
in court. Document briefs are usually indexed and the pages numbered consecutively to 
facilitate cross-referencing during the formal investigative process and court 
proceedings.
13.9.4 Evidence
The in-depth examination phase gathers additional evidence to support the allegations or 
suspicions noted in the screening and scrutinizing stages. Evidence is required to perform 
procedures such as the following:
• Summarizing and explaining the accounting or other systems and any paper trail
• Analyzing accounting and other records to identify additional areas of concern
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• Describing the position and responsibilities of the suspect within the system
• Demonstrating the control exercised by the suspect on the accounting system
• Showing the suspect’s knowledge of the accounting system
• Establishing and demonstrating any patterns of the fraud cover-up
• Establishing and proving the extent of the fraud
• Establishing and proving the financial position of the suspect
• Considering the position of other people within the organization and the possibility of 
collusion
• Documenting findings fully
Some of the evidence necessary to perform procedures such as these might have been 
gathered in the screening and scrutinizing phases. Evidence may also be gathered during 
interviews.
Since oral evidence alone will not support either a criminal or a civil action, the auditor 
must retrieve other types of evidence. How much evidence is enough? That depends on 
the type of action to be taken, either civil or criminal.
It is therefore necessary for fraud auditors to be aware of the rules of evidence and other 
related issues. This knowledge will affect the way an auditor conducts the screening, 
scrutinizing, and in-depth examination phases of the fraud detection process. Evidence 
must be gathered and preserved in a form acceptable to the courts.
13.9.5 Practical Issues
In any case involving documentary evidence, the auditor is faced with three questions:
1. What documents should be obtained?
2. What is their source?
3. How should they be handled?
Deciding on What Documentation to Obtain
What documents to obtain should be decided during the screening and scrutinizing phase 
with a view to the in-depth examination. Such decisions will be based on meetings with, 
witnesses and initial assessments of findings. The types of financial documentation likely to 
be required include:
• Documents showing the movement of assets into and out of the company, contractor, or 
third parties during the period under investigation
• Books of account, management reports, and statistical analyses pertaining to the 
contractor or to an individual for the period under investigation
• Relevant correspondence and personal documents such as bank account records
Obtaining Documentation
Once the auditor has decided what records or other documents must be obtained, a list 
should be prepared. This list can be used when obtaining permission to take originals or 
copies or could form the basis of a subpoena. Document descriptions should include at 
least the type and period required. This description can then form the basis of an 
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acquisition strategy that avoids “fishing expeditions.” Support may be gathered from 
sources such as:
• Public documents
• Documents provided voluntarily
• Witness interviews
This material will also be useful for the formal investigation stage.
Handling the Documents
Documents obtained during any stage of the fraud detection process must be carefully 
handled, properly identified, and cataloged. They must not be written upon, altered, 
stapled, or unstapled during the course of the examination.
The chain of custody must be recorded for all documentary evidence that may be used in 
court. All such documents should be marked, identified, inventoried, and preserved to 
maintain their original condition. If gaps in the chain occur, the evidence may be 
challenged in court on the theory that the writing or information on the evidence is not 
original or is not in its original condition and is therefore of doubtful authenticity. For any 
document to be admissible as evidence, it is necessary to prove that it is the same 
document that was obtained and in the same condition. It should be marked at the time of 
seizure for later identification. Because several persons may handle it between acquisition 
and presentation in court, the complete chain of custody must be recorded. To maintain 
the integrity of the document, the auditor must follow strict rules of evidence handling.
The auditor must mark the documents for later identification in court that they are indeed 
the documents seized and that they are in the same condition as when seized. The auditor 
may, for instance, initial and date each document in the margin, in a comer or some other 
inconspicuous place. If such marking risks rendering the document open to question on the 
grounds of defacement or other alteration, the auditor should make a copy for his files, 
then seal the original in an envelope and write a description on the front.
These techniques should be applied any time the auditor comes into possession of an 
original document that may be used as evidence in a trial. Steps should be taken to 
preserve the copy’s authenticity in case it is needed to replace the original in court.
Once the documents have been marked, identified, and cataloged, photocopies should be 
made to provide working copies for use when preparing schedules, completing interviews, 
and building the working paper files. If one fresh copy is taken which is never marked, the 
process of preparing a document brief will be that much easier.
13.10 Procurement Fraud Checklist
The following Procurement Fraud Checklist is designed to assist CPAs in addressing 
procurement fraud.
Generally, all No answers require investigation and follow-up. Use the Ref column to cross­
reference the checklist to any additional working papers. The Checklist is intended for 
general guidance and information only. Use of the Checklist does not guarantee the 
prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute for audit or similar 
procedures.
56 Fraud Supp. 5—2005
Chapter Thirteen: Detecting Procurement Fraud
Table 13.9 Procurement Fraud Checklist
PROCUREMENT FRAUD CHECKLIST Yes No N/A Ref
1. Needs Assessment
a. Is there a real problem that requires a needs 
assessment?
b. Does the needs assessment provide sufficient detail to 
justify the project or the performance specifications 
required?
c. If the need is real, is this contract necessary or could the 
problem be solved in-house?
d. Has the alternative been thoroughly examined as to 
materials, labor, time, etc.?
2. The Contract
a. Have contract performance standards been established?
b. Have in-house levels of authority been set for approval 
of the contract?
c. Is tendering necessary or could this contract be let on a 
sole-source basis?
d. If tendering is necessary, has a list of qualified 
contractors been developed based on technical, 
financial and management criteria?
e. Has the draft procurement contract been compared 
with the original needs assessment?
f. Has legal counsel been asked to be involved in the 
process of drafting the contract?
g. Does the request for proposal (RFP) contain all the 
elements of the needs assessment?
h. Is the contractor expected to provide technical and 
financial reports?
i. Is a process in place for monitoring contractor 
performance?
j. Is a process in place to resolve disputes?
k. Is a process in place to review any proposals to amend 
the contract?
1. Is some suitable person authorized to approve any 
amendments?
m. Does anyone have override authority?
n. Does the contract allow for audits of the contractor’s 
records?
(continued)
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Table 13.9 (continued)
PROCUREMENT FRAUD CHECKLIST Yes No N/A Ref
3. Collusion Between Employees and Vendors
a. Are certain contractors consistently successful in 
winning bids?
b. Is the lowest bidder not accepted even though it fulfills 
all the requirements of the contract?
c. Is the requirements definition so specific that tendering 
could be improperly restricted to only one or a few 
companies?
d. In reviewing the contract, are there any oddities in the 
timing of performance, distances to be traveled, 
frequency of certain activities, expenditures, labor, etc.?
e. Has the bid of an unqualified contractor won?
f. Is any contractor suspiciously aggressive in its 
marketing?
g. Do any company employees show an unusual interest 
in the details of the contract considering their 
responsibilities?
h. Is anyone in the tendering company exceeding their 
authority in assisting in the procurement process?
i. Is the tendering period too short for the type of project?
j. Are the bid specifications unclear as to performance and 
other criteria?
k. Are the bid specifications inconsistent with the 
requirements definition?
1. Have there been any changes to the specifications in the 
period between the granting of the award and the 
signing of the contract?
m. Have the bid proposals been delivered orally rather 
than published in the usual way?
n. Are any company alumni, current employees or 
consultants involved with or related to any contracting 
party?
o. Is the material on preferred and unpreferred contractors 
in company files unusually favorable or derogatory?
p. Are there any “mistakes” in the RFP that would allow 
for a tender recall if the contractor desired by the 
fraudsters did not submit the lowest bid?
q. Has the contract been split into small amounts to avoid 
exceeding authorized expenditure limits?
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Table 13.9 (continued)
PROCUREMENT FRAUD CHECKLIST Yes No N/A Ref
r. Is there any indication that bid documents have been 
altered after submission?
s. Have any bids been opened prior to the deadline or 
received after the deadline?
t. Has a competitive tendering process been converted to 
a sole-source contract?
u. Has an unexplained changed order been issued on a 
contract?
v. Is the replacement period for goods shorter than the 
manufacturer’s recommendations or departmental 
practice?
w. Has more stock been acquired than stipulated under the 
contract?
x. Have goods already sold as surplus been replaced?
y. Has more stock been acquired from one supplier than 
stipulated under the contract?
z. Are there secondary sources of supply for materials?
4. Vendor Fraud Against the Company
a. Can all contractors and subcontractors be confirmed at 
their addresses and telephone numbers?
b. Are contractor invoices cross-checked with other 
invoices to detect duplication?
c. Are the test-result documents on file originals?
d. Is the contractor’s work checked to ensure performance 
to specifications?
e. Are unit rates charged by the contractor the same as in 
the contract?
f. Is the work completed according to the phases of the 
contract?
g. Is there any documentation in the file concerning 
substandard goods or services?
h. Have all invoiced materials actually been purchased?
i. Have domestic products been substituted for more 
expensive foreign ones?
j. Has the contractor certified that invoices submitted by 
the subcontractors have been paid?
k. Do the progress payments correspond with the 
contractor’s plan?
(continued)
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Table 13.9 (continued)
PROCUREMENT FRAUD CHECKLIST Yes No N/A Ref
1. Have uncleared checks been submitted as proof of 
payment?
m. Have the contractor and subcontractors employed the 
tradesmen with the contracted level of skills?
n. Are there any delays or cost overruns on the project?
5. Collusion Among the Vendors Within an Industry 
of Bidding Group
a. Do certain contractors always bid against each and 
others never?
b. Are any bids unusually high or unusually low?
c. Did the lowest bidder withdraw after submitting a 
tender offer?
d. Are any bid package details inconsistent with the known 
capabilities of the bidder?
e. Has a low bidder withdrawn from the tendering process 
but later become a subcontractor to a higher bidder?
f. Does the successful bidder subcontract with any losing 
bidders for work on the same project?
g. Is one bidder’s package more detailed than that of any 
other contractor?
h. Do certain contractors not rebid after changes in the 
specifications?
i. Has confidential information been release to 
contractors?
j. Is there a nondisclosure agreement for consultants to the 
project?
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Identity Theft and Corporate Identity Fraud
14.1 Introduction
The theft of a person’s name, personal statistics, and unique identifying numbers enables 
the identity thief to impersonate the victim and behave as if he or she were the person 
being victimized. The thief can open accounts, apply for a mortgage, get a credit card, rent 
a car, even get a job using the victim’s name, and all without the victim’s knowledge. It is 
estimated that more than $1 billion is lost through the use of stolen identity every year.1 In 
2002, in the United States there were 161,819 reports of identity fraud to the Identity Theft 
Data Clearinghouse of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an increase of 88 percent 
from 86,198 in 2001.2 California had the greatest number of victims, at 30,738, in 2002 but 
the District of Columbia had the greatest number of cases per capita.3 4Most victims were in 
their 20s (26 percent) and 30s (27 percent).4 The youthfulness of this group reflects the 
preference of young people for high-risk technologies such as the Internet and online credit 
card purchases. Of all fraud complaints reported in 2002 to the FTC and the more than 60 
other government and non-government agencies in Canada and the United States with 
which the FTC has data-sharing agreements, identity fraud accounted for 43 percent, 
compared with 39 percent in 2001 and 22 percent in 2000.5
1 http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040303gu.pdf
2 http://www.consiuner.gov/sentinel/sentinel-trends/page8.pdf
3 http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/sentinel-trends/page 11 .pdf
4 http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/sentinel-trends/page 10.pdf
5 http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/sentinel-trends/page3.pdf
14.1.1 Defining Personal Identity Theft and Corporate Identity 
Theft
Personal Identity Theft
Identity theft is a growing problem both for individuals and for corporations. For the 
individual, apart from the financial losses, which can be significant, stolen identity also 
means a loss of part of a person’s public persona, the part that represents one’s public 
integrity in financial transactions. In its worst manifestations, identity theft can be a 
crippling violation that unjustly creates a reputation for unreliability and untrustworthiness. 
The institutions with which the victim is used to dealing no longer want to do business with 
him or her even though the victim might have had a spotless record up to that point. The 
suspicion that now attaches itself to the victim is like a slander that is slowly gaining 
acceptance and from which there is no escape. The victim now appears to everyone as 
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someone other than he or she really is or has been for his or her whole life. According to
Consumer Reports, victims of identity theft lose an average of $800 each but spend two years
clearing their names.6 Reestablishing one’s name is time-consuming and expensive and can
precipitate lawsuits against financial institutions for honoring forged documents and general
carelessness in checking out the person using the stolen identity.
Corporate Identity Theft
Corporations can be the victims of identity theft just as much as individuals, but they can 
also be the source of the stolen identities. Credit card companies, banks, mortgage lenders, 
and savings and loans are common targets of identity thieves. In fact, any company that 
sells a product using credit services can be a victim.
Corporations are involved in identity theft primarily as repositories of names, Social 
Security Numbers (SSNs), and the other information essential to the commission of identity 
theft. The number of databases is increasing with the proliferation of business both on and 
off the Internet. As has become embarrassingly clear in the last few years, corporations are 
outrageously slack at preserving the integrity of this vital information. The problem of 
identity theft for most corporations is primarily a problem of computer security.
14.1.2 Common Types of Identity Theft
1. Credit-card  fraud: Credit card fraud is the most commonly reported type of fraud, 
accounting for 42 percent of all frauds reported. The stolen identity was usually used to 
open new accounts (24.4 percent) or steal from existing accounts (12.1 percent).
2. Theft of wireless telephone services: This is the next most frequent type of identity fraud 
(10.5 percent).
3. Theft from existing bank accounts: (8.1 percent). 67
6 “Identity Theft: 33 Million Victims and Counting,” Consumer Reports, October 2003, p. 12.
7 http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/sentinel-trends/page9.pdf
8 http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra.htm
By the time the victim discovers what has been done, his or her credit rating may be 
impaired and large amounts of money may have been lost. Then the victim has the long, 
uphill struggle to reestablish a credit rating and prove the transactions were all done by 
someone else.
Identity theft is a type of fraud accountants are going to see more and more frequently. It is 
growing with the flow of information and the increasing number of business and consumer 
transactions being conducted through high-risk technologies. Despite the introduction of 
new laws to fight identity theft, the number of victims continues to rise.
14.2 Laws to Combat Identity Theft
Congress has responded to the growing problem of identity theft with three new laws:
1. The 1996 amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970.8
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2. The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 , which amended chapter 
47, title 18 of the U.S. Code to recognize identity theft itself as a crime.
9
3. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,  which regulates disclosure of nonpublic 





14 .2.1 Fair Credit Reporting Act
The FCRA (amended in 1996) governs the creation and use of credit reports. The three 
main repositories of credit information, the credit reporting agencies (CRAs), are Equifax, 
Experian, and Trans Union. Together they have 1.5 billion files on more than 190 million 
individuals and receive about two billion pieces of new or updating information each 
month. The FCRA makes it an offence to acquire “information on a consumer from a CRA 
under false pretenses” (§619).
The movement of the credit information sought by the identity thief is at the heart of the 
modem economy. Consumer spending accounts for more than two-thirds of U.S. gross 
domestic product, and consumer credit drives this spending. The credit reporting system 
keeps open the flow of information that facilitates the rapid assessment of credit risk and 
the approval of mortgages and consumer loans of all kinds. Creditors voluntarily submit 
(they are not required to do so by law) data on their clients and their borrowing history to 
the CRAs, which keep credit records on individuals only. Where there is a loan in two or 
more names, such as those of a married couple or business partners, a record is kept in 
each name with a reference to the joint loan.
The credit record contains five basic types of information:
1. Information that identifies the individual by name, SSN, and current and previous 
addresses.
2. The service history of each loan.
3. Information on bankruptcy, foreclosure, liens, and other events contained in public 
documents.
4. Collection agency reports.
5. Identities of everyone who has requested information from the record.
Some reports even include a spouse’s name, number of dependents, telephone numbers, 
income and employment record. The CRAs answer more than two million requests for 
these records every day.11 The information arrives from banks, finance companies, credit 
unions, major retailers, oil and gas companies, utilities, collection agencies, court and other 
public records. Most accounts are revolving credit accounts followed by installment 
accounts.
This data is accessed and used by lenders to develop predictive statistical models that assess 
the likelihood of default by a loan applicant. Through the analysis of historical consumer 
credit data, lenders have developed generic templates of borrower behavior to which the 
data on the loan application are compared. The extent of congruity of the application with
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the historical data provides a means of “scoring” the applicant as a risk. Credit evaluators 
rely primarily on die level of current and past indebtedness, payment history, and credit 
account characteristics, such as the type of account, its age, and the frequency with which 
the borrower applies for other types of credit such as car loans and mortgages.12
12 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/02031ead.pdf
The development of electronic data processing has changed the whole credit application 
process. The days of the personal visit to the loan officer and the wait for his or her 
decision are over. Consumers can now shop for the best rates on the Internet and receive 
almost instant approval because lenders can apply their credit scoring system to 
information obtained from an electronic consumer report provided by the CRAs.
The lending industry has also changed from a passive user of credit reports to an active 
marketer of products based on credit information provided by the CRAs. Insurers and 
credit card issuers supply the CRAs with a credit-risk profile by which to screen their 
databases to find those who could be low-risk buyers of their cards or coverage. The insurer 
or credit card issuer then makes a “prescreened” firm offer of services to the individuals on 
the list of prospects. The 1996 amendments to the FCRA sharpened the definition to the 
prescreening process and gave the target consumer the right to opt out of future 
prescreened lists.
One of the goals of the FCRA is to protect consumer privacy by limiting the distribution of 





• Government licensing agencies
• Investors, providers of services, and current insurers
• The consumer, upon a written request
A second important objective of this legislation is to achieve the greatest accuracy possible 
in the recording of information. The FCRA recognizes the importance of reliable 
information for the credit score but realizes that complete accuracy in this volume of 
information is not humanly possible. The Act expresses its intent by requiring the CRAs to 
“follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” (§607 (b)). To offset 
the danger of errors, mechanisms are provided that allow the consumer to check his or her 
own report, dispute the information, and have it corrected. The consumer has the right to 
know all information in the file except the risk scores and to learn the identity of anyone 
who has received a copy of the report within the last year.
14.2.2  Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 is an extremely important 
piece of legislation that recognizes identity theft as a distinct crime. Up to that time, the 
unlawful creation, use, or transfer of identity documents were crimes but the actual theft of 
the information was not. A person is now considered to have committed identity theft who 
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“knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a 
violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local 
law.” The key phrase here is “means of identification,” which refers to the names, numbers, 
codes, and personal characteristics that identify a person and can be transferred from 
document to document.
The term means of identification includes:
• Name, SSN, date of birth, official state or government issued driver’s license or 
identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, or 
employer or taxpayer identification number
• Unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other 
unique physical representation
• Unique electronic identification number, address, or routing code
• Telecommunication identifying information or access device, such as an access code or 
personal identification number.
14.2.3 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 creates for every financial institution “an affirmative 
and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security 
and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.” The various 
authorities and agencies that regulate the different types of financial institutions will be 
responsible for establishing appropriate means of achieving this security and 
confidentiality.
Financial institutions are now required to provide customers with an annual statement of 
their disclosure and protection policies. This statement must cover the types of information 
collected and disclosed to affiliates and third parties on both current and former customers. 
The customer must be given the opportunity to stop the institution from disclosing 
information to a nonaffiliated third party. The financial institution may, however, disclose 
information to such a third party for the institution’s marketing purposes provided the third 
party contracts not to disclose the information. No account number, access code, or other 
identifier may be provided to any party other than a CRA.
14.3 How Thieves Steal Your Identity
The identity theft that will affect a person or business may be committed by a friend, a 
stranger, or an employee, by kids rummaging in the dumpster out behind the office, by the 
employee of a gas station or restaurant waiter, or by some hacker on the other side of the 
country or even on the other side of the world. All that matters is that the fraudster obtains 
sufficient identification to be recognized by the accounting system as an authorized entity 
with which the company can do business. The initial crime is often not connected to 
identity theft until many months later, when irregularities start to appear on bank or credit 
card statements or when credit is refused on a consumer loan or mortgage application. A 
lost or stolen wallet or home break-in may provide the thieves with a name and Social 
Security, credit card, and bank account numbers, which can be sold to sophisticated rings 
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that use the information to commit larger, more daring thefts against banks and 
corporations—in the victim’s name.
Employees, especially in the accounts department of retailers, at banks, insurance 
companies, medical offices, and government services, use personal information every day 
in the processing of documents or to verify the identities of customers making inquiries. 
This data can be copied and sold to identity thieves without leaving any incriminating 
evidence in the system. Credit reports obtained lawfully from the CRAs may be seen by 
dishonest employees at credit grantors and used or sold. These reports are particularly 
attractive targets for identity thieves because they contain all the information required to fill 
out the credit application forms. Although they do not show the victim’s credit “score,” the 
thief can determine whether that score is likely to be good or bad from the record; the 
higher the probable rating, the easier it will be for the identity thief to obtain credit. 
Information can also be stolen from the mails. Millions of documents with identifying 
personal information flow through the postal system every day. A “lost” form or bill might 
not even be noticed until much later. Preapproved credit card offers are a favorite target 
and an easy one to use quickly.
Thieves also find information carelessly discarded in garbage or in dumpsters. Residential 
garbage often contains foils from credit card receipts, telephone calling cards, change-of- 
address forms, and preapproved credit card offers thrown out as junk mail. “Dumpster 
diving” is especially effective for finding business information such as client lists, bank 
account numbers, telephone numbers, SSNs, signatures, file numbers, and tax information.
Identity thieves may have acquired some of a potential victim’s personal information but 
need more to commit the crime. They then call a business where the victim is known to be 
a customer on the pretext of discussing an account and try to talk the phone clerk into 
giving them the missing information.
The key information the thief needs is the potential victim’s name, date of birth, and SSN. 
Once this information has been gathered, impersonation is, sadly, relatively easy; the thief 
can do anything the victim could do based on the victim’s credit rating.
As stated above, credit cards are the most popular target for identity thieves. Application 
for the preapproved credit to be sent to a different address or the use of the change-of- 
address form to redirect credit card bills for the existing number can give the thief plenty of 
time to use the card before the victim finds out anything is wrong. Delinquencies will go 
onto the victim’s credit report.
The other types of fraud that can be committed with the right identity information are 
probably limitless: opening bank accounts and writing bad checks on those accounts, 
taking out loans and defaulting, purchasing goods and services without paying the bills are 
but a few examples.
14.4 Personal Identity Theft
14.4.1 Who Are You, Anyway?
To a bureaucracy, you are only who your identification documents say you are. You are 
your birth certificate, passport, SSN, driver’s license, or credit cards. Once you are 
separated from the identity inscribed on those documents, you cease to be that person. The 
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person who steals and uses your documentary identity detaches you from your identifiers 
and places you in a Kafkaesque limbo of frustratingly endless nonrecognition. It is your 
impersonator who now enjoys the privileges to which you are otherwise entitled simply by 
virtue of possessing your identifying information—not the documents—just the 
information. To an institution, you are now a nonperson, a nullity with whom no business 
can be done.
14.4.2 How Do You Become Separated From Your Identity?
The very act of providing information about yourself to others puts your identity at risk of 
being stolen. “When you provide information to a person, organization or Internet-based 
enterprise through a website, use a debit or credit card, use a cordless telephone, a cell 
phone, a personal digital assistant (PDA), use your personal computer or another computer, 
send or receive physical mail or email, the risk of others accessing and misusing your most 
sensitive information is always present.”13 Mail can be stolen and information is now 
available that allows eavesdropping on cell phone conversations. E-mail is notoriously 
vulnerable to interception. Your personal computer can be hacked and your passwords 
stolen. In addition, the organizations that gather this information often share it with others. 
The more the information is shared, the greater the number of employees who have an 
opportunity to view it and work with it.
13 Jim Gaston and Paul K. Wing, Protecting Your Money, Privacy & Identity from Theft, Loss & Abuse, (Toronto: 
The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 2003) p. 5.
The risk of having your information tampered with is compounded by the fact that 
institutions have a prejudice in favor of taking the computer entry as true over your 
complaint that there is an error. The institutional position is understandable since the 
assumption is that the entry only exists because someone saw the appropriate original 
documents to make the entry in the first place. As a result, there is the suspicion that you 
might be the identity thief or at least have an ulterior motive for wanting to change the data 
in your file. This combination of prejudice and suspicion form the block that makes it so 
difficult for victims of identity theft to reestablish their good name.
Finally, institutions have three competing demands on them for the use of identity data. 
Customers want quick service. To provide this, retailers must have ready access to the 
databases providing the credit information that makes the sale of a car, TV, or other big- 
ticket item possible. Institutions of all kinds need the personal information they have 
gathered to develop marketing strategies that will allow them to focus sales campaigns on 
those people who fit the right profile for their products. There is also a demand for this 
information at other organizations that do not have the resources to assemble the data 
themselves. This profitable use of the information by retailers and marketers then has to be 
balanced against the need for security to protect the privacy of the individual whose data is 
being used and the need to provide citizens with protection against the misuse of their 
identity information by these compilers and users of databases has made necessary the new 
laws described in Section 14.2, Laws to Combat Identity Theft.
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14.4.3 Protecting Personal Information
Wallets and Purses
The key to protecting personal information is to have as little of it exposed to public view 
or physical loss as possible. For example, do not carry unnecessary documents in your 
wallet or purse. Leave at home your Social Security card, birth certificate, passport, the 
credit card you use only in foreign countries, membership cards, and any other item not 
used every day. Clear your wallet or purse of all credit card receipts and other papers 
carrying personal identifiers at the end of the day. Destroy or file at home all unnecessary 
papers once accounts have been reconciled. Carry only one credit card, your bankcard, 
and anything else you use regularly. Take care not to leave your wallet or purse unattended 
in any place such as an office, restaurant, library, or other public place. Make sure all cards 
carrying your signature are signed immediately upon receipt. Cut up any expired cards.
Mail
An amazing amount of material useful to the identity thief arrives through your mailbox: 
new unsigned credit cards, driver’s licenses, new checkbooks, telephone bills, tax 
information from all levels of government, utility bills, and bank and investment 
information, as well as preapproved credit card solicitations and so forth. An identity thief 
could reconstruct your identity by stealing just a few of these documents.
The risk of having your identity stolen from your mailbox can be greatly reduced by 
having a secure mailbox with a slot through the door. Outside mailboxes hanging on a wall 
with a flip top can be looted easily. Keep track of what bills and other documents you 
should be receiving. If something seems long overdue, call the sender to see whether it has 
been sent. A common practice is for identity thieves to steal a bill carrying your name, 
address, and account number. They will then contact the bank or company concerned, 
send in the change of address form and create a new address in your file and have your 
correspondence redirected. Since utility bills are frequently asked for by financial 
institutions to show that you really five where you say, the redirection of these bills is a 
common ploy of identity thieves gathering the identifiers needed to set you up as a 
potential victim. The new address will become an additional authenticator of your stolen 
identity to be used by the thieves.
When you are absent for any length of time, have a friend pick up your mail or have it 
held at the post office. If you move, call the places from which you receive important mail 
and notify them of the address change. For these sources, do not simply rely on the post 
office’s forwarding services. The arrival of statements from entities with which you do not 
do business is a sure indicator something is wrong. Follow up immediately to see why you 
are getting such material. There may just be a computer error at the company but this may 
be the first indication that you have become the victim of an identity theft.
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Telephones
Landline telephones are more secure than either cordless or cellular. Of course, landlines 
can be tapped but that requires special equipment and an intrusive connection to your line. 
You are more likely to have information stolen out of the air by a scanner that can pick up 
signals from your portable or cell. Your identity is at risk when doing telephone banking 
over a cordless or cellular phone because thieves can pick up the bankcard numbers and 
access codes. If you do a lot of banking and must use these insecure phones, change your 
access codes often.
The telephone is also a tool commonly used by fraudsters to commit their various scams. 
In one of the most common frauds, a “bank inspector” calls saying there is a fraud going on 
at your branch and they need your access codes to monitor a suspected dishonest bank 
employee. Since banks never actually investigate internal fraud this way, any such call is by 
definition fraudulent. Never give any identifying information to anyone over the phone. 
Never give any identifying information in a fax that will be going to a general fax number 
at an office. Anyone can read those faxes. If you have to send confidential information by 
fax, call the recipient and ask them to stand by the fax machine while you send it.
Debit and Credit Cards
Thieves have been known to go to extremes to get debit and credit card information: fake 
automated teller machines (ATMs) that record the numbers, hidden cameras at gas stations 
and restaurants to capture the transaction, simply looking over a person’s shoulder as the 
personal identification number (PIN) is entered, observing an ATM with binoculars from 
across the street, posing as a security guard or window cleaner and watching people enter 
their numbers. The stolen information is encoded on a magnetic strip on the back of a false 
card that is then used as if it were yours. Debit and credit cards are a major source of 
information for identity thieves and should be used carefully. Change the PIN on your 
debit card every time you receive a replacement. Limit the number of accounts linked to 
your debit card. The best practice is to have it linked only to your checking account where 
there is likely to be less money at any given moment than in the savings account. Never let 
your debit card out of your sight during a transaction. On the back of credit cards issuers 
have added a number composed of three or more digits to the basic card number. This 
supplementary “card verification value” is not necessary to complete any purchase and 
should not be revealed at any time except to the issuing financial institution. If you are 
traveling, make sure you have the local emergency number to call if your card is lost or 
stolen. Sign the back of all replacement cards upon receipt.
Social Security Number
In the United States this is one of the key, if not the key, pieces of identity information 
needed to impersonate you. It is your unique identifier developed by the government 
primarily for keeping track of its dealings with the millions of American citizens. 
Unfortunately, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, the government has legislated its use for 
a wide variety of trivial purposes that puts it into a lot of different databases. Since there is 
no legislation preventing its use for recordkeeping in the private sector, a lot of companies 
use it as a cheap and ready identifier that saves the cost of creating a new file number for 
every client. As a result, your SSN could be not only in numerous government databases 
but also in an unknown number of private ones.
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The best protection against misuse of your SSN is to monitor closely all transactions with
entities you know use this number in their recordkeeping. Never give it out to unsolicited
callers. Never send it by any of the insecure communications technologies such as e-mail or
cell or portable phones. If you are disposing of papers carrying the SSN, shred them; do
not put them out with the trash or into recycle bins.
Computers
The personal computer installed in your home is the primary means of processing 
information today and, as a result, likely contains many of your personal records most 
valuable to an identity thief. The first fine of defense in protecting this information is to 
allow no one else to use your computer. More people than you might think could have 
access to your computer: guests, tradesmen, children, housekeepers, babysitters, friends. 
Hackers can now break into your software and track your keystrokes or enter your files and 
access passwords and PIN numbers and other personal information. Viruses, worms, and 
other malicious invaders can copy information and transmit it over the Internet to an 
identity thief.
Basic protection of your computer begins with limiting access. Other frequent users such as 
your teenaged children should have their own passwords and access only to what they 
commonly use. Only you should be able to install or remove software. Never download 
software from an unknown source. Get one of the well-known virus scanners and use it at 
least once a month. Never open e-mails from unrecognized senders. All obvious spam 
should be deleted immediately. Store essential private information such as tax records or 
medical prescriptions on CD-ROMs, USB memory sticks or some other medium—but not 
on your hard drive. Log off correctly from bank, utility, or other Web sites where you have 
transacted financial business. Only disclose credit card numbers or other financial 
information to a known institution or vendor when transacting over the Internet. Never 
send personal information by e-mail; it can be read by anyone. If you work from home and 
must send important information to clients, use encryption.
14.4.4 What To Do If You Become a Victim
The first thing to do when you suspect something is wrong is to define the problem. Is 
whatever happened really identity theft or some other kind of theft or simply an error 
somewhere in a company computer system? Perhaps you just lost something or made a 
transaction you have forgotten about or the transaction was processed under the name of 
the vendor’s holding company which you don’t recognize instead of under the name of the 
vendor where you made the purchase. If you cannot explain the matter satisfactorily to 
yourself, contact the company concerned and check to see how the transaction came to be 
on your bill. Write down the names of everyone you talk to in the course of your 
investigations and keep notes of what was said. This information will be important later in 
the police investigation if, indeed, there has been an identity theft.
If the company confirms your suspicions, take immediate action to close all affected 
accounts and cancel any cards or PINs associated with them and your online and 
telephone banking services. Examine the record of recent transactions in all accounts to 
make sure you are not under attack from another quarter. If you discover a pattern of 
unexplained transactions, inform the police immediately. Provide the police with the 
names and telephone numbers of everyone you contacted in your own inquiries.
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While the police are conducting their investigation, contact the fraud departments of the 
CRAs and have a “fraud alert” put on your credit report. It is essential to contact the CRAs 
immediately since they are clearinghouses for almost all requests for credit Send a request 
in writing to get a copy of your report. Check to see whether any accounts have been 
opened in your name or any unauthorized changes made to existing accounts. Get the 
names of any companies making inquiries in your name. Inform the police of all these 
inquiries and any fraudulent accounts opened as a result if these inquiries. Give the police 
the names of the companies making the inquiries. Since fraud alerts and victim statements 
expire, continue to monitor your credit report and renew the alerts if necessary. CRAs are 
under no legal obligation to provide these services; check the policy of each bureau. Red 
flagging your credit report with a fraud alert is, however, no guarantee that additional 
credit might not be granted on the fraudulent accounts. Credit grantors can override these 
fraud alerts if they wish. For this reason, it is imperative that you close the fraudulent 
accounts.
If the police report determines that an identity theft is the most likely explanation of the 
questionable transactions, it can be used as a first step to reestablishing your name with 
your creditors. The police report can be used to reinstate your name with the bank. Once 
the bank has accepted that you are who you say you are, get a letter from them that can be 
used with other credit institutions or vendors to explain any questionable transactions. Get 
a letter from each company that accepts the police explanation so that you can develop a 
file to show to each succeeding company. The greatest problem will be in explaining 
transactions done in your name with companies with which you normally do not do 
business or are located overseas.
If it is established that you have been a victim of identity theft, you should file a complaint 
with the Federal Trade Commission through their hotline (877) IDTHEFT (438-4338) or 
www.consumer.gov/idtheft. The FTC cannot bring a criminal case but they can help you 
with information on how to deal with the consequences of the theft. The FTC also passes 
your information on to law enforcement and other agencies that assist in tracking down 
identity thieves.
I Always Wanted To Be a Doctor Case Study
There was a late fall chill in the Maine air when a man walked into the branch of a 
large national bank and identified himself as a medical doctor. He said he had a 
successful practice in another part of the city and was considering joining a clinic in 
the area near the bank. He needed the fine of credit to do some renovations to his 
home and to make some investments that he wanted to keep secret from his wife. 
He gave the loans officer a cell phone number saying his wife worked at his clinic 
and he didn’t want the bank calling either his office or his residence.
The man had been referred to the loans officer by a mutual friend, a real estate 
agent. The loans officer was an experienced employee who had worked for the 
bank for 12 years and had a lending record far better than average. The real estate 
agent had introduced other clients to the loans officer through the years and this 
referral seemed no exception. The real estate agent herself, however, did not do her 
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banking at this branch and the loans officer actually had no real knowledge of the
agent’s financial affairs.
The man completed the application for a $250,000 line of credit in the normal way 
and provided his date of birth, SSN, a telephone number, and various credit 
references, none of which indicated account numbers or outstanding balances. He 
would secure his loan with a mortgage on title against his principal residence, which 
was registered in his own name, valued at $800,000 and mortgage free.
The application was quickly approved and within a few weeks he had drawn down 
the whole line of credit. In one 10-day period, $236,650 was drawn down in a series 
of checks and bank drafts. A credit card application was also requested through the 
branch. It was approved and soon carried a liability in excess of $4,000.
As part of the credit application, a request for insurance had also been completed. 
Because the line of credit exceeded $200,000 the insurance company conducted a 
verification check with the client. They were surprised to find that the doctor they 
talked to was not the same “doctor” who had applied for insurance. The real doctor 
denied having a line of credit at the branch in question. The bank was notified and 
its investigation revealed that the line of credit and the credit card were being used 
in a way typical of a fraudster. One of the last purchases was airline tickets to 
Caracas, Venezuela. The card and the airline tickets were immediately cancelled.
The subsequent investigation showed that the real doctor in no way physically 
resembled the man who had sat across the desk from the loans officer and applied 
for a $250,000 fine of credit. The doctor said that about three months prior to 
discovering he had become a victim of identity fraud, he and his wife had noticed 
that mail had stopped coming to their residence. They finally checked at the local 
postal station and found that a change of address card had been made out for their 
residence and mail was now being redirected to a private mail box in the suburbs. 
They filed a complaint with the local police but nothing more was heard until the 
insurance company contacted him to verify the particulars of the line of credit. The 
doctor stated he did not know the real estate agent, knew nothing of any mortgage 
or transfer of title on his principal residence from his wife’s name to his own, had 
no business in that part of the city, and was not familiar with the payees of the 
checks drawn on the fine of credit.
Investigation of the checks and drafts drawn against the fine of credit showed that 
large sums had been paid to the real estate agent, her company, and her husband. 
Substantial amounts had been paid for German luxury cars and $100,000 to a 
foreign exchange broker. A lawyer had received $8,500 for the registration of the 
mortgage and transfer of title. An additional $15,000 had been paid to a third party 
for reasons unknown. Surveillance showed the agent driving one of the foreign cars.
The loans officer had completed the loan application using a photocopy of a 
driver’s license and a copy of the doctor’s Social Security card. Examination of the 
photocopy of the driver’s license showed it to be a forgery because the font used to 
print the card was different from that used on genuine licenses. The birth date on 
the photocopy was also different from that written on the credit application. The 
Social Security card was a replacement obtained using information found in the 
stolen mail.
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The fraudsters used an inexperienced young lawyer to prepare the mortgage and 
title documents required by the bank. The lawyer discovered that the property was 
indeed mortgage free but that title was registered not in the doctor’s name but in 
the name of his wife. The loans officer instructed the lawyer to register the new 
mortgage against title in the doctor’s name since he was the mortgagor. The 
fraudster and a woman posing as his wife duly appeared in the lawyer’s office and 
signed the necessary mortgage and transfer documents. The loans officer authorized 
the line of credit once the lawyer had notified her that the transfer and mortgage 
documents were in order.
The bank referred the matter to the police and the real estate agent was arrested 
and charged with fraud. Two foreign cars were seized as the proceeds of crime. The 
man who impersonated the doctor was charged with fraud but avoided being taken 
into custody. The bank made a claim against the lawyer for negligence and against 
a provider of title insurance. The real doctor obtained legal counsel who assisted 
him in having the fraudulent mortgage and transfer removed from his residence.
Conclusion and Analysis
There is plenty of blame for everyone in this case. Red flags were there right from 
the beginning. The real doctor and his wife should have acted more quickly. Three 
months without mail should have raised more questions than it did. Once they 
discovered their mail was being redirected, they should have taken the actions 
described in Section 14.4.3, Protecting Personal Information, to see what damage 
might have been done to their finances. The loans officer should have become 
suspicious when presented with a photocopy of the applicant’s driver’s license 
instead of the real Ecense, which is a document readily available because it is 
always carried on the person. The request to use the cell phone number exclusively 
should also have been a sign that there was something wrong with the application; 
the explanation that the applicant wanted to keep his investments secret from his 
wife should not have been accepted. The bank seems to have made no effort to 
check out his credit references despite the fact they contained no account numbers 
or amounts. The discovery that title to the property was registered in his wife’s 
name and not in his own as he had stated should have been the biggest red flag of 
all. It is simply not credible that any husband could make that mistake. The lawyer 
and the loans officer both should have refused to proceed once that had been 
revealed. The bank should also have been more alert to the fact that the money was 
not being used for the declared purposes for which the loan had been obtained.
14.5 Corporate Identity Theft
14.5.1 Preventing Identity Theft From Affecting a Business
The identity theft that can affect a business can be committed both on and off site. The key 
to preventing both types of identity theft from causing harm is to have tighter internal 
controls. Tight controls at company A mean that it cannot become a source of information 
that can be used to damage company B. The introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance 
requirements puts the full responsibility for maintaining internal controls squarely on the 
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shoulders of the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) at 
companies regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.14 The CEO and CFO 
must now certify that the internal controls of their company are sufficiently stringent to 
guarantee that the financial statements reflect the true financial condition of the company. 
The external auditor must also be satisfied that the controls are adequate since they must 
be able to attest to the certification of the CEO and CFO. This means, so far as identity 
fraud is concerned, the primary responsibility lies with business to put in place tight 
controls for handling sensitive information. Credit granting institutions will have to 
introduce stricter verification methods for loan applicants. Of course, not all fraud can be 
prevented. Determined fraudsters will always attempt to find ways around even the most 
rigorous system and will sometimes be successful. Sarbanes-Oxley means, however, that 
the external auditors will be asking harder questions and sloppiness will no longer be 
tolerated since the reputations of the CEO, CFO, and the auditors are all on the fine.
14 http://www.sarbanes-oxley.com/pcaob.php?level=l&pub_id=Sarbanes-Oxley
15 Unfortunately, the SSN is relatively easy to steal since Congress has authorized more than 40 required uses 
of it for identification purposes to get a job, open a bank account or even get a fishing license: 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/040303pa.pdf
14.5.2 Internal Controls
Corporate Code of Ethics and Privacy Policies
The most important internal control any company can have is a code of ethics that 
management lives by and enforces since the ethical tone of a company always flows from 
the top down. This code should be written and provided to every employee in conjunction 
with education and training programs that emphasize honest business practices. Included in 
this code should be the company’s privacy policies for the handling of client and employee 
identity information. Privacy policies should be reinforced by privacy audits under the 
authority of a chief privacy officer responsible for implementing and developing the 
standard operating procedures for privacy security.
Regulate Information and Personnel With Access
The basic principle is that the amount of information used and the number of persons 
handling it should be kept to a minimum. Information should be accurate, complete, 
timely, and relevant to the purpose for which it was collected. For example, is it really 
necessary to use a SSN to identify clients?15 Could a simple internal code not be used 
instead? A similar code should be used for employee identification on parking permits, 
time sheets, paychecks, and other internal documents. No part of the SSN should be used 
on passwords or other access codes. If an identity thief were to get hold of the company 
identifier, the damage would be limited to a company use.
Information should be collected directly from the individual client concerned. The client 
should know the purpose of the information and be assured that it will be used for that 
purpose alone. Every client should know that they have the right to review and correct any 
information kept on them.
Employees should be thoroughly trained in the management of sensitive information, 
especially in the handling of information requests. They should understand the meaning of 
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the information requested and the use of the forms by which it is transmitted. They should 
know how to extract the requested data from the records so that only that data is 
transmitted. For example, the careless faxing of a medical record that contains more 
information than requested could unnecessarily red flag an insurance company to an issue 
that is none of its concern but could be used against the insured in a claim. Data to be 
transmitted to an outside user should be carefully vetted by a second person before being 
sent. Temporary staff should be supervised closely.
Data Security
Client information is only as secure as the system that carries it. Persons should be assigned 
to data security under the chief privacy officer who are kept up-to-date on technical and 
legal issues through regular retraining. Data processing systems should be designed to leave 
a clear audit trail and provide penalties for browsing and unauthorized access. Employees 
must not leave their computers while sensitive information is on the screen. The use of 
password-activated screensavers is an additional protection.
Physical access to the electronic and paper files containing sensitive identity information 
should be restricted to those handling the files. Background checks should be made on all 
employees with access to sensitive information, including the cleaning staff and temporary 
workers. Password procedures should be strictly enforced and passwords should be 
changed frequently. Transmission of sensitive information over the Internet should be 
strictly controlled through authorizations and encryption. Penetration tests should be 
conducted regularly on all systems to determine their vulnerability to hackers.
Records Management Policies
There should be strict guidelines about what must be disposed of at the end of the working 
day and how it must be handled. Unneeded duplicates, photocopying errors, and 
handwritten notes can all carry information useful to the identity thief looking for just such 
carelessly discarded material to turn up in the dumpster parked outside the back door. 
Material scheduled for destruction should be kept in segregated locked containers and 
shredded under supervision.
Old records must be subject to a secure records management policy that establishes 
schedules for retention and destruction that meet the statutory, legal, and practical 
requirements of the industry. Records are evidence for possible use in court and must be 
created and retained in such a form that ensures their integrity by guaranteeing they have 
not been subject to tampering whether stored on or off site. Records boxed and ready for 
shipment to a secure offsite storage facility must be kept in a locked room while awaiting 
transport. At the expiry of the retention period, documents must be destroyed by a bonded 
recycling company that provides a certificate of destruction.
Diskettes, tapes and hard drives carrying sensitive information should be erased and then 
physically destroyed at the end of their retention period. Mere erasure is not enough to 
destroy electronic information. Sophisticated modem techniques can recover “deleted” files 
and e-mails and reconstitute information on burned or otherwise damaged drives.
The fax machine can easily become the means of leaking confidential information. A 
dedicated fax machine should be kept in a supervised area restricted to authorized persons 
only. Incoming faxes should be distributed to their recipients immediately and not be left 
lying in a bin. Senders should check the accuracy of all fax numbers with a preliminary 
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phone call to the recipient just before transmission. This prepares the recipient for the
message and prevents unauthorized persons from reading the document at the other end
where security might be loose. A cover sheet with the names, addresses, and phone
numbers of both sender and recipient should be attached to every transmission. A
transmission report should be filed with the original of every sent fax.
Sensitive information should never be left on answering machines or voice mail systems. A 
dialing error can and has led to sensitive information being left at the wrong phone 
number. The caller should ask to be called back and the sensitive issue discussed person to 
person only. There should be a clear policy on who has the right to access incoming voice 
mails. If management has a right to access the voice mails of an employee when he or she 
is ill or on vacation, this policy should be made known to all employees.
Sensitive information should never be discussed on cellular or cordless phones because 
conversations can be picked up by electronic eavesdropping equipment. Cellular phones 
should never be used for the additional reason that the calls are often taken in the presence 
of strangers who should not hear third-party private information.
E-mail policy should be equally clear. E-mail messaging is widely used and treated casually 
because of its apparent impermanence. It is quick and easy to use, can be sent from 
anywhere to anyone, can carry attached documents, and is used not only to communicate 
within the business organization but also with outsiders such as customers and suppliers. E- 
mail messages can be easily accessed by unauthorized persons when in transit between 
servers or are forwarded by the recipient without the sender’s knowledge. Management 
should have a policy concerning who can use the system and what kinds of information 
can be transmitted by e-mail and to whom. There should also be a policy on the use of the 
system for private communication, the retention/purge schedule, copying and forwarding, 
password creation, and change procedures as well as encryption.16
16 Michael R. Overly, e-policy: How to Develop Computer, E-mail and Internet Guidelines to Protect your Company 
and Its Assets, (New York: American Management Association, 1999).
Employees Working at Home
The company should have explicit rules for working at home and the use of laptops. Many 
of the same general rules covering the transmission of sensitive data would also cover the 
transmission of information between the office and home or a laptop. There should be 
strict control, however, of the type of information that can be taken home in paper files and 
created or kept at home in paper or electronic files. The house, apartment, condominium, 
or other residence must be secure and well protected against fire or other types of peril. 
Laptops should never be used to handle sensitive information in public places, such as 
aircraft or waiting rooms. The network connection between the office and remote 
computers must be secure.
Electronic Monitoring of Employees
Lastly comes the difficult and delicate issue of electronic monitoring of employees at work. 
If an employer decides it is necessary to monitor employee productivity by listening in on 
telephone calls or scrutinizing Internet activity, this policy should be made known to all 
employees and its methods explained. Credit granting institutions must take greater care in 
the verification of the identity of loan and credit card applicants. Records should be 
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checked to see whether an account in the applicant’s name already exists. Persons applying 
for credit cards on the basis of a preapproved credit offer solicited through the mails should 
be carefully vetted to make sure the applicant is indeed the person to whom the offer was 
made. The use of an SSN should be supplemented with the name and address on utility 
bills or tax records. Any request for an address change should be corroborated, especially 
where it differs from the one on the credit report. Account numbers should be truncated on 
point-of-purchase transaction slips. Implementation of an account profiling system would 
red-flag unusual activity and precipitate a notification to the customer.
14.6 Cyber Identity Theft
Computer security is one of the principal concerns of consumers and businesses alike 
because the amount of business being done through the Internet is growing so rapidly. 
Although most e-commerce is business-to-business, retail sales reached an estimated $46 
billion in 2002, up from $36 billion in 2001. The use of Internet-transmitted identities 
makes these transactions possible. With more than 600 million computers in use around 
the world today, of which 180 million are in the United States and the business being done 
among them growing rapidly, identity theft is certain to grow too.17
17 http://financialservices.house .gov/media/pdf/040303jf.pdf
Three major cases illustrate the vulnerability of electronic systems and the devastating 
results that occur when identity thieves attack.
Teledata Communications Inc. Case Study
Teledata Communications Inc. is a Long Island company providing so-called 
“credit prompter boxes” to more than 25,000 companies to facilitate quick credit 
checks to the three principal CRAs mentioned above. By pretending to be a credit­
report user such as a bank, a TCI help-desk employee is alleged to have requested 
reports using the credit grantor’s name and access number. About 30,000 credit 
reports were stolen and sold to a Nigerian fraud ring operating in the New York 
area. The Nigerians paid $60 for each report, which the accused split with an 
intermediary. For the 30,000 reports stolen, the accused and the intermediary 
would each have received $900,000.
The thefts were remarkably easy since the workers at the help desk already knew 
the client codes to perform their duties. Any help-desk staffer could have done what 
the accused is alleged to have done. This fact raises the issue of employee screening 
and how successful it can be. Unless an employee has a criminal record, it is almost 
impossible to determine who will commit fraud since criminologists remain unable 
to construct the risk profile of a potential workplace fraudster. Experience shows 
instead that much fraud is committed by trusted employees faced with need or 
tempted by opportunity. In the TCI case, it seems the accused was approached by 
the alleged intermediary with the suggestion there was money to be made selling 
credit reports. Some particular reports were allegedly stolen to order for the 
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Nigerians who provided the accused with names and SSNs acquired through other
identity thefts.
The suspect worked for TCI for only 10 months but the thefts went on over a three- 
year period and even continued after he left TCI and moved to Georgia. He is 
alleged to have loaded a laptop with names and access codes which he turned over 
to the Nigerian gang to operate on their own. He kept many override codes for 
himself, however, which he provided to the gang when companies they were trying 
to access changed their codes. About one third of the names were pulled after 
leaving TCI because the passwords the accused allegedly downloaded to his laptop 
remained valid. The scheme came apart when the gang got greedy and tried to 
request 15,000 reports from the Ford Motor Company.
The 30,000 innocent individuals whose identities were used to steal a minimum of 
$2.7 million did not find that their personal information had been taken until many 
months later when the bills began to come in and credit applications were refused. 
They are now engaged in the time-consuming and expensive process of 
reestablishing their good names.
This case reveals a shocking lack of Internet security and supervisory vigilance at 
TCI as well as the CRAs. Neither TCI nor the CRAs seem to have been aware of 
the now obvious patterns of requests coming from the suspect and his colleagues. 
There seems to have been no way of noticing suspicious activity and verifying it 
with the bank or retailer or whoever initiated the request. There was also no way of 
notifying the consumer that a request had been received. The FCRA establishes 
consumers’ right to know what is in their reports, but such a right can do nothing to 
detect an unauthorized request by an alleged credit grantor at the time it is made. 
As mentioned above, anyone can request a copy of their report and check for 
unrecognized inquiries. There also seems to have been no way for the CRAs to 
detect patterns of queries from credit grantors who have received complaints from 
customers.
TriWest Healthcare Alliance Corp. Case Study
TriWest Healthcare Alliance Corp. is a Phoenix-based Department of Defense 
contractor supplying managed healthcare services to 1.1 million active and retired 
U.S. military personnel and their families in a 16-state area around Arizona. During 
a break-in at one of its offices, computers storing sensitive personal information 
including SSNs of 500,000 members of military families were stolen from a secure 
room. Credit card information for 23 clients was also taken. The motive of the theft 
is unknown.
Although the stolen personal information does not seem to have been used for 
fraudulent purposes yet, the risk is still hanging over every beneficiary of TriWest. 
The use of the SSN as an account identifier meant that one of the fraudster’s most 
coveted pieces of information is now available on half a million persons. In this 
case, the risk of abuse to military records was increased since nearly all such records 
20 Fraud Supp. 4—3/04
Chapter Fourteen: Identity Theft and Corporate Identity Fraud
are kept under the SSN. The storing of highly sensitive personal medical records in 
unencrypted databases increased their vulnerability to hackers.
TriWest has responded to the risk of future threats by revamping its IT 
infrastructure, the details of which have not been made public. TriWest has now set 
up a fraud alert system with the CRAs that would allow beneficiaries to view their 
credit reports.
DPI Merchant Services Case Study
The third case is an attack by hackers on DPI Merchant Services, which specializes 
in the establishment of merchant credit card accounts and payment processing. 
More then 10 million Visa, MasterCard, and American Express card numbers and 
expiration dates were stolen. These numbers do not seem to have been used to 
commit fraud so far. Quick action on the part of the card issuers and the financial 
institutions seems to have prevented harm to the cardholders.
These three huge and dramatic cases illustrate the vulnerability of personal identity 
information to hacking and the importance of corporate security in protecting 
databases. There is much evidence of widespread sloppiness in corporate database 
security that is an invitation to hackers to steal personal information.
A final example from the manufacturing industry should illustrate the vulnerability 
of all industries to the effects of sensitive information falling into the wrong hands. 
Identity thieves do not always just impersonate individuals; sometimes they 
impersonate companies.
Breaking the Code Case Study
A manufacturing company had established an elaborate system of unique number 
codes to monitor the movement of replacement automotive parts from its 
warehouse to customers. A warehouse computer operator familiar with the codes 
sold some of them to a ring of thieves who wanted to sell the parts on the black 
market. The stolen codes allowed the thieves to assume the identities of parts 
retailers and submit orders. Extra parts were added to certain shipments. The 
drivers, who were in on the scheme, drove to the prearranged drop-off points 
where the extra parts were unloaded into the thieves’ trucks. The thieves then sold 
them to body shops that asked no questions. The parts manufacturer was defrauded 
of millions before the scam was discovered by an internal audit that contacted the 
real clients about the unusually high levels of their orders.
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14.7 Conclusion
The statistics presented at the beginning of this chapter show that identity theft is a serious 
and growing problem. New laws recognize identity theft as a distinct class of crime; other 
new laws attempt to control the flow and use of personal information from the databases 
where it is gathered. No laws, however, can prevent the occurrence of identity theft when 
individuals are careless with the custody of their SSNs, credit cards, and personal mail and 
other carriers of the personal identifiers beloved by identity thieves. Corporations, as seen 
in the cases described above, are also careless with the custody of the personal information 
entrusted to them. The belief that hackers are the greatest corporate security risk is an 
urban myth. Experience is showing that employees entrusted with the access codes for the 
databases used in the normal course of their daily work are a greater risk than any hacker. 
There is also all too often a failure to check the backgrounds and establish internal controls 
and monitoring systems to prevent and catch unauthorized behavior. The personal 
information provided on job applications is all too often not checked out Information on 
credit applications by new customers is also frequently not verified.
It is expected that Sarbanes-Oxley will force corporations to tighten their security systems. 
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the CEO be able to vouch for the accuracy and clarity of 
company financial statements. This, in turn, requires that the CEO ascertain that the 
internal controls are sufficiently rigorous to control the flow of funds and information 
within the company to produce reliable financials. The external auditors must review these 
controls and concur with the CEO before they will lend their signature to the financial 
statements. This dual review plus the penalties for producing unreliable statements should 
go a long way to strengthening internal controls, at least among the companies registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Vigilance is going to be the price of avoiding personal or corporate identity theft. Watch 
your purse or wallet; do not accept preapproved credit-card solicitations; check your bills 
and mail for anything unusual; be careful when using e-mail or cell phones. Corporations 
will have to vet job applicants more closely; tighten access to databases; encrypt; stop using 
Social Security numbers as a filing system; change passwords more frequently and, in 
general, inconvenience themselves a lot more to ensure the security of their clients’ 
personal information.
14.8 Checklist: Detection of Personal Identity Theft and
Corporate Identity Fraud
This checklist addresses control issues, taken from the discussion in this chapter specific to 
personal identity theft and corporate identity fraud.
This checklist is intended for general guidance and information only. Use of the checklist 
does not guarantee the prevention or detection of fraud and is not intended as a substitute 
for audit or similar procedures. Those with vital concerns about fraud prevention or who 
suspect fraud should seek the advice of a competent fraud practitioner.
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Table 14.1 Identity Theft Checklist
Identity Theft Checklist Yes No NA Ref
A. Protecting Personal Information
A No answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a greater 
likelihood of potential identity theft and fraud.
1. Do you carry in your purse or wallet only those documents 
needed to conduct daily business?
2. Do you remove all credit card receipts or other papers 
carrying your personal identifiers from your purse or wallet at 
the end of the day?
3. Do you destroy or file all papers carrying identifiers such as 
credit card receipts, bank statements or documents carrying 
your SSN once they have been reconciled?
4. Do you sign all new cards or replacement cards upon receipt?
5. Do you cut up or otherwise destroy all old cards?
6. Is your mailbox secure?
7. Are all the bills you regularly receive by mail arriving on 
time?
8. Are you receiving mail only from entities with which you do 
business?
9. Do you have your mail picked up by a friend or held at the 
post office when you are away?
10. Do you conduct personal financial business only on a secure 
land line?
11. Do you call the intended recipient before sending a fax?
12. Do you change the PIN on your debit card every time you 
receive a replacement?
13. Do you carry the local emergency telephone number to call if 
your debit or credit card is stolen while traveling?
14. Do you keep track of all the places where your SSN is on file?
15. Are you the only person with access to your home computer?
16. Do you know the sources of all your downloaded software?
17. Do you have a virus scanner installed?
18. Is important tax, health, or other information stored on your 
memory stick or CD-ROM instead of on your hard drive?
19. Do you send only nonpersonal information by e-mail?
20. If you work at home, do you use encryption to send client 
information?
(continued)
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Table 14.1 (continued)
Identity Theft Checklist Yes No NA Ref
B. Corporate Identity Theft
A No answer to any of the questions in this section indicates a need to 
take action to improve your internal controls.
1. Are your internal controls Sarbanes-Oxley compliant?
2. Does your company have a written code of ethics that 
includes a privacy policy?
3. Is the privacy policy reinforced by a privacy audit that 
reviews standard operating procedures for privacy security?
4. Do you use an internally developed filing system instead of 
SSNs to identify client or employee files?
5. Are your employees well-trained to handle information 
requests?
6. Are your consultants and temporary personnel closely 
monitored when they must handle confidential information?
7. Is all data to be transmitted outside the company vetted by a 
second person before being sent?
8. Are your data security personnel kept up-to-date on changing 
technology and privacy law through regular retraining?
9. Does your data processing system leave a clear audit trail?
10. Does your privacy policy provide penalties for unauthorized 
access or browsing in the databases?
11. Do you do background checks on employees who will be 
accessing personal information?
12. Do you enforce password procedures?
13. Do you change passwords frequently?
14. Do you subject your systems to regular penetration tests?
15. Do you have a strict records management policy in place 
regarding retention of documents onsite, destruction, and 
offsite storage?
16. Do your records meet the evidentiary standards of a court of 
law?
17. Can the integrity of your records be guaranteed onsite and 
offsite?
18. Are your diskettes, tapes, and hard drives erased and 
destroyed at the end of their retention period?
19. Do you have a dedicated fax machine in a restricted area for 
receiving confidential information?
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Table 14.1 (continued)
Identity Theft Checklist Yes No NA Ref
20. Is there a cover sheet and transmission report for every 
transmission?  
21. Does your security policy forbid employees from leaving 
confidential information on answering machines or voice 
mail systems?
22. Do you have a policy on who has the right to access the voice 
mails of absent employees?
23. Do your e-mail operating procedures include a 
retention/purge schedule, copying and forwarding policy, 
password creation, and the use of encryption?
24. Do you have policies governing the use of company files on 
laptops or computers at home?
25. Do your security policies forbid employees from using 
laptops in public places such as airplanes?
26. Do you have a policy permitting the monitoring of employees 
while they work?





Abuse of trust: See Trust, abuse of.
Account manipulation, direct: The alteration of computer programs to obtain direct but 
unauthorized access to account files for the purpose of manipulation.
See also: Computer crime.
Account, nominee: A bank or trust account set up under an alias, an assumed name, a 
company name, a corporate name, or a blind trust.
Account, posting improper credits to: Concealing a fraud involving the sales and 
collection cycle. In this scheme, an employee posts credit memos or other noncash items, 
for example, a sales return or writeoff, to the customer account from which the funds were 
diverted.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Accounts receivable, misappropriation of: The diversion of payments received from 
customers. An employee may open a personal bank account with a name similar to that of 
the customer (for example, Acme Inc. rather than Acme Company). Customer payments 
can then be taken by the employee and deposited into the employee’s bank account.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Acquisition and payment cycle: The sequence of accounting procedures that address 
the procurement of and payment for all goods and services except payroll and capital 
acquisitions.
See also: Capital acquisition and repayment cycle; Payroll and personnel cycle; Procurement fraud.
Advance-fee fraud: A scheme in which assurances of some future benefit (for example, a 
loan) are given to the proposed victim in return for a payment described as an advance 
service fee or other advance good-faith deposit (often falsely described as a “returnable” 
deposit).
Typical victims of advance-fee schemes are business people who cannot obtain banking 
services or credit from customary sources. They pay “deposits” or “fees” to others on the 
promise that the perpetrator will arrange loans or credit for them.
See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
Advertising, false and misleading: Use of untrue or deceptive promotional techniques 
resulting in consumer fraud.
Victims are consumers who rely on the false or misleading advertising or promotion. 
Noteworthy practices include the following:
1. Advertising as a “sale” item an item that is actually at the regular or higher price
2. Misrepresenting the size, weight, volume, or utility of an item
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3. Making false claims about an attribute that a good or service does not in fact possess
4. Misstating the true costs of a good or service through the use of confusing payment 
provisions or otherwise
See also: Bait and switch; Consumer fraud.
Allegation: In litigation, a formal assertion, claim, declaration, or statement of a party to 
an action, made in a pleading, setting out what that party expects to prove. In a nonlitigious 
situation, a concern backed by evidence that a party has committed fraud.
Anti-trust offense: An offence consisting of one or more of the following:
1. Combinations in restraint of trade, price fixing, predatory pricing or other schemes for 
the purpose of unlawfully driving competitors out of business.
2. Agreements among competitors to share business according to some agreed formula, 
for example, bid-rigging-conspiracies and discriminatory pricing agreements.
3. Domination of a business area by one or a few enterprises.
Victims of anti-trust offenses are businesses and purchasers of goods or services who pay 
prices higher than they would if the offenses were not committed.
See also: Price fixing; Procurement fraud; Trade, restraint of.
Appraisal, false: False and inflated appraisal used to support a loan for an amount larger 
than would be granted if the true value of the property were known.
See also: External fraud; Land fraud; Real estate fraud.
Arson for profit: Intentional burning of a house or property whether one’s own or 
another’s to collect the payment from the insurance company on a claim for the loss.
See also: Commercial crime; Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Auto-repair fraud: A form of consumer fraud involving maintenance services to 
automobiles.
Auto-repair fraud falls into several categories, including the following:
1. Overcharging for labor or parts or use of shoddy or substandard parts
2. Failure to perform promised services or repairs
3. Charging for services not performed or parts not used
4. Performing services or repairs that are unnecessary or unwanted
See also: Consumer fraud; Repair fraud.
Backdooring: Sale of shares by “friends” of a promoter in a stock market manipulation 
scheme as the price rises but contrary to their agreement to sell only on his or her 
instructions.
See also: Distribution network, setting up; Stock market manipulation; Warehousing.
Bagman: The person who carries cash as a bribe to the recipient.
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Bait and switch: A form of consumer fraud involving misleading advertising. A bargain 
(the bait} is advertised as an inducement to lure customers to the store where they are 
presented with a similar but higher priced item (the switch). Thus, the advertisement does 
not constitute a bona fide offer for sale of the merchandise in question. This scheme may 
be used because the advertised item is not available or is in short supply. The sales staff 
may try to prevent the customer from purchasing the advertised item by directing him or 
her to higher priced merchandise by criticizing the advertised goods.
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Consumer fraud
Banking fraud: Violations by insiders or customers of banks, trust companies or credit 
unions. Insider violations generally involve embezzlement or self-dealing whereby insiders 
lend money to themselves or to businesses in which they have an interest, take bribes to 
make loans or refrain from collecting loans, provide special favors to outsiders or 
defalcations from customer accounts. Violations by outsiders would include submitting 
false financial statements to induce a bank to make a loan, the use of fraudulent collateral, 
check kiting, and similar offenses.
Victims of banking fraud are bank depositors and shareholders, creditors, the federal 
government as the insurer of deposits, and surety companies that bond bank employees 
and officers.
See also: Check kiting; Collateral fraud; Commercial bribery; Trust, abuse of
Bankruptcy fraud: Fraud against parties to a bankruptcy. Victims are usually creditors 
and suppliers of the failed or failing business, although managers of fraudulently operating 
businesses can also victimize silent partners and shareholders. The following are the two 
major kinds of bankruptcy fraud.
1. Fraudulently planned bankruptcy. The assets, credit, and viability of a business are 
purposely and systematically used to obtain cash, which is then hidden.
2. Fraudulent concealment or diversion of assets in anticipation of filing for bankruptcy. This 
prevents the assets from being sold for the benefit of creditors.
Planned thefts and fencing activities may be associated with either kind of bankruptcy 
fraud as a means of diverting assets for the purpose of converting them to cash.
See also: Finance fraud.
Bid rigging: A conspiracy among contractors to set the price or terms of a contract for the 
purpose of raising the cost to the purchaser.
See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Biometrics: A method to ensure that only authorized people have access to computer 
systems, restricted areas, and/or equipment. It can include the checking of fingerprints, iris 
recognition, and hand geometry.
See also: Computer-access control.
Blowing off: The sale of unusually large amounts of stock during a stock market 
manipulation (also referred to as blowing a position).
See also: Stock market manipulation.
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Boiler room: A place of business used to promote fraudulent sales of securities, charitable 
donations, lotteries, and so on, through telephone solicitation. Salespeople working from 
call lists ask victims to buy a particular product or service. They call both locally and long 
distance, use glibly scripted presentations and work on high commissions. Legitimate 
enterprises, especially charitable institutions, often mistakenly use the services of these 
operators and, as a result, rarely see much of the money collected in their names.
See also: Charity and religious fraud; Securities fraud.
Borrower misapplication of funds: Loan fraud in which a borrower, with little or no 
personal risk in the collateral, misapplies borrowed funds.
See also: Loan or lending fraud.
Bundling and unbundling claims: See Claims, bundling and unbundling.
Business-opportunity fraud: One of the most common but varied forms of fraud, in 
which the victim is offered the opportunity to make a living or to supplement his or her 
income by going into business, full- or part-time, or by purchasing a franchise or 
equipment to manufacture some item, sell merchandise, or perform some service.
Victims are generally individuals with a small pool of savings, who are enticed by the 
prospect of independence and/or income.
This kind of scheme ranges from being a total sham to an “opportunity” whose promised 
return is highly illusory. Work-at-home merchandising schemes, such as selling knitting 
machines or raising mink, or the sale of distributorships in cosmetics, special rug cleaning 
processes, and so on, are common examples of the kinds of opportunities offered in this 
form of fraud. The opportunity presented by the fraudster often includes the promise of 
“guaranteed” markets for the goods or services to be produced. This kind of fraud can turn 
into a pyramid scheme if victims are induced to enlist other prospective victims.
See also: Franchise fraud; Pyramid scheme; Self-improvement scheme.
Capital acquisition and repayment cycle: The sequence of accounting procedures 
whereby capital items are purchased and paid for. This process is sometimes referred to as 
the financing cycle.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Casualty-insurance fraud: Claims for staged accidents and false claims for real accidents 
submitted under a casualty-insurance policy covering personal injuries and property 
damage that may be sustained as the result of an accident.
See also: Claim, accident with false; Insurance fraud; Personal-injury insurance fraud.
Chain-referral scheme: Fraud in which the victim is induced to part with money or 
property on the representation that he or she will make money by persuading others to buy 
in.
First-tier victims usually believe that those they involve in the scheme (second-tier victims) 
will make money. Since second-tier victims can only make money by involving third-tier 
victims and so on, the scheme must eventually collapse. Generally, only the fraudster 
makes money; few first- or second-tier victims (especially if they are honest) have a 
sufficient number of participating friends and acquaintances to come out whole.
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One common form of chain-referral scheme is the chain-letter. A more sophisticated 
version is the pyramid scheme. Here, the victim is sold a franchise to sell both merchandise 
and other franchises. Profits are promised to come from both merchandise sold and 
commissions or “overrides” on merchandise sold by any second- or later-tier victims who 
buy a franchise. The profits appear, therefore, to be in selling franchises rather than in 
selling merchandise. These schemes ultimately collapse under their own weight.
See also: Merchandising fraud; Pyramid scheme.
Charity and religious fraud: Fraud arising out of the fund-raising activities of charitable 
and/or religious groups.
Almost anyone can be the victim of this type of fraud often without knowing it. Even if the 
victim may later suspect the fraud, however, his or her individual loss may be so small that 
there is little desire to pursue the matter. The following two kinds of fraud are common.
1. Fake charity. Money is solicited for a nonexistent charitable organization or cause or for 
a charitable front set up to defraud donors.
2. Misrepresentation of association with a charity or religious group. Individuals solicited for 
donations to a legitimate charity or religious organization are not aware that most of the 
money collected is used to cover the cost of professional fund raisers and/or 
administrative overhead expenses, rather than the charity. (This is a gray area in law 
since professional fund raisers perform a legitimate service for which they may properly 
and legally be compensated).
In some instances, charitable organizations themselves are the victims of con artists who 
use them as a front to keep the largest part of the money collected. In other instances, the 
solicitation falls into a gray area where otherwise legitimate charities cover up the fact that 
most of the money collected goes to salaries and fund raising.
See also: Boiler room; Sham, corporate.
Check forgery: The copying of a check or some of its components (most often the 
signature) onto a fraudulent check to induce a financial institution to believe it is a bona 
fide check.
See also: Check fraud.
Check fraud: A general term for the attempted or actual negotiation of a bad check at a 
financial institution. Kinds of fraud in this category include: a false deposit made by a new 
customer, forged, altered or stolen check and check kiting.
See also: Check kiting; New-account fraud
Check kiting: A kind of fraud against banks that depends for success on the length of 
time the banking system takes to clear checks. The most common form of check kiting 
involves at least two bad checks used intentionally to temporarily obtain credit. In the 
simplest case, the fraudster must open two bank accounts, each of which contains little or 
no money. The accounts are often established at different banks in different cities in order 
to create and take advantage of a longer clearing period. A check is then written on one 
account for deposit in the other. This process may be repeated within the next day or so to 
build up the amount the fraudster needs to carry out the scheme. Money is then withdrawn 
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from one of the accounts before the first checks are cleared. The process can continue with 
multiple accounts in different cities and a constant stream of deposits and withdrawals.
Banks are victims of check kites. When first discovered, check kites often appear to have 
cost the bank far more than they actually have after all transactions have been analyzed, 
since hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks may have been circulated to steal only a 
few thousand dollars. In some instances, however, massive amounts have been stolen. In 
many cases, businesses employ check kites when they cannot get loans from banks to tide 
themselves over a temporary business crisis and intend to (and often do) put the money 
back into the accounts before the check kite is discovered. In these instances, the bank has 
been fraudulently induced to unwittingly grant what amounts to an interest-free loan. This 
form of fraud is becoming increasingly difficult to perpetrate because of the speed of 
electronic clearing.
See also: Banking fraud; Check fraud.
Churning: The buying and selling of stock for a client by a broker solely to generate 
commissions rather than to meet the client’s investment objectives.
Claim, accident with false: An individual involved in a real accident later exaggerates 
the seriousness of his or her personal injuries in order to collect an excessive insurance 
claim.
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Claim, false or fraudulent: Fraudulently written claim for payment for goods or services 
not provided as claimed. False claims may involve activities such as the following:
1. Presentation of a bogus claim or claimant; for example, ghost payrolling
2. Misrepresentation of the qualifications of an otherwise ineligible claim or claimant, for 
example, welfare fraud
3. Misrepresentation of the extent of payment or benefits to which a claimant is entitled, 
for example, overtime-pay fraud
4. Claims for reimbursement for goods and services allegedly provided to nonexistent 
recipients, for example, health care fraud, by service providers
The false claim will carry all the trappings of a legitimate claim and is most successfully 
undertaken by individuals with a thorough knowledge of the system being defrauded. The 
false claim will sometimes involve the cooperation of executives or officials of the entity to 
which the claims are submitted.
See also: Commercial bribery; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against;
Insurance fraud; Health-care fraud; Welfare fraud.
Claims, bundling and unbundling: The practice of physicians or clinics billing a 
patient’s health insurance provider (government or private carrier) separately for medical 
services performed at the same time.
See also: Health-insurance fraud
Cleaning up the market: Buying up as many shares of a company as possible when they 
become available. (Also referred to as taking out the market)
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Collateral fraud: The holding, taking, or offering of defective collateral pursuant to a 
financial transaction. In many instances collateral fraud will be related to bank loan 
transactions. Beyond this, however, this kind of fraud may be encountered in connection 
with any transaction in which defective security is provided, such as security for private 
loans, non-existent accounts receivable sold or pledged to factors, and the like. In some 
cases, collateral used as security may not belong to the person offering it. The collateral 
could be stolen (for example, securities), borrowed, or already subject to an undisclosed 
lien or other encumbrance. Alternatively, there may be some gross misrepresentation as to 
the collateral’s value.
Collateral frauds are typically violations of federal fraud and banking laws. There may be 
elements in banking or corporate violations involving self-dealing, such as when a bank 
officer makes a loan knowing the collateral is bad. Collateral frauds may also be involved 
in organized crime activities, for example, obtaining proceeds of stolen securities not by an 
attempted sale, which would precipitate discovery when title was transferred, but by their 
use as collateral for loans.
See also: Banking fraud.
Collusion or collusive fraud: A private agreement in which several parties plan to 
commit fraud against another party or organization. The group of fraudsters could be as 
few as two people and could include parties who are internal or external to an 
organization, or both. For example, collusion occurs if an internal fraudster helps an 
external fraudster commit a crime in return for a secret commission, kickback, or bribe.
See also: External fraud; Internal fraud
Commercial bribery: A form of insider fraud or abuse of trust in which an employee or 
officer of a business, charitable organization, or government entity is given a bribe or some 
other valuable consideration to induce the employee or official to make a purchase, grant a 
contract, or provide some special privilege (such as a zoning variance or license).
See also: Trust, abuse of; Procurement fraud.
Commercial crime: A white-collar crime committed by an individual or group of 
individuals in a company for the benefit of that company and, indirectly, themselves.
See also: Economic crime; External fraud; Procurement fraud; White-collar crime.
Compartmentalization: A restriction that limits computer users’ access to the specific 
files and programs for which they have a job-related requirement.
See also: Computer-access control.
Computer-access control: A series of controls used to help ensure that only authorized 
persons are permitted to access computer systems. Controls include passwords, 
compartmentalization, the use of biometrics, one-time passwords, automatic log-off, time- 
day controls, dialback systems, requests for random personal information, and Internet 
authentication.
See also: Biometrics; Compartmentalization; Computer crime; Dialback systems; Internet 
authentication; Information, random personal; Controls, time-day.
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Computer crime: A crime in which a computer is used either to commit a crime or as the 
target of crime. Crimes committed using a computer may include embezzlement, larceny, 
fraud, forgery, and counterfeiting. Crimes that target computers may include sabotage, 
vandalism, electronic burglary, wire tapping, and gaining illegal access. The most common 
forms of computer crime involve the manipulation of inputs and outputs.
See also: Computer-access control.
Computer fraud: Fraud arising out of the increasing use of the computer to maintain 
business and government records, such as those relating to inventories, accounts payable 
and receivable, and customer and payroll records. Most computer frauds are really 
traditional kinds of fraud that are committed by using a computer to alter electronic 
records rather than manually altering paper records. True computer frauds do exist, such as 
those involving unauthorized changes to a computer’s programming, but these are 
relatively less common and are most often committed by technical computer people.
See also: Computer crime.
Computer intrusion: Unauthorized access to another organization’s computers.
See also: Computer-access control; Computer crime.
Consumer fraud: A deception in the marketplace involving sellers’ misrepresentations to 
buyers. Victims are consumers of all kinds, individual and institutional, public and private. 
Common forms of consumer fraud include the following:
1. Sale of useless goods or services, represented as beneficial, for example, “miracle face 
creams”
2. Misrepresentation of product performance, benefits, or safety
3. False and misleading advertising
4. Failure to service items after sale, including reneging on warranties
5. Repair fraud
6. Hidden charges with respect to financing, necessary follow-up services, and so on
7. Weights and measures violations
See also: Advertising, false and misleading; Auto-repair fraud; Bait and switch; Chain-referral 
scheme; Merchandising fraud; Repair fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Controls, time-day: Controls that restrict access to computer systems to those times when 
employees are supposed to be on duty. An extension of this concept uses automated time- 
clock systems to deny access; the system reports a violation if access is attempted when an 
employee is shown as not being authorized to be present.
See also: Computer-access control.
Copyright piracy: The use of another’s copyright or other business rights for profit 
without the legal right to manufacture or copy the product.
See also: Commercial crime.
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Corruption, public or official: An abuse of trust violation involving commercial bribery, 
collusion with bid-rigging, avoidance of the competitive process in connection with the 
purchase of goods and services by government entities, self-dealing in connection with 
government purchases, or grants of franchise to use public property and real estate.
Most public corruption has its parallel in the private sector. Thus conflict of interest is the 
public equivalent of insider trading.
See also: Commercial bribery; Procurement fraud; Government-benefit program, fraud against; 
Trust, abuse of.
COSO framework: A framework for internal control created by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission published in 1992 as Internal 
Control—Integrated Framework. The SEC final rules for internal control over financial 
reporting accept the COSO framework as compliant with Sarbanes-Oxley. The framework 
defines internal control as: “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of objectives in the following categories:
• Effectiveness and efficiency of operations
• Reliability of financial reporting
• Compliance with applicable laws and regulations.”
Coupon-redemption fraud: Cheating manufacturers or merchandisers who promote 
sales of their products by offering coupons that return part of the purchase price when the 
products are purchased.
Many manufacturers, primarily in the food business, place coupons in newspaper and 
magazine ads offering, for example, “15 CENTS OFF” if the product is purchased. The 
grocery store is supposed to redeem the coupon, and will customarily receive a service 
charge of about 5 cents for handling the transaction. Frauds are committed against the 
manufacturers by amassing large numbers of coupons and submitting them to 
manufacturers without any bona fide purchases of the products.
This kind of fraud involves two basic steps, as follows.
1. Collect coupons.
2. Process the coupons for redemption.
Coupons can be collected by going through large numbers of old newspapers and 
magazines; sometimes this is done by trash collection or waste disposal companies as a side 
venture. Processing for collection requires the collaboration of retail merchants and is most 
efficiently done with the cooperation of officials of food retail chains.
See also: Commercial crime.
Credit-card fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit cards. Victims 
are the issuers of the credit cards. Common credit card abuses include the following:
1. Use of stolen credit cards
2. False statements in the application for a credit card, including application under a false 
name
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3. Making a purchase using a legitimate credit card with no intention of paying
4. Manufacture and use of fake credit cards
5. Electronic swiping of a card to capture card data later used to make unauthorized 
purchases
See also: Banking fraud.
Credit-card receipt, altered: A fraudulent increase in the amount recorded on a credit­
card receipt.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Credit, false application for: False information on a credit application including 
overstated assets, nonexistent assets, understated or omitted liabilities, inflated revenue, and 
understated expenses.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lending  fraud
Credit rating fraud: Fraudulent application for, extension, and use of credit. Victims are 
generally the providers of credit. Common credit-related schemes include the following:
1. Sale of good credit ratings to high-risk applicants
2. False statements in credit applications
3. Creation of false credit accounts for the purpose of theft
The modus operandi of these schemes varies widely. Recently, employees of credit rating 
organizations have altered credit ratings for payment, sometimes using computer 
techniques. The creation of false financial statements is another common method. On a 
smaller scale is a fraud that operates like shoplifting—opening a charge account with false 
information in order to purchase and immediately take away goods.
See also: Loan or lending fraud
Customs duty fraud: The false understatement by an importer of the value of goods to be 
imported to reduce the amount of customs duty paid to the government of the country into 
which the goods are imported.
See also: Commercial crime; Tax and revenue violation.
Debt-consolidation or adjustment swindle: The purported bundling of a debtor’s assets 
and income to repay all creditors over a period of time in order to keep creditors from 
pressing for the immediate payment of all sums due.
There are legitimate private agencies that provide these services and they have similar 
workout procedures available after filing for bankruptcy.
The usual modus operandi is to use heavy television and newspaper advertising to lure 
debtors into signing up. Sometimes the perpetrators will talk creditors into waiting for their 
money; in other instances, they falsely tell the debtors they have been able to call the 
creditors off. They then take the debtors’ assets and a portion of their weekly or monthly 
earnings, paying themselves first and (usually only after they have their entire “fee”) dole 
out the remainder to creditors. Frequently, creditors receive little or nothing and the 
debtors are left minus their fees and still in debt.
See also: Finance fraud
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Dialback systems: A computer security system that accepts a user identification (ID) and 
password then hangs up and dials a predetermined number. The system is only accessible 
by dialing in from a set location.
See also: Computer-access control.
Differential association: A theory established by Edwin H. Sutherland that explains why 
crime is committed. There are ten principles to his theory which, in summary, asserts that a 
person becomes a criminal because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of the 
law over definitions unfavorable to violation of the law.
Diploma mill: An outlet that grants diplomas to all people who apply for them in 
exchange for a hefty fee. Because the diploma mill is not accredited, the diplomas are 
worthless.
See also: External fraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Directory-advertising fraud: Fraud arising from the selling of printed mass advertising 
services. The following are the two basic kinds.
1. Impersonation schemes involve con artists who send bills to business enterprises 
resembling those customarily received; for example, purported bills from the phone 
company for yellow page advertising, with directions to make checks payable to entities 
whose names are similar to legitimate payees of the bills.
2. Another kind of scheme involves promising that advertising will appear in a 
publication distributed to potential customers even though distribution will actually be 
limited to the advertisers themselves, if the directory is printed at all.
See also: External fraud.
Disclosure Controls and Procedures: Defined under SEC Rules 13(a)-15 (e) as 
procedures:
“designed to ensure that information required to be disclosed by the issuer in the reports 





within the time periods specified in the Commission’s rules and forms. Disclosure controls 
and procedures include, without limitation, controls and procedures designed to ensure 
that information required to be disclosed by an issuer in the reports that it files or submits 
under the Act is accumulated and communicated to the issuer’s management, including its 
principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, 
as appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure.”
Distribution network, setting up: A term used in stock market manipulation. The 
network is set up with the promoter as its head and several distributors located in cities 
with facilities for trading the stock in question. Each distributor has access to a brokerage 
house’s sales force which in turn has access to the floor traders who will actually be 
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executing the trades. Via this network, the promoter has control over trading in the subject 
stock.
Double-indemnity fraud: The report by a beneficiary of a life insurance policy of a 
natural death as having been accidental in order to obtain more than the face value of the 
policy.
See also: Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Double-pledging collateral: Fraudulently pledging the same collateral to different 
lenders before the related liens are recorded and registered.
See also: External fraud; Land fraud; Real estate fraud.
Down payments and retainers, absconding with: A fraud in which the fraudster 
absconds with money obtained from the victim in advance by the false promise to provide 
goods or services.
Economic crime: A crime that is similar to white-collar crime but broader in its scope in 
that it includes violent crimes committed by people without any particular occupational 
status.
See also: White-collar crime.
Economic espionage: An act in which business secrets are stolen for the benefit of 
another organization.
Economic extortion: A crime in which a financial benefit is sought or obtained through 
intimidation or persistent demands.
See also: Commercial crime.
Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud: The conversion to one’s own use or benefit of the 
money or property of another, over which one has custody with which one has been 
entrusted or over which one exerts a fiduciary’s control. Victims include institutions, 
businesses in general, pension funds, and beneficiaries of estates managed by fiduciaries.
See also: Banking fraud; Insider trading; Loan or lending fraud; Trust, abuse of.
Employment-agency fraud: Fraudulent solicitations of money or fees in order to find 
employment for, to guarantee the employment of, or to improve the employability of 
another. Victims are generally individuals seeking jobs or hoping to improve their skills in 
order to obtain better paying jobs. Variations of employment-related fraud include the 
following.
1. Phony job agencies. An agency solicits advance fees in order to find employment for the 
victim, when in fact, the service is neither provided nor is it intended to be.
2. Job training fraud. Money is received from victims to train them for specific 
employment. The training is not supplied; “guaranteed” job opportunities on 
completion of training do not materialize; the training is misrepresented as being 
“certified” or “recognized” by employers when it is not.
Energy-crisis fraud: Fraud arising out of the sale of goods or services related to energy or 
fuel use, saving, and production.
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Victims axe generally consumers interested in saving on energy costs. Energy schemes 
include the following.
1. Merchandise schemes. Sale of worthless or bogus items that do not deliver the specific 
benefits promised or the degree of benefit promised; for example, carburetor gadgets to 
save gasoline or phony solar heating systems. Often, these kinds of fraud occur because 
of the novelty of the items involved combined with the naivete of the victims.
2. Weights and measures violations. Short weighing or measuring fuels to customers; for 
example, the manipulation of gas pump measuring devices or the misrepresentation of 
fuel types by changing octane ratings on fuel pumps.
3. Distributors' discriminatory allocation of fuel. Distribution to subdistributors and retailers, 
in consideration of commercial bribes to distributors’ executives or special payments to 
companies with the power to make distribution, in the form of under-the-table 
payments or required purchases of other items, in violation of antitrust or other laws.
See also: Antitrust offense; Commercial bribery; Merchandising fraud; Weights and measures fraud.
Environmental abuse: Business behavior that can harm the environment. The legal 
system considers these acts to be crimes. The two major practices are pollution and the 
misuse of natural resources. Businesses commit these crimes to avoid the costs associated 
with compliance.
See also: Commercial crime; Pollution and environmental protection violation.
Ethics: Principles or standards of human conduct.
Evidence: Oral, written, or physical material presented as proof in a trial or other hearing 
for the purpose of convincing the trier of fact (that is, judge, jury, mediator, arbitrator, and 
so on) of the truth of the facts and allegations.
Expense report, false: Expense report containing any combination of overstated, 
fictitious, or duplicated items prepared and submitted for reimbursement to an employee.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Claim, false or fraudulent.
Expert witness: A person possessing specialized knowledge acquired through experience, 
education, or training. Expert witnesses can provide opinions in court, whereas lay 
witnesses can only provide evidence regarding their physical experiences—what they saw, 
smelled, heard, tasted, or touched.
External fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by arm’s-length parties.
See also: Commercial crime; Internal fraud.
Fictitious company, payment of invoices to: The embezzler establishes a fake entity 
(often with a post-office box for an address, and a name similar to that of a legitimate 
company) and gets the fake entity entered into company records as a legitimate vendor. 
The embezzler then produces invoices for the fake vendor, has them processed in the 
accounts payable system, and pockets the payments made to satisfy the fake invoices.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud; Sham, corporate.
File-maintenance instructions, failure to enter: Failure to input information into the 
computer system because of an intention to deceive. For example, deliberately not 
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updating computer files when an employee has left the firm and not removing that 
employee from the payroll records. This kind of “omission” might be for the purpose of 
creating a ghost employee.
See also: Payroll and personnel cycle.
File-maintenance transactions, phony: Performing file-maintenance transactions such 
as changing a customer’s address or adding a new employee to the payroll. These 
transactions can lay the groundwork for any number of frauds, for example, the use of 
ghost employees to embezzle funds.
See also: Computer crime; Payroll and personnel cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Final Rules: See Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rules
Finance fraud: One of several kinds of fraud, including the following:
1. False mortgage security. The mortgage loan is larger than the underlying value of the 
property secured by the mortgage.
2. Advance fee fraud. The victim pays an up-front finder’s fee in exchange for a promise to 
receive an advance on a loan.
3. Debt consolidation scheme. A fraudulent debt consolidation agency makes money by 
organizing the debtors’ affairs and collecting and retaining most, if not all, the money 
handled on the debtor’s behalf.
4. Bankruptcy fraud. This includes fraudulent conveyances, concealed assets, asset 
stripping, or fraudulently planned bankruptcy.
The victims of financial fraud are generally financial institutions.
See also: Advance-fee fraud; Bankruptcy fraud; Commercial crime; Mortgage security, false.
Financial-statement auditing: A methodology used by auditors to evaluate the accuracy, 
timeliness, and completeness of recorded business transactions through sampling, 
confirmation, and analytical techniques.
Financial statement, false: False information created by upper-level managers with 
intent to manipulate data to enhance reported profitability and thereby earn higher 
bonuses, impress supervisors or executives, impress stockholders or lenders, or simply to 
comply with the goals set by senior management. The methods of creating a false financial 
statement include overstating revenue, overstating assets, understating expenses, 
understating liabilities, and misrepresenting information in the notes to the financial 
statements.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud; Statement, false.
Forensic: Material that is used in, or suitable to courts of law.
See also: Forensic accounting; Forensic standard.
Forensic accounting: An accounting subdiscipline that investigates alleged financial 
wrongdoing or damage for the purpose of providing evidence to meet the evidentiary 
standards of the courts. The forensic accountant also supplies expert testimony for 
arbitration hearings, mediation, and other business dispute resolution processes.
See also: Forensic; Forensic standard.
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Forensic standard: The evidentiary test of the courts. Evidence must meet the standards 
of court admissibility and be able to withstand cross examination.
See also: Forensic; Forensic accounting.
Franchise fraud: Fraud in the sale or service of a franchise.
Franchise fraud generally occurs in one or more of the following ways.
1. The franchisor has no intention of honoring any of its obligations; that is, the 
“franchise” is a complete ruse to acquire the victim-franchisee’s initial investment 
money.
2. The franchisor fails to provide promised goods or services essential to the success of the 
franchise.
3. The franchisor makes success for the franchisee either difficult or impossible by 
allowing too many franchises in a given market area.
4. The franchisor has misrepresented the market or demand for goods or services central 
to the franchise, or has misrepresented the level of skill needed to realize franchise 
profitability.
Item 1 is outright fraud, while items 2 to 4 represent variations that range from fraud to 
shady dealing and the failure to fulfill contractual obligations.
See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Chain-referral scheme.
Fraud: Criminal deception intended to financially benefit the deceiver. The deception 
must be criminal in nature and involve financial benefit.
See also: Commercial crime; External fraud; Internal fraud.
Fraud auditing: A methodology used by fraud auditors to find transactions that differ 
from the normal series of transactions and suggest irregularities that could be fraudulent.
See also: Financial-statement auditing.
Fraudulent disbursement: The theft (embezzlement) of a company’s cash by an 
employee, for example, by using company checks either to withdraw cash directly or to 
pay personal expenses.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Front-end fraud: The improper direction given to a company’s customers to take their 
business elsewhere thereby depriving the company of profits it would otherwise have 
earned.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Funeral fraud: A class of guilt-inducement fraud that relies on the emotional stress of 
victims who have lost or are about to lose loved ones through death. Victims are the 
relatives or friends of the deceased or terminally ill.
Funeral-related fraud often takes the form of consumer and merchandising fraud and 
generally involves one or more of the following practices.
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1. Relying on the guilt or anxiety of bereaved relatives. Victims are persuaded to contract for 
unnecessary or unduly elaborate funeral services or merchandise.
2. Billing for funeral expenses to include charges for services not performed. The fraudster relies 
on the victim’s grief to cloud his or her memory as to whether or not a particular 
service was performed and/or to preempt the victim’s challenge of the bill for payment.
3. Misrepresentation. Victims are told that certain goods or services are required by law 
when they are not.
4. Fraudulent contracts. The victim is sold and pays for the future provision of goods or 
services the fraudster has neither the intention nor the capacity to provide; for example, 
the sale of nonexistent cemetery plots.
See also: Consumer fraud; Guilt-inducement fraud; Merchandising fraud.
Generic risk factors: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but 
outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Ghost employee: A payroll fraud in which the embezzler enters the name of a fictitious 
employee into the payroll system and receives the resulting payroll check. Fictitious 
employees are commonly referred to as “ghosts.”
In one variation of this scheme, the names of individuals whose employment has 
terminated are kept on the payroll for several pay periods after they leave their jobs. The 
embezzler then receives the paychecks for the former employees. In another variation of 
the ghost payroll, the fraudster develops an overtime-pay scheme in which false claims are 
made for overtime work performed by bona fide employees.
Victims are generally public and private entities responsible for honoring payroll claims. 
Often, the ghost payroll is a device used to defraud government programs designed to 
provide employment for the unemployed or disadvantaged. This is closely related to 
welfare and unemployment insurance fraud. This device is used in cost-plus contracts to 
cheat government entities or by managers of sub-units in private enterprises to steal from 
their parent organizations.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Payroll and 
personnel cycle.
Government-benefit program, fraud against: Unlawful application for and receipt of 
money, property, or benefit from a public program designed to confer money, property, or 
benefit under specific guidelines.
Victims are federal, state, county, and municipal governments; their taxpayers; and 
qualified, intended beneficiaries of the programs. Typical kinds of fraud suffered by 
government programs include the following:
1. The misrepresentation of applicants’ qualifications concerning program eligibility; for 
example, welfare received by ineligible people
2. False billing or vouchering for services not rendered or for nonexistent beneficiaries; 
for example, physician’s claims under provincial health programs for patients not 
treated or for specific treatments not provided
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3. Inflated billing, vouchering, or claiming that charges public programs more than the 
allowable costs; for example, housing fraud in which the cost of construction is inflated 
so that the builder or owner receives more than the total cost of land and buildings and 
avoids making the investment required by law and administrative guidelines
4. Embezzlement by employees or officials misusing their custodial or fiduciary positions 
to convert public funds, property, or benefits to their own use; for example, licensed 
dispensers of food stamps converting them to their own use
5. Use of properly obtained funds in which money, property, or benefit are used for 
purposes other than those for which they were intended; for example, the use of 
student loans for purposes other than education
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Health-care fraud; 
Statement, false; Welfare fraud.
Guilt-inducement fraud: Fraud perpetrated by inducing guilt or anxiety in the victim 
concerning a child, parent, spouse, or friend. Victims are persuaded to part with money or 
property in the belief that they are atoning for any “shortcomings” or fulfilling 
“obligations” toward another.
Guilt inducement is used in many kinds of fraud. A few examples are the following.
1. Encyclopedia salespeople induce victims to sign purchase contracts by suggesting that 
their children will fail at school unless the books are bought.
2. Children of deceased parents are persuaded to purchase elaborate and unnecessary 
funeral arrangements for fear of not giving a “decent” burial. Victims are urged to 
believe that their failure to make these purchases implies a lack of affection or respect 
for the deceased.
3. Unnecessary and imprudent expenditure for life insurance is induced by the suggestion 
that failure to do so implies a lack of care for spouse and children.
4. Self-improvement merchandise and facilities are marketed to victims on the basis of 
guilt inducements such as, “You owe it to your spouse to be as [lovely, manly, successful, or 
whatever] as you can be” or “You can only be a failure if you fail to take advantage of 
opportunities to improve your [looks, job, speaking ability, or whatever]."
See also: Funeral fraud; Self-improvement scheme.
Health-care fraud: This term covers numerous types of fraud in the health care industry, 
for example; marketing drugs without adequate testing or for which the test results have 
been falsified.
See also: Commercial crime; Health-insurance fraud; Medical fraud
Health-insurance fraud: There are several forms of health insurance fraud, for example, 
mobile labs, bundling or unbundling claims, or collusion between an insured and a 
provider to claim health insurance for his or her own benefit.
See also: Claims, bundling and unbundling; health-care fraud; insurance fraud.
Home-repair or home-improvement fraud: Fraud arising from the provision of goods 
and services in connection with the repair, maintenance, or renovation of housing units.
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Victims are generally homeowners but may also include public agencies or programs that 
subsidize or underwrite home purchase and ownership. Home repair or improvement 
fraud includes the following practices:
1. Intentionally shoddy or incompetent workmanship
2. Sale of overpriced or unfit materials or services
3. Failure to provide services or goods paid for by the customer
4. Submission of false claims for materials or work not provided
5. Misrepresentation of the need for particular materials or services to be performed
6. Misrepresentations or concealment of the costs of credit or of the nature of liens 
securing the payment obligations
The victim may be told that the home is in violation of building codes or in a condition 
substandard to the rest of the neighborhood thus lowering the value of the home or 
compromising the safety of the victim’s family.
See also: Consumer fraud; Merchandising fraud; Repair fraud.
Homicide for profit: A homicide in which a victim is murdered for financial gain by the 
murderer or the person hiring the murderer.
See also: Homicide fraud; Insurance fraud; Life-insurance fraud.
Homicide fraud: A fraud in which a beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the 
policy holder to collect benefits.
Income tax fraud: The evasion of a tax by any means including filing false or fraudulent 
returns.
See also: External fraud.
Inflated costs: Expenses that have been artificially inflated and invoiced when a 
contractor is paid on a cost-plus basis.
See also: Commercial fraud; Procurement fraud.
Information, random personal: Information, known only to an authorized individual, 
that is used as a means of identifying unauthorized log-in attempts to a computer system. 
The computer randomly transmits a question using this information and denies access to 
the user unless it receives the right answer. If several dozen questions are on file, it can be a 
very useful technique for stopping unauthorized computer use.
Input tampering: A computer scheme that can be accomplished by altering, forging, or 
fabricating computer input documents. In an entity, especially a small business with 
inadequate logical access control, input tampering is quite easy to accomplish.
See also: Computer crime.
Insider trading: Benefiting oneself or others in whom one has an interest by trading on 
privileged information or position. Typical situations include those in which a corporate 
officer or director trades in the stock of his or her company on the basis of inside 
information as to prospective profits or losses; bank officers lending money to themselves 
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or businesses in which they have an interest; corporate executives or purchasing officials 
setting up suppliers of goods and services to contract with their companies.
See also: Banking fraud; Commercial bribery; Securities fraud; Trust, abuse of.
Instructions, unauthorized: Commands placed by a computer programmer into a 
computer program to perform unauthorized functions, for example, making payments to a 
vendor not on an approved list.
See also: Computer crime.
Insurance fraud: Fraud perpetrated by or against insurance companies. Victims may be 
the clients or stockholders of insurance companies or the insurer itself.
Insurance fraud breaks down into the following categories and subclasses.
1. Fraud perpetrated by insurers against clients or stockholders includes the following:
a. Failure to provide coverage promised and paid for when claim is made
b. Failure to compensate or reimburse fully on claims
c. Manipulation of risk classes and high-risk policy holder categories
d. Embezzlement or abuse of trust in management of premium funds and other assets 
of insurance companies
e. Twisting, that is, illegal sales practices in which the insurer persuades customers to 
cancel current policies and purchase new replacement ones
2. Fraud perpetrated by policy holders against insurance providers includes the following: 
Filing of bogus claims for compensation or reimbursement, or of multiple claims for the 
same loss from different insurers, and so on
a. Inflating reimbursable costs on claim statements
b. Paying bribes or kickbacks to local agents to retain coverage or to obtain coverage 
in an improper risk category
c. Failing to disclose information or making false statements in an application for 
insurance
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Claim, accident with false; Claim, false or fraudulent; Double­
indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud; Life-insurance fraud; Mortgage-insurance fraud; Personal-injury 
insurance fraud; Trust, abuse of.
Intellectual-property theft: The theft of intellectual assets such as business plans or trade 
secrets.
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting: The form of internal control required for 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Defined in the SEC final rules as: “A process 
designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant’s principal executive and principal 
financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the registrant’s 
board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements 
for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and 
includes those policies and procedures that:
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• Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and the dispositions of the assets of the registrant;
• Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit 
preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being made only in 
accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the registrant; and
• Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized 
acquisition use or disposition of the registrant’s assets that could have a material effect 
on the financial statements.”
Internal fraud: Fraud committed against an organization by its employees, officers, or 
directors.
See also: External fraud.
Internet authentication: A computerized security measure used to identify a specific 
Internet user and to send information across the Internet safely.
See also: Computer-access control.
Inventory balances, understating beginning: Fraudulent financial reporting to conceal 
inventory shortages or theft. A common method for understating beginning inventory is to 
overstate the allowance for inventory obsolescence. For example, understating may be 
perpetrated if there has been a change in management and current management wishes to 
report improved profitability.
See also: Financial statement, false; Inventory and warehousing cycle.
Inventory and warehousing cycle: The accounting process that deals with the purchase 
and warehousing of merchandise for manufacture or resale or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Investment fraud: The use of imprudent, illusory, or bogus projects or businesses to 
attract investors through the prospect of high rates of return.
Investment fraud generally victimizes those with a pool of liquid or convertible assets, 
ranging from retirees or near-retirement age people, widows and widowers, to high-income 
professionals and businessmen. Hallmarks of this kind of fraud may include the following.
1. The investment promises a higher-than-average rate of return.
2. The investment project is still in development, that is, the project or business is not a 
mature entity.
3. The buyer purchases the investment from a stranger.
4. The investment has a generalized definition of its nature and scope and lacks detailed 
plans for measuring any progress.
5. The object or site of the investment is geographically remote or distant from investors.
6. The seller fails to fully disclose facts that are material to the investor prior to his 
commitment of money.
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7. The seller is not registered with the appropriate regulatory agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission or a state’s securities commission.
8. The seller promises special advantages such as tax benefits.
See also: Land fraud; Ponzi scheme; Pyramid scheme; Securities fraud.
Invoice, false: An invoice submitted by a contractor for goods not delivered or for service 
not performed.
See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud.
Invoice, false sales: An altered company copy of the sales invoice showing a lower sales 
amount than the original invoice sent to the client. The difference between the real sale 
amount and the adjusted lower amount is then misappropriated when payment is received.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Invoice, false supplier: A supplier’s invoice is prepared and submitted for payment to 
the company even though no goods have been delivered, no services rendered, or the 
invoice shows inflated quantity, inflated value, or both.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Procurement fraud.
Jitney: The buy/sell broker disclosed on the exchange printout is acting on behalf of 
another broker.
Kickback: A form of off-book fraud in which the funds used for illegal payments or 
transfers are not drawn from the payer’s regular company bank account and the payments 
do not appear on the payer’s books and records. In collusion with suppliers, a purchasing 
agent may get paid a kickback for any number of activities, including allowing the supplier 
to submit fraudulent billing and approving the payment, excess purchasing of property or 
services, or bid-rigging.
See also: Commercial crime; Procurement fraud; Off-book fraud; Secret commission.
Land fraud: The sale of land, based on extensive misrepresentations as to value, quality, 
facilities, and/or state of development.
Victims are usually individuals buying land for retirement and/or investment. Land fraud 
usually consists of the direct sale of land or the sale of an interest in land—
1. To which the seller has no present title or claim of right; that is, the seller cannot 
properly transfer title or interest to the buyer as represented at the time of the sale.
2. About which there has been a misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact.
3. At inflated or unjustified prices based on misrepresentations made to the purchaser.
4. On the promise of future performance or development, which the seller neither intends 
to provide nor can reasonably expect to occur. Misrepresentations usually claim the 
presence of utilities, water, roads, recreational facilities, credit terms, and so on.
See also: Investment fraud.
Landlord-tenant fraud: Unlawful leasing or renting of property. Common fraud 
practices by landlords include the following:
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1. Keeping two sets of books, in support of tax fraud
2. Schemes to avoid the return of security deposits
3. Rental of property to which one has no title claim or right
4. Deliberate and persistent violations of safety and health regulations; failure to provide 
heat, services, and so on.
Lapping: A customer’s payment is embezzled and then recorded as paid sometime after 
the receipt of a subsequent payment from another customer. To keep customer A from 
complaining, the payment from customer B is applied to customer A’s account. Customer 
Cs payment is applied to customer Bs account, and so on.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Legitimate front: A form of money laundering in which a legitimate front business 
operating with large cash receipts is opened so that illegally earned money can be mingled 
with the bank deposits of the legitimate income of the business to disguise the source of the 
illegal money.
See also: Money laundering.
Life-insurance fraud: Any form of fraud making a life insurance company the victim.
See also: Double-indemnity fraud; Homicide fraud
Loan fraud, single-family housing: Misapplication of funds by a borrower who 
purchases single-family housing units, ostensibly for personal use, but in reality is 
purchasing rental properties for resale.
See also: Loan or lending fraud
Loan or lending fraud: The use of false information or the omission of material 
information for the purpose of granting or extending a loan.
When perpetrated by borrowers, loan fraud may take on any of the following forms:
1. Obtaining a loan through false statements
2. Using the loan for a purpose other than that for which the loan was granted
3. Larceny by false pretenses by which a loan is obtained with no intention of repayment
When perpetrated by the lending officer, loan fraud may take on any of the following 
forms:
1. Lending to oneself through ghost accounts
2. Lending to friends or entities in which one has an interest
3. Commercial bribery, meaning, approving loans to those who would not otherwise 
qualify as borrowers in exchange for kickbacks or other considerations
4. Advance fee schemes by which would-be borrowers remit money to secure a loan that 
is not forthcoming or for which no payment was necessary
A separate and important dimension of loan fraud involves the misuse or misrepresentation 
of items of collateral and collateral accounts.
See also: Banking fraud; Collateral fraud; Statement, false; Trust, abuse of.
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Loan, nominee: A loan made in the name of a straw borrower or agent while the identity 
of the real borrower is undisclosed to the lender.
Loan to non-existent borrower fraud: Use of a false identity to obtain a loan. This 
scheme can be carried out individually by the borrower or with the assistance of an insider 
such as a loan officer.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lending fraud.
Long the stock: Buying stock. Your long position represents the number of shares owned 
(also referred to as going long).
Market manipulation: The intentional inflation of a stock price accomplished by stock 
purchases, usually in a small-cap market, with a sudden sale to third parties who are left 
with stock that is worth substantially less than they paid for it.
Medicaid-Medicare fraud: Fraudulent practices involving the receipt or provision of 
health-care services under government-financed Medicare or Medicaid programs. This 
kind of fraud is usually perpetrated by health-care providers (both professional and facility 
operators) against the government financing the programs or the intended beneficiaries of 
the programs, or both. Specific Medicaid-Medicare fraud practices include the following.
1. Ping-ponging. Referring patients to other doctors in a clinic to claim reimbursement for 
the “consultation” rather than for bona fide patient treatment or observation.
2. Upgrading. Billing for services not provided.
3. Steering. Sending patients to a particular pharmacy, medical lab, and so on, for 
required prescriptions or services and receiving improper payments in return.
4. Shorting. Delivering less medication (for example, pills) than prescribed while charging 
for full amount.
5. Procurement abuses. Establishing supply-purchase arrangements with firms that pay 
kickbacks to health care facilities or providers with firms that are owned by those 
controlling the facility itself.
6. False claims. Submitting claims for payment by the government for patients who do not 
exist, or who were never seen or treated.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Government-benefit program, fraud against; Kickback; 
Procurement fraud.
Medical fraud: Provision and sale of bogus, highly questionable or dangerous medical 
services, cures, or medications.
Victims are often terminally or incurably ill patients seeking miracles. Also victimized are 
the poorly informed, who are vulnerable to false claims for beauty treatments and 
cosmetics.
Medical fraud generally includes one or more of the following.
1. Quackery. False representation of oneself as a legally trained and licensed health care 
professional
2. Fake cures. Sale of bogus or highly questionable “cures” for specific illnesses or diseases
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3. Misrepresentation. In addition to misrepresenting the therapeutic value of medication, 
the intentional omission of the known side effects of medication.
4. Misrepresentation of treatment. False statement about the therapeutic value of a particular 
treatment and the degree of its “acceptance” in bona fide medical practice; omission of 
material information concerning known side effects of a treatment that would affect the 
patient’s choice of treatment program.
See also: Health-care fraud.
Merchandising fraud: An umbrella term for a broad variety of consumer fraud involving 
false inducements to purchase merchandise, which either is not as represented or will never 
be delivered.
These kinds of fraud usually involve one or more of the following:
1. Representation that the item is sold at a lower than usual price, even though it is 
actually sold at the usual retail price or higher
2. Misrepresentation of the quality or utility of the merchandise
3. Misrepresentation of the ultimate price or credit terms
4. Misleading information on warranties, the return policy or the validity of “money back 
guarantees”
5. Solicitation of money with no intention to deliver the merchandise promised
6. “Bait and switch” fraud
Victims customarily buy from door-to-door salespeople or are entrapped when they 
respond to newspaper, magazine, telephone, radio, or television advertisements.
See also: Consumer fraud.
Mixing of funds: Commingling client funds with the funds of the brokerage firm, which 
then enables the broker to post the winning trades to the brokerage firm or the losing 
trades to their clients.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Mobile lab: A scheme in which a group of people posing as medical professionals set up a 
lab in a storefront located in a blue-collar, low-income area to offer free physicals to people 
who have medical insurance. The insured is subjected to extensive, expensive tests that are 
billed to his or her insurance company. The mobile labs are gone when the insured returns 
for the test results.
See also: Health-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud
Modeling-school fraud: Fraudulent schools tell students they must have a portfolio of 
portraits to send to potential customers in order to get modeling assignments. The victim is 
then charged greatly inflated prices by a photographer who is often a participant in the 
scam.
See also: External fraud; Self-improvement scheme.
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Money laundering: The process of turning “dirty” money, that is, illegally obtained 
money, into “clean” money to conceal its existence, source or use, or to obstruct 
investigative efforts, to preserve assets from forfeiture or to evade taxes.
See also: Legitimate front; Offshore banks and tax havens; Reporting guidelines, breach of; 
Smurfing.
Money-transfer fraud: Funds are stolen by an outsider or bank employee with access to 
the correct identification numbers needed to transfer funds by wire.
See also: External fraud.
Mortgage-insurance fraud: A scheme in which a healthy individual, who has a mortgage 
insurance policy that guarantees mortgage payments to the lender if the purchaser of the 
property defaults because of death or disability, falsely claims that he or she is disabled in 
order to have the insurance company pay the mortgage.
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Mortgage security, false: Security offered for mortgage financing purposes that is 
nonexistent or has a value far lower than represented.
See also: Commercial crime; Finance fraud.
New-account fraud: The use of false identification to open new accounts and steal money 
before the bank collects the funds from fresh deposits.
See also: Check fraud.
Nominee account: See Account, nominee.
Nursing-home fraud: Various kinds of fraud perpetrated by individuals providing 
institutional nursing and convalescent care to patients, particularly the aged.
Victims are the patients of the facilities, their families, and/or governmental entities that 
subsidize the cost of care.
Forms of nursing home fraud abuses include the following:
1. Unlawful conversion or attachment of patients’ assets
2. False claims to patient, family, or government entity regarding services delivered
3. False statements in license applications or renewals
4. Maintenance of fraudulent records as to general or overhead costs of operation of 
facilities as a basis for false claims to governmental entities
5. Receipt of kickbacks from facility suppliers
6. Employment of inadequate or unqualified staff in violation of licensing guidelines
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Government-benefit
program, fraud against; Health-care fraud; Procurement fraud
Off-book fraud: Fraud that occurs outside the accounting environment where no audit 
trail is likely to exist.
See also: On-book fraud
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Offshore banks and tax havens: Banks or financial institutions located in tax havens 
that conduct local and international business transactions in which money and other 
securities can be held or transferred from one jurisdiction to another in secrecy under the 
protection of banking privileges. The owners of the assets direct the transactions— 
personally or through an intermediary, such as a trust to minimize taxes, evade taxes, or 
avoid creditors.
See also: Money laundering.
On-book fraud: Fraud occurring in a business in which an audit trail (sometimes obscure) 
exists that could aid in its detection.
See also: Off-book fraud.
Overhead charge, false: Fraudulently inflating costs through the addition of bogus labor 
charges or overbilling of materials to increase profits in a cost-plus contract to allow the 
contractor to keep the difference between actual and inflated costs.
See also: Property-improvement fraud.
Patent fraud: A variation of the advance fee fraud. The fraudster solicits “patentable” 
ideas or gadgets through newspaper advertisements, and so on, for “evaluation by experts.” 
The “evaluation” usually involves a fee, or at least “further processing” of the submission 
may involve a fee. The fraudster usually has neither the intention nor the capacity to 
evaluate or process a patentable item.
See also: Advance-fee fraud; Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.
Payroll and personnel cycle: The accounting process that handles the hiring, firing, and 
payment of employees along with timekeeping, expense accounts, and travel 
reimbursement and insurance matters.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle.
Pension-fund fraud: Theft and fraudulent conversion of pension fund assets either by 
trustees, employers, or employees.
Fraud perpetuated by trustees in violation of their fiduciary duty in the management of 
pension funds through the following:
1. Poor investments tied to self-dealing or commercial bribery
2. Embezzlement
This fraud victimizes both the individuals who have contributed to the fund and those 
intending to benefit from it. Victims are employees whose potential benefits are reduced 
either by fraud or bankruptcy, as well as the employer whose contributions to the pension 
plan could be inflated or lost.
See also: Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Trust, 
abuse of.
Personal checks, substituting for cash: An employee takes money from the cash 
register and substitutes a personal check. In that way, the cash drawer is always in balance, 
but the employee never submits the personal check for deposit to the company’s bank 
account. Consequently, the employee receives free use of the cash.
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Personal-injury insurance fraud: Report of a real but overstated physical injury or a 
false injury to an insurance company to recover unentitled benefits such as for a tort claim 
or reimbursement of fake medical expenses.
See also: Casualty-insurance fraud; Insurance fraud.
Personal property pawned: The perpetrator inflates the value of his or her personal 
belongings, insures them, and then pawns them for a lesser amount of cash. He or she then 
reports them stolen and files a claim. If the insurance payment is received, he or she then 
recovers the items from the pawnshop with a portion of the insurance payment and pockets 
the difference.
See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud
Pigeon drop or pocketbook drop: One of a large variety of street con games. The 
victim is persuaded to withdraw a large sum of cash from a bank account to show good 
faith or financial responsibility regarding the sharing of a “discovered” cache of money 
with two other persons (who are con artists). In the course of the con, both the “discovered” 
money and the victim’s “good faith” money disappear as do the con artists.
Victims may be anyone, since perpetrators of this fraud have a remarkable ability through 
words to disarm their victims. Keys to the pigeon drop con are the following:
1. The con artists do not appear to be associated or know each other in any way.
2. A pocketbook, envelop, and so on, containing a sizable amount of money and no 
owner identification is “found” by one of the perpetrators who suggests the money is 
illicitly generated, for example, a gambler’s proceeds.
3. The fraudsters agree to share the money with the victim who shows “good faith” to 
those involved by putting up money. Alternately, all may agree to put money into a 
pool to be held by a coconspirator, meaning, the one who did not find the money.
4. A switch is made while the victim is distracted, and his or her money is stolen by one of 
the perpetrators.
Pollution and environmental protection violation: One of many abuses that violates 
specific environmental- and pollution-control statutes and orders. White-collar crime 
abuses in this area consist primarily of the making or submitting of false statements 
concerning the degree of compliance with regulations for pollution control in order to 
cover up violations or lack of compliance with environmental standards. Falsification of test 
or sample data designed to measure compliance with standards represent another form of 
this violation.
See also: Commercial crime; Environmental abuse; Statement, false.
Ponzi scheme: This is a general class of fraud (a variation of the pyramid scheme) in 
which the fraudster uses money invested by later victims to pay a high rate of return to the 
first group of investors instead of making promised investments. These schemes must 
inevitably collapse because it is mathematically impossible to continue them indefinitely. 
The length of time they can continue will depend upon the promised rate of return to 
investors, the amount of money the fraudster takes out for him- or herself and the costs of 
inducing victims to part with their money (for example, sales commissions). Many of these 
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frauds have cheated their victims of millions of dollars; some frauds have operated over a 
period of years.
Ponzi elements exist in many varieties of investment fraud under different guises and in 
different variations; for example, long-term investments and short-term business financing.
See also: Investment fraud.
Possession of property obtained by crime: An offense that refers either to the actual 
possession of property obtained by a crime or to the possession of proceeds from the 
disposal of property obtained by a crime.
See also: Fraud.
Price fixing: Illegal combinations by sellers to administer the price of a good or service, 
thus depriving customers of a competitive marketplace, restraining competition, and 
maintaining an artificial price structure.
Victims are customers who are deprived of freely determined prices for the goods and 
services they purchase. Secondary victims may be competitors of the firms participating in 
the price fixing agreement.
See also: Anti-trust offense; Trade, restraint of.
Procurement fraud: Unlawful manipulation of the public or private contracting process 
to obtain an advantage.
Victims are competitors, the public or private entity soliciting bids it believes to be 
competitive as well as customers or constituents of those entities who do not realize the 
benefits that would be derived from a truly competitive procurement process.
Three main forms of competitive procurement fraud are the following.
1. Bid rigging. A form of illegal anticompetitive activity in which bidders in a competitive 
procurement collusively set their bids in such a way as to deprive the bid solicitor of a 
competitive process. The effect is an administered bidding process in which the winner 
and the terms and prices of the goods and services involved are set by the conspirators 
rather than by the competitive process. Parties to the conspiracy are thus able to divide 
among themselves a set of procurement contracts and to fix prices for goods and 
services at the same time.
2. Bid fixing. A form of illegal manipulation of the procurement process whereby one 
bidding party is provided with inside information by the bid solicitor or an agent, 
which enables the said bidder to gain an unfair advantage over other bidders.
3. Bribery and kickbacks. The awarding of procurement contracts on the basis of the 
payment of bribes and kickbacks to procurement officials rather than on the basis of 
competitive procurement guidelines.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Commercial bribery; Kickback; Corruption, public or official
Product substitution: The substitution, without the knowledge of the purchaser, of a less 
expensive product or service. The purchaser is charged for the more expensive product or 
service and the fraudster pockets the difference.
See also: Commercial crime; External fraud; Procurement fraud; Property-improvement fraud
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Property-improvement fraud: The fraudster goes door-to-door promising repairs to 
property at bargain rates, collecting up-front money and then absconding with the 
proceeds. The victims are usually senior citizens.
See also: External fraud.
Property-insurance fraud: An insured reports a false theft, inflates the value of his or her 
personal belongings and pawns them or purposely destroys them to collect a benefit from 
the insurer.
See also: Arson for profit; Insurance fraud; Personal property pawned; Repossessed household goods.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB): “A private-sector nonprofit 
organization created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee the auditors of public 
companies and protect the interest of investors and further the public interest in the 
preparation of informative, fair and independent audit reports”. The PCAOB replaces the 
Audit Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA as the body responsible for creating auditing 
standards for public companies. The ASB will continue to set generally accepted audit 
standards for non-public companies.
Public or official corruption: See Corruption, public or official.
Purchases, unnecessary: Inventory ordered specifically for personal use, theft, or scrap 
proceeds. The embezzlements are then charged to inventory.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Inventory and warehousing cycle; Procurement fraud.
Pyramid scheme: The commercial version of the chain letter scheme used by fraudsters 
to sell phony investments (Ponzi scheme), distributorships, franchises, and business 
opportunity plans.
See also: Chain-referral scheme; Franchise fraud; Investment fraud.
Real estate fraud: A form of loan fraud involving the purchase of under- or over-valued 
real estate.
See also: External fraud; Loan or lending fraud; Mortgage security, false.
Referral sales fraud: See Chain-referral scheme; Merchandising fraud.
Repair fraud: Consumer fraud involving repair or maintenance service performed on 
consumer goods.
These white-collar crime schemes generally involve the following:
1. Overcharging for services performed
2. Charging for services and parts not used
3. Performing services or repairs not wanted or needed
4. Failing to perform services or repairs promised
See also: Consumer fraud.
Reporting guidelines, breach of: A breach in defiance of a government requirement 
that banks assist in the prevention of money laundering by reporting details of large cash 
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deposits. For example, a bank employee who conspires with a money launderer to make 
deposits without reporting the required details is breaching the reporting guidelines.
See also: Money laundering.
Repossessed household goods: Household items are repossessed and the insured 
submits a false claim to the insurer reporting the property was stolen.
See also: Insurance fraud; Property-insurance fraud.
Repurchasing: A stock market manipulation in which the promoter buys back control of 
the company when the stock price reaches rock bottom.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Risk factors, generic: Risk factors within the control of the entity protecting itself but 
outside the control of potential perpetrators.
Revenue recognition in the improper period: Preparation of false financial statements 
through the improper accruals of revenue on future, anticipated sales. Techniques include 
altering dates on shipping documents or holding the books open until after shipments have 
occurred. This technique is often used to inflate reported profits.
See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue 
recognition criteria.
Revenue recognition on transactions that do not meet revenue recognition 
criteria: Preparation of false financial statements by improperly recognizing revenue on 
transactions for which the earning process is incomplete—for example, when the right of 
return exists, or on bill-and-hold transactions. The items involved are often concealed 
through the use of written side agreements or oral agreements that are not included with 
the company’s books of account.
See also: Financial statement, false; Revenue recognition in the improper period.
Running a box: One or more persons control the movement of a stock to manipulate its 
price. They are called “the box.”
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sales and collection cycle: The billing of goods or services to customers, the setting up 
of accounts receivable for customers who purchase goods or services on credit and the 
collection of funds relating to those receivables.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Act of Congress passed in July 2002 to give greater reliability to 
financial statements of public companies.
Scrap, theft of: This kind of theft can be significant, especially if the thief has the 
authority to designate saleable inventory as scrap. In most companies, inventory scrap is 
easy to steal because it is not recorded or well controlled.
See also: Procurement fraud.
Secret commission: The most common form of procurement fraud. A secret payment is 
given, usually by a supplier to a purchasing agent, to buy the purchasing agent’s influence 
on his or her employer’s decision-making.
See also: Commercial crime; Kickback; Procurement fraud.
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Securities and Exchange Commission Final Rules: Regulations published by the SEC 
after discussion. As used in this Handbook, the final rules are the means of implementing the 
intent of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Securities fraud: Fraudulent activities involving the sale, transfer, or purchase of 
securities or money interests in the business activities of others.
Victims are generally investors who are not aware of the full facts regarding transactions 
into which they enter. Abuses cover a broad range and can include, for example, the 
following situations.
1. Businesses or promoters seek to raise capital unlawfully or without proper registration 
and monitoring.
2. Securities of no value are sold or are misrepresented as being worth far more than their 
actual value.
3. Purchasers are not advised of all facts regarding securities and/or of the failure to file 
appropriate disclosures with federal and provincial regulatory agencies.
4. Insiders use special knowledge to trade in securities to the disadvantage of the general 
public.
5. Broker-dealers and investment advisers act for their own benefit rather than for the 
benefit of their clients.
6. False information is provided to security holders and the investing public in financial 
statements published or filed with securities regulatory agencies or in the media as a 
result of payments to financial writers or publications.
7. Manipulation of the price of securities by purchases and sales on the stock exchanges or 
over-the-counter markets.
Securities violations potentially exist wherever investors rely on others to manage and 
conduct the business in which an investment is made. It is not necessary that there be any 
formal certificates such as stocks and bonds. Any form of investment agreement is 
potentially a “security.”
See also: Advance-fee fraud; Boiler room; Insider trading; Investment fraud; Statement, false.
Self-improvement scheme: This kind of fraud appeals to the victims’ desire to improve 
him- or herself personally or financially by the acquisition of social, employment, or 
physical skills or attributes.
Schemes in this category tend to run on a continuum from improving purely personal or 
social skills and attributes to those tied to an individual’s employment opportunities. On 
the personal end of the scale are the dance studio or charm school schemes; on the 
employment end of the scale are fraudulent job training schemes and advance fee 
employment agencies.
Somewhere in the middle are modeling agencies which purport to both improve the 
“person” and his or her employment prospects. Also included are courses on improving 
one’s image or ability to communicate with others. Some business opportunity schemes, 
which hold out the prospect of financial improvement plus “being a respected community 
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businessperson,” also fall into this category by appealing to the victim’s desire to improve 
his or her finances and life style.
See also: Business-opportunity fraud; Employment-agency fraud; Vanity-publishing scheme.
“Sewer” service: A term used to describe the kinds of activity noted below.
Many merchandising, home repair, and other kinds of fraud rely on the use of litigation for 
ultimate collection of the proceeds of the fraud. Likewise, many enterprises that are not 
strictly speaking fraudulent, for example, those that sell much overpriced merchandise on 
credit, also depend on litigation or the threat of litigation to squeeze money from victims.
In both these situations, devices are often adopted to fraudulently deprive victims of the 
opportunity to defend against litigation—usually by not informing them that litigation has 
been initiated against them (that is, dropping the summons or subpoena “down the sewer”). 
This is accomplished, usually, by false affidavits, filed in court, that a summons and 
complaint were served on the victim.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Sham, corporate: The use of a corporate entity to provide a veil of respectability and 
substance for fraudulent activity.
See also: Commercial crime.
Sham transaction: A fraudulent transaction giving the impression of a legitimate 
transaction at a higher price. These transactions are particularly difficult to detect because 
they involve collusion with a co-conspirator outside the entity.
See also: Sham, corporate.
Shell company: An inactive company whose shares have been repurchased.
Short weighting or loading: Deliberate shorting of the volume or quantity of a cargo or 
other purchase. The short load is accompanied by a false invoice demanding payment for 
the full amount. This kind of fraud is easiest to perpetrate where the goods involved are of 
a nature or bulk that it is difficult for the receiver to detect shortages.
The reverse of the short weighting or loading fraud is often used as a modus operandi for 
theft of cargo. In this situation, a transport vehicle is intentionally overloaded; the overage 
is not recorded and the overloaded amount forms the basis of kickbacks to the scheme 
operators from the recipient of the shipment, who is often the fence for the stolen goods. 
Manipulation of the size or volume of loads must always be accompanied by false 
documentation.
This violation involves either a false claim to a customer or a plain and simple theft from 
the shipper. Because insiders are frequently involved, it will often involve commercial 
bribery, kickbacks, and so on.
See also: Weights and measures fraud.
Short selling: A technique whereby the trader is gambling that the price of a stock will 
fall. Thus, he or she anticipates a profit on the transaction by selling a number of shares 
first, for later delivery at a specified price. The trader then buys those shares at a later date, 
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when, if his or her gamble were correct, the share price has fallen and he or she delivers 
them. Thus, the trader makes a profit during a period of declining prices of the stock.
Siphoning funds: Illegal withdrawal of money in small amounts from a large number of 
accounts. For example, pennies and portions of pennies (resulting from rounding off) can 
be shaved from thousands of savings accounts. The money is then accumulated in a single 
account that is accessed by the embezzler.
Skimming: A scheme in which cash is skimmed before it enters the accounting system. 
For example, an employee accepts cash but never prepares a receipt or prepares a receipt 
for less than the amount received.
See also: Sales and collection cycle.
Smurfing: The use of couriers (also known as smurfs) to deposit and withdraw cash or cash 
equivalents at financial institutions in amounts less than the reporting limit to avoid 
reporting requirements.
See also: Money laundering.
Statement, false: The concealment or misrepresentation of a fact material to the decision­
making process of an entity. The false statement is often the means by which a fraudulent 
scheme to obtain money or benefit is effected for either of the following, among other, 
reasons.
1. The false statement constitutes the underlying documentation for a false claim.
2. The false statement impedes discovery of the fraudulent scheme, that is, covers up the 
fraud. These statements often provide the opportunity for conditioning the victim to 
unquestioningly accept and approve a false claim.
See also: Claim, false or fraudulent; Ghost employee; Government-benefit program, fraud against.
Stock market manipulation: A crime perpetrated by a stock promoter who artificially 
influences the market price of shares in a company for personal gain at the expense of the 
investing public.
See also: Commercial crime; Securities fraud.
Street certificate: A stock certificate that has been issued in the name of a brokerage firm 
and then endorsed by it. It is now like a bearer certificate and can change hands several 
times in many trades without being returned to a trust company for transfer.
Taking out the market: See Cleaning up the market.
Talent-agency scheme: See Self-improvement scheme; Vanity-publishing scheme.
Tax and revenue violation: Fraud perpetrated with the intent to deprive a taxing 
authority of revenue to which it is entitled or of information it needs to make a judgment 
regarding revenues to which it is entitled or to avoid admission of involvement in illicit, 
though profitable, business activities.
Tax fraud may be perpetrated through the filing of a false return, as in personal income tax 
fraud; through the bribery of a public official, as may occur in property tax assessment 
fraud; or in the failure to file appropriately, as with an organized crime-figure who may not 
be concerned with avoiding tax liability but rather with revealing the sources of his or her 
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taxable income. Many white-collar crimes obligate the offender to commit tax fraud 
because of illicitly obtained money he or she does not wish to report, for example, assets 
due to bribe, larceny, kickback, or embezzlement proceeds. Common crimes, especially of 
a business nature, also result in tax violations, for example, bookmaking and fencing stolen 
goods, which could be income and sales tax abuses.
Tax avoidance through false statements may be a component of otherwise legitimate 
business enterprises, especially in the areas of business and occupation taxes, inventory 
taxes, and sales taxes. Individuals and businesses will also seek to avoid or evade excise 
taxes, for example, on cigarettes or in the case of tanker trucks by the substitution of low- 
taxed home heating oil for higher-taxed diesel fuel.
See also: Income tax fraud.
Trade, restraint of: Actions, combinations, or schemes that interfere with unfettered 
marketplace transactions. Examples are price fixing, bribery and kickbacks for commercial 
advantage, interference with competitive bidding processes, dictation of price structure to 
customers or dealers, and exclusive buying arrangements.
See also: Commercial bribery; Price fixing; Procurement fraud.
Transactions, entering false: Entering invoices for fake vendors into the accounts 
payable system or recording false credit memos to reduce legitimate accounts receivable.
See also: Acquisition and payment cycle; Sales and collection cycle.
Trust, abuse of: Misuse of one’s position and/or privileged information gained by virtue 
of that position to acquire money, property, or some privilege to which one is not entitled. 
Abuse of trust also often involves a violation of fiduciary duty.
Abuse of trust can occur in many areas but arises most frequently in the following four 
white-collar crime areas.
1. Banking. Self-dealing in connection with loans or credit to oneself, one’s friends, or 
business associates.
2. Securities. Insider information used for personal benefit at the expense of clients, 
stockholders, and others.
3. Commercial bribery. Manipulation of procurement and competitive bidding processes.
4. Embezzlement. Misuse of property or funds in the custody of a trustee.
See also: Banking fraud; Commercial bribery; Embezzlement and fiduciary fraud; Insider trading; 
Procurement fraud; Securities fraud
Trust fund, misappropriation of: The diversion of client funds held in trust and use of 
the money for purposes other than those intended by the client.
See also: External fraud
Vanity-publishing scheme: Any scheme that involves eliciting fees from individuals on 
the promise of promoting their creative “talents” (real or imaginary) or assisting them in the 
development of said “talent.”
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The success of these kinds of fraud relies on the victim’s vanity about his or her hitherto 
unrecognized talent. These schemes work best in areas such as literary publishing or song 
writing, where taste is more important than performance standards.
The fraudster will imply a promise of national advertising, book reviews, distribution, and 
special marketing services but not so concretely that he or she will be held to any 
obligation. The victims usually invest heavily and lose both their money and their hopes. 
They are left with a few copies of a printed and scored song arrangement or a number of 
copies of books that established book review publications have not troubled to look at 
because of their publishing source.
See also: Self-improvement scheme.
Warehousing: Part of a stock market manipulation that places shares into the hands of 
people who are friendly to the promoter—warehousing or parking—to allow the promoter 
to maintain control of the shares and continue to restrict and regulate their availability.
Wash-trading: A flurry of trading activity falsely created by the promoter’s group to give 
the appearance of great interest in the stock to increase demand for the stock among the 
public to whom the promoter plans to eventually sell his holdings when the price reaches a 
certain level.
See also: Stock market manipulation.
Weights and measures fraud: Cheating customers by failure to deliver prescribed 
weights or volumes of desired goods. The victim is defrauded by relying on the false 
documents provided by the fraudster testifying to the delivered quantities.
Examples of white-collar crimes include the following:
1. Gas pump meter manipulation to show more gas pumped than received by the 
customer
2. Odometer rollbacks in auto sales
These kinds of fraud are most successful if the victim cannot easily verify the accuracy of 
the measuring devices or if the victim has no reason to question the seller’s claim or 
statement, for example, when the products sold are bottled or packaged.
See also: Short weighting or loading.
Welfare fraud: Abuses of government income and family subsidy programs.
Government welfare programs are often exploited by applicants who apply for benefits to 
which they are not entitled or continue to claim eligibility even though they no longer meet 
the eligibility criteria.
Receipt of money from claimants by officials processing welfare claims represents another 
dimension of this fraud. These monies may be solicited as kickbacks in exchange for the 
filing of inflated claims; as bribes to certify claimants who are ineligible or to avoid 
reporting claimants’ ineligibility or as extortion for processing claims to which a recipient is 
fully eligible. In some cases, nonexistent recipients (ghosts) may be created to fraudulently 
siphon money out of the programs.
See also: Government-benefit program, fraud against.
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White-collar crime: Nonviolent crime for financial gain committed through deception by 
entrepreneurs, professionals, or semiprofessionals using their special occupational skills and 
opportunities. This category also includes similar crimes committed by anyone having 
special technical and professional knowledge of business and government, irrespective of 
the person’s occupation.
See also: Commercial crime; Economic crime.
Work-at-home schemes: See Business-opportunity fraud; Franchise fraud.
Written-off account, diversion of payments from: Diversion of payments received 
from a customer whose account has been written off. Because most companies do not 
monitor defunct accounts, this activity is rarely detected. For example, an employee will 
work with a customer to collect an overdue receivable. Before the customer pays, the 
employee writes off the account, removes it from the books, and pockets the funds 
received.
See also: Internal fraud; Sales and collection cycle.
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Web Sites with Fraud Related Topics
Approximately 1,200 new Web sites are created every day and an untold number become 
derelict. It is important, therefore, to understand that no list can ever be up-to-date or 
guarantee accuracy.
The AFU and Urban Legends Archive, www.urbanlegends.com
This site separates the myriad hoaxes on the Internet (and in society) from those 
with a grain or more of truth.
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American College of Forensic Examiners, www.acfe.com
The American College of Forensic Examiners has more than 15,000 members and 
is a networking opportunity for forensic science experts of all disciplines. It is the 
largest association established for forensic experts of all disciplines to promote 
continuing education, networking and seminars, conferences, workshops, Internet, 
continuing education courses, and home study courses.
Asiaweek.com. www.asiaweek.com
This newsmagazine Web site also includes a list of the region’s 1,000 largest 
companies and 500 largest banks.
Association of Certified Forensic Investigators of Canada (The).
www.homewoodave.com
This nonprofit Canadian organization’s objective is to promote and foster a national 
forum and governing body for the affiliation of professionals who provide to the 
public, governments, and employers their expertise and services in the areas of 
fraud prevention, detection, and investigation.
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (The). www.cfenet.com
This is the Web site for The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, an 
international, 25,000-member professional organization dedicated to fighting fraud 
and white-collar crime. With offices in North America and chapters around the 
globe, the Association is networked to respond to the needs of antifraud 
professionals anywhere in the world.
Billy’s Money Laundering Information Website. www.laundryman.u-net.com
This site provides information about UK Government money laundering laws. This 
is not a government authorized site, however, some of the interesting and valuable 
material includes an overview of the business areas prone to money laundering 
activities, UK legislation, money laundering offenses, and international initiatives in 
place to prevent this crime.
Business Credit USA. www.businesscreditusa.com/index.asp
Offers free and inexpensive credit ratings, credit reports, and customer opinions on 
12 million businesses.
Business Roundtable (BRT). www.brtable.org
The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. 
corporations. The BRT is committed to advocating public policies that foster 
vigorous economic growth, a dynamic global economy, and a well-trained and 
productive U.S. workforce essential for future competitiveness. The BRT’s Corporate 
Governance Task Force focuses on issues related to corporate governance and 
responsibilities, including accounting standards
California Business Search Program. www.ss.ca.gov/automate.htm
Allows you to search California corporations, limited partnerships, and limited 
liability company databases. Provides access to more than two million records with 
frequently requested business entity information, such as status, Secretary of State 
file number, date of filing, and agent for service of process. The information is not a 
complete file and is currently updated weekly rather than daily.
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ChinaOnline. www.chinaonline.com
This daily online paper provides real-time, in-depth news and information about 
the rapidly growing Chinese marketplace, including industry updates, analyses and 
in-depth reports, and company and media profiles, including fraud-newsworthy 
events.
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
www.coso.org
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO) is a voluntary private-sector organization dedicated to improving the 
quality of financial reporting through business ethics, effective internal controls, and 
corporate governance. Originally formed in 1985 to sponsor the National 
Commission of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, COSO has released numerous 
influential publications including Internal Control—Integrated Framework.
Note: See “Struggling to incorporate the COSO recommendations into your audit 
process? Here’s one audit shop’s winning strategy” by Dennis Applegate and Ted 
Wills (from the December 1999 issue of Internal Auditor) at 
www.coso.org/Articles/audit_shop.htm .
Conference Board. www.conference-board.com
The Conference Board is a global, independent membership organization that 
creates and disseminates knowledge about management and the marketplace to 
help businesses strengthen their performance and better serve society. They 
conduct research, convene conferences, make forecasts, assess trends, publish 
information and analysis, and bring executives together to learn from one another. 
The Conference Board’s Blue-Ribbon Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise 
has proposed reforms to strengthen corporate compensation practices and help 
restore trust in America’s corporations and capital markets.
Consumer Scams in Canada, www.canadaonline.about.com/cs/scams/
This Web site provides warnings, alerts, and safety precautions to protect you from 
Canadian scams and fraud, online and offline. It includes consumer information 
and assistance, invention company scams, and job scams, Net hoaxes, 1-900 phone 
scams, cheque fraud, counterfeit bank notes, online auction fraud, phone fraud, 
telemarketing fraud, and the latest RCMP fraud cases.
Corporate Board Member, www.boardmember.com
Corporate Board Member magazine’s website, Boardmember.com, serves as a central 
resource for officers and directors of publicly traded corporations, top private 
companies, and Global 1000 firms. Their Resource Center offers the full-text of 
Corporate Board Member magazine, as well as additional articles, webcasts, and 
interviews. Topics include corporate governance, strategic board trends and issues, 
executive and director compensation, audit committees, risk management, 
international and technology trends, investor relations, board education, and other 
critical topics facing today’s directors and officers of publicly traded companies. 
They also offer conferences, director training programs, roundtables, an extensive 
database, and timely research.
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The Corporate Library, www.thecorporatelibrary.com
The Corporate Library serves as a central repository for research, study and critical 
thinking about the nature of the modem global corporation, with a special focus on 
corporate governance and the relationship between company management, their 
boards and shareholders. Most general content on the site is open to visitors at no 
cost; advanced research relating to specific companies and certain other advanced 
features are restricted to subscribers only.
Cybercrime.gov. www.cybercrime.gov
The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) of the Criminal 
Division U.S. Department of Justice is responsible for implementing a 
comprehensive program designed to address the growing threat of computer and 
intellectual property crime. Their Web site contains links, information, and other 
resources for consumers, parents, and law enforcement personnel about cybercrime 
and other computer-aided scams and schemes.
Escrow.com. www.escrow.com
Escrow.com, founded in 1999 by Fidelity National Financial, is a privately held 
company providing secure business and consumer transaction management on the 
Internet. Its Web site provides an overview of the escrow process, and information 
and resources related to fraudulent use of the escrow process in the online 
environment.
Ethics Officers Association (EOA). www.eoa.org
The EOA is the professional association exclusively for managers of ethics, 
compliance and business conduct programs. The EOA provides ethics officers with 
training and a variety of conferences and meetings for exchanging best practices in 
a frank, candid manner.
Ethics Resources Center (ERC). www.ethics.org
The ERC is a nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization whose vision is a 
world where individuals and organizations act with integrity. Their mission is to 
strengthen ethical leadership worldwide by providing leading-edge expertise and 
services through research, education and partnerships. Especially useful are their 
resources on business and organizational ethics.
Experts.com. www.experts.com
This is an extensive directory of qualified and professional experts from all over the 
world in many areas of expertise. Experts.com promotes and matches high-level 
expert professionals with individual business or legal needs.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, www.fdic.gov
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), created in 1933, is an 
independent agency of the federal government whose stated mission is to preserve 
and promote public confidence in the U.S. financial system by insuring deposits in 
banks and thrift institutions for up to $100,000; by identifying, monitoring and 
addressing risks to the deposit insurance funds; and by limiting the effect on the 
economy and the financial system when a bank or thrift institution fails. More on 
the FDIC can be found at its Web site which also contains information on deposit 
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insurance, consumer protection, industry analysis, regulation and examination, 
asset sales, and other topics.
Fighting Fraud and Corruption.
http://www.ex.ac.uk/ ~ RDavies/arian/scandals/fighthtml
This site provides links to a host of other fraud-related Web sites that include 
professional bodies, investigative services, forensic accounting firms, pressure 
groups, and so on.
Financial Executives International (FEI). www.fei.org
FEI is the preeminent professional association for senior level financial executives 
including Chief Financial Officers, VPs of Finance, Controllers, Treasurers, and 
Tax Executives. They provide peer networking opportunities, emerging issues 
alerts, personal and professional development and advocacy services.
Financial Services Regulation, www.fsa.gov.uk
The Financial Services Authority is an independent body that regulates the 
financial services industry in the UK. The FSA has four objectives under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which are to maintain market confidence; 
promote public understanding of the financial system; protect consumers; and fight 
financial crime.
Firstgov.gov. www.firstgov.gov
Firstgov.gov is the official U.S. gateway to all government information with a 
comprehensive search engine allowing the user to search through millions of pages 
(many not available elsewhere) from federal and state governments, the District of 
Columbia and U.S. territories.
Fraudnet. www.auditnet.org/fraudnethtm
Fraudnet is a specialized section of AuditNet® that provides an opportunity for 
auditors and financial professionals around the world to share (via submissions) 
fraud policies, procedures, code of ethics, and other resources.
Fraud Watch International (FWI). www.fraudwatchintemational.com
Fraud Watch International is a web portal, based in Australia, that contains links 
and other resources directed at combating Internet fraud scams such as “phishing” 
and protecting consumers from identity theft and other concerns.
Harvard Business School’s Corporate Governance, Leadership & Values. 
www.cglv.hbs.edu
Harvard Business School’s Corporate Governance, Leadership & Values website is 
a comprehensive overview of research, educational programs, and other activities at 
Harvard Business School aimed at providing new frameworks for thought and 
practice in the interrelated areas of corporate governance, leadership, and values. It 
includes links to the on-going workshop series; background papers; research 
programs, such the Corporate Governance Initiative; executive education 
programs; viewpoints on key issues published in the national press; faculty 
comments in the media; and an on-line forum for exchanging views on emerging 
issues.
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Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA). www.isaca.org
Founded in 1969, the Information Systems Audit and Control Association® 
(ISACA®) is an organization devoted to issues related to IT governance, control, 
security and assurance. ISACA sponsors international conferences, publishes the 
Information Systems Control Journal,™ develops international information systems 
auditing and control standards, and administers the Certified Information Systems 
Auditor™ (CISA®) designation and the Certified Information Security Manager™ 
(CISM™) designation.
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, www.icaew.co.uk
This is the Web site of the largest professional accountancy body in Europe, with 
more than 120,000 members. Information contained includes professional 
standards, library and information services, policy, education and training and an 
online directory of over 25,000 CA firms worldwide.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). www.theiaa.org
The Institute of Internal Auditors is a dynamic international organization that meets 
the needs of a worldwide body of internal auditors. IIA focuses on issues in internal 
auditing, governance and internal control, IT audit, education, and security 
worldwide. The Institute provides internal audit practitioners, executive 
management, boards of directors and audit committees with standards, guidance, 
best practices, training, research, and technological guidance for the profession.
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). www.imanet.org
The IMA is a leading professional organization devoted to management accounting 
and financial management. Its goals are to help members develop both personally 
and professionally, by means of education, certification, and association with other 
business professionals. A respected leader within the global financial community, 
the IMA influences the concepts and ethical practices in management accounting 
and financial management. Its ethical standards provide guidance to practitioners 
for maintaining the highest levels of ethical conduct.
IT Governance Institute (ITGI). www.itgi.org
Established by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association and 
Foundation (ISACA) in 1998, the IT Governance Institute (ITGI) exists to assist 
enterprise leaders in understanding and guiding the role of IT in their 
organizations. ITGI helps senior executives to ensure that IT goals align with those 
of the business, deliver value, and perform efficiently, while IT resources are 
properly allocated and its risks mitigated. Through original research, symposia and 
electronic resources, ITGI helps ensure that boards and executive management 
have the tools and information they effectively manage the IT function.
InsuranceFraud.com. www.insurancefraud.com
This Web site links organizations and professionals in the anti-insurance fraud 
community. It provides a unique forum for the anti-fraud executives and 
independent professionals who do not normally have the resources on hand to 
identify insurance fraud and abuse in the industry, to quickly investigate and 
subsequently recover from the fraudster’s activities, and/or to identify ways to 
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prevent the occurrence or recurrence of fraud in the insurance industry. It includes 
a data base listing of anti-fraud professionals, vendors, and regulators.
International Association of Financial Crimes Investigators, www.iafci.org
This organization was formed by a small group of law enforcement officers and 
special agents of the credit card industry to represent the professional fraud 
investigator. The Association, a nonprofit international organization, provides 
services and facilitates the collection and exchange of information about financial 
fraud, fraud investigation and fraud prevention methods.
Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC). www.ifccfbi.gov
The Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) is a partnership between the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National White Collar Crime Center 
(NW3C).
Its mission is to address fraud committed over the Internet. For victims of Internet 
fraud, IFCC provides a convenient and easy-to-use reporting mechanism that alerts 
authorities of a suspected criminal or civil violation. For law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies at all levels, IFCC offers a central repository for complaints 
related to Internet fraud, works to quantify fraud patterns, and provides timely 
statistical data of current fraud trends.
Internet Scambusters. www.scambusters.org
This Web site provides information about the latest Internet frauds and scams as 
well as virus updates.
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). www.nacdonline.org
Founded in 1977, the NACD is the premier educational, publishing and consulting 
organization in board leadership and the only membership association for boards, 
directors, director-candidates and board advisors. The NACD promotes high 
professional board standards, creates forums for peer interaction, enhances director 
effectiveness, asserts the policy interests of directors, conducts research, and 
educates boards and directors concerning traditional and cutting-edge issues.
National Bureau of Asian Research, www.nbr.org
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan 
institution that conducts advanced research on policy-relevant issues in Asia. It also 
serves as the global clearinghouse for Asia research conducted by specialists and 
institutions worldwide.
National Check Fraud Center, www.ckfraud.org
This private organization provides nationwide, updated multisource intelligence to 
support local law enforcement, federal agencies and the financial and retail 
communities in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of known check fraud 
and other white collar crimes.
National Fraud Information Center (The). www.fraud.org
The NFIC offers consumers advice about promotions in cyberspace and route 
reports of suspected online and Internet fraud to the appropriate government 
agencies. The NFIC was originally established in 1992 by the National Consumers 
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League, the oldest nonprofit consumer organization in the United States, to fight 
the growing menace of telemarketing fraud by improving prevention and 
enforcement. The NFIC provides the only nationwide toll-free hotline for 
consumers to get advice about telephone solicitations and report possible 
telemarketing fraud to law enforcement agencies.
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). www.nyse.com
The New York Stock Exchange is a not-for-profit corporation that provides a self­
regulated marketplace for the trading of financial instruments. Its goal is to add 
value to the capital-raising and asset-management process by providing the highest- 
quality and most cost-effective trading environment. They work to promote 
confidence in and understanding of the financial trading process and serve as a 
forum for discussion of relevant national and international policy issues. They have 
taken the lead in corporate governance issues through their participation in the 
Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
Committees and more recently in their formation of the NYSE Corporate 
Responsibility and Listing Standards Committee.
Nigeria-The 419 Coalition. http://home.rica.net/alphae/419coal/
This Web site is operated by “The 419 Coalition” and provides an overview and 
tips for combating the prevalence worldwide of an e-mail scam which has been 
reportedly run out of Nigeria (under successive governments) since the early 1980s. 
The financial damage caused by the scam is estimated at five billion dollars (in 
US$) by the coalition. The scam has also been referred to as “advance fee fraud”, 
“419 fraud” (four-one-nine) after the relevant section of the criminal code of 
Nigeria, and “the Nigerian connection” (mostly in Europe).
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC). www.privacyrights.org
Founded in 1992, and mostly grant-supported, the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(PRC) is a nonprofit consumer organization that provides consumer information 
and consumer advocacy. Its stated goals involve consumer privacy issues: raising 
consumer awareness of how their personal information is used and how to protect 
it; responding and documenting specific privacy related complaints, such as identity 
theft; and advocating for consumers’ privacy rights with policy makers (local, state, 
and federal), as well as industry representatives, consumer advocates, and the 
media.
Pubic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). www.pcaobus.org
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is a private-sector, 
non-profit corporation, created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to oversee the 
auditors of public companies in order to protect the interests of investors and 
further the public interest in the preparation of informative, fair, and independent 
audit reports.
Sinosource. www.sinosource.com
This is a private, Internet-based business info provider in China to help foreign 
business, particularly small- and middle-sized companies, communicate directly 
with businesses in China. Includes a business directory of China.
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Statistics Singapore. www.singstat.gov.sg
This is the national statistical authority responsible for disseminating official 
statistics on Singapore.
U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). http://www.ftc.gov/index.html
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), founded in 1914, stated mission is to ensure 
that U.S. markets are vigorous, efficient and free of restrictions that harm 
consumers. The FTC enforces federal consumer protection laws that prevent fraud, 
deception and unfair business practices. The Commission also enforces federal 
antitrust laws that prohibit anticompetitive mergers and other business practices 
that restrict competition and harm consumers. Its site contains tips on combating 
telemarketing fraud, Internet scams, price-fixing schemes, identity theft, and other 
resources to protect consumers.
U.S. Securities arid Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/consumer/cyberfr.htm
This site provides valuable information about Internet fraud and how to avoid 
Internet investment scams. This alert tells you how to spot different types of 
Internet fraud, what the SEC is doing to fight Internet investment scams, and how 
to use the Internet to invest wisely.
Note. The following two articles may be of particular background interest to fraud 
practitioners:
“Internet Fraud: How to Avoid Internet Investment Scams” found at 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/cyberfraud.htm, and
“The Numbers Game”, a speech presented to the New York University Center for 
Law and Business by then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt on Sept. 28, 1998, found at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt
Vodatel Networks Holdings Limited, www.irasia.com
This is an investor relations site that includes profiles of publicly listed South Asian 
companies. It has annual reports, press releases, stock quotes, and so on.
Yahoo Internet Business-Fraud section. See the following link:
http://dir.yahoo. com/Computers_and_Intemet/Intemet/Business_and_Economics/Fraud/ 
This section on Yahoo has links to sites dealing with specific Internet scams and 
other fraudulent schemes found on the World Wide Web.
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AICPA SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM (2006-2007)
Copyright © 2006 AICPA
All rights reserved.
LICENSE AGREEMENT
The Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM provided with The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial 
Crime Prevention contains electronic versions of the checklists and other materials found in the book. 
Subject to the conditions in this License Agreement and the Limited Warranty herein, you may duplicate 
the files on this disk and/or modify them as necessary for your internal use only.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written 
permission of the AICPA. Reproduction prohibitions do not apply to the checklists, forms, worksheets, 
sample correspondence, and any other sample documents contained in this product, when reproduced for 
personal use only. This material may NOT be reproduced for commercial exploitation, unless prior 
permission is obtained from the AICPA’s Copyright Permission Office.
Limited Warranty
AICPA warrants that the program will substantially conform to the published specifications and to the 
documentation, provided that it is used on the computer hardware and with the operating system for which 
it was designed. AICPA also warrants that the magnetic media on which the program is distributed and the 
documentation are free from defects in materials and workmanship. AICPA will replace defective media at 
no charge, provided you return the item with the original packaging with the book to AICPA within 90 
days of the date of delivery.
Except as specifically provided above, AICPA makes no warranty or representation, either express or 
implied, with respect to this program or documentation.
In no event will AICPA be liable for direct, indirect, special incidental, or consequential damages arising 
out of the use of or inability to use the program or documentation, even if advised of the possibility of such 
damages. Specifically, AICPA is not responsible for any costs including, but not limited to, those incurred 
as result of lost profits or revenue, loss of use of the computer program, loss of data, the costs of recovering 
such programs or data, the cost of any substitute program, claims by third parties, or for other similar costs. 
In no case shall AICPA’s liability exceed the amount of the license fee (ie: cost of product).
The warranty and remedies set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others, oral or written, express or 
implied. No AICPA dealer, distributor, agent, or employee is authorized to make any modification or 
addition to this warranty.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied warranties or limitation for incidental or 
consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you. In the U.K., this 
warranty does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer.
General
The material on this CD-ROM is designed to provide information in regard to the subject matter covered 
and does not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and is 
distributed with the understanding that the publisher, authors, and editors are not rendering legal, 
accounting, or other professional services on this CD-ROM. If legal advice or other expert assistance is 
required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
AICPA retains all rights not expressly granted. Nothing in this License Agreement constitutes a waiver of 
AICPA’s rights under the copyright laws or any other Federal or State law.
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Installation of the Fraud prevention checklists CD-ROM
Installation: Open Word for Windows on your screen and insert the Fraud Prevention Checklists
CD-ROM into your computer’s CD-ROM drive (d or e). Go to the file button and select open (with disk 
drive d or e selected). A list of files and folders will appear. All Files or Word Documents should be 
selected in the dialog box. Select the file you want to open from one of the folders included in the CD- 
ROM. You can now work on the file you have selected.
There are 14 folders of material found on the CD-ROM: 
1. Chapter 1, Risk Management Checklist, 
2. Chapter 2, Ethical Environment Checklist, 
3. Chapter 3, Fraud Insurance Checklist, 
4. Chapter 4, Computer Security Checklists, 
5. Chapter 8, Computer Crime Checklists, 
6. Chapter 9, Dealing with a Known or Suspected Fraud Checklist, 
7. Chapter 10, Detection of Financial Statement Fraud Checklist, Sarbanes-Oxley Checklist, 
8. Chapter 11, Corporate Security Checklists, 
9. Chapter 12, Bankruptcy Fraud Checklist, 
10. Chapter 13, Procurement Fraud Checklist, 
11. Chapter 14, Detection of Personal Identity Theft and Corporate Identity Fraud Checklist, 
12. Appendix A, Industry Sector by Sector Checklists, 
13. Appendix B, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, 
14. Additional Fraud Resources.
Note on Fonts: The exhibits on the CD-ROM (with the exception of Exhibit A from Chapter 12, Appendix 
B: SAS 99, and Resource 3: AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework) were produced in Word for Windows 2000 
using True Type fonts. If you do not have this version of Word or this font library available, the exhibits 
may not convert correctly. You will have to substitute a different font and may have to replace/correct 
formatting that does not convert correctly.
PDF Documents: In order to view/use the Chapter 12 Exhibit A, Appendix B SAS 99, and the 
AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework material, you must have Adobe Acrobat Reader to view the portable 
document format (pdf) files. Go to www.adobe.com and download the Adobe Acrobat Reader following 
the Web site’s instructions. Once the Adobe Acrobat Reader is installed on your computer you can access 
the pdf files on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
Saving Files: You cannot overwrite the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. If you plan to continually 
use and update the checklist files with client or other information, use the Save As feature when saving a 
file with new information for the first time. Go to the File button and select Save As. Save the file selected 
under a new name that you will remember for later use. Direct the saved file to your hard drive or other 
location as appropriate for your needs.
As a general rule, remember to save your data frequently. If you use the Save function the first time you 
save your work, you will overwrite the template. This means that you will have to clean up your saved file 
to return it to its original format or reload the file from the CD-ROM again.
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Updating Letter—Supplement 6—2006
Statement Fraud”




2006 Supplement Pages 
(Chapter/Page)
Title Page Tide Page Tide Page
Table of Contents iii-viii iii-viii
Preface ix to xiv ix to xiv
Acknowledgments XV XV
About the Authors xvii to xxi xvii to xxi
Chapter 1: “Managing the Risk of Fraud” 1 to 32 1 to 38
Chapter 8: “Computer Crime, Computer 
Criminals, and Computer Evidence”
1 to 49 1 to 58
Chapter 10: “Reducing the Risk of Financial 1 to 115 1 to 121
NOTE: The 2006-2007 Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM, included with Supplement 6, replaces 
the 2005-2006 edition. The 2006-2007 edition updates and reorganizes files for quicker access and 
easier search, adds new “Resources,” including links to SAS 99 and related materials, and adds an 
overview of the AICPA Anitfraud & Corporate Responsibility Center and AICPA’s Audit 
Committee Effectiveness Center, including links to numerous additional resources on the Centers.
This completes the filing of Fraud Supplement Six.
Upon completion, insert this Update Letter behind the “Filing Instructions” tab card.
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Copyright © 2005 AICPA
All rights reserved.
LICENSE AGREEMENT
The Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM provided with The CPA’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial 
Crime Prevention contains electronic versions of the checklists and other materials found in the book. 
Subject to the conditions in this License Agreement and the Limited Warranty herein, you may duplicate 
the files on this disk and/or modify them as necessary for your internal use only.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by 
any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written 
permission the AICPA. Reproduction prohibitions do not apply to the checklists, forms, worksheets, 
sample correspondence, and any other sample documents contained in this product, when reproduced for 
personal use only. This material may NOT be reproduced for commercial exploitation, unless prior 
permission is obtained from the AICPA’s Copyright Permission Office.
Limited Warranty
AICPA warrants that the program will substantially conform to the published specifications and to the 
documentation, provided that it used on the computer hardware and with the operating system for which it 
was designed. AICPA also warrants that the magnetic media on which the program is distributed and the 
documentation are free from defects in materials and workmanship. AICPA will replace defective media at 
no charge, provided you return the item with the original packaging with the book to AICPA within 90 
days of the date of delivery.
Except as specifically provided above, AICPA makes no warranty or representation, either express or 
implied, with respect to this program or documentation.
In no event will AICPA be liable for direct, indirect, special incidental, or consequential damages arising 
out of the use of or inability to use the program or documentation, even if advised of the possibility of such 
damages. Specifically, AICPA is not responsible for any costs including, but not limited to, those incurred 
as result of lost profits or revenue, loss of use of the computer program, loss of data, the costs of recovering 
such programs or data, the cost of any substitute program, claims by third parties, or for other similar costs.
In no case shall AICPA’s liability exceed the amount of the license fee (ie: cost of product).
The warranty and remedies set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others, oral or written, express or 
implied. No AICPA dealer, distributor, agent, or employee is authorized to make any modification or 
addition to this warranty.
Some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of implied warranties or limitation for incidental or 
consequential damages, so the above limitation or exclusion may not apply to you. In the U.K., this 
warranty does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer.
General
The material on this CD-ROM is designed to provide information in regard to the subject matter covered 
and does not represent an official position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and is 
distributed with the understanding that the publisher, authors, and editors are not rendering legal, 
accounting, or other professional services on this CD-ROM. If legal advice or other expert assistance is 
required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.
AICPA retains all rights not expressly granted. Nothing in this License Agreement constitutes a waiver of 
AICPA’s rights under the copyright laws or any other Federal or State law.
Fraud Supp. 5—2005
Page 1 of 2
Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM Installation
Installation of the Fraud prevention checklists CD-ROM
Installation: Open Word for Windows on your screen and insert the Fraud Prevention Checklists
CD-ROM into your computer’s CD-ROM drive (d or e). Go to the file button and select open (with disk 
drive d or e selected). A list of files and folders will appear. All Files or Word Documents should be 
selected in the dialog box. Select the file you want to open from one of the folders included in the CD- 
ROM. You can now work on the file you have selected.
There are 5 folders of material found on the CD-ROM:
1. Fraud Chapter checklists folder,
2. Appendix A complete folder (text and checklists),
3. Sector-by-Sector checklists folder,
4. Other Handbook materials folder (includes Appendix B. SAS 99, Chapter 12 Exhibit A material, 
and other sample documents)
5. Additional Fraud Resources folder (includes “Ethics and Fraud In Business: Cases and 
Commentary,” Resource 1: “Implementing An Ethics Strategy,” Resource 2: “Designing An 
Ethics Training Program.” Resource 3: “the AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework (Including the 
AICPA/CICA Trust Services Privacy Principle and Criteria),” and Resource 4: “Evaluating the 
Independent Auditor: Questions to Consider”].
Note on Fonts: The exhibits on the CD-ROM (with the exception of Exhibit A from Chapter 12, Appendix 
B: SAS 99, and Resource 3: AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework) were produced in Word for Windows 2000 
using True Type fonts. If you do not have this version of Word or this font library available, the exhibits 
may not convert correctly. You will have to substitute a different font and may have to replace/correct 
formatting that does not convert correctly.
PDF Documents: In order to view/use the Chapter 12 Exhibit A, Appendix B SAS 99, and the 
AICPA/CICA Privacy Framework material, you must have Adobe Acrobat Reader to view the portable 
document format (pdf) files. Go to www.adohe.com and download the Adobe Acrobat Reader following 
the Web site’s instructions. Once the Adobe Acrobat Reader is installed on your computer you can access 
the pdf files on the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM.
Saving Files: You cannot overwrite the Fraud Prevention Checklists CD-ROM. If you plan to continually 
use and update the checklist files with client or other information, use the Save As feature when saving a 
file with new information for the first time. Go to the File button and select Save As. Save the file selected 
under a new name that you will remember for later use. Direct the saved file to your hard drive or other 
location as appropriate for your needs.
As a general rule, remember to save your data frequently. If you use the Save function the first time you 
save your work, you will overwrite the template. This means that you will have to clean up your saved file 
to return it to its original format or reload the file from the CD-ROM again.
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